exim bank tanzanialtd vs five b hotels tours ltd cons commercial reference no1619 2023 tzhccomd 107 6 april 2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) AT DAR ES SALAAM CONSOLIDATED COMMERCIAL REFERENCE NO. 16 & 19 OF 2022 (ARISING FROM TAXATION CAUSE NO. 86 & 100 OF 2022 ORIGINATING FROM COMMERCIAL CASE NO. 109 OF 2016) EXIM BANK (TANZANIA) LTD. …………..………….………..……….….. APPLICANT VERSUS M & FIVE B HOTELS & TOURS LTD. ………………….………...……… RESPONDENT RULING Date of last order:31/03/2023 Date of ruling:06/04/2023 AGATHO,J.: This ruling dealt with the following major issues: existence of two taxation causes with respect of the same suit; a question as to how instruction fee should be taxed where costs have been awarded to two advocates; requirement of certification where costs is to be awarded to two or more advocates; the application of taxation principles; and status of taxation cause where there is notice of appeal. Some of these issues are novel and hence the court makes the interpretation of the Advocates Remuneration Order, G.N. 264 of 2015 to give effect to the spirit of that law. The ruling stems from two references (No. 16 and 19 of 2022) filed by the Applicant against the decisions of taxing officers in taxation causes No. 86 and 100 of 2022. While reference No. 19 was assigned to me, the reference No. 16 was assigned to learned Judge Dr Nangela. Later and owing 1 to the connection between the references, the commercial reference No. 16 was re-assigned to me. To resolve the issues raised by the two linked references it was sought fair and just to consolidate them. The parties were summoned and informed on the consolidation. They did not have any objection. These two reference applications were thus consolidated because they are against the taxation causes that stem from the same suit, that is Commercia Case No. 109 of 2016. The Applicant is applying for orders that the Court be pleased to set aside or quash the ruling of the Taxing Master in respect of Taxation Cause No. 86 and 100 of 2022 dated 08/09/2022, and that the court be pleased to grant any other or further orders as it thinks just and convenient in the circumstances of the case. And finally, costs be provided for. The grounds for reference application No. 100 were: (i) That the Taxing officer erred in law and committed a fundamental error of illegality by continuing with Taxation Cause No. 100 of 2022 on 31/08/2022 and awarded the sum of TZS 161,440,000.00 on 08/09/2022 while she was aware that there was Taxation Cause No. 86 of 2022 which was based on the same Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 which was before another taxing officer and came for ruling on the same day in the afternoon. (ii) The awarded amount of TZS 150,000,000.00 as instruction fees under the bill of costs is highly excessive and the taxing officer did not take into account all the principles of awarding costs in taxation of costs. 2 (iii) The taxing officer never addressed the important ground raised by the Applicant’s submission in that there is an appeal which is still pending in the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, whereby the Applicant had filed a notice of intention to appeal against while decision of the High Court Commercial Division in Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 on 21/06/2022, in which the order of this Court which awarded costs is subject of the said appeal. (iv) There was no justification for awarding TZS 150,000,000.00 as instruction fee under item 1 of the Bill of Costs. (v) That the taxing officer did not take the submission made by counsel during the hearing into account while awarding the said costs by her ruling dated 08/09/2022. The grounds for reference No. 86 of 2022 were: (i) The awarded amount of TZS 190, 731, 687.00 as instruction fees under item 1 of the Bill of Costs is highly excessive and the taxing officer did not take into account all the principles of awarding costs in taxation of costs. (ii) The Taxing officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the bill of costs and tax it on 31/08/2022 because, there is an appeal which is still pending in the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, whereby the Applicant had filed notice of intention to appeal against the whole decision of the High Court in Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 on21/06/2022, in which the order of this Court which awarded costs is subject of the said appeal. 