gulf aggregates t ltd vs jassie and co ltd 2023 tzhccomd 216 6 july 2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) AT DAR ES SALAAM COMMERCIAL CASE NO. 79 OF 2022 GULF AGGREGATES (T) LIMITED /.'.‘VlhRLAINJTIFF VERSUS JASSIE AND COMPANY LIMITED DEFENDANT JUDGEMENT Date of last order: 07/06/2023, Date of Ruling: 06/07/2023 nangelAP Thisb is<*an ex-parte judgement. The matter at hand proceed- ex-parte owing to the Defendant's inability to appear in Court to defend her interests against the claims preferred by the Plaintiff. Through a plaint filed in this court on the 25th of July 2022, the Plaintiff prays for Judgement and Decree against the Defendant as follows: Page 1 of 25 1. Payment of TZS 211,707,415.73 being principal sum overdue on building materials supplied by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. 2. Payment of interest on prayer No.l above at agreed commercial rate of 3. Payment of interest on the de'cfetaljy^ sum at the rate of 7%, per annum from the date of judgni'eWt^o'tfedate of full and final p'ayment.lh'’ 4. Genera (Damages,. i '“Ih , IL (I 5. Costs oflthis suit; and i&hjany dthep- relief as this Honourable h H Ih.Wh^n this case was called on for orders on the 20th of December 2022, Ms. Lulu Mbinga, learned advocate appeared for the Plaintiff while Mr. Kulwa Samson, learned advocate, represented the Defendant in this case. The matter proceeded to first pre-trial conference and mediation process to a final Page 2 of 25 pre-trial stage. The final pre-trial conference was scheduled on 7th March 2023. On the material date, Mr. Odhiambo Kobas, learned advocate, appeared for the Plaintiff. He also held brief for Mr. Kulwa, the advocate appearing for the Defendant. Due to Mr, Kulwa's absence, Mr. Odhiambo prayed for another date for 11 the final pre-trial conference (PTC). This Court gnaijite^1 the ■iPhihu,. prayer, and the matter was fixed for final lijT(^pwlpieh was to take place on the 27th of March 2023. jh’ On the material dat^(([^Ir. Lenard Sylvanus, learned advocate appeared in Codrt'for Defendant while Mr. Odhiambo II appeared for the Plaintiff. Omthe material date, the following issues were agreed andyrecorded by this Court as issues for 1 ji’ (a) Whether there was a contract of supply of aggregates/building materials between the two parties. (b) Whether there was breach thereof. (c) Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages because of breach of such a contract. Page 3 of 25 (d)To what reliefs are the parties entitled. Following the agreed issues hereabove, this court fixed the 15th and 16th days of May 2023 as the dates for the hearing of this suit and the parties were further ordered to file their respective witnesses' statements within 14 days as per the requirements of Rule 49 and 50 of the High Court tarnmdhciaI Division) Procedure Rules, GN. No.250 of 2’01!2h(as amended <[’ '' by GN.No.107 of 2019). 'll. r On the 15th of May 202’3,’hjthe Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Odhiambo Kobas appeai^djn court. The Defendant and her learned counsel never showed1’ up, and never filed witness 'Hh d’’ statements as directed by this court on the 27th of March 2023. ,,,,111111. V fl r Since the’’"D)efendant never filed witness statements, and hiip’’ together with her advocate failed to appear in court on the day the "i^ajtte'r was fixed for hearing, this court granted the Plaintiff's counsel's motion made under Order IX rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap.33 R.E 2019, for the suit to proceed ex-parte. The order for ex-parte hearing was made because the Defendant out of choice failed to appear in court and his Page 4 of 25 advocate as well was not in court at the time and date earlier agreed by all parties that the full hearing of the testimonies of the witnesses was to commence. This court, thus, invited the Plaintiff to establish her case by leading evidence to that effect. In proving the Plaintiff's case, the Plaintiff called two witnesses who were Mr. Venkata Sunil Thorata, who testified as Pw-1 and Mr. Kelvin Mwanga, who testified as RW-2. -Pw-1 tendered in court six (6) documents which' wefeiirpceived as I exhibits by the court. !,hh jb’’ In his testimony in chief, Pwtl told this court that, he 'hl. 