JUDGMENT CIVIL APPEAL NO

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DOPOMA (CORAM: KOROSSO. J.A.. RUMANYIKA. J.A.. And ISSA. 3.A.T CIVIL APPEAL NO. 680 OF 2023 HADIJA SAID ..........................................................................APPELLANT VERSUS GODGREY MGETA ATHUMAN................................................ RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania at Dodoma) (Kaaomba. J.^ Dated the 20th day of October, 2022 in Land Appeal No. 46 of 2021 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 11th & 18th March, 2025 KOROSSO, JA.: In this appeal, the appellant Hadija Said faults the decision of the High Court (the first appellate court) on four grounds of appeal which essentially give rise to the following complaints: One, failure to address the lack of locus standi on the part of the appellant. Two, failure to address the absence of the evidence of Daudi Hassan Mbugha (the discharged 2nd respondent at the trial) who was the one who sold the disputed land to the respondent. Three, failure to consider that the appellant and her husband had built a house and have been in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute for more than twelve (12) years; and four, not considering that the documentary exhibits produced by the respondent were false denying the appellant an opportunity to produce the owner of the land in dispute as a witness. The background to this appeal is that the respondent filed a suit at the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Singida (DLHT) against the appellant (the 2nd respondent then) and Daudi Hassan Mbugha (who is not part of this appeal and was the 1st respondent then) claiming that he was the lawful owner of a piece of land measuring 12.85 metres North, 9.50 metres South, 19 metres East and 19 metres West, located at Utemini Street, Utemini Ward, within Singida Municipality, Singida Region (disputed land) having purchased it from the then 1st respondent. The respondent further claimed that the appellant had invaded the suit land and constructed a house there without his permission. The reliefs sought by the respondent included a declaration that he was the lawful owner of the disputed land; permanent eviction of the appellant and the then 1st respondent and their agents, assignees or any other person working under their instructions; costs; and any other reliefs the Tribunal deemed just and equitable to grant. In his lodged written statement of defence, Daudi Hassan Mbugha, conceded to the suit, saying that he had sold the disputed land to the respondent on 6/3/2020 and attached a sale agreement to augment his position. Notably, in view of the said concession to the suit, on 13/10/2021, upon a prayer from Mr. Chima, learned Advocate representing the respondent, the DLHT marked as withdrawn the suit against David Mbugha. The appellant's written statement of defence disputed the suit claims and prayers stating that the suit property belonged to her husband namely Mohamed Abubakar Satu. According to her, her husband's ownership of the disputed land commenced in 2008 when he was handed the same by his father-in-law through his second wife, the late Juma Ngabu whose ownership of the disputed land started in the 1960's, having been given by his father. She acknowledged the fact that together with her husband, built a house in the disputed land between 2014 and 2021. That in 2021, the respondent appeared and put "STOP" signs on the suit premises and that thereafter, the discussions that ensued with the respondent to resolve the matter amicably were barren of fruits. On the day of hearing the appeal before us, the appellant appeared in person, unrepresented whereas the respondent enjoyed the services of Mr. Erick Christopher and Ms. Salma Hashim, learned Advocates. The appellant commenced her submissions by adopting the grounds of appeal filed. She alluded her dissatisfaction with the decision of the trial Tribunal and the High Court for not properly addressing a concern she had raised at the inception of the trial of lacking locus standi to stand as party in the suit since the disputed property belonged to her husband and she only worked on it and supervised construction of the house. Amplifying her second complaint that addressed her dissatisfaction with both the trial Tribunal and first appellate court for believing the evidence of Daudi Mbugha that he sold the disputed land to the respondent without any documentary evidence to support such claims. Regarding the third complaint, she argued that the documents tendered by the respondent to substantiate his claims did not have any bearing on the issues for determination and that some were improperly admitted since they were either not stamped or lacked authenticity. On the fourth complaint, the appellant condemned the trial Tribunal and first appellate court for failing to consider that the land had been in her husband's possession for more than 12 years without any disturbance or dispute. Thus, she prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs. On the respondent's side, Mr. Erick Christopher and Ms. Salma Hashim, who submitted interchangeably, commenced resisting the appeal, however, upon further reflections, conceded to the first ground. Mr. Christopher argued that considering the pleadings before the trial tribunal, the issue of lack of locus standi on the part of the appellant should have been addressed first. Ms. Hashim contended further that failure of the trial Tribunal and the first appellate court to consider and determine the concern vitiated the trial. Taking into account that the locus standi of the appellant to stand as the respondent in the trial proceedings was uncertain, he argued that in the interest of justice, the proper remedy is for the Court to invoke its revisional powers under section 4(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap 141 (the ADA) and nullify the proceedings of the DLHT and the High Court and set aside the Judgments and Orders from the trial stage without costs. The appellant had no rejoinder, only urging the Court to consider the grounds of appeal and allow the appeal. Delving into determination of this appeal, having in hand the submissions from both parties and the record of appeal, we are of the view that determination of the issue of whether or not the appellant had locus standi to stand as a party in the matter currently before the Court is pertinent. Locus standi is a person's legal right or ability to bring a legal action in a court of law, or to appear in a court. Without it, a person is seen as ineligible to be part of a case either for or against. In the case of Peter Mpalanzi v. Christina Mbaruka, Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2019 (unreported), the Court observed: "Locus standi is a rule o f equity that a person cannot maintain a suit or action unless he has an interest in the subject matter. Unless a person stands in a sufficient dose relation to the subject matter so as to give a right which requires protection or infringement o f which he brings the action, he cannot sue on i t " Indeed, it was held in the case from Malawi, Attorney General v. Malawi Congress Party