Judgement Land Appeal No

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT MOSHI LAND APPEAL NO. 17978 OF 2024 (C/F Application No. 170 of 2024 in the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Moshi at Moshi) ESCARY FANDI NDOSSI………………. ..................................APPELLANT VERSUS JAMES JOSEPH MKOJERA….……………………….....….....RESPONDENT JUDGEMENT 30th October & 05th December, 2024 MONGELLA, J. Before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Moshi (hereinafter, the Tribunal), the appellant sued the respondent over 3,750 square meters of land located at Karamsingi area at South Kirua Ward within Uchira village and Mushi Rural district (hereinafter, the suit land). The land is bordered on the North at 75 metres by one Salvatory Remi Kundi; the South at 75 metres by one Philipo Mkojera and Maria Kidaisho; on the East at 50 metres by a trench ‘Korongo’ and one Njau and; on the West at 50 metres by a pass way. The suit land was by then valued at TZS. 52,000,000/-. Page 1 of 21 At the Tribunal, the appellant alleged being the owner of the suit land having being allocated the same by Uchira village on 20.11.1989 and paid appropriate fees thereto. He alleged that since he had no enough money to construct a house, he only cleared the land and used it to graze his goats and cultivate seasonal crops. He further alleged to have marked boundaries on the suit land and in the year 2006 he started constructing a house whereby he constructed a foundation for one room. He further claimed to have enjoyed peaceful ownership of the suit land until 16.10.2020 when he was informed that the respondent had invaded the land whereby, he was wildly cutting trees and painting the boundary stones on ground of inheriting the land from his deceased father. Upon failure to amicably resolve the issue, the appellant decided to lodge a complaint at the police station on criminal trespass. He was however advised to file a land matter at the Tribunal as it seemed the dispute was based on ownership of land. He thus filed Application No. 170 of 2020 before the Tribunal praying, among other reliefs, to be declared the lawful owner of the suit land and for permanent injunction to be issued against the respondent. The respondent’s case was to the effect that: he was given the suit in 1996 by his father one Mzee Joseph Paul Mkojera who passed away in 1999. That, he was given the land in the presence of one Samson Mkwe, a member in the village authority. That, thereafter he put someone to uproot the stumps. He claimed to have left for Dar es Salaam and used to come back to check the land whereby Page 2 of 21 at one point he came back and found a one-room foundation constructed on the suit land. To prove his case, the appellant testified as SM1 and tendered one document admitted as Exhibit P1. He also paraded 4 witnesses being; SM2, one Maalim Kileo; SM3, one Eliewacha Julius Mdee and; SM4, one Patrice Agusti Tarimo. In defence the respondent testified as SU1 and tendered 4 documents admitted as Exhibit R1, R2, R3 and R4. He also paraded 3 witnesses to wit: SU2, one Jeofrey Victor Mlay; SU3, one Demetria Njau and SU4, one Emmanuel Sempeo. Upon hearing both parties, the Tribunal found the appellant had failed to establish his claim, thus dismissed his suit without costs. Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal on the following grounds: 1. That, the Hon. Chairman erred in both law and fact as he ignored the fact that the Respondent was not the estate administrator of his late father, Joseph Mkojera, as it was clearly submitted. (sic) 2. That, the Hon. Chairman erred in both law and fact he wrongly admitted the 'kielelezo R4', while the Respondent had no mandate. (sic) 3. That, the Hon. Chairman erred in both law and fact as he delivered the wrong Judgment against the Appellant by Page 3 of 21 relying on the Respondent's mis-leaded facts and cooked witnesses and failed to regard the Appellant's strong arguments and reliable witnesses. (sic) 4. That, the Hon. Chairman erred in both law and fact as he failed the Appellant's Suitland boundaries and neighborhood as against those of the Respondent. (sic) 5. That, the Hon. Chairman and the Tribunal Assessors erred in both law and fact as they together failed to direct the Tribunal in delivering the Justice to the Appellant. (sic) 6. That, the entire Trial decision is bad in law for the Hon. Chairman, erred in both law and fact as he failed to give any good reason for the Tribunal's decision. (sic) The appeal was resolved by written submissions whereby the appellant was represented by Mr. Julius Semali while the respondent was unrepresented. Submitting in chief, on the 1st ground, Mr. Semali challenged the locus standi of the respondent in the matter. He averred that the respondent was not the administrator of the estate of the late Joseph Mkojera and therefore could not claim that the suit land belongs to him while the process to appoint the administrator was not done. He further challenged the respondent’s claim of being given the land by his father on the ground that there was no proof to that effect. In the