3 (iii) There was no justification for awarding TZS 193,311, 687.00 as instruction fee under item 1 of the Bill of costs; (iv) That the taxing officer did not take the submission made by the counsel during the hearing into account when awarding the said costs by her ruling on 31/08/2022. (v) The taxing officer also erred in law because the taxation is not arithmetic exercise as done but taxation must be exercised judiciously based on the principles governing taxation of bill of costs. Briefly, the grounds are that the taxing officer erred for wrongly applying the taxation principles, the instruction fee was exorbitant and excessive, the taxing officer had no jurisdiction, and she did not consider the submission of the applicant’s counsel that there was notice of appeal. As mentioned earlier, there were two taxation causes: No. 86 of 2022 whose reference was No. 16 of 2022. This was prosecuted by FK Law Chambers (Sauli Santu, Advocate) and Locus Attorneys (John Laswai, Advocate). And Taxation Cause No. 100, whose reference was No. 19. The advocates were Miriam Bachuba for the applicant and Mpaya Kamara for the respondent). While the hearing of reference No. 16 was conducted by way of written submissions, that of No. 100 was conducted orally. Both taxation causes were in respect to Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016. The question is whether it was proper to entertain two taxation causes? The records show that the taxing officer in Taxation Cause No. 100 was informed that there is another taxation cause emanating from the Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 which is before another taxing officer in this very court. This in my view 4 ought to have been given due regard by the taxing officer. I find merit in this ground. Besides that, the issue of instruction fee being charged under wrong provision of the law that is whether the taxing officer erred in taxing the instruction fees under the 9th schedule surfaced in both references No. 16 and No.19. In taxation Cause No. 100, the taxing officer allowed TZS 150, 000,000/= as instruction fee where she slightly reduced the amount 186,846,252/= which is 3% of the amount claimed in the main suit. That is on item 8 of the 9th schedule to the Advocate Remuneration Order. This is also raised by the applicant in reference No. 16 against taxation cause No. 86 that the instruction fee of TZS 190,731,687 out of 228,518, 900 TZS as 3% of TZS 6,357,722,900/= the amount claimed is excessive and wrong provision of law was applied that is item 8 of the Nineth Schedule of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The latter schedule provides for scales applicable to contentious proceedings for liquidated sum. The applicant contends that the matter was not a contentious proceeding for liquidated sum. Herein below we explore this. Both in Reference No. 16 and 19 of 2022 one of major issues is whether the 9th schedule applies. It is common ground that the said schedule is for contentious proceedings for liquidated sum in original and appellate jurisdiction. The term liquidated sum is not defined in our laws. But it has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 8th edition to mean “of an amount or debt settled or determined especially by agreement.” It means that as an ascertained amount/quantity of money as held in Well worth Hotels and 5 Lodges Limited vs East Africa Canvas Company Limited & 4 Others, Taxation Reference No. 5 of 2022 page 4. As shown by the judgment attached to the present application that the Applicant (the Plaintiff) filed Commercial Case No. 109 of 2019 seeking for declaration that the Respondent (Defendant)/ among others breached the loan facility agreement and payment of outstanding of USD 2,878,100. With respect, I disagree with the view of Ms. Miriam Bachuba (in reference No. 19), and Mr. Sauli Santu (in reference No. 16) the Applicant’s counsel that the claim of USD 2,878,100 was not ascertained, the agreed sum or fixed by the parties under the loan facility agreement but rather an outstanding sum constituting of the principal amount and interest which was subject to proof. I am humbly viewing that as a misconception to regard the claim for loan recovery or an outstanding amount constituting the principal sum and interest not a claim for a liquated sum. Under section 74 (1) of Law of contract Act [Cap 345 R.E. 2019], the liquidated sum is a known sum of money. It is a sum fixed on a contract, or certainly loan amount and the repayment sum plus interest these are set out in the credit facility agreement. It is therefore wrong to contend that the said amount is unknown or not fixed. In practice the bank gives the loan beneficially a payment schedule which shows the amount to be repaid and interest. The amount stated is part of the credit facility agreement. Without sugarcoating that is a liquidated sum, envisioned in the 9th schedule of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The issue of proof cannot change that stand. After all, the 9th schedule uses the words contentious proceedings. These words connote a need for proof 6 even for a claim for liquidated or ascertained sum. The latter claim does not mean a claim without proof. See Section 110 of the Evidence Act [Cap 6 R.E. 2019]. Any case brought before the court of law is subject to proof unless it is admitted by the opposite party. In which case judgment on admission will be pronounced. I am settled in my view that Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 was for