lazarus mirisho mafie and ms shidolya tours safaris vs odilo gasper kilenga alias moiso gasper 2010 tzhccomd 1 10 january 2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)

AT DAR ES SALAAM COMMERCIAL CASE N0.10 OF 2008 1. LAZARUS MIRISHO MAFIE...................................1st PLAINTIFF 2. M/S SH3DOLYA TOURS & SAFARIS.....................2nd PLAINTIFF

VERSUS ODILO GASPER KELENGA Alias MOISO GASPER........ DEFENDANT Date of last order. 27.05.2010 Date of final submissions-. 30.07.2010 Date of ruling. 01.10.2010

RULING MAKARAMBA, 3.: This is a ruling on a preliminary objection on a point of law the Defendant's Counsel, Mr. Albert Msando raised in this Court on the 27th day of May 2010 in the course of hearing of this suit that some e-mail the Plaintiffs' Counsel sought to tender in evidence through the 1st Plaintiff was inadmissible. On that day, the Plaintiffs Counsel, Senior Counsel Mahatane, while leading the 1st Plaintiff (PW1) in testimony in chief, sought to tender in evidence e-mail containing statements the 1st Plaintiff claim the Defendant made and which the 1st Plaintiff allege to be defamatory. Following the objection, this Court, after hearing brief oral submissions l from Counsel, directed them to conduct further research on the issue of admissibility in evidence of electronically stored information in civil proceedings and address this Court accordingly, a task they carried out with great zeal and industry for which this Court highly commend them. Their submissions and cited authorities in not a small measure have contributed towards the preparation of this ruling. Before I traverse the arguments of the learned Counsel on the preliminary point of objection, a brief background to the matter is apposite. Central to the preliminary objection are statements in an e-mail the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant sent to the Financial Manager of Rockjum per Biriding Tours o f W

orldwide Birding Adventure of South Africa on the 26th day of June 2008, informing that Manager that in the year 2007 the said South Africa tour company had made double payments to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs allege further that in the said e­ mail text the Defendant demanded a reward for revealing the fact about the alleged double payments to the South African Tour Company, and further that the Defendant had asked the South African Tour Company not to reveal the Defendant's name to the Plaintiffs' company as this may cost the Defendant, who was an employee of the Plaintiff's company, his job. The 2nd Plaintiff maintains further that anyone reading that e-mail text will inevitably understand that the 2nd Plaintiff and its Managing Director as well as that Managing Director personally knew of the entries of the double payments, and that the said Plaintiffs had deliberately kept quiet about that information with the view to retain excess payments, and further that the Plaintiff would punish any of its employee who would reveal the double 2 payments to Rockjum per Birding Tours company. By necessary implication, the Plaintiff allege further, the Defendant called the Plaintiffs dishonest persons and thieves who wantonly steal from clients, something the Plaintiff claim that it is all false. The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendant published the said false e-mail

statement to one KAREN ERASMUS and also to one ADAM in South Africa, as a result of which the Plaintiffs claim to have suffered a great deal of damage not only to their personal reputation and character but also to their tourist business generally. The Plaintiffs' claim against the Defendant is for certain sums of monies as special and general damages resulting from the alleged defamatory e-mail statement which the Plaintiffs claim was sent, made and published by the Defendant. It is the admissibility of the alleged defamatory e-mail statement which the preliminary objection the Defendant's Counsel raised concerns. The main contention of the Defendant's Counsel is that the e-mail containing the alleged defamatory statements being part of electronic evidence is not admissible in evidence in civil proceedings and should therefore be rejected. The point of law involved in the preliminary objection is that an e­ mail being part of electronic evidence is not admissible in civil proceedings. This point of law is a novel one as it has not been dealt with previously by our courts. As rightly submitted by the Defendant's Counsel, the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings is not yet part of our laws. A novel legal issue as it is obviously creates some challenges to courts which necessarily call for judicial innovation as it holds a stake in the development of the law

in so far as the admissibility of electronic evidence 3 in civil proceedings is concerned. This is the reason why this Court requested Counsel for the parties to address it on the subject in order to come up with a meaningful decision, which may set a direction for course of action in the future. The e-mail the Plaintiffs sought to be admitted as evidence to support their claim is central to the preliminary objection. This Court however is being called upon to consider the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings generally, which admittedly is not yet covered under our laws of evidence or civil procedure. There is however some limited sphere in admissibility of electronic evidence in certain specified matters in civil proceedings as well as in criminal proceedings. This Court therefore in dealing with the matter before is doing so without the benefit of any express enactment on admissibility of electronic evidence generally in other civil proceedings, and without any precedent from our courts on admissibility of e-mail to fall back on. In the course of their submissions, the learned Counsel for the parties have brought into the fore what in my view seems to be two schools of thought on the matter before this Court. The first school of thought is that of "tim id souls! shared by the Defendant's Counsel and the other school is that o f "boldspritst' shared by the

Plaintiff's Counsel. The Defendant's Counsel has framed a broad issue whether o r not electronic docum ents/records m ay be adm itted as evidence in proceedings o f civ il nature. This issue does not lend itself easily of any quick and straightforward answer. It must be appreciated however, that in this country, aside from certain restrictive amendments to the law of 4 evidence, and the decision of this Court in the case of THE TRUST BANK OF TANZANIA VS LE-MARSH ENTERPSRISES LTD. AND TWO OTHERS, Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 (unreported), which dealt with the issue " whether o r not a com puter print-out is a banker's book under the Evidence Act, 1967, there is dearth of statutory provisions and case law on admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings generally. The first task of this Court however is to examine the existing provisions in our law on admissibility of documentary evidence an d construe them broadly if possible in order to establish a set of rules to guide admissibility of electronically stored information generated for use in court of law as evidence in civil proceedings. The Defendant's Counsel in his submissions mentioned the amendment to the Evidence Act, 1967, brought about by the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) A ct o f 2006], dealing with what the Plaintiffs' Counsel see to be a "restrictive approach" as it concerned itself only

