MAGRETH ALUDO RYAGA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MUSOMA SUB-REGISTRY AT MUSOMA LAND APPEAL NO. 000005287 OF 2024 CASE REFERENCE NO. 202403131000005287 (Arising from the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Tarime in Land Application No. 47 of2020) MAGRETH ALUDO RYAGA................................................................................... 1stAPPELLANT WILLIBERT RYAGA........................................................................................... 2ndAPPELLANT JOSEPH ARIYO OIMA......................................................................................... 3rdAPPELLANT GRACE OTIEGO................................................................................................... 4thAPPELLANT GRADUS MGAKA WARITU.................................................................................. 5thAPPELLANT VERSUS SAMWEL OTIENO OLOLO.................................................................. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 24/09/2024 & 03/12/2024 Kafanabo, J.: This is an appeal preferred from the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Tarime (hereinafter the 'Tribunal') in Land Application No. 47 of 2020 dated 19th January 2024. A brief background of the matter as may be gathered from a record of the appeal is that the Respondent herein alleged in the proceedings before the Tribunal that in the year 1965, he was bequeathed the land in dispute measuring fifteen (15) acres by his late father, one Ololo Okero, and that i the Respondent became the owner of the said land before the demise of his father who passed away in 1966. The land in dispute is located at Raranya Village within the Rorya District and the same was acquired customarily by the Respondent's late father in the year 1957. It was further alleged that after the Respondent had become the owner of the suit land from his late father, he and his mother continued to occupy the same and used it for agricultural activities. However, in the year 1986, the Appellants trespassed into the disputed land when the Respondent was away in Tabora. When the Respondent returned to Raranya Village from Tabora he found the Appellants unlawfully occupying the disputed land. It was further alleged that the Appellants requested the Respondent to allow them to remain in temporary occupation of the Respondent's land for agricultural activities and to reside thereon temporarily. The Respondent allowed the Appellants to temporarily occupy his land but not to acquire it as their own and not to part with its possession. It is further gathered from the record that in December 2019, the Respondent went to the suit land to refurbish his late father's grave, but the Appellants stopped him and they also refused to vacate from the suit land. Since the Appellants acted contrary to the earlier agreement, the Respondent sought an order from the Shirati Primary Court to allow him to renovate his late father's grave in the suit land but he did not succeed. The Respondent successfully appealed to the District Court of Tarime against the decision of Shirati Primary Court, in respect of which an order was given allowing the Respondent to recondition his late father's grave. 2 Thereafter, the Respondent instituted Land Application No. 47/2020 in the Tribunal in which he prayed, among other reliefs, for the Tribunal to declare him as the lawful owner of the suit land. The Appellants on their part disputed the Respondent's claim and stated that they are the lawful owners of the land in dispute because it was allocated to them by the Raranya Village Government. In its judgment which was delivered on the 19th of January 2024, the Tribunal decided in the Respondent's favour and declared the disputed land to be the property of the Respondent. The Tribunal also declared the Appellants trespassers to the disputed land and ordered them to vacate the disputed land. The Appellants were aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Tribunal delivered on 19th January 2024, and thus preferred the present appeal. In the present appeal the Appellants have set forth eight grounds of appeal whose substance is as follows: 1. The learned Chairman of the Tribunal failed to notice that the Respondent in his pleading failed to describe and specify the disputed land in terms of location, size, and address which is the dictates of Order 7 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2019] and provision of Regulations 3(2)(b) of the Land Disputes (the District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations G.N. 174 published on 27/6/2003 failure of which vitiates the proceedings and judgment of the Tribunal as delivered thereto. 2. The trial Chairman wrongly relied on exhibits Tl, T2, T3, T4, and T5 (minutes of the Village Government of Raranya) which were wrongly taken and admitted in evidence. 3 3. That, though exhibits Tl, T2, T3, T4, and T5 were not annexed to the Respondent's application it was wrong on the part of the trial Chairman to conclude that the minutes of the Village Government were forged without the allegation of fraud being specifically pleaded in the Respondent's application. 4. The trial Chairman failed to evaluate properly the evidence on record and hence wrongly decided that the disputed land was the property of the Respondent. 5. The trial Chairman in deciding the case before him invited extraneous matters which were neither raised in the pleading nor the evidence and hence reached a wrong decision. 