liquidated sum. Therefore, 10th, 11th, and 12th schedules to the Advocate Remuneration Order are not applicable. What the applicant is forgetting is that contentious proceedings can be for liquidated sum or otherwise. The 9th schedule is dedicated to the contentious proceedings for liquidated sum. Hence, I find Amos Njile Lili’s case may be of relevancy. I think the view of the learned counsel for the Applicant was based on wrong understanding of the concept liquidated sum. Even by stretch of imagination the definition of liquidated sum given in Wellworth’s case (supra) cannot change the reality that the present case is for liquidated sum. Therefore, the suggestion that item 1 (d) of the 11th schedule dealing with instruction fee for suit when proceedings are defended or to defend such proceedings are such sum as the taxing officer considered reasonable but not less than TZS 1,000,000 is not applicable to the case at hand. That is because the present case Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016 was for liquidated sum. The amount was specified in the credit facility agreement. The fact that the claim is for liquidated sum does not mean that it is not subject to proof. Claims brought before the court be it for liquidated or unliquidated sum are subject to proof. It is trite law that every fact in issue requires proof. That is elementary in Evidence Law. 7 The taxing officers therefore were correct to rule that the suit was a contentious proceeding for a liquidated sum in original jurisdiction. They rightly noted that the applicable scale is item 8 of the 9th schedule for the Advocates Remuneration Order. The taxing officer in taxation cause No. 100 applied the said reasoning property and held that the amount claimed was USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/= whose 3% as instruction fee is TZS 190,731,687/= but she awarded TZS 161,440,000/=. Similarly, in reference No. 16 the taxing officer charged TZS 190,731,687/= as instruction fee which is 3% of TZS 6,357,722,900/= the amount claimed in the suit. The taxing officer in her ruling (see page 4-5 of the ruling) rightly stated that the suit was complex and it took more than 5 years to be finalized from 2016 to 10/06/2022. She cited a case of ECO Bank Tanzania Limited v Double Company Limited and Others, Commercial Reference No. 02 of 2020, HCCD in which factors to be considered in awarding instruction fees were restated to include: the suit amount, the nature of subject matter, complexity of the suit, time taken for hearing, extent of research involved, parties’ general behaviour and facilitation of expeditious disposal of the case, public policy by ensuring that allowable court, that litigation should be affordable, and maintenance of consistency in quantum of costs allowable. These principles are not in contradiction to what was held in George Mbuguzi & Another v A.S. Maskini [1980] TLR 53 or in the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162. The taxing officer further referred to the case of Mollel Electric Contractors Limited v Mantrac Tanzania Limited, Civil Reference No. 05 of 2020 HCCD in which observance and abiding to the scales in the schedules to the Advocates Remuneration Order 8 was emphasized. I have no reason to query their decisions which properly applied taxation principles. Another point worth examination is the allegation that the taxing officer, erred in entertaining the Taxation Cause No. 100 while she was aware or informed that there is another taxation cause No. 86 of 2022 before another Deputy Registrar both based on Commercial Cause No. 109 of 2016 is with substance. My perusal of proceedings in Taxation Cause No. 100 shows that the issue of existence of the two taxation causes was brought to the attention of the taxing officer. These taxation causes are intertwined, luckily the Applicant’s counsel informed the taxing officers in Taxation Cause No. 100. The submission that the existence of two taxation causes were brought to Hon. Deputy Registrar as taxing officer is thus true. This ground therefore has merit. Turning to the issue of certification of costs to two advocates, this is equally worth examination. The Applicant’s counsel has attacked the award of costs to two advocates that it was without certification from the trial judge. But the judge ordered that “the suit is dismissed with costs to two advocates.” Frankly, the issue of certificate is provided for under Order 49 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, GN No. 264 of 2015. It deals with circumstance where a certificate may be issued and content of the said certificate. The order 49 reads as follows: “The costs of more than one advocate may be allowed in cases or matters in which the judge at the trial, in the case of a plaintiff, having regard to the amount recovered or paid in settlement or the relief awarded or the nature, importance 9 or difficulty of the case and, in case of the defendant having regard to the amount sued for or the