with electronic evidence and records in the banking business under the Banker's Books in the Evidence Act, 1967. This approach, restrictive as it is, in the Plaintiffs' Counsel opinion was most probably ushered in as a result of judicial advice His Lordship Justice Nsekela of the High Court of Tanzania (as he then was) gave in THE TRUST BANK OF TANZANIA VS LE-MARSH ENTERPSRISES LTD AND TWO OTHERS. Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 (unreported), a case which the Defendant' also cited in his main submissions. The Plaintiffs' Counsel on his part however, went further to explore a subsequent amendment to the Evidence Act, 1967 brought about by the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Amendments) A ct [A ct No. 15 o f2007], 5 \ amending section 40 of the Evidence Act, 1967 by adding section 40A relating to "adm issibility o f electronic evidence in crim inal proceeding^', which he contends that the Defendant's Counsel overlooked in his submissions. The Defendant's Counsel however annexed to his submissions the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Am endm ents) (No.2 ) A ct [Act No. 15 of 2007] which amended section 40 of the Evidence Act, 1967 by adding section 40A which provides as follows: "40A. In crim inal proceedings- (a) An inform ation retrieved from com puter system s, netw orks or servers; or (b) The records through surveillance o f means o f presentations o f inform ation including facsim

ile m achines, electronic transm ission and com m unication facilities. (c) The audio or video recording o f acts or behavior or conversation o f persons charged Shall be adm issible in evidence." (em phasis supplied by P lain tiff's Counsel). The argument by the Defendant's Counsel that the 2006 amendment to the Evidence Act, 1967 effected through the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Amendments) A ct [A ct No.2 o f 2006] is confined only to electronic records in relation to the banking business is also shared by the Plaintiffs' Counsel. However, even after the most current amendment to the Tanzania Evidence Act, 1967 (which is the 2007 amendment), the Defendant's Counsel contend that the Evidence Act, 1967 still does not provide for the admissibility or the receiving in evidence in civil proceedings of electronic records including e-mails except in the course of banking business. The further argument by the Defendant's Counsel is that even 6 with that, it is only upon meeting the criteria set out in the new section 78A(1) inserted by section 36 of the Amending Act No. 2/2006, which provides as follows: "36. The prin cipal A ct is am ended by adding im m ediately after section 78 the follow ing new section - "78A.-(1) a p rin t out o f anv entry in the books o f a bank on m icro­ film , com puter, inform ation system , m agnetic tape or any other form o f m echanical or electronic

data retrieval mechanism obtained by a m echanical o r other process which in its e lf ensures the accuracy o f such p rin t out, and when such p rin t out is supported by a proof stipulated under subsection (2) o f section 78 that it was made in the usual and ordinary course o f business, and that the book is in the custody o f the bank, it sh a ll be received in evidence under this A ct." (the em phasis is o f the Defendant's Counsel). The Defendant's Counsel having submitted on the shortcomings in the existing law on the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings, proceeded to explore case law on the subject. The Defendant's Counsel managed to unearth so far the only case decided by our courts which is closer to the situation at hand, that of THE TRUST BANK OF TANZANIA VS LE-MARSH ENTERPSRISES LTD AND TWO OTHERS. Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 (unreported), where the Commercial Division of the High Court of Tanzania dealt with the issue " w hether o r not a com puter print-out is a banker's book under the Evidence Act, 1967." The Defendant's Counsel however distinguished this case with the issues at hand and submitted that they do not bear any similarity. The Defendant's Counsel however, appreciated the approach His 7 Lordship Nsekela adopted in that case, who oblivious of the fact that the Tanzania Evidence Act by then was silent on the issue dealt with in

the case before him, commented that "th e law m ust keep abreast o f technological changes as they affect the way o f doing business." The Defendant's Counsel very strongly maintained however that in that case His Lordship Justice Nsekela still confined himself to technological changes that affect the banking industry, and remarked obiter that, "If w ould have been much better if the position were clarified beyond a ll doubt by legislation rather than ju d icia l intervention." As it turned out, the Defendant's Counsel further argued, the legislature in 2006 heeded to the judicial call by His Lordship Nsekela and effected the necessary amendments to the Evidence Act, 1967 to provide for admissibility of computer print-out in evidence as part of banker's books. The ruling of this Court in that case, as the Defendant's Counsel correctly submitted, and the subsequent amendment to the Evidence Act, 1967 only cured the particular issue of admissibility of electronic records in relation to the banking business, but not in all other scenarios of admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings. It seems to me however that both learned Counsel for the parties share the same sentiments on the role of our courts, which is not to develop a new area of the law of evidence. The Plaintiffs' Counsel however is of the opinion that courts should see to it indeed if there is any legal

logic why our law provides expressly on admissibility in evidence of computer print-outs in relation to the banking business and in criminal proceedings, but is silent in relation to admissibility of electronic evidence in other civil proceedings. The Plaintiff's Counsel wondered if this does not amount to creating an absurdity, which in any event needs to be cured by courts, suggesting that it is within the boundaries of the wisdom of the Court to extend the same terms and conditions to civil proceedings for admissibility of electronic evidence as in criminal proceedings, where the burden of proof is on a balance o f probabilities, a much lighter burden than in criminal proceedings where it is beyond any reasonable doubt In buttressing further his point the Plaintiffs' Counsel argued that if the legislature has already enacted a law to admit electronic evidence in criminal matters, where the burden of proof is much higher than in civil proceedings, then it will be within the boundaries of its wisdom if this Court extends to civil proceedings the same terms and conditions for admissibility of electronic evidence as for criminal proceedings. In the considered opinion of the Plaintiffs' Counsel, the Court will not be laying down for the first time a new rule as the Defendant's Counsel asserts, but it will be only extending to civil proceedings "th at which the legislature has