and Another, Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1996 which the Court made reference to in the case of The Registered Trustees of SOS Children's Villages of Tanzania v. Igenge Charles and 9 Others, Civil Application No. 426/08 of 2018: "Locus standi is a principle which is a jurisdictional issue, it is a rule o f equality that a person cannot maintain a suit or action unless he has an interest in the subject o f it, that is to say, unless he stands in sufficiently dose relation to it so as to give a right which requires prosecution or infringement o f which he brings the action." Certainly, locus standi is a crucial issue in every proceeding, and therefore the person suing has to show that he has locus standi to sue, and the same for the person being sued. (See, Gervas Masome Kulwa v. The Returning Officer and Others (1996) TLR 320 and Lujuna Shubi Ballonzi Senior v. Registered Trustees of Chama cha Mapinduzi (1996) TLR 203). Therefore, without prevaricating, the propriety or otherwise of the proceedings and judgment of the trial Tribunal and the first appellate court depended on the parties before it having locus standi as held in the case of Omary Yusuph (Legal Representative of the late Yusuph Haji) v. Albert Munuo, Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2018 (unreported) that: "...the existence o f legal rights is an indispensable pre-requisite o f initiating any proceedings in a court o f law." It is on record that in his pleadings before the trial Tribunal, the respondent (then the applicant) claimed to own the disputed land, having bought it from Daudi Hassan Mbugha on 6/3/2020 and that the said land was later invaded by the appellant to the extent of constructing a house. While the then 1st respondent had conceded to the claims, the appellant had clearly shown she was not claiming ownership of the disputed land, and her interest in it was only as a spouse to the one she claimed owned the land. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of her written statement of defence, she stated: "2 That, the contents o f paragraph 7(a)(i) o f the applicant's application are strongly disputed and the applicant is put to strict proof thereof. However, the 2nd respondent avers that her husband, namely MOHAMED ABUBAKAR SATU, started to own the suit premises since 2008 after being given the same by his father-in-law, namely JUMA NGABU, the late. 3. That, in addition to what has been stated in paragraph 2 above, the 2nd respondent further states that, while her husband was given the suit premise it was not surveyed to date and his father in law who gave her husband started to own the same since 1960's whom also was given the same by his father since time immemorial and 4th August, 2021 wrote a letter to the Director o f Singida Municipal for its plot being surveyed...." [Emphasis Added] The reproduced excerpt above reveals that the appellant categorically stated that she was not the owner or possessor of the suit property; and that it belonged to her husband. As stated earlier, it is well settled that in any civil proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate that he/she has locus standi over the disputed matter, likewise the respondent/defendant has a duty to inform the court or tribunal that the applicant/plaintiff has sued a wrong person. Which is what the appellant did in the instant case as shown above. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, para 49 at pg. 52 cited in the case of Re: I.G. Farben industries AG Agreement [1943] 2 All ER 525, the issue was discussed and it was held that in order to maintain proceedings successfully, a plaintiff or an applicant must show not only that the court has power to determine the issue, but also that he is entitled to bring the matter before the court against a person capable to comply with the final court order. The position above was discussed at length in the case of Lujuna Shubi Balonzi Vs. Registered Trustees of Chama Cha Mapinduzi [1996] TLR 203, where it was held: - "In this country, locus standi is governed by the common iaw. According to that law, in order to maintain proceedings successfully, a plaintiff or an applicant must show not only that the court has power to determine the issue but also that he is entitled to bring the matter before the court: Courts do not have power to determine issues o f general interest: They can only accord protection to interests which are regarded being entitled to legal recognition. They will thus not make any determination o f any issue that is academic, hypothetical, premature or dead. Because a court o f law is a court o fjustice and not an academy o f law, to maintain an action before it a litigant must assert interference with or deprivation of, or threat o f interference with or deprivation of, a right or interest which the law takes cognizance of. Since courts will protect only enforceable interests, nebulous or shadowy interests do not suffice for the purpose o f suing or making an application. O f course, provided the interest is recognised by law, the smallness o f it is immaterial. It must also be distinctly understood, I think. That not every damage or toss can be the subject matter o f court proceedings". In the instant appeal, while the record shows that the trial Tribunal discharged the 1st respondent upon the respondent's withdrawal of the suit against him subsequent to his concession to the suit claims, we have failed to find any deliberation related to the appellant's disclaimer on ownership of the land and her legal stance in the suit. Considering that appellant as the 1st respondent at the trial, stated categorically in her pleadings that the suit land belonged to her husband, we are of the view that the issue of whether she was the right party to be sued as the respondent should have been addressed and determined at the earliest opportunity. It was unfortunate that this anomaly was also not addressed by the first appellate court. In that regard, in light of the above, in absence of any evidence to show the appellant's interest in the land apart from her working there, we have failed to find any other right or interest in that property to warrant being sued by the respondent as the one to have invaded the suit land. The institution of the suit by the respondent against the appellant, who had no locus standi\ we find, was erroneous. For the foregoing, we allow the appeal and consequently, quash the proceedings of both the trial DLHT and the High Court and set aside the resultant Judgments. The respondent if he so desires, may pursue his rights over the suit land against a proper person in accordance with the dictates of the law. Considering the circumstances of the matter, we make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 17th day of March, 2025. W. B. KOROSSO JUSTICE OF APPEAL S. M. RUMANYIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. A. ISSA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 18thday of March, 2025 in the presence of the appellant in person and in the absence of the respondent is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. D. P. KINYWAFU DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL