fatuma mussa ringo

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB REGISTRY AT DODOMA MISC. LAND APPLICATION NO. 24995 OF 2024 (Originating from the High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma in Land Appeal No. 7380 of 2024 and the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Dodoma at Dodoma in Land Application No. 20 of 2018) FATUMA MUSSA RINGO (Administratrix of the estate of the late MUSSA RINGO).................................................................... APPLICANT VERSUS REHEMA HASHIMU SAID................................................ RESPONDENT RULING Date of last order: 11/02/2025 Date of the Ruling: 28/02/2025 KHALFAN, J. The applicant has preferred the present application under section 41 (2) of the Land Disputes Courts Act [Cap 216 R: E 2019] (hereinafter referred to as "the LDCA") and section 14 (1) of the Law of Limitation Act [Cap 89 R.E 2019] (hereinafter referred to as "the LLA"), seeking for one substantive relief that this court be pleased to grant an extension of time for her to file an appeal out of time against the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Dodoma (hereinafter referred to as "the DLHT"). The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant herself while the respondent filed a counter affidavit to contest the application. Hearing of the application was by way of written submissions whereby the applicant had the services of Mr. Ditrick Mwesigwa whilst the respondent was represented by Mr. Ezekiel Amon Mwakapeje, both learned counsels. In his submission, Mr. Mwesigwa, the counsel for the applicant referred this court to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the affidavit and contended that initially, the applicant was successfully sued by the respondent at the DLHT in Land Application No. 20 of 2018. The judgment was delivered on 06/03/2024. That being aggrieved, she subsequently appealed within time that is, on 05/04/2024 at this court vide Land Appeal No. 7380 of 2024. He contended that this court on 27/09/2024, struck out the said appeal for being incompetent as the appellant appeared to be a stranger to the impugned judgment of the DLHT for failure to indicate in her pleadings that she was an administratrix of the late Mussa Ringo. The learned counsel argued that the applicant now is out of time to appeal, thus she is seeking the extension of time due to the delay which arose from the technicalities. To buttress his position, he sought refuge in Fortunatos Masha vs. Willium Shija and Another, [1997] TLR 154. 2 Mr. Mwesigwa went on submitting that after the decision of this court in striking out the appeal on Friday 27/09/2024, the appellant acted promptly and diligently in prosecuting this application by first writing to this court on Monday 30/9/2024 requesting for the copies of the ruling and in two days, that is, on 03/10/2024 she prepared and finally filed this application. Besides the above reasons, Mr. Mwesigwa prayed this court to consider another ground of illegality stated in paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in granting this application. The learned counsel stated that the suit, Land Application No. 20 of 2018, was filed at the DLHT out of time, that the said suit was determined by the DLHT without pecuniary jurisdiction, it was wrongly determined by failure to join a necessary party, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works and finally that the DLHT, in its decision, it illegally relied on the forged letter of offer. In reply, the respondent's counsel, Mr. Mwakapeje urged the court to dismiss the application since there was no reason advanced by the applicant for the delay. He submitted that failure to indicate the capacity of the applicant in Land Appeal No. 7380 of 2024 that led this court to strike out the appeal was due to the negligence of the applicant and her legal team. The learned counsel argued that the law demands diligence from litigants. That the applicant's negligence should not be disguised as a technical delay. Reference was made to the famous case of Lyamuya Construction Co. Ltd vs. Board of Trustees of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania [2002] TLR 296 and FINCA (T) Ltd and Another vs. Boniface Mwalukisa, Civil Application No. 589/12 of 2018. With regard to the promptness of the claims of the applicant in filing this application since 27/09/2024 when this court struck out the appeal, Mr. Mwakapeje contended that the applicant failed to account for each day of delay as required by the law. On the side of illegalities pointed out by the applicant, Mr. Mwakapeje contended that they are not apparent on the face of the record as required by law. Furthermore, the learned counsel denied presence of the alleged illegalities and submitted that the decision of the DLHT strictly complied with the laws. It was his prayer that