already done in respect o f crim inal proceedings." Otherwise there is no legal logic, in the opinion of the Plaintiffs' Counsel, why the legislature did not include the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings in section 33 of the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Am endm ents) A ct [A ct No. 15 o f 2007, an absurd lacunae unreasonably left by the legislature, which is imperative for the Courts to plug given the overwhelming and universal use of computers, e-mails, electronic storage of information, electronic print-out etc., the Plaintiffs' Counsel very happily and confidently surmised. 9 «> In his bid to show that under the existing law the admittance of electronic evidence in civil proceedings is still a raw issue posing unanswered questions not only in our courts but also in courts in other jurisdictions in countries endowed with more technologically advanced legal systems than ours, the Defendant's Counsel in his submission travelled as far as to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, where through web search managed to unearth an article discussing a legal opinion rendered by Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Chief United States Magistrate in May 2007 in the case of JACK R, LORAINE AND BEVERLY MACK VS. MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY Civil Action No.PWG-06-1893. The Defendant's Counsel however could not provide this Court with a full report of

that case. In its efforts to get to the substance of the said opinion this Court managed to uncover the web report of that case at http://indianalawbloa.com/documents/Lorraine v Markel.pdf. which is a 101 page "MEMORANDUM OPINION' handed down by Judge Grim. This case although it dealt with arbitration matters it involved an issue of admissibility of e-mail in evidence, which is similar to the issue we are dealing with presently. In that case Judge Grim however dismissed both parties' motions without prejudice for their failure to properly establish the authenticity o f e-m ail docum entation as evidence to support their case. Judge Grim however, seized the occasion to put together a comprehensive opinion on the evidentiary hurdles to be overcome in getting electronically stored information into evidence in a court of law. According to Judge Grim, it is critical for Counsel to be prepared to recognize and appropriately deal with the evidentiary issues associated 10 with admissibility of electronically stored information. In that case, Judge Grim also realized that in the United States of America cases abound regarding the discoverability of electronic records, but there is lack of comprehensive analysis of the many interrelated evidentiary issues associated with electronic evidence. As I intimated to earlier, the task of this Court is to analyze and broadly construe the existing

laws in order to establish court rules on admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings. In the considered opinion of the Defendant's Counsel, given the absence of any express authority in statutory provisions in an Act of Parliament or precedent, the present case is not one of those situations where a court may lay down a rule for the first time. The Defendant's Counsel argued further that there is so much at stake involved if electronic records are received in evidence in civil proceedings without there being in place acceptable rules and procedures for their admissibility. The Plaintiffs' Counsel much as he seems in a way to appreciate the view by the Defendant's Counsel on the stakes involved in admitting in evidence electronically stored information in civil proceedings, which stakes although the Defendant's Counsel referred to them without any further elaboration, they relate particularly to other primary rules of evidence such as the rules on hearsay, rules of authenticity; identity of the author of the document or information etc. The Plaintiff's Counsel however, is of the strong view that the present case is a fit one for the courts to lead the way by filling the lacunae in the existing laws on admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings by extending to civil proceedings th a t" which the legislature has already done u in respect o f crim inal

proceedings." The Defendant's Counsel on his part however, seems to entertain a totally different view. Picking a leaf of advice from Fitzgerald, Saim ond on Jurisprudence (12th Edition)(1966) reproduced in Introduction to the Legal System s o f East Africa, the Defendant's Counsel is of the strong view that if this Court feels inclined to develop this particular area of the law, the rules to be applicable in the present case should be those found in the existing law under the Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap.6 R.E. 2002]. The Defendant's Counsel further insisted that the e-mail statements intended to be tendered in evidence by the Plaintiffs in this suit should not be admitted, but the Court may proceed "to set down new rules fo r establishing the validity o f electronic docum entation, or electronically stored inform ation in view o f the growth in the creation, storage and sharing o f documents electronically." The. Defendant's Counsel however, wonders whether our Courts are well equipped to handle electronic evidence in view of absence of rules and procedures for the admissibility of such evidence. The Defendant's Counsel is also worried if our courts, in the absence of any express statutory enactment, can take the bold leap and exercise their powers to mould the law by taking into account technological advancements. The Defendant's Counsel insisted that there has to be specific

rules and procedures enacted by the legislature to be followed by courts in admitting electronic evidence. The Defendant's Counsel cited some examples from other jurisdictions including Kenya, the United States of America, the Philippines and the United Kingdom where such rules already exist. The Defendant's Counsel attached to his submissions a web article by Cathy Mputhia titled " When D igital 12 Evidence is Adm issible in Court' where the learned author discusses some provisions in the Kenyan Evidence Act particularly section 65 which allows the admittance of computer print outs for use in trial and section 65(6) which provides for standard of authentication needed before electronic evidence can be admitted. The Defendant's Counsel argues one of the most critical issues courts will be faced with in relation to admitting in evidence electronic evidence such as e-mail is its authenticity. According to the Defendant's Counsel any person can easily log into someone's e-mail account and create documents, even bearing a company's letter head and the president's signature. The Defendant's Counsel insisted that the Tanzania Evidence Act, 1967 does not provide for the admissibility of electronic records and there are no standards or rules set for the admissibility of such evidence in our law. The Defendant's Counsel argued further that the Plaintiffs have not even on their own

motion before filing the suit or before tendering the alleged emails in evidence, tried to establish and adhere to the standards followed in other jurisdictions so that issues such as hearsay, authenticity, relevancy, unfair prejudice, and whether the emails are original documents or duplicates would not arise. The Commercial Division of the High Court of Tanzania in Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 between TRUST BANK TANZANIA LTD AND LE-MARSH ENTERPRISES LTD, (unreported) has already developed the law by recognizing computer print outs as evidence, which is now part of our law following amendments done to the Evidence Act. The issue in that case was whether or not a computer print-out is a banker's book under the 13 Evidence Act, 1967. In that case issues of hearsay, authenticity, relevancy, unfair prejudice, and whether the emails are original documents or duplicates did not arise and there are no standards which were set by the court in that regard. The two amendments to the Evidence Act did not touch on the issue of authenticity either. There is therefore lack of set standards in that regard in our law. His Lordship Justice Nsekela in that case having cited with approval section 5 of the English C iv il Evidence A ct of 1968 on admissibility of statements produced by computers, took a very bold step of allowing in evidence a computer print-out as part of a banker's book in the