6. The trial Chairman erred in law and fact to treat the Appellants as invitees on their own land while there is no evidence to support the same. 7. That, as a whole the trial Chairman was biased in the conduct of the case and his judgment. 8. The Appellants occupying the disputed land before the coming of Village Land Act No. 5 of 2001 and their allocation by the Village Government were proper. After the Court was satisfied that it was seized with the record of the Tribunal, the Court ordered that the appeal be disposed of by way of written submissions and the parties duly complied with the schedule of filing the same. According to the record, the Appellants were represented by Mr. Cosmas Tuthuru, learned Advocate, and the Respondents were represented by Messrs George Masudi and Paul Obwana, learned Advocates. 4 In support of the appeal, and commencing with the first ground of appeal, the learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the learned Chairman of the Tribunal failed to notice that the Respondent both in his pleadings and testimony in the Tribunal failed to describe and specify the disputed land which is a dictate of Order VII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2019] (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC') and Regulation 3(2)(b) of the Land Disputes (The District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations G.N. No. 174, published on 27/6/2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations') and hence he failed to prove his case on the balance of probabilities. It was submitted that the law requires that where the subject matter of the suit is an immovable property the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and in case such property can be identified by title number under the Land Registration Act, Cap. 334 R.E. 2019 the plaint shall specify such title number, citing Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC. Moreover, Regulation 3(2)(b) of the Regulations requires the application to the Tribunal to be made in the prescribed form and shall contain the address of the suit premises or a location of the land involved in the dispute to which the application relates. The Appellants' counsel also submitted that the Respondent's application which was filed in the Tribunal on 20th July 2020, the location and address of the suit premises was stated as Raranya- Rorya which is not enough to identify the disputed property. In the Respondent's testimony, who testified as PW1 (Samwel Otieno Ololo) on pages 11 - 13 of the typed proceedings, also the disputed property is not described in terms of size, boundary, or 5 neighbours surrounding the disputed property. It was also argued that not only PW1 did not describe the disputed land, but also no witness of the Respondent testified on the description of the disputed property in the Tribunal. The case of Martin Fredrick Rajab vs Ilemela Municipal Council & Another (Civil Appeal 197 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 434 (18 July 2022) was cited in bolstering the submission. Responding to the Appellants' written submissions on the 1st ground of appeal the Respondent submitted that this court should consider the peculiar facts and circumstances which prevailed in the entire case before the trial Tribunal and be guided by, among other things, the often cherished principle that each case has to be decided on its own facts citing this Court's decision in Alphonce Lusako & 3 Others vs The Attorney General & 3 Others, Misc. Civil Cause No. 5 of 2023, TZHC 19947 (10 August 2023). It was also submitted by the Respondent's counsel that in paragraph 3 of the application, the Respondent specified the address of the disputed land as Raranya Village within Rorya District, and also under paragraphs 5 (i) & 7 (i) of his application, the Respondent described the size of the disputed land to be (15 acres) and its location to be Raranya in Rorya District which was not only enough to properly identify the disputed land, but it was also in accordance with the requirement of the law in as far as the description of the disputed land is concerned regarding applications which are instituted in the Tribunal. The Respondent's counsel also made a distinction between the requirements of the law under Regulation 3(2)(a)&(b) of the Regulations which gives a party an option of either to state the address of the suit 6 premise or location of the land involved in the dispute. The Respondent's counsel submitted that the application filed in the tribunal complied with the law citing section 13 of the Interpretation of Laws Act [CAP. 1 R.E. 2020], also citing the case of the case of Charles Mwita Siaga vs National Microfinance Bank Pic (Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2017) [2022] TZCA 227 (29 April 2022). Moreover, the Respondent submitted that Order VII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code [CAP. 33 R.E. 2019] (hereinafter the 'CPC') is irrelevant in the present case because there are already in place the Regulations, which specifically govern rules of procedures in District Land and Housing Tribunals as opposed to the CPC which is a general law, citing the case of Erasto Ngailo vs Blastus Allen Mgimwa (Misc. Land Application No. 15 of 2022) [2022] TZHC 14824 (17 November 2022). The Respondent's counsel thus distinguished the Court of Appeal case of Martin Fredrick Rajab v. Ilemela Municipal Council and Others, (Supra) because it relied on the provisions of Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC. It was also the Respondent's counsel's submission that in the present case, the Tribunal visited the locus in quo and the Respondent described the suit property and it was not disputed by the Appellants. Also at the visited locus in quo, both parties were at one about the location, size, boundaries, and physical features of the suit land and thus the visit of the locus in quo served the purpose citing the case of Avit Thadeus Massawe vs Isidory Assenga (Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 357 (14 December 2018). 