this court dismiss this application as it serves as a means of prejudicing the respondent from attaining the fruits of his success. Having gone through the parties' rival submissions and the record, the sole issue for my determination is whether this application has merits. This application has been preferred under sections 41 (2) of the LDCA and 14 (1) of the LUX. Sections 41 (2) of the LDCA provides that: 4 "An appeal under subsection (1) may be lodged within forty-five days after the date of the decision or order: Provided that, the High Court may, for the good cause, extend the time for Piling an appeal either before or after the expiration of such period of forty- five days." Similarly, section 14 (1) of the LLA: "Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the court may, for any reasonable or sufficient cause, extend the period of limitation for the institution of an appeal or an application, other than an application for the execution of a decree, and an application for such extension may be made either before or after the expiry of the period oflimitation prescribed for such appeal or application."[Emphasis added]. From the foregoing provisions, before the court can exercise its discretion for extension of time, it is imperative for the applicant to show reasonable and sufficient cause. But the provision of the law quoted above does not state what amounts to reasonable and sufficient cause. In the case of Osward Masatu Mwizarubi vs. Tanzania Fish Processing Ltd, Civil Application No. 13 of 2010 (unreported) the Court of Appeal stated that: " What constitutes good cause cannot be laid down by any hard and fast rules. The term 'good cause' is a s relative one and is dependent upon the party seeking extension of time to provide the relevant material in order to move the Court to exercise its discretion." That being the position, it follows therefore that what constitutes good cause depends on the circumstance of each case. However, from the decided cases, certain factors provide guidance on whether or not the applicant has shown good cause. Amongst the factors to be taken into account were succinctly stated in the case of Lyamuya Construction (supra) as follows: "(a) The applicant must account for all the period for delay; (b) The delay should not be Inordinate; (c) The applicant must show diligence, and not apathy, negligence or sloppiness in the prosecution of the action that he intends to take; and (d) If the court feels that there are other sufficient reasons, such as the existence of a point of law of sufficient importance; such as the illegality of the decision sought to be challenged". In the instant application, the applicant intends to challenge the decision of the DLHT which was delivered on 06/03/2024. However, as 6 the records show, prior to this application, she appealed within time vide Land Appeal No. 7380 of 2024 which was struck out on 27/09/2024. There is no dispute that this application was filed before this court on 03/10/2024 about 6 days from the date of the ruling of this court. I have carefully gone through the applicant's affidavit in support of the application. I am satisfied that this is a case where this court is required to extend time on ground of technical delay and diligence of the applicant. This is because, after the decision of the DLHT on 06/03/2024, she readily appealed within time, that is, on 05/04/2024. And that after this court struck out her appeal on 27/09/2024, she readily filed this application on 03/10/2024. Reference is made to Fortunatus Masha (supra) and was relied on by the applicant where the Court of Appeal held: "A distinction has to be made between the case involving real or actual delays and those as the present one which clearly only involved technical delay in the sense that the original appeal was lodged in time but had been found to be incompetent for one or another reason." Furthermore, considering the fact that the first two days were weekend, the applicant spent about four days requesting for the documents from the court and finally she filed this application. This court finds that the 7 applicant successfully counted for each day of delay warranting this court to extend time. The need to account for each day of the delay has been restated in a number of cases. To mention but few, Elifazi Nyatega & 3 Others vs. Caspian Mining Ltd, Civil Application No. 44/08 of 2017 and Moses Mchunguzi vs. Tanzania Cigarette Co. Ltd, Civil Application No. 531/4 of 2016 (both unreported). In the upshot, I find the applicant has shown good cause for the delay and accounted for each day of the delay of all six days. The application is therefore granted. The applicant to file the appeal within 21 days from the date of this ruling. In the circumstance, I will not make an order as to costs. It is so ordered. Dated at Dodoma this 28th day of February, 2025. 8