Evidence Act, 1967. Section 5 of the English Civil Evidence Act, 1968 in addition to widening the admissibility of hearsay evidence in documents produced by a computer, also made specific provision for computers. It is worth noting however, that in England, the Civil Evidence Act of 1995 has greatly simplified and relaxed the law as found in the English Civil Evidence of 1968, by encompassed electronic documents without mentioning either "d ocu m en t' or " computer,s", under its section 13 which stipulates that:- "13. In this A ct- • • • '< docum ent" means anything in which inform ation o f any description is recorded, and "copy", in relation to a document, m eans anything onto which inform ation recorded in the docum ent has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or indirectly 14 Furthermore, currently in England, the substantive provisions in the English Civil Evidence Act of 1995 allow the admission of copies of any degree of remoteness from the original by providing as follows:- " 8 .-( l) Where a statem ent contained in a docum ent is adm issible as evidence in c iv il proceedings, it m ay be proved- (a) by the production o f that document, or (b) whether o r not that docum ent is s till in existence, bv the production o f a copy o f that docum ent or o f the m aterial part o f it authenticated in such m anner as the court may approve. (2) It is im m aterial

fo r this purpose how m any rem oves there are between a copy and the original. 9. —(1) A docum ent which is shown to form part o f the records o f a business o r public authority m av be received in evidence in civ il proceedings w ithout further proof. (2) A docum ent sh a ll be taken to form p art o f the records o f a business or pu b lic authority if there is produced to the court a certificate to that effect signed by an officer o f the business or authority to which the records belong. For this purpose— (a) a docum ent purporting to be a certificate signed by an officer o f a business or p u b lic authority sh all be deem ed to have been duly given by such an o ffice r and signed by him ; and (b) a certificate sh a ll be treated as signed by a person if it purports to bear a facsim ile o f h is signature. (3) The absence o f an entry in the records o f a business or public authority m ay be proved in c iv il proceedings by affidavit o f an officer o f the business o r authority to which the records belong. (4) In this sectio n - "records" m eans records in whatever form ; "business" includes any activity regularly carried on over a period o f tim e, whether fo r p ro fit or not, by anybody (whether corporate or not) or by an individual; 15 "officer" includes any person occupying a responsible position in relation to the relevant activities o f the business or public

authority or in relation to its records; and "public authority" includes any pu b lic o r statutory undertaking, any governm ent departm ent and any person holding office under Her Majesty. (5) The court may, having regard to the circum stances o f the case, direct that a ll or any o f the above provisions o f th is section do not apply in relation to a particular docum ent or record, o r description o f docum ents or records." The English law which His Lordship Nsekela cited in Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 between TRUST BANK TANZANIA LTD AND LE-MARSH ENTERPRISES LTD, unreported) has since undergone some further development in England as evidenced by the provisions of the English Civil Evidence Act of 1995, which I have cited above. Although this case has yet to be affirmed or reversed by the highest court of the land, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, it forms an illuminating example of how a court can can embark on what has come to be popularly known as judge-made law. It is encouraging to note however, that following the decision of Justice Nsekela, the legislature in Tanzania embarked, albeit on a piecemeal basis, on a course of amending the Tanzania Evidence Act, first in 2006, vide the W ritten Law s (M iscellaneous Am endm ents) A ct [A ct No.2 o f 2006] by allowing in evidence in civil proceedings "a p rin t out o f any entry in the books o f a bank", and through the W

ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Am endm ents) A ct [A ct No. 15 o f 2007\ by allowing in evidence "a/? inform ation retrieved from com puter system s, networks or server.s" among others, in criminal proceedings. Despite this piece meal approach to legislating, the law on admissibility of electronic evidence in Tanzania is still 16 highly unsatisfactory. The main task for this Court presently is therefore to develop the law a step further by setting out guiding standards for recognizing admissibility of electronically stored evidence in civil proceedings. It is worth noting that this Court in Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 between TRUST BANK TANZANIA LTD AND LE-MARSH ENTERPRISES LTD, unreported) has already established judicially that a computer print­ out is a bankers book under the Evidence Act, 1967, which has now been legislated and therefore part of our law. In that case, this Court embarked on a journey of statutory interpretation by appreciating first that the term "bankers book' was not defined anywhere in the Evidence Act, 1967. Different however from the present case the term "document" is already defined in the Evidence Act, 1967. The first task for this Court is therefore to establish whether a computer print-out of statements contained in an e­ mail is a document in the context of our law of evidence. The learned author Tania Correia, a Legal Consultant in a web

article titled " Legal Adm issibility o f Docum entary Evidence in C ivil and Crim inal Proceeding5" (downloaded on 27/09/2010 at httD://www.ssrltd.com/WhitePaDers/Leaal%20Admi5Sibilitv%20of%20Document3rv%20Evidence%2Qin% 20Civil%2Qand%20Criminal%20Proceedinas.pdfif gives SOme quite insightful thoughts on the meaning of the term " document? and makes a distinction between admissibility and weight of evidence. In the said article, the learned author kicks off the discussion by citing a very old English case of R. V. DAYE (1908) 77UK8 659 where it was stated that: 17 { 'There is a docum ent whenever there is w riting o r printing capable o f being read, no m atter what the m aterial m ay be upon which it is im pressed or inscribed." According to the above illustration, documents cover any record of evidence or information and are not limited to pieces of paper. In terms of section 3 of the Tanzania Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap.6 R.E. 2002], a "document!" means: "any writing, handwriting, typew riting, printing, photostat, photograph and every recording upon anv tangible thing, anv form o f com munication or representation by letters, figures, m arks or sym bols or by more than one o f these means, which m ay be used for the purpose o f recording any m atter provided that such recording is reasonably perm anent and readable by sight; (the em phasis is o f this Court). And according to

section 4 of the Interpretation o f Laws A ct [Cap.l R.E. 2002], a "document": "includes any publication and any m atter w ritten, expressed, or described upon any substance by means o f letters, figures, or m arks, o r bv more than one o f those means, which is intended to be used or m ay be used fo r the purpose o f recording that m atter..." It is interesting to note however, that whilst the form of words may have changed over the years, the description of a "docum ent' given in the old English case of R. V. PAYE (1908) 77 UK8 659 (supra) has not really changed over the decades. Our Evidence Act, 1967 which we received by way of India was promulgated in 1875, long before documents Bridge LJ. 18 referred to at page 82 of BARKER V. WILSON ri9801 2 All E.R. 80, cited in Commercial Case No.4 of 2000 between TRUST BANK TANZANIA LTD AND LE-MARSH ENTERPRISES LTD, (unreported), as "made by any o f the m ethods which modern technology m akes availabld', had come into existence. An e-mail form part of documents made by modern technology. Contrary to the view entertained by the Defendant's Counsel that the business of creating a rule on admissibility of electronically stored information such as an e-mail should be left to the legislature since this kind of rule has not been done before, I am alive to the words of Lord Denning in PACKER V PACKER [1954] P 15 that: " ...If we never do

anything which has never been done before, we sh a ll not g e t anywhere. The law w ill stand s till w hilst the re st o f the w orld goes on: and that w ill be bad fo r both." In the present case, the duty of this Court is to " construd' the words in the existing laws and then to " extend' that construction to cover electronically stored information. The idea is not as the Plaintiffs' Counsel would wish this Court to do to extend to civil proceedings rules on admissibility of electronic evidence developed for criminal proceedings, but to construe the term " document' in section 3 of the Tanzania Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap.6 R.E. 2002] to encompass an e-mail for purposes of admissibility in civil proceedings. In so doing, this Court will be fulfilling one of its basic and noble duties under the Article 107A of the Constitution of Tanzania as the last arbiter of rights and custodian of the laws. As was appreciated by the highest court of the land in TANZANIA COTTON 19 MARKETING BOARD VS CORGECOT COTTON COMPANY SA [1997] TLR165 while construing the words " registered p o st' in Rule 4 of the Arbitration Rules, 1957: "...the words registered post should be interpreted w idely enough to take into account the current developm ent in com m unication technology that has taken place since 1957 when the rules were enacted. It is common knowledge that since that tim e other modes o f

postage have been introduced." (the em phasis is o f th is Court). In that case, the DHL courier services which were not in existence in 1957 when the postage rule in the Arbitration Rules was promulgated, was considered to be a modern mode of postage and thus falling within the words " registered p o st' in Rule 4 of the Arbitration Rules, 1957. In 1875 when the Indian Evidence Act from which our current Evidence Act, 1967 derives was promulgated, the modern methods of making e-mail by computers were not yet in existence. This Court however, given technological revolution in information communication which has been sweeping the world since the last century, cannot afford to hide behind old ways of communicating by refusing to accept other types of electronic documents such e-mail, which may carry electronic information capable of being stored on computers and generated by being printed out. It is for this reason that this Court feels very strongly that to extend the definition of a " docum ent' under section 3 of the Evidence Act by interpreting it broadly to cover evidence generated by computers including e-mail subject of course to the general evidentiary rules on documentary evidence found in Part III of the Evidence Act, [Cap.6 R.E. 2002]. 20 According to section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1967 the term "docum ent" includes among other things " w riting/',"every recording

upon any tangible thine/' and "any form o f com m unication, which may be used fo r the purpose o f recording any m atter” provided that "such recording is reasonably perm anent and readable by sight." An e-mail is also a writing containing electronically recorded information. The only difference between paper documents and electronic documents however, is that, whereas the former is "reasonably permanent" and readable by sight, the latter may not be reasonably permanent although it is readable by sight. This is where the requirement fort authentication comes in. An e-mail being an electronically produced document forms part of computer records capable of being retrieved from a computer database containing relevant information. The need for authentication also comes in particularly in terms of need to prove reliability of the equipment and mode of entering data. An e-mail being an "electronically produced docum ent' within the meaning assigned to that term under section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1967, in my view much as issues about its admissibility in evidence in civil litigation may arise, the standards to be set by courts as to authentication go more to the weight to be attached by this Court to the e-mail in the event it is admitted in evidfence. The existing rules in our law of evidence on admissibility of documents in my view suffice to cover electronically generated

information without requiring the intervention of Parliament. The only thing which is missing are standards for determining authenticity. As for standards on relevancy and hearsay, the existing rules of evidence suffice. The rules to be developed by courts are for setting out prior requirements to be met 21 before an electronically generated document can be admitted in evidence in civil proceedings. This is where opinion given by Judge Grim in JACK R. LORAINE AND BEVERLY MACK VS. MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY Civil Action No.PWG-06-1893 becomes relevant. As the Defendant's Counsel correctly argued the fact that the weight of an e-mail being a computer generated record as evidence may be reduced unless there is sufficient authentication to convince the court that it is an accurate copy is highly critical. Authentication is proving to the court that a docum ent is what it purports to be. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have to prove that the original of the e-mail sought to be tendered in evidence is authentic and also that the e-mail has not been altered since the date it was retrieved from the computer. As the learned author in " Legal Adm issibility o f Docum entary Evidence in C ivil and Crim inal Proceedings" (supra) argues such authentication evidence would normally be in the form of an "audit trail" that is, show ing how the original docum ent (e-m ail) was turned

into an electronic im age stored in the com puter system from where it was retrieved and then produced to the court. If an audit trail like this cannot be produced, the electronic evidence may be rejected. The content of the e-mail document could also be an issue. In civil proceedings there is unlikely to be any problems about producing copies of the various e-mail documents (either electronic or as a hard copy), except in some fraud actions, where this may not be the case for example, if a signature is at issue then it is obviously better to produce the original document rather than an electronic image or even a photocopy of it. In the present case arguments over the admissibility of the e-mail as electronically generated evidence can lead to investigations into the computer system which produced the paper on which the e-mail statements is produced, the method of its storage, operation and access control, and even to the computer programmes and source code used. It may also be necessary for the Plaintiffs to satisfy this Court that the information on the e-mail was stored in a "proper" manner. The Defendant's Counsel has advanced arguments questioning the authenticity of the disputed e-mail which in my view is a tactic to discredit the e-mail as piece of evidence and make it inadmissible. It is therefore very important that the Plaintiffs seeking to use the electronic

