Khadija Fikirini Waziri (as Administratrix of the Late Shamte Abdallah Mkumba) v Nyika Hassan Ramadhani

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA AT TEMEKE PC CIVIL APPEAL NO. 000013918 OF 2026 KHADIJA FIKIRINI WAZIRI (AS AN ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE LATE SHAMTE ABDALLAH MKUMBA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS NYIKA HASSAN RAMADHANII .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT JUDGMENT MWAIPOPO, J The background of this matter is as follows: Following the death of the late Shamte Abdallah Mkumba, who died intestate, Fikirini Waziri Tajiri was appointed as the administrator of the estate in Probate Administration Cause No. 96 of 2003 before the Ilala Primary Court. Upon his appointment, the court authorized him to administer the estate and directed the Land Office to facilitate the transfer of House No. 36, Plot No. 20, Block M, Tanga Street, Ilala, Dar es Salaam to him as the sole beneficiary, in accordance with the family distribution of the estate. Before completing the administration of the estate and the transfer of the said property into his name, Fikirini Waziri Tajiri passed away. Consequently, Khadija Fikirini Waziri, his daughter, was appointed on 25 May 2021 as the administrator to replace her late father Page. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the Appellant") and continue the administration of the estate of the late Shamte Abdallah Mkumba, including the completion of the transfer process. While the Appellant was taking steps to transfer the property, the Respondent, Nyika Hassan Ramadhani, contended that House No. 36, Plot No. 20, Block M, Tanga Street, Ilala, Dar es Salaam remained part of the deceased's estate and ought to be distributed among all the beneficiaries. Upon hearing the parties, the Primary Court held that the property continued to form part of the estate of the deceased. The court reasoned that, although the Appellant maintained that the property had already been distributed to the late Fikirini Waziri Tajiri, there was no inventory or final account filed by the former administrator to demonstrate that the administration of the estate had been completed. The court further found that the probate proceedings had never been closed. It also relied on a letter from the Ilala Municipal Council dated 26 May 2023, which indicated that, according to the municipal records, the title to House No. 36, Plot No. 20, Block M, Tanga Street had been registered in the name of the late Shamte Abdallah Mkumba since 8 October 1996. On the basis of those findings, the court concluded that the property remained part of the deceased's estate and was therefore subject to distribution among all the beneficiaries. Aggrieved by that decision, the Appellant filed Civil Revision No. 1890 of 2024 before the Temeke District Court, (One Stop Centre), contending that the Primary Court had already determined the distribution of the property in Probate Administration Cause No. 96 of 2003 and had consequently become functus officio. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the proper remedy was an appeal rather than an application for revision. The District Court upheld the preliminary objection and struck out the application for revision as incompetent. Dissatisfied with that Page. 2 decision, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal armed with four grounds as they appear herein below as follows;. 1.That, the District Court misdirected itself to sustain the Preliminary Objection which is not pure point of law. 2.That, the District Court erred both in law and fact to make findings that the Appellant was supposed to file Appeal and not a Revision. If the Court directed its mind to the law and facts it would hold the Appellant main complaints originated from the errors on face of records raised before the matter being finally determined, which could only be entertained by the higher courts by way of revision not appeal. 3.That, the District Court erred in law and facts, to make decision based only on some part of the proceedings. If it directed its mind to the law, it would discover that, it had to make findings after visiting the whole allegations raised in the proceedings, not otherwise. 4.That, the District Court misdirected itself for failure to distinguish the circumstances which lead to appeal and revision from the primary courts. When the parties appeared before me, the appellant was represented by Mr. Jamal Ali, the learned counsel, and the respondent was represented by Ms. Marry Nyasebwa, the learned counsel. The parties agreed that the matter would be decided based on written submissions. On the 1st ground of appeal, the Appellant submitted that the District Court erred in law by upholding a preliminary objection which was not founded on a pure point of law. Counsel argued that, according to the principles laid down in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law capable of disposing of the matter without requiring the court to ascertain facts or Page. 3 examine evidence. The Appellant further relied on Riziki Samwel (as Administratrix of the Estate