premises, he had the stance that the person Page 4 of 21 that ought to have claimed ownership was the late Joseph Mkojera himself and not the respondent. In proving the appellant’s ownership over the suit land, he contended that the appellant owned the suit land since 1989 and in 2006 he started constructing a house in the suit land. That, in 2020, the appellant was informed that the respondent had trespassed on the suit land. Mr. Semali concluded on this ground by stressing that the Tribunal Chairman misdirected himself in declaring the respondent the rightful owner while there was no any probate process in which the respondent was bequeathed the suit land. Addressing the 2nd ground, Mr. Semali averred that since the respondent was not the owner of the suit land, he was not competent to tender Exhibit R4, a receipt indicating proof of payment of building Karamsingi allegedly issued to the late Joseph Mkojera. He alleged that no foundation was laid down to show how he came into possession of the exhibit. The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th grounds were argued collectively. On these grounds, Mr. Semali submitted that the respondent presented a testimony that contradicted that of his witnesses as he even failed to identify the neighbours surrounding the suit land. He further challenged the said exhibit and the Tribunal’s reliance on the same on the ground that the exhibit did not specifically state the description of the suit land. He referred the Court to the case of Daniel Kanunda (As Administrator of the Estate of the late Mbalu Kashasha Bundu vs. Masaka Ibeho and 4 Others, Land Appeal No. Page 5 of 21 26 of 2015 High Court of Tanzania at Tabora (unreported), in which it was stated that specific demarcations are what differentiate one piece of land from another. In his view, in the absence of such description the Tribunal ought to have visited the locus in quo to satisfy itself on the boundaries. He supported his averment on visit to the locus in quo with the case of Kimonidimitri Mantheakis vs. Ally Azim Dewji & Others (Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2018) [2021] TZCA 663 (3 November 2021). Further, in relation to the 3rd and 5th grounds, Mr. Semali alleged that the trial Chairman erred in appreciating and according weight to the respondent’s evidence while the same was hearsay. He argued that apart from the evidence of SU4 contradicting that of other witnesses, the testimonies of SU2, SU3 and SU5 were all based on information supplied to them by other persons, especially during cross examination. Arguing on the legal position regarding hearsay evidence, Mr. Semali contended that it is a well-known principle that hearsay evidence is not to be accorded weight. He supported his position with the case of Leopold Mutembei vs. Principle Assistant Registrar of Titles, Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development & Another (Civil Appeal 57 of 2017) [2018] TZCA TANZLII. Considering his arguments, the learned Counsel concluded that the appellant’s evidence was heavier than that of the respondent. He added that the appellant proved his case on balance of probabilities, thus should have been declared the lawful owner of the suit land. He referred the case of Charles Richard Kombe t/a Page 6 of 21 Building vs. Evarani Mtungi and 2 Others (Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2012) [2017] TZCA 153 (24 March 2017) TANZLII on the settled law on balance of proof in civil cases. Mr. Semali finalized his submission by praying for this Court to quash and set aside the judgement and decree of the trial Tribunal with costs and declare the appellant the rightful owner of the suit land. The appeal did not go unopposed. In his reply to the 1st ground, the respondent challenged the ground for raising a new issue that did not transpire during trial. He averred that the appellant did not raise the concern about him not being the administrator of estate of the late Joseph Mkojera at the trial Tribunal. Without prejudice to such argument, he went on to challenge the appellant’s argument contending that the same was unfounded and an afterthought. He argued so saying that he never claimed the suit land belonging to the deceased, but rather being given the same by his father, the late Joseph Paul Mkojera. He further expounded that in his pleadings and evidence, he had stated that he was allocated the suit land by his father the late Jospeh Paul Mkojera in 1996 when he was still alive. He said that he even narrated the incident on how the suit land came into his possession during his cross examination. That, the trial Tribunal was satisfied that he was allocated the suit land by his deceased father before his demise and there is nowhere the trial Ttribunal declared the suit land belonging to the late Joseph Mkojera. Page 7 of 21 The respondent further argued that even if the suit land belonged to the deceased, both parties agree in pleadings and evidence adduced as well as their submissions in this appeal that he is the son of the late Joseph Mkojera. In his view, being the son of the deceased, he is an