information on the e-mail in this Court to have an audit trail. The issues relating to authenticity which the Defendant's Counsel has raised in relation to computer generated records, in my view would not have been a problem in these proceedings If the Plaintiffs had disclosed the evidence through the process of discovery, where the documents in the possession, power and control of the parties relating to the issues in dispute would have been exchanged. In the present case, the process of discovery did not take place. The Plaintiffs simply annexed the disputed e-mail to the Plaint. It is common practice for parties in a civil suit to provide and exchange a list of documents and as such a document which is asserted on the list to be a copy is presumed to be a true copy unless its authenticity is specifically disputed by the other party. If, however, the admissibility of the document is being disputed as is the case presently, evidence as to its authenticity will be required. In criminal proceedings, however, where the burden of 23 proof is much higher than in civil proceedings, it will always be necessary for the party seeking admissibility of a particular document to be able to produce some founding testimony as to the source and authenticity of the document, especially if it is an image, otherwise the courts may refuse to admit the evidence. I presume this is the reason why

the legislature in Tanzania provided specifically for the admissibility of " com puter record^' in criminal proceedings vide the W ritten Laws (M iscellaneous Am endm ent) Act, No.15 o f 2007, the Plaintiffs' Counsel alluded to in his submissions. It is the discretion of this Court properly directing its mind on the relevant law, to always to exclude evidence which has doubtful value. In criminal proceedings a prosecutor or party to civil litigation will always need to be prepared to offer further evidence about the source of electronic evidence and the processing and storage it has undergone since it was first recorded. As it was held in one English case, that of R.V. ROBSON and HARRIS [1972] 1W.LR. 651), "a person producing a recording as evidence m ust describe its provenance and history so as to satisfy the judge that there is a prim a facie case that the evidence is authentic." In the present case the Plaintiffs have not been able to cross the hurdle of proving the authenticity of the e-mail they are seeking to produce in evidence. Our Evidence Act, 1967 however does not contain any express provision on authentication and identification of electronically stored information as is the case with the Kenyan Evidence Act or the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. The underlying concept under the Evidence Act, 1967 is relevancy of evidence to the facts in issue. In

relation to electronic evidence a party seeking it to be admitted in evidence has to 24 lead evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Authentication of electronically stored information may require greater scrutiny than that required for the authentication of " hard co p y documents but this does not mean abandoning the existing rules of evidence when doing so. In general, electronic documents or records that are merely stored in a computer raise no computer-specific authentication issues. If however, a computer processes data rather than merely storing it, as is the case presently where there is a computer print out of e-mail statements, authentication issues may arise. In JACK R. LORADME AND BEVERLY MACK VS. MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY Civil Action No.PWG-06-1893, Judge Grim revisited the relevant rules in the US Federal Rules on Evidence and made the following observation: "Although Rule 901(a) addresses the requirem ent to authenticate electronically generated or electronically stored evidence, it is silen t regarding how to do so. Rule 901(b), however, provides exam ples o f how authentication m ay be accom plished. It states: (b) Illustrations. By way o f illu stration only, and not by way o f lim itation, the follow ing are exam ples o f authentication or identification conform ing with the requirem ents o f

this rule: (1) Testim ony o f w itness with knowledge. Testim ony that a m atter is what it is claim ed to be. (2) Non-expert opinion on handwriting. Non-expert opinion as to the genuineness o f handw riting, based upon fam iliarity not acquired fo r purposes o f the litigation. 25 (3) Com parison by trie r or expert witness. Comparison by the trie r o f fact or by expert w itnesses with specim ens which have been authenticated. (4) D istinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, in ternal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum stances. (5) Voice identification. Identification o f a voice, whether heard firsthand o r through m echanical or electronic transm ission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice a t any tim e under circum stances connecting it with the alleged speaker. (6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a ca ll was made to the num ber assigned at the tim e by the telephone com pany to a particular person o r business, if (A) in the case o f a person, circum stances, including s e lf identification, show the person answ ering to be the one called, or (B) in the case o f a business, the ca ll was made to a place o f business and the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone. (7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a w

riting authorized by law to be recorded or file d and in fact recorded or file d in a pu blic office, o r a purported public record, report, statem ent, o r data com pilation, in any form, is from the pu blic office where item s o f this nature are kept. (8) Ancient docum ents or data com pilation. Evidence that a docum ent or data com pilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, w ould lik e ly be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the tim e it is offered. (9) Process or system . Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a resu lt and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result. (10) M ethods provided by statute or rule. Any m ethod o f authentication o r identification provided by A ct o f Congress or by other rules prescribed by the Suprem e Court pursuant to statutory authority." According to Judge Grim, the ten methods identified by Rule 901(b) of the US Federal Rules of Evidence are non-exclusive citing the FEDERAL 26 RULES ON EVIDENCE 901(b) Advisory Committee's has noted that "The exam ples are not intended as an exclusive enum eration o f allow able m ethods but are m eant to guide and suggest, leaving room fo r grow th and developm ent in th is area o f the law."; also citing WEINSTEIN at §901.03[1] that " Parties m ay

use any o f the m ethods listed in Rule 901(b), any com bination o f them, or any other p ro o f that may be available to carry th eir burden o f show ing that the proffered exhibit is what they claim it to be." Judge Grim having revisited the relevant rules in the US Federal Rules of Evidence on electronically stored information (ESI) remarked that " there is no form o f ESI more ubiquitous than e-m ail." As was in that case, it is the category of ESI at issue in the present case. According to Judge Grim: "Although courts today have m ore or less resigned them selves to the fact that '[w je live in an age o f technology and com puter use where e-m ail com m unication now is a norm al and frequent fact fo r the m ajority o f this nation's population, and is o f particular im portance in the professional world, ....Perhaps because o f the spontaneity and inform ality o f e-m ail, people tend to reveal more o f them selves, for better or worse, than in other m ore deliberative form s o f w ritten com m unication. For that reason, e-m ail evidence often figures prom inently in cases where state o f mind, m otive and in tent m ust be proved. Indeed, it is not unusual to see a case consisting alm ost entirely o f e-m ail evidence provided the follow ing guidance in establishing the authenticity o f electronically stored inform ation:" Judge Grim recognizing that not surprisingly,

