mkora vs chief secretary presidents office and others 2009 tzhc 6 25 june 2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA AT OAR ES SALAAM MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 38 OF 2003. MR. HAMIS A. E. MKORA APPLICANT VERSUS THE CHIEF SECRETARY PRESIDENTSOFFICE & OTHERS ... RESPONDENT Date of last Order: 29/5/2009 Date of Judgment: 25/06/2009 RULING Mlay, J. The Applicant HAMISI A. E. MKORA has filed a Memorandum of Review seeking the review of the Ruling of this court dated 18/8/2006, in which an earlier application made by the same applicant for extension of time, for leave to apply for prerogative orders and for the granting of the order of certiorari to quash the decisions of various authorities, was dismissed. There is only one ground put forward for the proposed review, which is: "The order of the Honourable court confined itself to a single prayer found in item (i) of paragraph (b) of the chamber summons which touched on the alleged decision of the President ..... leaving matters in item (ii) and (iii) of the same paragraph which touched on the decisions of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents .... unconsidered and undetermined". After this court had dismissed a preliminary objection to the application for review, this court decided to hear the parties on the proposed review, by way of written submissions. In the Applicants submissions it was argued that in the dismissed application the Applicant had applied for certiorari to quash the decisions of: (i) The President dated 18/1/2003 (ii)The Minister of Land Government dated 19th October 2000 (Hi) Of the Local Government Commission dated 12th November 1998. The Applicant contended that in the dismissed application, this court only considered the purported decision of the President and the decisions of the Minister and of the Commission escaped the attention of the court in coming to its decision. The applicant submitted that the non- consideration of the decisions of the Minister and of the Commission had a decisive effect on the application before the court, because if they had been considered ant found to be of merit, the court would not have dismissedthe application. The Applicant referred to Order XLII Rule (1) (b) of the Civil Procedure Code and submitted that it "allows review on, inter alia the grounds of errors apparent on the fact of the record". The Applicant further quoted form Mulla s Code of Civil Procedure 7th Edition, writing on I Order 47 Rule 1 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code which, is in pari materia with our Order XLII Rule (1) (b). The essence of the Applicants submission relied on a passage in Mulla's treatise at page 663where it isstated: "Where the judgment did not effectively deal with or determine an important issue in the case, it can be reviewed on the ground of error on the face of the record". Based on the above passage, the Applicant submitted that "the important issue not considered here is whether the decisions of the Minister and of the Commissioner were decisions capable of being quashed by certiorari, if leave is granted". The Respondent's through submissions filed by the Attorney General, opposed the application for review. The Respondents pointed out that the chamber summons for the dismissed application had, among us prayers the following prayers..... (I) "an extension of time to file an application for orders of certiorari and mandamus, (2) "Court may be pleased to grant leave to the Applicant to file for an order of certiorari to remove ....." The Respondents argued that what ought to have been considered was the extension of time. They further argued that the chamber Summons containing 4 prayers was contrary to Order XL III Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore an incompetent application. Alternatively but without prejudice, the Respondents submitted that the remaining items (b) (ii) and (b) (iii)which were not dealt with by the court, have a fundamental illegality. They pointed out that in item (b) (ii) which challenges the decision of the Minister of Local government, the decision was given on 19/10/2000 while the decision of the Commission of Local Government referred to in item (b) (iii) was made on 12/11/1998. The Respondents contended that the application for extension of time was filed on 15/6/2003 approximately seven years after the first decision and three years after the second decision. The Respondents invited this court to take judicial notice of he lateness of the application which offends section 19 (2) of the Law Reform Fatal Accidents Miscellaneous ProvisionsAct, Cap 310 R.E2002.The said provisions limit the time for bringing applications for prerogative orders to six months. In essence, the Respondents argued that the period of limitation applied to both the decisions of the Minister of Local Government and of the Local Government Commission which the Applicant intended to challenge by way of certiorari. They submitted that there is only one decision which this court could have reached which is dismissing the application. The Applicant filed further submissionsas a rejoinder but having duly considered them, they do not add anything new. Upon scrutiny of the Chamber Summons relating to the dismissed application, the application was for the following orders: a) That this Honourable court be pleased to EXTENDTIMEto file an application for orders of certiorari and Mandamus. b) That this Honourable court may be pleased to GRANTLEAVEto the Applicant to file the application an order of certiorari to remove to the High Court and quash the decision made by: (i) The President of the United Republic of Tanzania dated 18th January 2003 . (ii) The Minister for Local Government dated 19th October 2002.... (iii) The Local Government Service Commission dated 12th November 1998 . c) That this Honourable court may be pleased to grant an order of mandamus restoring the Applicant to hisemployment . d) That costs of this application be granted. On the face of the Chamber summons it is clear that the application lumped together, at least three applications in one. The first application was for extension of time to file an application for prerogative orders, the second for the grant of leave to apply for prerogative orders. Thisparticular application was again subdivided into three parts, meaning that the proposed leave was to bring an application to quash three separate decisions, one made by the President, the second by the Minister for Local Government and the third the decision made by the Local Government Commission. In the ruling dated 18/8/2006, this court found that "the application for extension of time and for leave to apply for the orders of certiorari and mandamus, relate to an alleged decision of the President made on 18th January 2003"... and for that reason, since for the chamber summons was filed on 15/5/2003, the period of sixmonths within which to file an application for leave to apply for prerogative orders, counting from 18th January 2003, had not lapsed. The court therefore found that there was no need for extension of time in which to apply for leave. In this regard, this court clearly only considered the application in respect of an extension of time in which to apply for leave to challenge the decision the President dated 18/1/2003. This court did not consider the application for extension of time in so far as it related to leave to apply for prerogative orders to challenge the decisions of the Minister or of the Local Government Commission. We agree with the Applicants submission that this is was an error on the face of the record, as this court did not deal with all the matters raised in the application. Again, in dealing with the application in so far as it related to the granting of leave to apply for the prerogative orders, again this court dealt with the application only in so far as it concerned the decision of the President dated 18/1/2003. Thiscourt found and the applicant had conceded that the president "had no powers to entertain the appeal" and for that reason, there was no basis for applying for the orders of certiorari and mandamus to quash a decision which was not made or to compel the President to perform a duty which the law has not conferred powers upon the President to perform. It was on this ground that the application for leave to apply for the prerogative orders was dismissed. This court did not consider the question of granting leave to the applicant to challenge the remaining two decisions by way of prerogative orders. Again we agree with the Applicant that this was an error on the face of the record on the same basis as it was for the application for extension of time to apply for leave. The two situations therefore warrant this court to take a second took at its ruling dated 18/8/2006, in order to also dispose of the issueswhich were overlooked. The Respondents have argued that the application was incompetent for lumping many applications together. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide on this issueat this stage as it should have been raised at the earliest stage during the hearing of the first application. The undetermined issues for consideration are whether the application. The undetermined issuesfor consideration are whether the applicants application for extension of time to apply for leave to apply for the orders of certiorari to quash the decisions of the Minister for Local Government and of the Local Government Commission should have been raised at this earliest stage during the hearing of the first application. The undetermined issues for consideration are whether the applicants application for extension of time to apply for leave to apply for the orders of certiorari to quash the decisions of the Minister for Local Government and of the Local Government Commission should be granted. As shown in the chamber summons, starting with the earliest decision that of the local Government Commission, the decision was made on 12/11/1998. If the Applicant intended to challenge the decision by way of judicial review, the application for leave to apply for prerogative orders should have been made at least within six (6) months of that decision. The application seeking extension of time and leave to apply for the prerogative orders was filed on 15/5/2003, which is about five years after the said decision was made. The reasons for the delay as explained in paragraph 4 (c ) and (d) of the Applicants affidavit, are as follows: (c) After the 3rd Respondents decision, the Applicant appealed to the Minister .... whose decision .... took about two years before the decision on the appeal was made. (d) After the 2nd Respondent made his decision the Applicant was not satisfied and appealed to the President ..... whose decision took more than a year ..... to be communicated to the Applicant. It is clear from the above reasons for the delay that the Applicant opted to appeal against the decision of the Local Government Commission rather that to apply for judicial review. Judicial review therefore does not lie against a decision which has already been appealed to and determined by a higher authority. In that event, an extension of time cannot be granted to bring an application for leave to apply for prerogative orders to challenge a decision which has already been considered by an appellate authority. In the final analysis, in so far as the application relates to extension of time to apply for prerogative orders to challenge the decision of the Local Government Commission, the application is miscacened and it is accordingly dismissed. We are left with the application for extension of time and for leave to apply for prerogative orders, to challenge me decision of the Minister of Local Government. The decision of this Minister was made on 19/10/2000while the application for extension of time and for leave to apply for the prerogative orders was filed on 15/5/2003, nearly three years later. Thiswas an in ordinate delay considering the period of imitation to bring an application for leave to apply for prerogative orders is six months from the date of the decision. The reason for the delay as given in paragraph 4 (e) of the Applicants affidavit, is that lithe applicant ignorantly proceeded to appeal to the President .....". It is trite law that ignorance of the law is not a defence. The Local Government Service Act No. 10 of 1982 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1991, provides in Section 14 A (d) that the Minister is the appellate authority in respect of officers employed by the Commission, like it was the case for the Applicant. There was no mechanism or provision made for appeals to the President against the decision of the Minister. Section 21 of the Law of Limitation Act, Cap 89 RE2002, provides only for exclusion of the trial during which the party has been prosecuting within diligence either another civil proceedings in court of first instance or on appeal. Prosecuting an appeal before the President is not prosecuting a proceeding before a court of law for which time has been allowed. If the Applciant intended to challenge the decision of the Minister by way of prerogative orders he should have made an application for leave within the prescribed time while still persuing his appeal to the President. The Applicant has not therefore shown good reason for the delay to apply for leave to apply for the prerogative orders to challenge the decision of the Minister. In the circumstances and for the reasons given the application for extension of time to apply for leave is dismissed. It follows that the application for extension of time having failed all the after applications which are dependent extension of time having failed all the after application which are upon an extension of time being granted,are incompetent and are accordingly struck out. The ruling dated and delivered on 18th day of August 2006, is reviewed to the extent shown above. J. I. la~ JUD 25/06/2009