'll'"' ih *hh * has been a marketing njiaha'ger ofWe Plaintiff since May 2013 and he is charged With the duti'es of doing marketing and sales of the Plaintifcquanwg products including aggregates and dlf I’ /’ base courselhl,chipping, dust, and stones for construction purposes, i Ik / We told this court that, sometime in July 2019, the Defendant's Director, Mr. Karanveer Bachu inquired about their products and purchased aggregates and base course materials for use in Defendant's construction projects which were paid for via Tigo-Pesa and M-pesa platforms. Page 5 of 25 Pw-1 stated further that, on the Month of August 2019, the Plaintiff did supply as well aggregates to the Defendant of all sizes for the latter's road construction project in Mbagala area Dar-es-Salaam, a supply which ran from August 2019 to April 2020. The two parties negotiated a contract and executed the same on the 07th of August 2019. The said agreement was ’ll, tendered in court and was admitted into evidence's Exh.P- Pw-1 told this court that, as pefhExh.jP-1, the orders were to be placed 24hrs befofehan^and that, on the 14th of J ’hih ,(h( hh> / August 2019, the Defendant placedrdrders to be supplied with 6,300 tons of Aggregates, Basb Course, and crushing refining ’Oh rock stones#HmCCRR)lhhwhich, together, amounted to a consignmenfel^voS^’TZS 133,812,000/-. To substantiate the assertion, Pw-1 tendered in court Local Purchase Orders (LPO) which were collectively admitted into evidence and marked Exh.P-2. Pw-1 told this court as well that, as per the Exh.P-1, the Plaintiff was to provide the Defendant with a credit limit of TZS 100,000,000 or 60days credit period from the date of invoice and, that, a commercial loan bank interest rate of 18% Page 6 of 25 was to apply on all payments overdue for more than 30 days. Besides, he told the court that, Exh.P-1 did also require the Defendant to offer a security in form of post-dated cheques worth TZS 100,000,000/=. He told this court that, as per the terms of Exh.P-1, the Defendant issued five post-dated cheques (dated 30th October 2019) and valued at TZS 50,000,000/=. Th(ese((were tendered in court and collectively admitted ass E^hpP^3. Pw-1 testified further that, the paries.had agreed to a ■’ h. term that the Defendant wilLMso bobble to place orders and >' 'i|h ’M|j/ r send her trucks to take^deliVe^ ofpth'e consignments from the Plaintiff's crushing.fsite [at Lugo la Quarry Site and the Plaintiff ’Ullin... . l|h would deliveni > to the*' Defendant's trucks the ordered consignment§||jvhereat each Defendant's truck driver/agent or officer accompanying the respective truck will sign the "Deliver^Notes" acknowledging to have received the materials ordered. Pw-1 tendered in court as evidence, orders made via WhatsApp Group between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and these were collectively admitted as Exh.P-4. He tendered as well, various Delivery Notes which were issued upon loading Page 7 of 25 of the materials and delivery to the Defendant. The said Delivery Notes were collectively admitted into evidence and were marked as Exh.P-5. He also tendered in court Tax Invoices raised by the Plaintiff and ledger account statements, and these were collectively admitted as Exh.P-6. Pw-1 told the court in his testimony that, the balance left unpaid up to the 27th of December 2019h|was(!fTZS M Ihf- 1,440,863.69 and, that, during the year 2020^te Defendant did, on various occasions, request bek’supplied with aggregates, base course, du(s<and "clipping of different sizes 1111. HP Mill, and quantities valued at!TZSh477yl34,985.73 inclusive the balance of TZS 1/440,863.69 carried over from the year 2019. Pw-l’htpld this court that, during the year 2020, in con'sideratioii of the already supplied materials made some part-payments of the dues to a tune of TZS 357,000,000/ = and was left with a balance of TZS 120,134,985.73/= inclusive of the unpaid sums for the year 2019. Pw-1 told this court further that, Exh.P-1 although did expire but the parties continued to transact their business on the same premises set by Exh.Pl. As such, Pw-1 told this Page 8 of 25 court that, in the year 2021, the Plaintiff supplied to the Defendant aggregates, course base materials, dust and chipping of different sizes and quantities valued at TZS 361,707,415.73 (inclusive of TZS 134,555,985.73 carried over from the year 2020). He told this court that, on account of the supplies made, the Defendant paid, on various dates, a total of TZS 150,000,000/- and was left with a 'balance of iHlIiin i1’ TZS 211,707,415.73/= which remains outstah’dipg* to date. k1' hi) I .t He told this court further that;^due i»to the failure, neglect, or refusal by the Defendant to pay the outstanding * h'1’ dt hi ( balance, the Plaintiff ((hbsl ((suffej£cl great inconveniences, II ? including but nob’ limited tos denied use of her monies, numerous folJoyy-upsjlifailure to meet financial obligations to ‘h>r I*'*1’ her other suppliers and, therefore, the claim for general /............ "'Ji... darhages. Since the matter proceeded ex-partef there were no Illi cross-examination of Pw-1. As for Pw-2, his testimony was that he was employed by the Plaintiff since September 2018 and was/is stationed at the Plaintiff's quarrying site at Lugoba, Dar-es-Salaam. Pw-2 testified to have loaded the Defendant's trucks No. T.518CAD Page 9 of 25 driven by Mr. Adam Mayenga and T.848 BZE driven by Mr. Jafari Rashidi. According to Pw-2 the Defendant's drivers got issued with Delivery Notes, No. 15153 and 15152 and the duplicated copies thereof were sent to the Plaintiff's Head Office where Tax Invoices were issued. He told this court that,9 the Defendant did use different trucks driven by otheh||different drivers as well. V ' J ' 1 At the closure of the Plaintiff's cake, ttys court granted the Plaintiff time to file closing||subm^siqns upon prayer by Mr. iflh ^lih Odhiambo to do so. On^the 07>th ofjBdne 2023, this matter was il ‘ set for necessary orders and Mr. Michael Kabekemba, learned llh advocate appealed forrj^Jae Plaintiff and told the court that, the Plaintiff doeshnot wish to file closing submissions. I thus set this matter- [or Judgment on this 6th of July 2023. As one of the settled principles of law, he who alleges any fact must prove it. This cardinal rule of evidence embodies what is referred to as the concept of burden of proof and does apply equally even in a situation where a suit is adjudge ex- parte. Since it is an accepted principle that no suit can be decreed as a matter of course, and every judgment must be Page 10 of 25 on merits, even if a suit is heard ex-parte, the Plaintiff must prove her case and must stand on her own legs. There cannot be an automatic decree simply because a suit is heard ex- parte. In the Indian case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya V/s Anil Pajwani, AIR 2003 SC 2508, while considering the provisions of Order IX, Rule 6 and Order VIII, Rule^lO of the llh» 'hf^ Indian CPC, the court observed that, even if me *stiit|proceeded <!‘iL t ex-parte under Order IX, Rule 6 of the ‘GfC, .the necessity of proof by the Plaintiff of its ca,^ cannot be dispensed with. IN yet another Indian case'^of MayahDevi V/s Lalta Prasad, 1,1 l|| <f (2015) 5 SCC 588,,fit iias held^that the absence of defendant to contest thpisjjit doeknot invite a punishment in the form of an automatic! decree. ......... Il, I . From) the foregoing discussion, the law, therefore, is 'll,. / I .. . . , |_1 KU I- I-I r clear that, there is a burden placed on the shoulders of whoever party to a suit who intends that this court should rule in favour of him and not the other party. In the present case before me, the provisions of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 R.E 2019, specifically sections 110, 111 and 112 thereof, are all alive to that legal requirement. Page 11 of 25 The second aspect concerns here is the parameters used or relied on to gauge proof in civil matters as the one at hand. The principle is that unlike in criminal cases where proof must be beyond reasonable doubt, proof in a civil suit, like the one at hand, is to be on the balance of probability. It follows, therefore, that, once the Plaintiff discharges the, burden of proving its case on the scales of probability, the Pliaintip'will carry the day in court. h pmhip'* ■*fI h, I Having said that, can it be said that the’’Pla intiff in this jiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiihhi ' f 11 case has been able to prove case^tp that required standard Hi of proof in civil cases'?^* tes^ponsb’to that will invite one to i|. '' examine the evidence'llaid before the court and by evaluating it considering!the issu^s(<raised to guide the process, the facts r .. .. . ..... . .. . of the case Ind the applicable law; one will then be able to sett! e the scores. That is indeed what this court is ready to embark on shortly. As stated herein, earlier this court had agreed to and recorder four issues which will guide determination of this suit. The first issue was: Page 12 of 25 (a) Whether there was a contract of supply of aggregates/building materials between the two parties. According to the Law of Contract Act, Cap.345 R.E 2019, all agreements are contracts if they are made by free consent of the parties who are competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object armare nqt5 on the verge of being declared void. That, imtannutshe1l, is the h i whole essence of section 10 of the 'Law of^ Contract Act, Cap.345 R.E, 2019. From the law of contract vi^pbint as well, agreements or contracts are commenced when there is an offer from one party (the offepr), ah'd;, in terms of section 7 of the Contract r 1 K 'th'' Act; for such’|ambffef'to become a binding promise, it must be absolutely accepted by the offeree. The manner in which acceptance is made or communicated, if one looks at what section 8 of the Law of Contract Act provides, include performance or by conduct of a party. Under section 5 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, Cap.214 R.E 2002, it is provided, for instance, that, in the making of a contract of sale, such contract may be in writing (either with Page 13 of 25 or without seal) or by word of mouth or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth or may be implied from the conduct of the parties. See the Case of Zanzibar Telecom Ltd vs. Petrofuel Tanzania Ltd, Civil Appeal No.69 of 2014 (Unreported). From the above considerations, it follow^, therefore II that, in essence, whether there be or even withoutha formal ’llnihn, written agreement, when a party proves ’to hav^‘ supplied ,r hjr r ’L goods to another for a price (consideration)),»’*and the other party receives and retains such goods, one may readily draw 'H|h 'ih.' (dh hl * a conclusion that, the tjW'6 panties’jare in a contract of supply. di ‘ hi» (See this court's decision in the case Kibogate Tanzania Limited vs. Grandtech (T) Ltd, Commercial Case No. 32 of 2021 (unreported). | Fromjjthe testimony of Pw-1 and according to Exh.P-1, Exh.PZ; Exh.P4, Exh.P5 and Exh.6, there is no doubts whatsoever that, the parties had a contract of supply of construction materials in the form of aggregates and other related rock bases crushed products used in the construction industry. Page 14 of 25 It is worth noting, however, that, in his testimony, however, Pw-1 told the Court that, Exh.P.l expired. Indeed, according to Exh.P-1, its duration was from August 2019 to April 2020. In the eyes of the law, once a contract has expired, it no longer exists. However, the same can be renewed but the renewed contract is not merely an extension of(a previous contract, but it effectively become a new contract^that tin. %«'' recreates the previous and now-renewed coiptracW]ii<*,‘ Mu*’’ <’ i1*h|j 11 In the case at hand, Exh.P-1 di’d{|not|h'ave a renewal _>* 4* clause and nowhere is it said ,tl|iat thejparties signed a renewed II1’’ uHi I h ' contract in writing. N()n’e bf^that|!s’ort was tabled in court. Nevertheless Pw-lfdikttestify4hat, the parties continued to transact basednon A* theferms sH’ and conditions of the old contract (Exh.Pl). Etid such a conduct constitute a renewal (re- creation) ofjithe expired contract (Exh.P-1)? The answer is "Yes", 'it was a disguised or implied renewal of the terms and conditions prescribed under the old contract (Exh.P-1) but making a whole new contract from the dates post the expiry. In the case of Mr. Erick John Mmari vs. M/s Herkin Builders Ltd, Commercial Case No. 138 of 2019 Page 15 of 25 (Unreported) ruling dated 11th May 2020), this Court stated that, in a contracting scenario, once the initial contract expires: "anything done post the expiry date amounts to a new arrangement which many constitute a new contract impliedly under the same old terms." As the evidence tabled in courrhk indicates, ^iij,’lit),'1z notwithstanding the fact that Exh.P-1 expifednby April 2020, y .P’zinp- the parties continued to transact business ari’jd ,Exh.P-4 does J’ prove that fact. Exh.P-4 was .admitted having complied with the requirements of section l&li^y 'and (2) the Electronic Transactions Act, 2015. In thel’case of Mr. Erick John Mmari .z -Ihi / (supra), this court "did state that as a well-accepted legal position thak >>’ subsequent actions, as well as words of the parties, may create a new contract after the expiry of the earlier one. In essence, the key to establishing such a fact is to look at the conduct of the parties, judging them objectively and with an eye to Page 16 of 25 find out how consistent their conduct is with the terms of the old contract." In the suit at hand, therefore, there is no doubt, by looking and judging at