there are many ways in which e-mail evidence may be authenticated proceeded to state that one well respected commentator has observed: 27 "[E]-m ail messages m ay be authenticated by direct o r circum stantial evidence. An em ail m essage's distinctive characteristics, including its "contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum stances" may be su fficien t fo r authentication. Printouts o f e-m ail m essages ordinarily bear the sender's e-m ail address, providing circum stantial evidence that the message was transm itted by the person identified in the e-m ail address. In responding to an e-m ail message, the person receiving the message m ay transm it the reply using the com puter's reply function, which autom atically routes the m essage to the address from which the original message came. Use o f the reply function indicates that the reply message was sent to the sender's liste d e-m ail address. The contents o f the e-m ail m ay help show authentication by revealing details known only to the sender and the person receiving the message. E-m ails may even be self-authenticating. Under Rule 902(7), labels or tags affixed in the course o f business require no authentication. Business e-m ails often contain inform ation showing the origin o f the transm ission and identifying the em ployer company. The

identification m arker atone m ay be sufficien t to authenticate an e-m ail under Rule 902(7). However, the sending address in an e-m ail m essage is not conclusive, since e-m ail m essages can be sent by persons other than the nam ed sender. For exam ple, a person with unauthorized access to a com puter can transm it e-m ail messages under the com puter ow ner's name. Because o f the potential for unauthorized transm ission o f e-m ail messages, authentication requires testim ony from a person with personal knowledge o f the transm ission or receipt to ensure its trustw orthiness." Rule 901(b)(4) of the US Federal Rules of Evidence is one of the most frequently used by Courts in the United States of America to authenticate e-mail and other electronic records. It permits exhibits to be authenticated or identified by "[appearance,, contents, substance, internal 28 patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum stances." Courts in the United States of America have recognized this rule as a means to authenticate ESI, including e-mail, text messages and the content of websites [See United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000) (allow ing the authentication o f an e-m ail entirely by circum stantial evidence, including the presence o f the defendant's work e-m ail address, content o f which the defendant was fam iliar with, use

o f the defendant's nicknam e, and testim ony by witnesses that the defendant spoke to them about the subjects contained in the e- m aif). Rule 901(b)(9) of the US Federal Rules of Evidence recognizes one method of authentication that is particularly useful in authenticating electronic evidence stored in or generated by computers. It authorizes authentication by " evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result." In addition to the non-exclusive methods of authentication identified in Rule 901(b), Rule 902 of the US Federal Rules of Evidence identifies twelve methods by which documents, including electronic ones, may be authenticated without extrinsic evidence, commonly referred to as "self-a uthentication." Judge Grim discussed in detail the five distinct but interrelated evidentiary issues that govern whether electronic evidence will be admitted into evidence at trial or accepted as an exhibit, nameiy: (1) Relevance The first evidentiary hurdle to overcome in establishing the admissibility of ESI is to demonstrate that it is relevant, as defined by Evidence Act, 29 V [Cap.6 R.E. 2002] as amended. "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence. It is important therefore for the proponent of the evidence to have considered all of the potential purposes for which it is offered, and to be prepared to articulate them to the court if the evidence is challenged. (2) Authenticity The party seeking an ESI to be admitted in evidence must provide authenticating facts for the e-mail and other evidence that the party wish to proffer in support of its case but not simply to attach the exhibits. Absence of authentication strips the e-mails of any evidentiary value because this Court can not consider them as evidentiary facts. The Plaintiff has to cure the evidentiary deficiencies. The Plaintiffs' Counsel needs to plan which method or methods of authentication that will be most effective, and prepare the necessary formulation, whether through testimony, affidavit, admission or stipulation. The proffering Counsel needs also to be specific in presenting the authenticating facts and, if authenticity is challenged, should cite authority to support the method selected. (3) The Hearsay Rule 30 The other hurdle which must be overcome when introducing electronic evidence is the potential application of the hearsay rule. Hearsay issues are pervasive when electronically stored and generated evidence is introduced. According to PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, 262 (ABA Publishing 2005): "Hearsay is an

out-of-court statem ent offered in court to prove the truth o f the m atter asserted by the out-of-court declarant. It is offered into evidence through the testim ony o f a witness to that statem ent or through a w ritten account by the declarant. The hearsay rule excludes such evidence because it possesses the testim onial dangers o f perception, memory, sincerity, and am biguity that cannot be tested through oath and cross-exam ination.') There are five separate questions that must be answered: (i) does the evidence constitute a statem ent; (ii)w as the statem ent made by a "declarant"; (Hi) is the statem ent being offered to prove the truth o f its contents; (iv) is the statem ent excluded from the definition o f hearsay; and (v) if the statem ent is hearsay, is it covered by one o f the exceptions to the hearsay rule. It is critical to conduct a proper hearsay analysis by considering each of the above questions. The second question that must be answered in the hearsay analysis is that a "w ritin g ' or "spoken utterance cannot be a "statem ent*' under the hearsay rule unless it is made by a "declarant', that is, a person who makes a statement. When an electronically generated record is entirely the product of the functioning of a computerized system or process, such as 31 the " report' generated when a fax is sent showing the number to which the fax was sent and the time it

was received, or an e-mail print out, there is no "p erso rf involved in the creation of the record or the e-mail print out, and no "assertion" being made. For that reason, the record or e-mail print out is not a "statem ent' and cannot be hearsay. The key to understanding the hearsay rule is to appreciate that it only applies to intentionally assertive verbal or non-verbal conduct, and its goal is to guard against the risks associated with testimonial evidence: perception, memory, sincerity and narration. Cases involving electronic evidence often raise the issue of whether electronic writings constitute "statements." Where the writings are non-assertive, or not made by a "person," courts in the United States have held that they do not constitute hearsay, as they are not "statements" [See United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003)]. The third question that must be answered in determining if evidence is hearsay is whether the statement is offered to prove its substantive truth, or for some other purpose. Once it has been determined whether evidence falls into the definition of hearsay because it is a statement, uttered by a declarant, and offered for its substantive truth, the final step in assessing whether it is hearsay is to see if it is excluded from the definition of hearsay. Judge Grim commented that "given the near universal use o f electronic means o f

