GEOFREY JAFET ANANIA vs AMIRI ABDULRAHMAN KIROBOTO

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT TANGA LAND APPEAL NO. 000031903 OF 2025 GEOFREY JAFET ANANIA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS AMIRI ABDULRAHMAN KIROBOTO .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT JUDGMENT NDESAMBURO, J This judgment concerns an appeal lodged by the Appellant against the decision and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Muheza at Muheza, DLHT, in Land Application No. 08 of 2023, whereby the DLHT declared the Respondent the lawful owner of a piece of land situated at Mwarimba Village, Misozwe Ward within Muheza District. In brief, the factual background giving rise to the present appeal may be recounted as follows: The Appellant instituted Land Application No. 08 of 2023 before the DLHT, alleging that the Respondent had unlawfully trespassed upon his land. The Appellant contended that he is the lawful owner of the disputed property measuring 3.5 acres out of 5 acres he owns, having acquired it in 1995 from Mkwajuni Village Council. He further alleged that the land was forest before he cleared it and made developments by planting orange trees, lemon trees, banana, cassava, coconut, and maize. In 2023, the Respondent trespassed into the disputed land and claimed to be the lawful owner. In his defence, the Respondent denied the allegations of trespass and maintained that he is the lawful owner of the same piece of land, which he Page. 1 purchased from the previous legal owner. Upon a full hearing on the merits, the DLHT found in favour of the Respondent and accordingly declared him the lawful owner of the disputed land. Aggrieved by that decision, the Appellant lodged the present appeal against the whole judgment on the following grounds: 1. The District Land and Housing Tribunal erred in law and facts by pronouncing the Respondent as a lawful owner of the suit land in the absence of counter-claim to that effect contrary to the law. 2. The Trial Tribunal Chairperson erred in law and in fact for failing to find that the Appellant established his ownership over the suit land on the balance of probabilities, as required by law, and that the Appellant's evidence was heavier than that of the Respondents. 3. The Honourable Tribunal Chairperson erred in law and in fact for failure to find out that, the Appellant has been in ownership and physical occupation of the suit land since 1995 to date peacefully and uninterrupted. 4. That, Exhibit R-l was improperly admitted, not read over after being admitted and the Honourable Tribunal Chairperson was functus officio to admit the same. 5. The Trial Tribunal Chairperson erred in law and fact for failure to consider the Appellant's documentary evidence (Exhibit A-I) in the judgment, which proved the Appellant's ownership of the suit land, as a result, reached an unjust decision. 6. The Trial Tribunal Chairperson erred in law and fact for allowing the Respondent to depart from his written statement of defense and adduced evidence on facts not pleaded in the pleadings. 7. That, trial Tribunal erred in law and in fact for failure to observe the procedures for visiting the locus in quo contrary to the law. From the above grounds, the Appellant prayed this Court to quash and set aside the judgment and decree of the DLHT, to be declared the lawful owner of the disputed land, and costs of this appeal be paid by the Respondent. The Respondent opposed the grounds of appeal and urged this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs and to uphold the decision of the DLHT. By consent of the court, the appeal was argued by way of written submission. The Appellant was represented by Mr Thomas Kitundu, while the Respondent was represented by Ms Ritha Julius Mollel, both learned counsel. On the first ground of appeal, Mr Kitundu submitted that the Tribunal erred in declaring the Respondent the lawful owner Page. 2 of the suit land in the absence of a counter-claim or any prayer to that effect in the written statement of defence, WSD. It was argued that a court cannot grant a relief that has not been pleaded or prayed for. Reliance was placed on Ekson Mtafya vs Michael Mtafya, Probate Appeal No. 6 of 2020, High Court of Tanzania, where it was held that “The court is not your mother to grant what has not been pleaded or asked for”, and Dr. Emil Lebabu Woiso vs July Maarufu and 3 Others, Land Case No. 84 of 2016, High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, where it was held that “...it is the law that the Court cannot grant a relief that was not prayed for...”