the conduct of the parties post the month of April 2020, as evinced by Exh.P2, Exh.P4, Exh.P5 and Exh.P6, that, the parties had a legally binding J contract. Since the parties continued with their transactions-even/after the Exh.P-1 had expired, my findings are fhatTtheir conduct post-expiry had the effect of constituting cp’new contract, impliedly under the same ExhIP-1/shterms and conditions. It hh •* follows, therefore, that,4ne first issue is responded to in the affirmative. The second issue,is: H• 'HI ' M "m.'Wnether there was breach thereof. What! is a breach of contract? A breach of contract is a situatiWwhere a party to that contract fails to abide by what was agreed. In Katarama Electrical Services Co. Ltd vs. TIB Development Bank Ltd, Land Case No. 41 of 2015 (unreported), the Court, citing the case of Joachim vs. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110, held that the debtor is duty bound to find the creditor and pay him when the debt is Page 17 of 25 due. Failure to do so will mean that, the debtor is in breach of its obligations under the contract. In the present suit at hand, there is no doubt that the Defendant was supplied with building materials in form of aggregate, CRR, base course, dust and other related rock crushed products used in the construction works and has failed .■''lib, 1], to pay to date. Essentially, the necessity to honour wnatjWasiragreed by the parties to a contract cannot be overemphasized. As the .dHIlIHHIIllIillillhh ’ i‘ hi Supreme Court of Canada j^ce suggested in the case of "Hh Bhasin vs. Hrynew Z^l^SCfE' 7 7r,||c6ntracting parties have "a ll ‘ duty of honesty imContractuahjDerformance", and have "good faith as an organizingferinciple" in the common law of contract. Each party/lhitherefore, is expected to hounour his/her Ohj’’’ f *h / obligations to the letter. Tn11 our jurisdiction, however, such a requirement constitutes a fundamental or cardinal principle in the law of contract fully enshrined under section 37(1) of the Law of Contract, Act, Cap.345 R.E 2019. In that regard, the law requires parties to any lawful agreement to strictly perform their obligations as agreed in their contract. Page 18 of 25 As per the testimony of Pw-1 and Exh.P-3, Exh.P5 and Exh.P6, the Defendant remains a debtor to the Plaintiff and, since the Defendant failed to pay the outstanding balance to date, that failure amounts to breach of the parties' contractual terms. The second issue is, therefore, responded to in the affirmative as well. The third issue is: Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages a result of breach of such a czontract. ■'hh J1’ Unlike for equitable .-remedies such as specific performance, damages fprthloss iikajrbreach of contract claim d1’’ ,,.i| || Z are available as of riglpt. It fol pfe that, an innocent party has a right to claim damages from the party in breach in respect |p(’ of all breaches of contract. It matters not whether the 'im damages are nominal or substantial. Ik II1 MlHqwever, nominal damages will be awarded where the innocent party has suffered no loss because of the other party's breach while substantial damages are awarded as monetary compensation for loss suffered due to the other party's breach. Page 19 of 25 It is as well settled principle that, an innocent party in a claim of breach of contract may only recover damages for loss suffered because of the breach provided that such loss is not too remote. The principle of remoteness was adeptly considered in the century old case of Hadley vs. Baxendale ([1854] 9 Exch. 341) where it was observed that recoverable h. losses will include all loss which flows naturally from the breach I’1 as well as all loss which were in the contemplation of the .('•/ ‘ik Mi’li*,r <r parties at the time the contract was made as a probable result of the breach. lb Generally, therefore, purpose’’of awarding damages to I j IH11 i I T bpntract’is to put him in the position he would have ^epn habhtfie contract been properly performed. I’’ * Under secticitoj?^1® of the Law of Contract Act, Cap.345 R.E 201(9, the lldw is quite instructive as regards payment of damages to atone for the losses suffered because of the breach. It states that: "73.