interested party, thus has a right to appear in the suit. He supported such averment with the case of Samson Mwambene vs. Edson James Mwanyingili [2001] TLR 4-5. On the 2nd ground, the respondent countered that when Exhibit R4 was tendered and admitted on 22.02.2024, the appellant never objected on the same. He further challenged the appellant for failure to cross examine the respondent on his competence to tender the exhibit. That, the only question posed by the appellant was in relation to the name of one Samson Mkwe appearing on the said Exhibit. Referring the legal position, he contended that it was settled law that failure to object the admissibility of an exhibit and or cross examine a witness on a vital document implies acceptance of the facts contained therein. He fortified his argument with the case of Hamis Amri Idd vs. Mohamed O. Mandwanga (Misc. Land Appeal 16 of 2022) [2022] TZHCLandD 384 (30 May 2022) TANZLII. Further, referring to Section 34C (1) (a)(i) and (2) (a) and (3) of the Evidence Act [Cap 06 RE 2022], he held the stance that he was a competent witness to tender the exhibit. He argued so on the ground that he had personal knowledge of the exhibit as he was allocated the suit land by his late father. He added that since he was allocated the suit land, a fact he narrated on, he was the Page 8 of 21 custodian of the exhibit as it related to ownership of the suit land. With regard to the said Samson Mkwe who appeared on the said document, he alleged that he sufficiently explained in cross examination that the said person was too old to appear before the Tribunal to testify. The respondent went on to reply on the appellant’s submission on the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th grounds. Starting with the issue of description of the suit land, he argued that the appellant could not be declared the owner for merely stating the boundaries and that the description of the suit land was never disputed by him. He added that his evidence and that of the appellant are in agreement on the size of the suit land which is located at Karamsingi, Uchira village. He further challenged that the issue regarding variance in the description of the land was also never raised in the pleadings as to render the same one of the issues in dispute necessitating the visit of the locus in quo. In this vein, the respondent found the case of Daniel Kanunda (supra) distinguished from the present circumstances as there was no dispute over description of the suit land. Reacting to the assertion on contradiction among his witnesses, the respondent challenged the appellant for failure to point out the specific contradictions by the alleged respondent’s witnesses. Concerning the allegation that the decision of the Tribunal was founded on hearsay evidence; the respondent contended that the Tribunal upon comparing Exhibit P1 and R4 found that the latter Page 9 of 21 carried more weight as the respondent’s father was the first person allocated the suit land in 1986, unlike the appellant’s father who was allegedly allocated the land in 1989. Further, he argued that the Tribunal found that the appellant’s witnesses proved to have been sent to work on the suit land, but had no knowledge of its location and how the same came into ownership of the appellant. In addition, he contended that he brought witnesses who were neighbours to the suit land who explained how the suit land came into his possession. Considering the oral evidence by his witnesses, the respondent reiterated his stance that his evidence had more weight compared to that of the appellant. He finalized his submission by praying for the appeal to be dismissed with costs for want of merit. I have considered the rival submissions of both parties as well as the record of the trial Tribunal. Like the parties, I will independently resolve the 1st and 2nd grounds and collectively resolve the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th grounds of appeal. Starting with the 1st ground, the appellant contended that the respondent was not the administrator of the estate of the late Joseph Paul Mkojera, thus could not claim to own the suit land. Further, that the respondent failed to establish that he was given the said land and, in the circumstances, it was the late Mkojera who ought to have claimed the said land. The respondent countered the same with the assertion that he had pleaded and testified to Page 10 of 21 have been given the suit land by his late father while he was still alive. I must say that I find the appellant’s claim regarding the respondent not being an administrator of the deceased’s estate rather absurd. This is because in this matter, it was not the respondent that preferred the case, but the appellant himself. As demonstrated in his Application before the Tribunal, the appellant preferred the matter owing to allegedly trespass into the suit land by the respondent. In his written statement of defence, the respondent only claimed to be a bonafide purchaser. he did not plead to have inherited the suit land nor claimed ownership over the same. In those bases, this ground is found to