of the Late Mama Rukia Mattasi) v Melchiad Peter Kimaro & Another, Land Case No. 2 of 2021 (HC, Moshi Registry), where the Court, citing Shose Sinare v Stanbic Bank Tanzania Ltd & Another, Civil Appeal No. 89 of 2020 (CAT), reiterated that a preliminary objection cannot be sustained where its determination depends on proof of facts or examination of evidence. It was submitted that the Respondent's objection, namely that the application for revision was incompetent because the Appellant had a right of appeal and that the court had not been properly moved, could not be determined without examining the pleadings, proceedings, ruling and annexures. Accordingly, the objection involved mixed questions of law and fact and did not qualify as a proper preliminary objection. The Appellant further argued that the ruling sought to be challenged had not conclusively determined the rights of the parties and, therefore, the issue whether the proper remedy was an appeal or revision required examination of the record. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on Eva Mdondole v Dengwa Chando, Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1995 (HC, Mbeya, unreported), where the Court held that an appeal does not lie as of right against a non-conclusive order. The Appellant therefore contended that the District Court misapplied the principles governing preliminary objections, improperly denied the Appellant an opportunity to have the revision heard on its merits, and prayed that the first ground of appeal be allowed with costs. On the 2nd ground of appeal, the Appellant submitted that the District Court erred both in law and fact by holding that the Appellant ought to have filed an appeal instead of an application for revision. Relying on section 22(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act, Cap. 11 R.E. 2023, counsel argued that the District Court possesses supervisory and revisional Page. 4 jurisdiction to examine the correctness, legality, propriety and regularity of proceedings and decisions of Primary Courts. The Appellant contended that the revision application did not challenge the merits of the Primary Court's decision but rather the legality and procedural propriety of the proceedings. It was submitted that the Primary Court had become functus officio after previously determining that the disputed property belonged exclusively to Fikirini Waziri Tajiri, yet it subsequently revisited the same issue and ordered redistribution of the property. The Appellant also complained that the Primary Court exceeded its jurisdiction by identifying beneficiaries and directing distribution of the estate, matters which, according to law, fall within the powers of the administrator. In support of those arguments, reliance was placed on H.E.R v V.L.R, Civil Revision No. 7753 of 2025 (HC, Temeke Sub-Registry), where the Court held that revision is available where no appeal lies, the right of appeal has been blocked, or where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity. The Appellant also cited DPP v Salum Ali Juma, Criminal Application No. 2 of 2005, on the circumstances in which revisional jurisdiction may properly be invoked. Further reliance was placed on Monica Nyamakare Jigamba v Mugeta Bwire Bhakome (Administrator of the Estate of the Late Musiba Reni Jigamba) & Hawa Salum Mengele, Civil Application No. 199/01/2019 (CAT), in which the Court of Appeal held that a probate court has no power to determine beneficiaries or distribute the estate, as those functions belong to the administrator. The Appellant further submitted that the Primary Court's ruling of 22 September 2023 was not a final determination because it merely directed the administrator to distribute the estate within thirty days, while the administration of the estate remained incomplete, no inventory or final account had been filed, and the probate proceedings had not been closed. Consequently, an appeal was premature, and revision was the proper remedy to challenge Page. 5 the alleged illegalities and procedural irregularities. In support of that proposition, counsel relied on Ms Farhia Abdullah Noor v Advetech Office Supplies Ltd & Others, Civil Application No. 261/16/2017 (CAT), where the Court held that revisional jurisdiction may be invoked where no appeal lies or where exceptional circumstances justify such intervention. The Appellant therefore prayed that the second ground of appeal be allowed with costs. On the 3rd ground of appeal, the Appellant submitted that the District Court erred in law by determining the preliminary objection on the basis of only part of the record while failing to consider all the material placed before it. Counsel argued that a court is under a duty to evaluate the entire record before reaching its decision. In support of that proposition, reliance was placed on Moses Mwakibete v The Editor, Uhuru & Others (1995) TLR 134 and Transport Equipment Ltd v Devram P. Valambhia, where the courts emphasized that all relevant matters on record must be considered before determining parties' rights. The Appellant further relied on H.E.R v V.L.R, Civil Revision No. 7753 of 2025 (HC, Temeke Sub-Registry), which, citing DPP v Salum Ali Juma, Criminal Application No. 2 of 2005, held that revision is available where a subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity. The Appellant contended that the District Court overlooked the very irregularities complained of in the revision application. It was submitted that the revision application specifically complained of the existence of two conflicting decisions issued by the same Primary Court concerning the ownership of House No. 36, Plot No. 20, Block M, Tanga Street, Ilala. According to the Appellant, the first decision, made in 2004, recognized Fikirini Waziri Tajiri as the sole beneficiary of the property and directed the Ilala Municipal Council to transfer the title into his name. The second decision, delivered on 22 September 2023, declared that the same property remained part of the estate of the late Shamte Abdallah Mkumba and ordered that it be distributed among all the beneficiaries. Counsel argued that the existence of these Page. 6 contradictory decisions constituted an illegality apparent on the face of the record and raised the issue whether the Primary Court had become functus officio. The Appellant maintained that the District Court failed to address this central complaint and instead confined itself to the question whether the Appellant ought to have appealed. The Appellant further relied on Yusuf Ali Yusuf @ Shehe @ Mpemba & 5 Others v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 2019 (CAT) and Scholastica Benedict v Martin Benedict [1993] TLR 1, in which it was held that once a court has finally determined a matter, it becomes functus officio and has no jurisdiction to revisit its own decision. Reliance was also placed on Gwasa A. Sebabili v Joseph Meroma, Misc. Land Application No. 11 of 2022 (HC, Bukoba), where the High Court held that the existence of two conflicting decisions on the same matter constituted an error requiring judicial intervention. The Appellant therefore submitted that, had the District Court considered the entire record and the alleged conflicting decisions, it would have found that the revision application disclosed apparent illegalities and procedural irregularities warranting the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Appellant accordingly prayed that the third ground of appeal be allowed with costs. On the 4th ground of appeal, the Appellant submitted that the District Court misdirected itself by failing to distinguish the circumstances under which an appeal lies from those in which revision is the appropriate remedy, particularly in probate proceedings. Counsel argued that probate and administration proceedings are distinct from ordinary civil suits because the administration of an estate is a continuing process involving several stages before its final conclusion. In support of that proposition, reliance was placed on Scholastica Benedict v Martin Benedict [1993] TLR 1, where the Court recognized the special nature of Page. 7 probate proceedings and the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court in matters concerning the administration of estates. The Appellant contended that, although the Primary Court had determined certain issues concerning the disputed property, the administration of the estate had not been completed or formally closed. Consequently, the District Court erred in treating the impugned ruling as though it were a final decree in an ordinary civil suit and in holding that the Appellant's only remedy was an appeal. It was submitted that, by overlooking the continuing nature of probate proceedings, the District Court failed to appreciate the scope of its revisional jurisdiction under section 22(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act, Cap. 11 R.E. 2023, thereby denying the Appellant an opportunity to challenge the alleged illegalities and procedural irregularities apparent on the face of the record. The Appellant therefore urged the Court to allow the appeal, quash and set aside the ruling of the District Court dated 16 December 2025, and remit the revision application to the District Court for determination on its merits, with costs. In response to the 1st ground of appeal, Ms. Nyasebwa submitted that the District Court properly sustained the Preliminary Objection, as it raised a pure point of law concerning the Appellant’s right to appeal and the improper invocation of revisional jurisdiction. Relying on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, she argued that a preliminary objection is proper where it raises a legal issue capable of disposing of the matter without requiring evidence or factual investigation. Page. 8 She submitted that the objection was based on the existence of a statutory right of appeal under the Magistrates’ Courts Act and whether the Appellant could invoke revision while that right remained available. These questions, she argued, were ascertainable from the record and the applicable law, since the Primary Court’s ruling expressly informed the parties of their right to appeal. Ms. Nyasebwa further distinguished Riziki Samwel (Administratrix of the Estate of the Late Mama Rukia Mattasi) v. Melchiad Peter Kimaro & Another, contending that the objection in that case involved allegations of fraud requiring factual investigation, unlike the present case. She also distinguished Eva Mdonole v. Dengwa Chando, submitting that the ruling challenged herein finally determined the beneficiaries, estate properties and their distribution, and was therefore appealable. Relying on H.E.R v. V.L.R., Civil Revision No. 7753 of 2025, she submitted that revision is not a substitute for appeal where a party has an available and unblocked right of appeal. She therefore maintained that the Preliminary Objection met the requirements of a pure point of law and that the District Court correctly distinguished between the circumstances warranting an appeal and those warranting revision. She prayed that the 1st ground of appeal be dismissed. In response to the 2nd ground of appeal, Ms. Nyasebwa submitted that the District Court correctly held that the Appellant ought to have filed an appeal instead of revision. She submitted that sections 43(1) and 45(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, Cap. 11 R.E. 2023, provide a statutory right of appeal against decisions of Primary Courts. Since the Appellant was a party to the proceedings, participated fully, and was expressly informed of her right to Page. 9 appeal, there was no impediment preventing her from pursuing that remedy. She argued that although section 22(1) of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction upon the District Court, revision cannot be invoked where an unblocked right of appeal exists. Relying on H.E.R v. V.L.R., Civil Revision No. 7753 of 2025, and Ms. Farhia Abdullah Noor v. Advetech Office Supplies Limited & Another, Civil Application No. 261/16/2017 (CAT), she submitted that revision is only available where there is no right of appeal, or where such right has been blocked and sufficient reasons are shown. In the present case, the Appellant had a right of appeal, was not prevented from exercising it, and had shown no exceptional circumstances warranting revision. Ms. Nyasebwa further submitted that the Primary Court’s ruling dated 22 September 2023 was a final decision, notwithstanding the direction to the Administrator to distribute the estate within thirty days. The ruling had substantively determined the lawful beneficiaries, the properties constituting the estate, and the manner of distribution; hence, the subsequent distribution was merely consequential. She distinguished Monica N. Jigamba v. Attorney General, Civil Reference No. 4 of 2019, arguing that the case concerned a decision made without jurisdiction, whereas the Appellant in the present matter challenged the correctness of the Primary Court’s decision on the beneficiaries and distribution of the estate. Such complaints, she submitted, fall within appellate rather than revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, Ms. Nyasebwa maintained that the learned District Court correctly found that the Appellant ought to have pursued an appeal and prayed that the 2nd ground of appeal be dismissed. Page. 10 In response to the 3rd ground of appeal, Ms. Nyasebwa submitted that the District Court did not err by considering only part of the proceedings, since its primary duty was to determine the competency of the Revision Application and the Preliminary Objection, rather than the merits of the alleged conflicting decisions. She argued that the authorities cited by the Appellant, namely Moses Mwakibete v. Editor, Uhuru & Others [1995] TLR 134 and Transport Equipment Ltd v. Devram P. Valambhia, concerned the duty of a court to evaluate evidence when determining substantive matters and were therefore distinguishable. Ms. Nyasebwa further submitted that if there were conflicting decisions of the Ilala Primary Court, the proper remedy was an appeal, through which the appellate court could examine the respective decisions and determine which was correct. Relying on Yusuf @ Shehe @ Mpemba & 5 Others v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 2019, she contended that issues such as functus officio are questions of law that can properly be determined on appeal. She also distinguished Gwasa A. Sebabili v. Joseph Meroma, Misc. Land Application No. 11 of 2022, arguing that it involved competing decisions of different tribunals and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, whereas in the present case the alleged conflicting decisions were made by the same Primary Court. She maintained that this did not justify invoking revision where a right of appeal existed. Accordingly, Ms. Nyasebwa submitted that the learned District Court properly considered the proceedings for purposes of determining the competency of the revision and prayed that the 3rd ground of appeal be dismissed. Page. 11 In response to the 4th and final ground of appeal, Ms. Nyasebwa submitted that the District Court properly distinguished between the circumstances warranting an appeal and those warranting revision. She argued that although probate proceedings have unique characteristics, decisions made in probate matters are not exempt from the ordinary right of appeal. Under section 22(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, revision is a discretionary remedy available only where no right of appeal exists or in exceptional circumstances. Ms. Nyasebwa acknowledged the special nature of probate proceedings recognized in Scholastica Benedict v. Martin Benedict [1993] TLR 1, but submitted that such nature does not permit a party to bypass the appellate process merely because she is dissatisfied with a probate decision. She maintained that the Primary Court’s ruling dated 22 September 2023 made substantive determinations regarding the beneficiaries and properties forming part of the estate, and was therefore appealable even though the administration of the estate had not been fully completed. She further distinguished Eva Mdonole v. Dengwa Chando, Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1995, on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory ruling which did not finally determine the parties’ rights, unlike the present case. Relying on H.E.R. v. V.L.R., Civil Revision No. 7753 of 2025, she reiterated that revision is not a substitute for appeal where an available and unblocked right of appeal exists. Ms. Nyasebwa therefore submitted that the learned District Court correctly found that the Appellant ought to have pursued an appeal rather than revision and prayed that the 4th ground and the entire appeal be dismissed with costs, and that the District Court’s ruling dated 15 December 2025 be upheld. Page. 12 The Appellant’s rejoinder in very short, was that the Respondent failed to appreciate the distinction between an appeal and revision. She maintained that the Primary Court’s ruling was not a final decision and that the circumstances surrounding the alleged conflicting decisions and the Primary Court having become functus officio justified invoking revisional jurisdiction. She therefore contended that the Preliminary Objection was not a pure point of law and ought not to have been sustained. The Appellant further maintained that the District Court erred by determining the competency of the revision without considering the entire proceedings and the alleged irregularities committed by the Primary Court. She relied on the authorities cited in her submissions and prayed that the appeal be allowed, the ruling of the District Court be set aside, and the revision application be reinstated for determination on its merits. Having considered the four grounds of appeal together, the submissions of the learned counsel for both parties, the record of the proceedings, and the ruling of the District Court, the central question for determination is whether the learned District Court Magistrate erred in sustaining the Preliminary Objection on the ground that the Appellant had an available right of appeal and, consequently, whether the application for revision under section 22(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, Cap. 11 [R.E. 2023] was incompetent. I shall begin with the 1st ground, in which the Appellant complains that the Preliminary Objection was not founded on a pure point of law. The principles governing a Preliminary Objection are well settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, a Preliminary Objection was described as one which raises a pure point of law which, if argued successfully, is capable of disposing of the matter without requiring the court to ascertain facts or examine evidence. Page. 13 In the present case, the objection raised before the District Court was that the Appellant had an available right of appeal against the decision of the Primary Court and, therefore, could not properly invoke revisional jurisdiction. The question whether a party has a right of appeal and whether revision may properly be invoked in the presence of such right is essentially a question of law. It is true that the Appellant sought to rely on the circumstances surrounding the impugned ruling, including the alleged earlier decision of the Primary Court, the issue of functus officio, and whether the ruling was final or interlocutory. However, those matters were advanced principally to justify the choice of revision over appeal. They do not alter the legal character of the Preliminary Objection itself. More importantly, the existence of the right of appeal was not a matter requiring the District Court to receive evidence from outside the record. The impugned ruling itself expressly informed the parties of their right of appeal. The Appellant was also a party to the proceedings before the Primary Court and fully participated therein. Thus, the material facts necessary for determining the objection were apparent from the court record. I therefore find no merit in the argument that the Preliminary Objection was incompetent for not raising a pure point of law. In the present case, the essential question was whether the Appellant had an available appellate remedy against the impugned decision, a matter ascertainable from the law and the record. I therefore find that the 1st ground fails. Page. 14 Turning to grounds 2nd, 3rd and 4th, the principal complaint is that the District Court wrongly held that the Appellant ought to have appealed instead of seeking revision. The starting point is section 22(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, Cap. 11 [R.E. 2023], under which the District Court has revisional jurisdiction over proceedings and decisions of Primary Courts for purposes of satisfying itself as to their correctness, legality, propriety and regularity. However, the existence of revisional jurisdiction does not mean that a party who is dissatisfied with an appealable decision is at liberty to choose revision instead of appeal. The established position is that revision is not intended to operate as an alternative to an available appellate remedy. This principle was reiterated in Ms. Farhia Abdullah Noor v. Advetech Office Supplies Ltd & Another, Civil Application No. 261/16 of 2017, where the Court of Appeal emphasized that where a party has a right of appeal, revision should not ordinarily be invoked in place of that remedy, save in circumstances recognized by law. The Court of Appeal in several occasions has warned on the use of revision as an alternative to appeal unless there are exceptional circumstances. See Mantrac Tanzania Ltd vs Junior Construction Co. Ltd & 3 others, Civil Application No. 552/16 of 2017, Kempinski Hotels S.A vs Zamani Resorts Ltd & Another (Civil Application No. 94 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 507 (12 December 2019), Felix Lendita vs Michael Longidu (Civil Application 312 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 299 (10 December 2018) and Yara Tanzania Limited vs DB Shapriya & Company Limited, Civil Application No. 345/16 of 2017 (all unreported). In the present case, there is no dispute that the Appellant was a party to Probate Administration Cause No. 96 of 2003 before the Ilala Primary Court. She participated in the Page. 15 proceedings and was expressly informed by the Primary Court that she had a right of appeal against the decision delivered on 22 September 2023. There is also nothing on record showing that she was prevented, blocked or otherwise incapacitated from exercising that right. The Appellant nevertheless contends that the ruling was interlocutory because the administration of the estate had not been completed, no inventory or final account had been filed, and the probate proceedings had not been formally closed. I am unable to accept that argument. The fact that administration of an estate may continue after a particular decision does not, by itself, make every decision rendered during the administration interlocutory and non- appealable. What is material is the substance and effect of the particular decision being challenged. In the present case, the ruling of 22 September 2023 determined the substantive dispute concerning House No. 36, Plot No. 20, Block M, Tanga Street. The Primary Court considered whether the property remained part of the estate and concluded that it did. It further directed that the property be dealt with in the distribution of the estate. The Primary Court also expressly informed the parties of their right of appeal. Therefore, although the administration of the estate might not have been completely concluded, the ruling itself determined the particular dispute concerning the status and distribution of the property. The continuation of administrative steps following that determination does not deprive the decision of its appealable character. Page. 16 The Appellant further argues that the Primary Court had previously decided that the property belonged exclusively to the late Fikirini Waziri Tajiri and that, by subsequently determining that the same property remained part of the estate, the Primary Court acted functus officio. The record shows that the Appellant's principal complaint is that there were allegedly two inconsistent decisions concerning the same property. The first decision is said to have recognized Fikirini Waziri Tajiri as the sole beneficiary and directed transfer of the property to him, whereas the later ruling of 22 September 2023 held that the property remained part of the deceased's estate. This allegation is undoubtedly a serious matter. However, the mere fact that an applicant characterizes the complaint as an illegality or an error apparent on the face of the record does not automatically convert an appealable grievance into a revisional matter. The substance of the complaint must be examined. If the complaint concerns whether the Primary Court correctly interpreted its earlier decision, whether it was entitled to revisit the status of the property, whether it became functus officio, or whether the evidence established that the property had already been distributed, those are matters which could properly be canvassed in an appeal against the ruling. In other words, the description of a complaint as an "illegality" is not, by itself, sufficient to oust the ordinary appellate remedy. The Appellant contended that revision may be exercised where a subordinate court acts without jurisdiction or with material irregularity. I accept the general proposition that Page. 17 revisional jurisdiction may properly be exercised in appropriate circumstances involving jurisdictional defects or serious irregularities. However, those authorities do not establish that revision becomes available as of right whenever an applicant alleges illegality or irregularity. The circumstances of each case must be considered, particularly where an appeal is expressly available. In the present case, the alleged functus officio, the alleged conflicting decisions and the propriety of the Primary Court's determination were matters capable of being placed before the appellate court. The Appellant was not denied an appeal; rather, she chose revision. I also find no merit in the argument that the District Court was required, at the stage of determining the Preliminary Objection, to determine the merits of the alleged conflicting decisions. The District Court was not hearing the revision on its merits. Its immediate task was to determine whether the revision proceedings were properly before it. Once it found that an appeal was available and had not been blocked, it was not necessary for it to determine whether the Primary Court had actually acted functus officio, whether the property had previously been distributed, or whether the two decisions were legally inconsistent. Those are matters going to the merits of the challenge to the Primary Court's decision. This also disposes of the 3rd ground of appeal. The Appellant complains that the District Court considered only part of the proceedings. However, a court determining a Preliminary Objection is not required to determine every substantive allegation contained in the underlying application. Its duty is to determine the objection before it. The District Court considered the impugned ruling, the status of the Appellant as a party, the express right of appeal granted by the Primary Court, and the applicable law governing revision. Those were the matters necessary to determine the competency of the revision application. Page. 18 The Appellant’s concern on the duty of a court to consider the relevant material when determining substantive rights. They do not impose an obligation upon a court determining a Preliminary Objection to determine the substantive merits of the case which the objection seeks to prevent from proceeding. As to the 4th ground, I agree with the Appellant that probate proceedings have their own peculiar characteristics and that administration of an estate may continue through different stages before the estate is finally administered. However, that proposition does not create a separate rule that an order made in probate proceedings is immune from appeal or that revision is automatically the proper remedy. The question remains whether the particular decision challenged was appealable. In this case, the Primary Court made a substantive determination concerning the disputed property and expressly granted a right of appeal. The Appellant therefore cannot rely merely on the continuing nature of probate administration to bypass that appellate avenue. I have also considered the Appellant's argument concerning the limits of a probate court in determining beneficiaries and distributing an estate. Even assuming that the Primary Court acted beyond its proper function, that allegation does not, in the circumstances of this case, justify bypassing an available appeal. The alleged error could have been raised and determined through the appellate process. The same reasoning applies to the argument based on functus officio. If the Primary Court had finally determined the ownership or distribution of the property in an earlier decision and subsequently revisited that determination without lawful authority, that would certainly Page. 19 be a matter worthy of appellate consideration. But whether such earlier decision had the legal effect asserted by the Appellant, whether it was final, and whether the subsequent ruling was inconsistent with it are matters that go to the correctness and legality of the impugned decision. They do not, in themselves, establish that the Appellant had no appellate remedy. It is significant that the District Court did not hold that it lacked revisional jurisdiction under section 22(1) altogether. Rather, it held that the jurisdiction should not be invoked because the Appellant had an available and unblocked right of appeal. In my view, that was the correct approach. Consequently, I find that the Appellant's 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grounds of appeal do not disclose any error warranting interference with the ruling of the District Court. The learned District Court properly treated the Respondent's objection as a Preliminary Objection raising a question of law and correctly held that the Appellant ought to have pursued the available appellate remedy rather than invoking revision. The appeal is therefore devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The ruling of the District Court sustaining the Preliminary Objection and striking out the revision application is upheld. Dated at TEMEKE this 27th of August 2026 . Page. 20 S. D MWAIPOPO JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 21