. The Appellant therefore contended that the Tribunal had no legal basis to declare the Respondent the lawful owner of the suit land. On the second ground of appeal, Mr Kitundu submitted that the Tribunal failed to find that the Appellant had proved his ownership of the suit land on the balance of probabilities. He argued that the burden of proof rested upon the Respondent, pursuant to sections 117 and 118 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 R.E. 2023. Reliance was placed on Abdulkarim Haji vs Raymond Nchimbi Alois & Another (2006) TLR 419, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, where it was held that “It is an elementary principle that he who alleges is the one responsible to prove his allegations.” He further argued that the Respondent had no documentary evidence establishing his acquisition or occupation of the suit land, relying on Issa Ahmad vs Mussa Abdul, Land Appeal No. 72 of 2010, of this court, on the need for clear and cogent evidence of ownership. He contended that the Appellant’s ownership was established through Exhibit A1 and the evidence of AW1 to AW5. Reliance was also placed on Crescent Impex (T) Limited vs Mtibwa Sugar Estates Limited, Civil Appeal No. 455 of 2020, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, and Sharifa Habibu (as Legal Personal Representative of the Estate of the Late Habibu Ally) vs Mohamed Juma Ali & 2 Others, Civil Appeal No. 445 of 2021, Court of Appeal, on the importance of credible evidence and the standard of proof in civil cases. He also cited Hemedi Saidi vs Mohamed Mbilu [1984] T.L.R. 113, for the principle that the party with heavier evidence must prevail. On the third ground of appeal, Mr Kitundu submitted that the evidence established the Appellant’s ownership, physical occupation and Page. 3 use of the suit land since 1995, during which period he had peacefully and uninterruptedly developed and cultivated it. He relied on the evidence of AW1 to AW5 in support of that contention. On the fourth ground of appeal, the Appellant’s counsel challenged the admission of Exhibit R1, arguing that the Tribunal had previously rejected it for non- compliance with section 74 of the Evidence Act, and was therefore functus officio in relation to its subsequent admission. He relied on Kamundi vs Republic [1973] E.A. 540 at 545, Zee Hotel Management Group and Others vs Minister of Finance and Others [1997] T.L.R. 265, Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited and Others vs Tri-Telecommunications Tanzania Limited [2006] E.A. 393, Oscar Karsan Kanji vs Abdallah Hassan (Suing as a Legal Personal Representative of Hassan Abdallah-Deceased), Civil Appeal No. 9 of 2020, Sofia Simon (Administratrix of the Estate of Late Maliyatabu Fugugu Kilimu Ludubi) vs Dorothea B. Aloyce and Another, Civil Appeal No. 56 of 2025 and Bibi Kisoko Medard vs Minister of Land Housing and Urban Development and Another [1983] TLR 250 on the doctrine of functus officio. He further contended that Exhibit R1 was not read after admission, contrary to Robinson Mwanjisi and Three Others vs R (2003) T.L.R. 218, which, he argued, vitiated the proceedings. On the fifth ground of appeal, Mr Kitundu submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider Exhibit A1, which supported his claim of ownership since 1995. He urged this Court, as a first appellate court, to re-evaluate the evidence and arrive at its own findings. Reliance was placed on Martha Michael Wejja vs Attorney General and 3 Others [1982] T.L.R. 35, on the duty of a first appellate court to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence. On the sixth ground of appeal, Mr Kitundu submitted that the Tribunal improperly allowed the Respondent to depart from her WDS and adduce evidence on matters not pleaded. He argued that the Respondent had neither filed a counter-claim nor pleaded the particulars of the land allegedly belonging to him or its alleged purchase from Ezekiel Japhet Anania. Reliance was placed on Martin Fredrick Rajab vs Ilemela Municipal Council and Another, Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2019, on the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings and cannot depart from the case pleaded. On the last ground of appeal, Page. 4 Mr Kitundu challenged the manner in which the Tribunal conducted and recorded its visit to the locus in quo. He submitted that the proceedings did not disclose what transpired during the visit, the evidence taken, observations made or any sketch map drawn. He relied on Kimonidimitri Mantheakis vs Ally Azim Dewji and 7 Others, Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2018, (unreported), which sets out the requirements for a meaningful visit to the locus in quo, and Bongole Geofrey and Four Others vs Agnes Nakiwale, Civil Appeal No. 0076 of 2015, on the necessity of recording observations made at the locus. He contended that the omission occasioned a miscarriage of justice and prevented this Court from properly re-evaluating the trial proceedings. In conclusion, Mr Kitundu prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs, the judgment and decree of the DLHT be quashed and set aside, and that he be declared the lawful owner of the suit land. In reply, Ms Mollel on the first ground, concerning the alleged error in determining ownership in the absence of a formal counterclaim, submitted that the issue of ownership was directly placed before the Tribunal by the Appellant himself. Upon the Respondent disputing the Appellant’s ownership and asserting a competing interest, the Tribunal was entitled to determine who had a better claim to the land. It was argued that the absence of a document formally headed “Counter-Claim” did not occasion any prejudice to the Appellant, who had the opportunity to challenge the Respondent’s evidence. The ground was therefore said to be devoid of merit. Ms Mollel consolidated the second, third and fifth grounds of appeal, which challenged the evaluation of evidence and submitted that admission of Exhibit A-1 did not make all facts contained therein conclusive proof of ownership. She argued that the Tribunal was entitled to assess Exhibit A-1 together with the oral and documentary evidence, the identity and boundaries of the disputed land, and the circumstances surrounding the competing claims. Reliance was placed on Lupembe Village, Ikolo Ward, Kyela District and Another vs Bethelhamu Mwandefwa & 5 Others, Civil Appeal No. 377 of 2020, [2023] TZCA. Ms Mollel further submitted that the number of witnesses called by a party was not determinative of a civil dispute; rather, the quality, credibility, consistency and probative value of the evidence were material. Although the Page. 5 Appellant called five witnesses against the Respondent’s three, the Tribunal was entitled to find the Respondent’s evidence more probable. She relied on the Respondent’s alleged acquisition of the land in 2000, continuous possession for about twenty-five years, and developments made thereon. On the fourth ground, challenging the admission of Exhibit R- 1, the Respondent’s counsel addressed the complaints that the Tribunal had become functus officio, that the document was inadmissible for want of stamp duty, and that it was not read aloud in open proceedings. On functus officio, reliance was placed on Bibi Kisoko Medard vs Minister for Lands, Housing and Urban Development and Another [1983] TLR 250, while it was submitted that the Appellant had not established that there had been a final and definitive determination concerning the same document. Ms Mollel distinguished Diamond Trust Bank Tanzania Limited vs Granitech (T) Company Limited & Others, Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2021, [2024] TZCA 102, and submitted that the circumstances of that case were different. As regards stamp duty, it was argued that section 47 of the Stamp Duty Act, Cap. 189 R.E. 2023, should be read with the provisions permitting examination, impounding and regularization of insufficiently stamped instruments. It was further submitted that failure to read the document aloud did not, without proof of actual prejudice, render it inadmissible. On the sixth ground, alleging departure from the Respondent’s WSD, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that although parties are bound by their pleadings, evidence may properly be adduced to support matters already placed in issue. The Appellant had not identified the particular pleading allegedly departed from, the evidence said to be inconsistent with it, or any prejudice occasioned thereby. Relying on Martin Fredrick Rajab v Ilemela Municipal Council and Another (supra), Ms Mollel maintained that respondent’s evidence concerning acquisition, possession and development of the land was directly connected to the Appellant’s claim of ownership. On the seventh ground, concerning the proceedings at the locus in quo, Ms Mollel submitted that a locus visit was not, in itself, an irregularity. Relying on Kimonidimitri Mantheakis v Ally Azim Dewji & 7 Others (supra), it was argued that such a visit is intended to assist the adjudicating body in verifying matters Page. 6 already raised in evidence, such as boundaries, size and developments, and not to create a new case. The Appellant had not demonstrated that he was excluded from the visit, prevented from participating, or otherwise prejudiced by the manner in which it was conducted. In conclusion, Ms Mollel submitted that the Appellant had failed to establish that the