lack merit. With respect to the 2nd ground, the appellant challenged admission of Exhibit R4 on the ground that the respondent was not competent to tender the exhibit. On his par, the respondent contended that being the owner of the suit land and the custodian of the exhibit, he was competent to tender the same. The Evidence Act provides for parties competent to tender exhibits in certain circumstances. The Exhibit Management Guidelines, 2020 which guide courts as to the entire process on admissibility of exhibits has named the following people as competent to tender exhibits being; the maker or author of a document; a person who at one point in time possessed anything subject of the trial; custodian of an exhibit; actual owner; addressee; arresting, searching or investigating officer; or an officer from a corporate Page 11 of 21 entity to which an exhibit relates and any person with knowledge of the exhibit. See also; Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Kristina D.O Biskasevskaja (Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 2016) [2017] TZCA 278 (11 August 2017) and; Thomas Ernest Msungu @ Nyoka Mkenya vs. Republic (Criminal Appeal 78 of 2012) [2013] TZCA 440 (18 June 2013) (both from TANZLII). Considering the respondent’s claim of ownership over the suit land through gift inter vivos, I am of the view that he was in the position to know about the suit land he allegedly claimed to own. In the circumstances, he had personal knowledge of the suit land, which renders him competent to tender the exhibit. This ground is also without merit. The 3rd ,4th, 5th and 6th grounds of appeal have a common factor. They all challenge the evaluation of evidence by the Tribunal, but on diverse aspects. Considering their nature, I find it prudent to summarize the evidence adduced by both sides prior to resolving the issues therein. As initially indicated at the beginning of this judgement, the appellant stood as the first witness on his case and paraded three more witnesses; SM2, SM3 and SM4. The appellant’s evidence was to effect that he was allocated the suit land by Uchira village way back in 1989. He claimed to have paid for the land as required and tendered the receipt on the said payment. The receipt indicated payment of TZS. 1000/- issued on 15.07.1989. The same was admitted as Exhibit P1. He further alleged that he could not Page 12 of 21 develop the suit land at first thus cultivated maize and beans on the land. That, in 2006 he constructed a one-room foundation on the suit land. That, 2020, he receiving information that the respondent had painted the border marks and cut trees in the suit land claiming the same belonged to his father. He further testified that he reported the issue to the police and the respondent was called whereby he maintained that the suit land belonged to his father. He added that after unsuccessfully trying to resolve the dispute through one Samuel Mdee, who was close to the respondent’s family, he decided to file the matter in the Tribunal. SM2, testified to have been the Village Secretary of Uchira from 1987 to 1990. He stated that the appellant was one of the villagers allocated land and the said land was the suit land. SM3, testified to have been born at Uchira village and that he was the hamlet chairman of Uchira Kati Juu since 2015. He alleged that even prior to his appointment as hamlet Chairman, he saw the appellant tending to the suit land. Further that, in 2018 he supervised the digging of a trench for accessing water and the appellant was among those who dug the said trench. He alleged that in 2020, the respondent came to the office claiming that his land was trespassed and he told him to search for the appellant as he was the owner of the suit land. SM4’s testified not knowing who between the parties was the rightful owner of the suit land. He said that such fact could only be Page 13 of 21 known by the village leaders. However, he averred that the appellant, in the year 1999, gave him money to work on the suit land in three months. He claimed to have cultivated maize and beans on the suit land and while performing such tasks no one intervened to prevent him from doing so. On the other hand, the respondent’s testimony was to the effect that in 1996, his father, the late Joseph Paul Mkojera took him and one Samson Mkwe to the area he was allocated by Uchira village. He was shown the boundaries of the suit land and they employed a person to uproot stumps. He said that he lived in Dar es Salaam and visited the suit land when he came to Moshi. He added that his father demised in 1999 and after several years, he came to the suit land and found a small foundation established. Seeing that he reported the matter to the village government. That, in 2015, the village went to observe the foundation. They searched for the responsible person to no avail. The village authority then issued a notice. The said notice was admitted as Exhibit R1. The respondent further alleged that after the said notice was issued, nothing transpired. That, after a long period of time, he found beacons dividing the suit land into 20 x 