relief claimed, or nature, importance or difficulty of the case has certified under his hand that more than one advocate was reasonable and proper, and such certificate may be granted in respect of two members or employees of the same firm.” It is true that there is no prescribed format of the certificate. However, reading Pollock House Ltd v Nairobi Wholesalers Ltd (No.2) [1972] 1 EA 172 the decision by the then East African Court of Appeal, one deduces that in order to award costs to two or more advocates in the same matter there should be a certificate. A represented party ought to make an application to the Court stating that he will employ a service of two advocates. Thereafter, the court while informed of the nature of case, the complexity of the case, etc., will certify the same. In the present case the judge having considered the complexity, and time spent in research he held “the suit is dismissed with costs to two advocates.” That is also quoted by the Respondent’s counsel in the taxation cause No.100. And the taxing officer was rightly convinced and ruled that the instruction fees awarded stems from the fact that the case was complex. With reference No.19, Mr Mpaya Kamara, the Respondent’s counsel argued that it was the trial judge who allowed the two advocates to represent the defendant (Respondent) and to proceed with the matter. The trial judge awarded costs for both advocates. These advocates came from two distinct law firms. One, Edward Nelson Mwakingwe from FK Law Chambers and the other was Mpaya Kamara, from, Kamara & Co. Advocates. They both represented the 10 defendant. It is on record that when the main suit ended in a dismissal and costs awarded two advocates, they filed two different taxations causes (taxation causes No. 86 and No. 100 of 2022). In Mr Kamara’s view, with regards to reference No.19 arising from Taxation Cause No. 100 of 2022 that the Hon. Deputy Registrar did not error in law to entertain the taxation. Mr Kamara held the same view in reference No. 16 against taxation cause No. 86. He opined that the two separate taxation causes were therefore justifiable based on the award of costs given by the trial judge for the two advocates of the Respondent (the Defendant). Depending on the complexity or circumstance of the case, it is not an anomaly for the judge to award costs to two or more advocates. Ms. Bachuba, the Applicant’s counsel in reference No. 19 fiercely contended that there was no certification from the trial judge when he awarded the costs to the two advocates. We ask was there a certification? Is there a format of the certification? What is the content of certification? These are answered by Order 49 of the Advocates Remuneration Order as hereinabove explained. The controversy though remains because the order requires the judge to certify under his hand. In absence of a prescribed form, it is my view that the trial judge by clearly stating that “the suit is dismissed with costs to two advocates.” That is as good as certification. Perhaps by way obiter dictum the Order may in the future include a form to be used as a certificate. Regarding the award of TZS 150 million as instruction fee, in my view that amount is not excessive because the suit value was USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/=. A problem that arises is where there are two advocates engaged by a party in the same suit from either different law firms or the same law firm and the suit proceedings is a contentious one for 11 liquidation sum. How do we apportion the instruction fee? As will be explained, the suit being a contentious one for liquidated sum, item 8 of the 9th schedule of the Order applies. Under that schedule a scale set is 3% of the value of the claim above TZS 400 million. If we apply the 3% in suit amount of USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/= then it is important to remember that the same cannot be charged or awarded twice. In my settled view, the advocates ought to have split the said 3% as instruction fee out of the suit amount of USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/= amongst themselves unless there is evidence that one of them hard large share of work than the other. It will be unfair to the Applicant to be condemned to pay twice the said 3%. The spirit of the Advocates Remunerate Order is in my view that the 3% for amount which is about TZS 223,648,900.00 from USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/= in the Commercial Case No.109 of 2016 and Taxation Cause No. 100 of 2022 was for instruction fees regardless of the number of advocates representing the party to suit. For that reason, the Taxation Cause No. 86 of 2022 and Taxation Case No. 100 of 2022 both emanates from Commercial Case No. 109 of 2016. What brings controversy is the 3% of the suit amount (USD 2,878,100 equivalent to TZS 6,357,722,900/=). The 3% of the TZS 6,357,722,900/= for scale item 8 of the 9th schedule of the Order is TZS 190,731,687/=. That provision of the law does not mention number of advocates to be involved. Therefore, the scale does not change regardless of the number of advocates. Therefore, if the advocates involved were two, the 3% will remain the same but it ought to be divided by the number of advocate’s who represented the Respondent (then the Defendant). Since TZS 190,731,687 is the correct 12 instruction fee per the scale in item 8 of 9th schedule of the Order. For each advocate to get equal share, the instruction fee ought to be divided by two (the number of advocates employed by the Respondent) that equal to TZS 95,365,343.50. Each therefore will have or ought to have been awarded half of 3% (as instruction fee) and not the whole TZS 190,731,687/= and TZS 150,000,000/= respectively as was done. In my view, these were erroneously awarded. The question as to who has large portion of work is left to the advocates themselves. They may of course in their own arrangement decide how to divide the 3% amongst themselves. What is important for the taxing officer is to remember that the 3% remains undisturbed because that scale is set by the law, and it must be observed. Since the Applicant has faulted Taxation Cause No. 86 of 2022 and Taxation Cause No. 100 of 2022, this Court has examined both. And sticking to the above reasons that each among the two advocates ought to be awarded a half (1/2) of 3% of TZS 190,731,687, consequently, I am varying the TZS 150,000,000/= (reference No. 19 from taxation cause No. 100) and TZS 190,731,687/= (reference No. 16 from taxation cause No. 86) awarded as instruction fee to the advocates instead of having two separate set of instruction fees to just an abridged instruction fee to the tune of TZS 190,731,687=. But since the trial judge awarded costs for the two advocates then taking 3% of the suit amount of TZS 190,731,687 divide by number of advocates (that is two) equals to TZS 95,365,343.50. In my considered view that is the amount each advocate deserves because its sum aligns to 3% scale. That also sync well with the public policy that litigation should be affordable as held in ECO Bank Tanzania Limited’s case (supra). I am holding so because as rightly argued by the applicant, taxation is not a mere 13 arithmetic process. It is an application of taxation principles that is not devised to punish a party condemned to pay costs. It was held in ZTE Corporation v Benson Information Limited, Commercial Reference No. 3 of 2018 HCCD that costs ought not be excessive or oppressive. It should be only such costs necessary for conduct of the case. If one employs the army of lawyers from different law firms and taxation principles are not properly applied, then instruction fees awarded may exceed the suit value. Indeed, costs are not intended to enrich parties. Rather, they are meant to reimburse them for the expenses incurred in the litigation. Besides that, there is also a need for encouraging filing of one taxation cause whenever two or more advocates have been employed by a party in a case. In such scenario consolidation of taxation causes suffices. That will discourage multiplicity of taxation causes. As to whether the presence of notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal is a bar to the taxation cause, that need not detain us, In my view that it is not a bar because like execution proceedings without an order of stay of execution the same may proceed to be determined to its finality. I am aware that there are several decisions of this Court which held that the notice of appeal is bar to taxation proceedings. These include National Chicks Corporation Limited & Four Others, Consolidated Misc. Commercial Cause No. 148 & 161 of 2015 HCCD; Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited & 30 Others v Scova Engineering S.P.A & Another, Misc. Commerical Application No. 256 of 2016; Noman – Mahboub t/a Noman Al Mahboob General Trading Company v Milcafe, Commercial Case No. 41 of 2003 HCCD. But the provisions of Section 5(1)(c), (2)(a) (i), (ii), (b), and (c) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act [Cap 141 R.E. 2019] enlist the 14 matters that the High Court can entertain whenever there is notice of appeal. The list is not exhaustive. Moreover, that law does not categorically bar taxation proceedings to be entertained even if there is notice of appeal. Therefore, there is no law forbidding such proceedings. For detailed disposition see cases of Rose Mkeku (the administratrix of the estate of the late Simon Mkeku v Pervez Shabbirdin, Misc. Land Application Case No. 89 of 2021, HCT Sub-registry of Mwanza and KCB Tanzania Limited & Another v Delina General Enterprises Limited, Taxation Reference No. 24 of 2022 HCCD. The applicant counsel also cited the CAT decision in Aero Helcopter (T) Limited v F.N. Jansen [1990] TLR 142 to buttress their view that the taxation officers lacked jurisdiction to entertain taxation causes where there is notice of appeal. What the counsel forgot to tell the Court is that the case referred to did not list all the items that the High Court is barred to handle when there is notice of appeal. In fact it gave example of matters that can be entertained by the High Court when there is notice of appeal such as application for leave to appeal to CAT or application for certificate on point of law; matters specifically stated under Section 5(1)(c), (2)(a) (i), (ii), (b), and (c) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act [Cap 141 R.E. 2019], and application for execution unless an order for stay of execution is given. Therefore, and in my considered view this case of Aero Helcopter (T) Limited v F.N. Jansen [1990] TLR 142 does not categorically bar the taxation proceedings at the High Court. Furthermore, awarding of costs is a discretion of the Court, and appeal against costs awarded is subject to court leave. In strict sense, taxation has nothing to do with appeal. In my view, notice of appeal therefore cannot be 15 a bar to taxation. For the above reason, in my view the award of costs cannot be a ground of appeal embedded in the substantive grounds of the prospective appeal. Although there is a divergent view that the appeal may be for various grounds and takes on board costs of appeal and proceedings in the trial court, I distance myself from this view. Lack of justification for awarding TZS 150 million as instruction fee is another ground for reference. I am of the considered view that the TZS 150 million could have been well within the scale as per item 8 of 9th schedule to the Order. The amount of work done, the research and time spent justified the amount. However, the awarded instruction fees as held herein above was in respect of the two advocates. That ought to have been split into two halves. Thus the 3% of the TZS TZS 6,357,722,900/= divide by two. That is TZS 95,365,343.50 each. That is because to award 3% as instruction for each of two advocates will make it 6%. That in my view violated the Order. I am of the view that the justification for awarding TZS 150 million and 190 million respectively was there, but the reasoning was fallacious and contravened item 8 of the 9th schedule of the Order which prescribes instruction fee for contentious suits for liquidated sum to be 3% for the amount exceeding TZS 400 million. Perhaps, the matter would have been simplified by the certificate issued by the trial judge in conformity with Order 49 of the Advocates Remuneration Order stating the reason(s) for allowing two advocates from different law firms to represent a party and hence entitling them to the costs as per the ratio payable. Regarding the allegation of failure to consider what was submitted by the applicant’s counsel during the hearing when awarding costs, I will respond briefly. These are issues of notice of appeal and the presence of two 16 taxation causes. I have already examined and responded to the issue of lack of jurisdiction (notice of appeal) and presence of two taxation causes in respect of the same suit. I therefore need not to reiterate it. As for costs for attendance, I find the amount charged was fair, reasonable, and proper scale and schedule was applied. I am not convinced that the instruction fee is meant to cover the costs for attendance. Since the 9th schedule does not provide for costs for attendance, one is not precluded from invoking the 8th schedule for items or matters whose scale have not been provided for such as costs for court attendance. The case at hand is thus distinguish from the circumstance and facts of the case of ZTE Corporation vs Benson Information Limited, Commercial Reference No. 3 of 2019. In lieu of the foregoing the decisions of the taxing officers (in taxation causes No. 86 and No. 100 of 2022) are varied with respect to instruction fees only. Instead of two separate instruction fees, we remain with one, TZS 190,731,687 that is the 3% of the suit amount (TZS 6,357,722,900/=) exceeding TZS 400,000,000/= as required by the item 8 of the nineth schedule to the Advocates Remuneration Order. That means TZS 95,365,343.50 for each of the two advocates. Otherwise, parties may bring to court army of lawyers and a party liable to pay costs will be punished, which is not the purpose of costs. Hence the reference applications are partly meritorious and partly dismissed. Given that the parties are not to be blamed for misinterpretation of the law each party shall bear its costs. It is so ordered. 17 DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 6th day of April, 2023. U. J. AGATHO JUDGE 06/04/2023 Date: 06/04/2023 Coram: Hon. U.J. Agatho J. For Applicant: Prisca Nchimbi & Lilian Mawalla, Advocates For Respondent: Elly Mkwawa, advocate also holding of Mpaya Kamara Advocate. C/Clerk: Beatrice Court: Ruling delivered today, this 6th April 2023 in the presence of Prisca Nchimbi and Lilian Mawalla, advocates for the applicant, Elly Mkwawa, advocate also holding brief Mpaya Kamara, the learned counsel for the Respondent. U. J. AGATHO JUDGE 06/04/2022 18