Tribunal applied a wrong legal principle, unlawfully shifted the burden of proof, ignored material evidence, relied on inadmissible evidence in a manner occasioning injustice, reached an unsupported conclusion, or committed a sufficiently serious procedural irregularity. She therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs and that the Judgment and Decree of the DLHT be upheld and affirmed. In rejoinder, Mr Kitundu reiterated what was stated in submission in chief. Having carefully considered the rival submissions of the parties, and upon a thorough evaluation of the record of the DLHT, the impugned judgment, and the applicable law, the duty now rests with this Court to resolve the matter. Accordingly, the issue for determination is whether the grounds of appeal are meritorious. I will begin with the first ground of appeal. Under this ground, learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the trial tribunal erred in declaring the Respondent the lawful owner of the disputed land, notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent had not pleaded in his WSD that he be declared the lawful owner. It was the Appellant’s contention that there was neither a prayer nor a counterclaim in the Respondent’s WSD seeking a declaration of ownership over the suit land. It is trite law that the relief granted by a court must flow from the prayers sought by the parties. Thus, a court cannot grant a relief which has not been prayed for. This position has been stated by the Court of Appeal in many cases, including Said Abdallah Doga vs Rose Fridoline Mwapinga & Another (Civil Revision No. 1 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 17898 (28 November 2023), where the Justices of Appeal stated that; "…it is evident that the learned High Court judge awarded a relief that was neither pleaded in the pleadings nor prayed by the applicant. This is, in our considered view, an irregularity and a deviation from the settled position of the law, underscored in many of our decisions, that reliefs must be founded on the prayers made by the parties”. Against the Page. 7 foregoing position, a careful scrutiny of the record of the DLHT reveals that the Respondent did, in fact, pray in both his WSD and his oral testimony that he be declared the owner of the suit land. In the prayers contained in his WSD, the Respondent stated as follows: "WHEREFORE the Respondent prays for the following orders:- {a}…………… {b} The Declaration that the suitland in Muheza, is the(sic) of AMIRI ABDULRAHMAN KIROBOTO”. Although the above prayer contains grammatical errors, its intended meaning is clear that the Respondent sought a declaration that he was the owner of the suit land. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that he did not seek such relief merely because of the grammatical or drafting errors appearing in the prayer. Consequently, the first ground of appeal is devoid of merit. I jump to the fourth ground of appeal where the Appellant faulted the DLHT for improperly admitting a sale agreement (Exhibit R1). Under this ground, the Appellant’s challenge to admissibility of Exhibit R1 is threefold: one, not being read over, two, the trial chairperson was functus officio and three, it lacked stamp duty. Regarding the Exhibit not being read over, this Court is well aware of the procedure that after the document being admitted in evidence the same should be read over before the court for the adverse party to appreciate its contents, as articulated by the Court of Appeal in Masanyiwa Msolwa vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 280 of 2018) [2022] TZCA 456 (21 July 2022). In the present case, the record shows that, after RW2 tendered the sale agreement and the DLHT admitted it, Exhibit R1 was read over. The trial Chairperson recorded in the typed proceedings that; "RW2: SAIDI TWAHA OMARI (58) ameonywa kuendelea kutoa ushahidi chini ya kiapo, Kielelezo R1 kikasomwa kisha akaongozwa na wakili DANIEL TAZURA na kueleza…” (emphases added). From the foregoing quotation, it is clear that Exhibit R1 was read over after it had been admitted in evidence. Accordingly, this complaint lacks merit. As regards the complaint that the trial Chairperson was functus officio, the record of the DLHT shows that, when the Respondent was testifying, he sought to tender a copy of the sale agreement in evidence. The Appellant’s counsel objected to its admission, and the objection was upheld on the ground that the requisite procedure for tendering secondary evidence Page. 8 had not been complied with. The document was consequently rejected, and the Appellant proceeded with his oral testimony. Subsequently, the same copy of the sale agreement was tendered by RW2 and admitted as Exhibit R1 after the DLHT overruled the Appellant’s objection. The question that therefore arises is whether it was proper for the trial Chairperson to admit a document which had previously been rejected by the same tribunal. Having carefully scrutinized the record of the DLHT, I am satisfied that it was improper for the trial Chairperson to revisit the issue of admissibility and admit a document which had previously failed the test of admissibility and had been ruled inadmissible. As rightly argued by Mr Kitundu, the DLHT had already become functus officio in respect of the admissibility of the sale agreement. The Court of Appeal, when confronted with an almost similar situation in Dimond Trust Bank Tanzania Limited vs Granitech T. Company Limited (Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 102 (23 February 2024) had the following to say: "We say so because the trial court had already heard and made a final determination on the questions concerning the admissibility of Exhibit P9 in its ruling delivered on 2nd September, 2020 found at page 1514 and 1515 of the record… …Thus, the learned trial judge was functus officio when he raised once again the issue of admissibility of exhibit P.9 on the pretext of determining evidential value of the exhibit and thereby deciding not to consider the exhibit” I am also persuaded by the decision of this Court cited by Mr Kitundu in Sophia Simon (Administratrix of The Estate Late Maliatabu Fugugu Kilimuludubi) vs Dorothea B. Aloyce and Another (Civil Appeal 56 of 2021) [2023] TZHC 17122 (3 March 2023), where Hon. Robert, J stated inter alia that: "The procedure for admitting documents in evidence is for the trial court to hear arguments for and against the admissibility of the document being tendered in evidence. Once a court finds that a document fails the test of admissibility such a document, as a general rule, is considered tendered and rejected thereby making it inadmissible in the same proceedings and the defect cannot be cured during the said trial” . Guided by the foregoing position, I agree with Mr Kitundu that, once the document had been ruled inadmissible, it could not properly be admitted by the same Page. 9 tribunal in the same proceedings. Consequently, Exhibit R1 is hereby expunged from the record. In view of that finding, there is no need to consider the third complaint concerning the absence of stamp duty. I now turn to the sixth ground of appeal, in which the Appellant faulted the DLHT for allowing the Respondent to adduce evidence on facts which had not been pleaded in his WSD. Under this ground, Mr Kitundu argued that the Respondent failed to describe the land he claimed to own in terms of its size, location, and boundaries, thereby departing from the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings. While Ms Mollel argued that the Respondent adduced evidence concerning acquisition, possession and development of the land which was directly connected to the Appellant’s claim of ownership. A WSD is not intended to reproduce the entirety of the evidence that a party may subsequently adduce at trial. Rather, it is required to comply with the applicable rules of pleading and to respond to the material facts alleged by the opposing party. A perusal of the trial DLHT's record reveals that the Respondent did not plead the size, location, or boundaries of the disputed property in his WSD. However, during the hearing, the Respondent specifically testified as to the description of the disputed land, including its size, location, and boundaries. Primarily, the law places upon the Applicant the duty to describe the land which is the subject matter of the dispute in the application, pursuant to Regulation 3(2) of the Land Disputes Courts (The District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations, GN. No. 174 of 2003, which provides as follows: "An application to the tribunal shall be made in the form prescribed in the second schedule to these Regulations and shall contain: (a) Not applicable… (b) The address of the suit premises or location of the land involved in the dispute to which the application relates;” The Applicant duly complied with the above Regulation. It was, therefore, not necessary for the Respondent to provide a fresh description of the same property, even if there were some variations between his description and that provided by the Appellant. Since the suit land had already been sufficiently identified and described in the Appellant's application, the DLHT was properly seized of the dispute. Consequently, I find no merit in the sixth ground of appeal, Page. 10 which is hereby dismissed. I now turn to the seventh ground of appeal, in which the Appellant faulted the DLHT for failing to observe the requisite procedures when visiting the locus in quo. Under this ground, Mr Kitundu argued that the following procedures were not followed: one, ensuring that all parties, their witnesses, and advocates, if any, were present; two, allowing the parties and their witnesses to adduce evidence on oath at the locus in quo; three, allowing cross-examination by either party or his counsel; four, recording all the proceedings at the locus in quo; and five, recording any observation, view, opinion, or conclusion of the court, including drawing a sketch plan where necessary, which must be made known to the parties and their advocates, if any. At the outset, I wish to state that there is no law compelling a trial court or tribunal to visit the locus in quo before delivering its judgment. Such a visit is undertaken at the discretion of the court or tribunal where it considers that the visit may assist in verifying the evidence adduced during the trial or in resolving any doubts arising therefrom. However, once the court or tribunal decides to visit the locus in quo, certain procedures ought to be observed. See Sarah Diotrephes Mmari vs M/S ASM (T) Limited (Civil Appeal No. 224 of 2022) [2025] TZCA 416 (19 May 2025). In Kimonidimitri Mantheakis (supra), the Court of Appeal stated that: "… for the visit of the locus in quo to be meaningful, it is instructive for the trial Judge or Magistrate to: one, ensure that all parties, their witnesses, and advocates (if any) are present. Two, allow the parties and their witnesses to adduce evidence on oath at the locus in quo; three, allow cross-examination by either party, or his counsel; four, record all the proceedings at the locus in quo; and five record any observation, view, opinion or conclusion of the court including drawing a sketch plan if necessary which must be made known to the parties and advocates, if any”. Guided by the foregoing position, I will now consider whether all five procedures were complied with. A perusal of the typed proceedings of the DLHT shows that the locus in quo was visited on 19th September 2025 in the presence of both parties and their respective advocates. The parties and witnesses who were present at the locus in quo, namely AW1, Geofrey Japhet Anania, AW2, Hilda Page. 11 Yohana, and RW1, Amiri Abdulrahman Kiroboto, gave evidence on oath. Each witness was cross-examined by the adverse advocate. The proceedings were duly recorded by the Chairperson, and a sketch map was drawn as one of the observations made by the DLHT. It is, therefore, apparent that the requisite procedures governing the visit to the locus in quo were duly complied with. Consequently, this ground of appeal is devoid of merit. Grounds two, three, and five will be considered together, as they all challenge the DLHT’s evaluation of the evidence. Under these grounds, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant established his ownership of the suit land through concrete evidence; that the DLHT failed to find that the Appellant had been in peaceful ownership of the suit land since 1995; and that Exhibit A-1, which established the Appellant’s ownership, was not considered. I wish to begin by observing that, as a first appellate court, this Court is vested with the power to re-evaluate and reconsider the entire evidence adduced before the DLHT and, where appropriate, arrive at its own findings of fact. It is also settled law that the burden of proof lies upon the party who would fail if no evidence were adduced by either side. Equally trite is the principle that, in civil proceedings, the applicable standard of proof is that of a balance of probabilities. The burden does not shift to the adverse party unless and until the party upon whom it rests has discharged it. This principle was aptly reiterated in Habiba Ahmadi Nangulukuta & Others vs Hassani Ausi Mchopa & Another (Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2022) [2022] TZCA 156 (29 March 2022). In the instant matter, the record of the DLHT reveals that there were two principal issues for determination, namely: first, who between the parties was the lawful owner of the disputed land, and secondly, the reliefs to which the parties were entitled. The Appellant called five witnesses, and the Respondent called three witnesses in support of their respective cases. On the part of the Appellant, he testified that he acquired the suit land in 1995 from Mkwajuni Village Council before the village was divided. He stated that he was allocated five acres and that the Respondent trespassed upon 3.5 acres thereof in 2018. He further testified that he had peacefully used