com m unication, it is not surprising that statem ents contained in electronically made or stored evidence often have been found to qualify as adm issions by a party opponent if offered 32 against that p a rty citing Siddiqui case, 235 F.3d at 1323 (ruling that e­ m ail authored by defendant was not hearsay). (4) The original w riting rule When counsel intends to offer electronic evidence at trial he must determine whether the original writing rule is applicable, and if so, the Counsel must be prepared to introduce an original, a duplicate original, or be able to demonstrate that one of the permitted forms of secondary evidence is admissible. In the present case, the Plaintiffs' Counsel did not address the original writing rule, despite its obvious applicability given that the e-mail was closely related to the controlling issue in this suit which is defamatory statements contained in the e-mail which the Plaintiffs allege were published by the Defendants and therefore prove of the contents of the e-mail will be an issue. It has been acknowledged that the original writing rule has particular applicability to electronically prepared or stored writings, recordings or photographs. Judge Grim cited one respected commentator who observed as follows: "Com puter-based business records com m only consist o f m aterial originally produced in a com puter (e.g. business memoranda),

data drawn from outside sources and input into the com puter (e.g. invoices), or sum m aries o f docum ents (e.g. statistical runs). The adm issibility o f com puter-based records "to prove the content o f a w riting" is subject to the best evidence rule... which generally requires the origin al o f a w riting when the contents are a t issue, except that a "duplicate" is also adm issible unless a genuine issue is raised about its authenticity. A duplicate includes a counterpart produced by "electronic re-recording, which accurately reproduces 33 the o rig in a l." Courts often adm it com puter-based records w ithout m aking the distinction between originals and duplicates /W e in s t e in at § 900.07[l][d][iv]." It is apparent that the definition of " writings,r recordings and photographs" in our Evidence Act includes evidence that is electronically generated and stored. Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon accumulations of data and expressions affecting legal relations set forth in words and figures. This meant that the rule was one essentially related to writings. Present day techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential form that the information ultimately assumes for useable purposes is words and figures. Hence, the considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to include computers, photographic systems, and other

modern developments. According to Judge Grim, the following are circumstances in which secondary evidence may be introduced instead of the original: (a) whether the w riting, recording or photograph ever existed in the first place; (b) whether som e other writing, recording, o r photograph that is offered into evidence is in fact the original; and (c) whether "other" (i.e. secondary) evidence o f contents correctly reflects the content o f the w riting, recording or photograph. (5) The need to balance its probative value against the potential fo r unfair prejudice, or other harm According to Judge Grim, when a lawyer analyzes the admissibility of electronic evidence, he or she should consider whether it would unfairly 34 prejudice the party against whom it is offered, confuse or mislead the jury (or assessors in this part of the world), unduly delay the trial of the case, or interject collateral matters into the case. Courts are particularly likely to consider whether the admission of electronic evidence would be unduly prejudicial in the following circumstances: (1) When the evidence would contain offensive or highly derogatory language that m ay provoke an em otional response; (2) When analyzing com puter anim ations, to determ ine if there is a substantial risk fo r m istaking them for the actual events in the litig atio n ; (3) when considering the adm issibility o f sum m

aries o f volum inous electronic w ritings, recordings o r photographs; (4) In circum stances when the court is concerned as to the reliab ility o r accuracy o f the inform ation that is contained w ithin the electronic evidence. I have endeavoured to outline in greater details the above the five hurdles discussed by Judge Grim which any Counsel seeking to tender in evidence electronically stored information may face. Whether the e-mail as part of electronically stored information (ESI) is admissible into evidence is determined by a collection of five standards as outlined above which present themselves like what Judge Grim referred to as "a series of hurdles to be cleared by the proponent of the evidence." Failure to clear any of these evidentiary hurdles means that the evidence will not be admissible. The Plaintiffs must therefore consider the following standards rules: 35 (1) Is the e-m ail relevant as determ ined under the Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap. 6 R.E. 2002] (does it have any tendency to make som e fact that is o f consequence to the litigation m ore or less probable than it otherw ise would be); (2) I f relevant under the Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap. 6 R.E. 2002] as am ended is it authentic in the sense that, can the proponent show that the e-m ail is what it purports to be; (3) if the e-m ail is offered fo r its substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined under the rules in

the Evidence Act, [Cap. 6 R.E. 2002] as am ended and if so, is it covered by an applicable exceptions to the hearsay rules under the Evidence Act, 1967 [Cap.6 R.E. 2002] as amended; (4) is the e-m ail that is being offered as evidence an original or duplicate under the original w riting rule, o f if not, is there adm issible secondary evidence to prove the content o f the e-m ail; and (5) Is the probative value o f the e-m ail substantially outw eighed by the danger o f unfair prejudice o r other identified harm. I consider the above standards to be the set court rules for guiding this Court in determining the admissibility of electronically stored information (ESI), which is not limited to e-mails only, but may encompass 36 other forms of electronic evidence such as computer print outs, website messages etc. Given the pendency by the Plaintiffs' to clear the hurdles in seeking the e-mail to be admitted in evidence using the standards as outlined by this Court above, this Court cannot at this stage and point in time, conclusively determine the preliminary objection. The trial will proceed with the examination in chief of PW1 from where it ended by the Plaintiffs' Counsel clearing the hurdles that present themselves in the five set standards for testing admissibility of electronically stored information as outlined in this ruling. I shall make no order for costs. It is accordingly ordered. R.V.MAKARAMBA

JUDGE 01/10/2010 37 \ Ruling delivered in Chambers this 1st day of October 2010 in the presence of Mr. Lazaro, I., and Mr. Lazaro, Mafie, the Plaintiff in person and in the presence of Mr. Odillo, Gaspar, the Defendant in person and in the absence of their Advocates. R.V. MAKARAMBA

JUDGE 01/10/2010 Word count: 9,841 38