20 paces and trees about three days old that were irrigated. He said that he went back to inform the village authority which again visited the suit land. The letter allegedly witnessing the said visit was admitted as Exhibit R2. He added that his family then wrote a letter informing the village authority on the trespass. He was required to submit proof of ownership whereby he submitted a receipt of payment issued on Page 14 of 21 24.10.1986. This was admitted as Exhibit R4. That, eventually, the suit land was handed over to him. SU2 testified that the suit land bordered his uncle (baba Mkubwa) one Patrick Issa Mlay. He claimed that since childhood, he saw the late Joseph Paul Mkojera cultivating crops and excavating stones. That, upon demise of his uncle and late Joseph Paul Mkojera their other farms around the suit land were invaded. He said that they tried resolving the dispute and eventually the trespassers left. He alleged that the respondent learnt late on the suit land being invaded. He confirmed on a notice being issued when the respondent learnt of the trespass and that they tried to amicably resolve the issue to no avail. SU3 alleged to border the respondent whereby their lands are separated by a valley. She claimed to have resided in her land since being married in 1977, but has never seen the appellant in the suit land. In cross examination she changed her statement alleging that her land was far from the suit land. SU4 alleged that the land he inherited from his mother bordered the suit land which belongs to the respondent. He claimed that the respondent had inherited the suit land from his father. He admitted not knowing how the respondent came into possession of the suit land, but was only informed on the same. It is trite law that the standard of proof in civil cases is on balance of probabilities. This is well stipulated under Section 3 (2) (b) of the Page 15 of 21 Evidence Act. In this standard, the Court is to weigh the evidence of the parties against each other and then make its findings basing on the evidence that hold more weight. See; Paulina Samson Ndawavya vs. Theresia Thomasi Madaha (Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 453 (11 December 2019). The claimant bears the first burden to prove his case as the law is settled that the one who alleges must prove. See, Sections 110 and 111 of the Evidence Act. Emphasizing on this legal position, the Court of Appeal in the case of Maria Amandus Kavishe vs. Norah Waziri Mzeru & Another (Civil Appeal No. 365 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 31 (20 February 2023) stated: “It is a cherished principle of law that, generally in civil cases, the burden of proof lies on the person who alleges anything in his or her favour. This is the essence of the provisions of sections 110 (1), (2) and 111 of the Evidence Act. It is equally elementary that, since in this appeal the dispute between the parties was of civil nature, the standard of proof was on a balance of probabilities, which simply means that the court will sustain such evidence which is more credible than the other on a particular fact to be proved.” See also: Amos Njile Lili vs. Nyanza Cooperative Union (1994) Ltd & Others (Civil Appeal No. 126 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 13 (31 January 2024); Anthony M. Masanga vs. Penina (Mama Mgesi) and Another (Civil Appeal No. 118 of 2014) [2015] TZCA 556 (18 March 2015) and Jambo Foods Products Co. Limited vs. Hassan Hussein Musa and Another (Civil Appeal No. 454 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1116 (15 November 2024), all from TANZLII. Page 16 of 21 The law is settled that the first appellate court has the discretion and duty to re-evaluate the evidence of the trial court and make its own findings, if any. This was well stated in the case of in Siza Patrice vs. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2010 CAT (unreported) in which the Court of Appeal held: “We understand that it is settled law that a first appeal is in the form of a rehearing. The first appellate court has a duty to re-evaluate the entire evidence in an objective manner and arrive at its own findings of fact, if necessary." See also, Registered Trustees of Joy in the Harvest vs. Hamza K. Sungura (Civil Appeal 149 of 2017) [2021] TZCA 139 TANZLII. Upon observing the evidence adduced by both parties, I am of view that the appellant’s evidence held more weight compared to that of the respondent. I argue so because, the appellant successfully established that he obtained the suit land through being allocated the same by the village authority in 1989, a fact well witnessed by SM2 who was the VEO from 1987 to 1990. SM2 witnessed his use of land as well as SM3 who has been the Uchira Hamlet Chairman from 2015 to date. SM4 testified to have tended to the land by removing stumps in 1990 and even cultivating on the suit land. While indeed it was questionable on why SM4 did not know the neighbours to the suit land, still compared to the respondent, the appellant was able to demonstrate his presence at the suit land since 1989 to date of the alleged trespass. Page 17 of 21 The respondent’s evidence was faulty in multiple areas. First, in his written statement of defence he alleged that he was a bonafide purchaser. To support his averment, he annexed what was later admitted as Exhibit R4. In his testimony he alleged he was given the suit land by his father way back in 1996. In cross examination, he averred that the suit land was allocated to him and his late father Joseph Paul Mkojera. However, Exhibit R4, a receipt issued on 24.10.1986, reflected the payer being one Josefu Pauli Mkojere alone. Thus, his testimony was at variance with his pleadings. Second, while the respondent alleged to have been given the suit land by his father, his evidence reflected that he was not given the said land. I argue so because Exhibit R1, R2 and R3, all address the suit land as being the deceased’s and commonly identified the same as belonging to deceased’s family. This fact was also brought about by SU2 and SU3. This suggests that the suit land was never handed over to the respondent as he had alleged. Thirdly, the evidence by the respondent’s witnesses reflects a possibility that the late Mkojera was never in possession of the suit land. Apart from Exhibit R4 which reflects payment being made by one Josefu Pauli Mkojere, there was no further evidence to show that the said deceased was in possession of the suit land or that after his demise, the suit land was in the respondent’s possession. SU2 alleged that his uncle one Patrick Issa Mlay was the late Mkojere’s neighbour in the Northen part. However, none of the mentioned border neighbours goes by such name. Even though he alleged his uncle had demised, he did not state the person that Page 18 of 21 inherited the land. This raises concern on whether such details pertained to the suit land or some other land. SU3 who testified to have been an actual neighbour to the suit land later admitted in cross examination that she was living far from the suit land, thus unaware on who was using the suit land. Although she stated the same to have belonged to the late Mkojera, and the respondent to have tended to it; with her own proof that her land was distant from that of the respondent, there is no telling whether she saw any of such events. It is strange that she resided in such place but did not know any of the names of the bordering neighbours to the suit land despite allegedly knowing them. SU4’s testimony was that of comradeship whose foundation is allegedly the dispute over the suit land. He only knew the respondent as they both found themselves battling trespassers to their lands. While he also disclosed to have inherited a piece of land from his mother who was a neighbour to the suit land, the record reflects that he never disclosed the name of his mother, and never even stated any name of any neighbour to the suit land. On record, it appears that the respondent claimed to have followed up on the suit land. The only traces appear in 2015 where a notice (Exhibit R1) which was issued by his family and the village warning against anyone selling the land or trespassing. The other evidence was allegedly a letter on visit being made by the village authority, admitted as Exhibit R2. Exhibit R2, is in no means a letter, the same appears as a report, in fact, a mere passage without any Page 19 of 21 disclosed author. The same is at the end vetted by the VEO. The information displayed is way unclear to facilitate understanding of the context from which it is founded. On the other hand, Exhibit R3 is a mere letter by one Jenes Mkojera in which he/she informs the village authority on trespass of land owned by the family of the late Joseph Mkojera’s land, but does not specify which exact piece of land it was. Exhibit R4 reflects the late Joseph Mkojera being allocated a piece of land in 1986. However, the respondent failed to establish that the suit land was the said land. In addition, even his description of the suit land was faulty. The East and South borders as he described were somewhat the same save for not including one Njau at the East and one Philip Mkojera at the South. However, in the North there was one Wilbard Msoffe and the West there was one Maria Kidaisho. Even if there were no conflicts on the suit land, being the land in dispute, the variance in description which he did not contest in his written statement of defence should have been explained. As observed hereinabove, indeed the appellant’s evidence held more weight compared to that of the respondent rendering him deserving to be declared the rightful owner. In those premises, I hereby quash the trial Tribunal Judgement and set aside all resultant orders. As the appellant also sought for reliefs deemed fit by this Court; I declare the appellant the lawful owner of the suit land. A permanent injunction is hereby issued against the respondent and his agents from interfering in any way with the suit Page 20 of 21 land. The appeal is therefore allowed, with costs to be borne by the respondent. Dated and delivered at Moshi on this 05th day of December, 2024. X L. M. MONGELLA JUDGE Signed by: L. M. MONGELLA Page 21 of 21