the disputed land from 1995 until 2018. He tendered Exhibit A1, titled Page. 12 “Uthibitisho wa umiliki wa shamba la ndugu Geofrey Jafet katika kijiji cha Mwarimba”. Furthermore, his witnesses, AW3, AW4, and AW5, candidly testified that they were neighbours who were allocated land together with the Appellant in 1995 by Mkwajuni Village Council. Each of them was allocated five acres, except the Appellant’s brother, one Ezekiel Jafet Anania, who was allocated three acres. AW2, the wife of the late Ezekiel Jafet Anania, testified that her husband was allocated three acres in 1995 and that, in 2000, he sold the same land to the Respondent. She therefore confirmed that the disputed land belonged to the Appellant and was not part of the three acres which her husband had sold to the Respondent. Conversely, the Respondent testified that he acquired the suit land, measuring four acres, in 2000 after purchasing it from Ezekiel Japhet for TZS 340,000/=. RW2 corroborated his evidence, testifying that he was present when the Respondent purchased the suit land from Ezekiel Japhet and that, at the material time, he was a village leader. During cross-examination by the Appellant’s counsel, he testified that Ezekiel Japhet had been allocated land measuring three acres. The Respondent’s case was further supported by RW3, who testified that he was present when the Appellant and his brother, Ezekiel Japhet, were allocated land. He further confirmed that the Respondent was the lawful owner of the suit land after purchasing it from Ezekiel Japhet. Having re- evaluated the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the Appellant, who was the Applicant before the DLHT, discharged the burden of proving his ownership of the disputed land on a balance of probabilities. His evidence was clear and consistent as to how he acquired the suit land in 1995. Significantly, none of the witnesses, including the Respondent and his witnesses, disputed the fact that the Appellant had been allocated land in 1995. The Appellant’s acquisition of the suit land was supported by four witnesses, three of whom were his neighbours and had likewise acquired their respective portions of land through allocation in 1995, each receiving five acres. AW2, the wife of Ezekiel Japhet, who had sold his land to the Respondent, also supported the Appellant’s claim of ownership and confirmed that the land sold to the Respondent by her husband was different from the suit Page. 13 land. The evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondent is wanting. There is a material contradiction between the Respondent and his witness, RW2, concerning the size of the land allocated to the late Ezekiel Japhet and subsequently sold to the Respondent. Whereas the Respondent testified that he purchased four acres from Ezekiel Japhet, RW2 testified that Ezekiel had been allocated only three acres because that was the extent of land available. It is my considered view that the DLHT failed to critically analyze the evidence on record, particularly by failing to trace the origin of the disputed land. The Respondent testified that he purchased the disputed land, measuring four acres, from Ezekiel Japhet. However, no witness, apart from the Respondent himself, testified that the late Ezekiel Japhet owned four acres. Even his wife, AW2, testified that her husband owned only three acres, which he sold to the Respondent, and that those three acres were not the subject of the dispute. The question that therefore arises is: how could the Respondent have purchased four acres from Ezekiel Japhet when the latter owned only three acres? Even assuming that it was proved, as argued by Ms Mollel, that the Respondent purchased land from Ezekiel Japhet, the fact that Ezekiel Japhet never owned four acres raises serious doubt as to whether the land purchased by the Respondent is the same land that is the subject of the present dispute. Basing on the principles enunciated in Habiba Ahmadi Nangulukuta & Others vs Hassani Ausi Mchopa & Another (supra), the Appellant’s evidence outweighed that of the Respondent. The Appellant sufficiently demonstrated the manner in which he acquired the disputed land and, consequently, proved his ownership thereof on a balance of probabilities. I am therefore satisfied that the trial Chairperson improperly analyzed and evaluated the evidence before arriving at the impugned decision. In the circumstances, I find this appeal meritorious and I accordingly allow it, with costs. I also declare the Appellant as the lawful owner of the disputed land. It is so ordered. Page. 14 Dated at TANGA this 10th of September 2026 . H. P NDESAMBURO JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 15