-(1) Where a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the Page 20 of 25 contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it." It is worth nothing that, in law, damages Mare either specific or general. As a matter of legal requirement, general damages must be pleaded but the assessment is left to the discretion of the court. Hoover,’’t^nlike specific damages, lih which need to be not cjn'fy pleadeyand proved, once pleaded ill general damages need [not befproved. See th^leases o^ooper Motor Corporation Ltd vs. Moshi/Aru^ba’IBScupation Health Services [1990] TLR 96 ■( ’ k J’ and Fredrick Wanjara, M/S Akamba Public Road Service Limited A.K.A Akamba Bus Service vs. Zawadi Juma Mruma, Civil Appeal No. 80 of 2009 CAT (Unreported). In the pleadings filed by the Plaintiff and according to the testimony of Pw-1, the Plaintiff has claimed to have suffered great inconveniences, including but not limited to denied use of her monies, numerous follow-ups, failure to Page 21 of 25 meet financial obligations to her other suppliers and, therefore, the claimed for general damages. As I stated earlier herein above, the position of the law about payment of general damages is that to be eligible for general damages, the Plaintiff should have suffered loss or inconvenience to justify award of general damages. In my view, there is no doubt that the Defendant’has been holding the Plaintiff's monies for nqt paying for the a' supplies made to her and, as a matter ofpbommonsense, business-related monies held)(as an‘unpaid debt to a claimant ''llh, 'r , . . ''Ih» X.J I ■ . . . are monies given a denied use>smcethe claimant as a business i b* minded person would wish tofireinvest his earnings to expand <‘!lbhh Hhiimi’’1 his business .and the like.* ill 1 It follows, therefore, that, when money is given a denied ,(l"... Hill. T 'III <f usd without there being sufficient cause, the claimant entitled to sucnHamount is also entitled to payments of compensation for such a denied use over and above any order for an immediate payment of the outstanding balances. From the foregoing, it is my finding that, since the Defendant failed to adhere to the requisite principles governing her contractual relationship with the Plaintiff and, given that Page 22 of 25 there has been material breach of the contract, the Plaintiff is entitled to general damages resulting from the Defendant's breach of contract and for the sufferings and inconveniences which ensued thereafter. On that account, the third issue is responded to affirmatively. However, since the Plaintiff pleaded to tje awarded ■■'4 ii. general damages, in assessing the amount payable'as general (h damages suffered due to the denied use of theJaitplint which the Defendant ought to have timely paidijthe Plaintiff, it is my "h. view that, such assessment sjjipuld 'b(e cjiven a general value, hjh <hf (11 'll. It follows, therefore, giyerV'the natafe and the circumstances |f ',,M 1’ ** .casekat surrounding the..'•llh, hand and the evidence so far ''llllllllllll'' ilh marshalled tpse^tablisn|jthe alleged breach of contract, I hereby proceed to assess the amount payable as general damages at tzs 5,ooomoo.oo. III. ' [I Lastly is the fourth issue regarding the kind of reliefs the to which the parties are entitled. Essentially, a party entitled to relief is the party who has successfully established his/her case to the required standards. As I stated herein earlier, the standard applied in proof of civil claims is on the balance of probability. Page 23 of 25 In this instant suit at hand, it is my staunch findings that, what the Plaintiff is claiming from the Defendant is highly probable than not. As such, the Plaintiff has successfully proved her case to the required standard and is entitled to judgment and decree as prayed. In the upshot of the above, this court does hereby grant judgment and decree in favour of the Plaintiff and'brdersthe 'Hhu*1 ~ r , pHlhl!.,. J Defendant to: 1 ' FFff ,,l‘ I'm'1 '' -h. ■<! '•», ■r- ’h 1. Pay the Plaintiff'h>. TZS 211,707,415.73" tfeing principal 'b? ■‘lib '!'r sum overdue resulting' from the y-'1" -iF F Plaintiff's supply-df building materials (F td'the Defendant; .... F^/l'pay interest on the above item No.l h if t* hF 'hp’H'ru’ ''HL at the agreed commercial rate of 18% h> F' !j| 1 per annum from the 05th day of May pif 2021 to this date of the Judgement; 3. pay interest on the decretal sum at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of this Judgment to the date of full and final payment; 4. pay the Plaintiff General Damages to the tune of 5,000,000/=; and, Page 24 of 25 5. pay the Plaintiff all Costs associated to the conduct of this suit. It is so ordered. DATED AT DAR-ES-SALAAM ON THIS 06th DAY OF JULY 2023 Page 25 of 25