7 It follows that the submissions of the parties regarding the first ground of appeal having duly netted, it is opportune for this court to determine the same in light of the submissions made by the parties and the relevant law. The major point of contention in the first ground of appeal is whether the Respondent described the disputed land in the application filed before the tribunal as per the dictates of the law, and sufficient to identify the disputed land. Two major laws were cited by the Appellants' counsel, one is regulation 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Regulations, which provides that: "3(2) An application to the Tribunal shall be made in the form prescribed in the Second Schedule to these Regulations and shall contain: (a) the names and address ofparties involved; (b) the address of the suit premise or location of the land involved in the dispute to which the application relates; It was the submission of the Respondent that Regulation 3 (2)(b) above uses the word "or" which means that, in describing the suit land, the Respondent had the option of either describing the address of the suit land or giving the location of the disputed land, and if one of the two options has been provided in the application then the disputed land has been properly described, and since the Respondent provided the location of the disputed land then the same has been sufficiently described and properly identified by virtue of Regulation 3(2)(b) above. However, the Appellant's learned counsel was of a different view as indicated herein above. The other provision relied upon by the Appellants is Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC which reads as follows: 8 "Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it and, in case such property can be identified by a title number under the Land Registration Act, the plaint shall specify such title number." The Respondent submitted that the above section does not apply to the Tribunal because there is a specific law that is applicable in the Tribunal and a prescribed form has been categorically provided in the relevant law, which is the Regulations. This Court settles with the Respondent's counsel on the application Regulation 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Regulations being the specific law on the matters of procedure before the Tribunal. Also, it is not in dispute that Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC is a general law when it comes to procedures before the Tribunal and it applies to the Tribunal by virtue of section 51 of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2019 where the Regulations are inadequate. It is also important at this stage to state that although the CPC comes secondary in regulating procedures before the Tribunal, the same inspires this court on how the suit property should be described in order to ensure that the dispute between the parties is fairly heard and determined. This is because a proper description of the disputed property would eliminate ambiguities on the nature of the claim and the facts stated which would assist the court in making an informed decision. It follows that before determining whether the disputed land in the present case was properly described as required by the relevant law, and as argued by the Respondent, or not as argued by the Appellants, it is important 9 to review the relevant case laws on the importance of the description of landed property in dispute. In the case of Martin Fredrick Rajab vs Ilemela Municipal Council & Another (supra), which has been relied upon by the Appellants' Counsel the Court held that: 'From what was pleaded by the appellant, it is glaring that the description of the suit property was not given because neither the size nor neighbouring owners of pieces of land among others, were stated in the plaint. This was not proper and we agree with the learned trial Judge and Mr. Mrisha that, it was incumbent on the appellant to state in the plaint the description of the suit property which is in terms of the dictates of Order 7 rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code [CAP 33 R.E 2019]. " Emphasis added. Moreover, in the case of Lupembe Village Government Ikolo Ward Kyela District & Another vs Bethelehamu Mwandafwa & Others (Civil Appeal No.377 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 17313 (9 June 2023) when commenting on the apprehension of a party when there is no proper description of the suit land the Court held that: "We understand the complaints on this ground to be, (i) the propriety of the suit (subject of the instant appeal) to warrant the court to grant the claims sought, (ii) the impracticality of executing the granted decree." The above observation of the Court of Appeal shows that if the disputed land is not properly described, the Court's decision would be subjected to a io conjecture on granting the reliefs sought, one usually being, like in the present case, declaring the complainant the owner of the land in dispute and therefore execution of the resultant decree would be contingent and chaotic. The Court cannot order a party to the suit to be the owner of the land generally, the pleadings must specifically state and identify the land in dispute. Moreover, in the case of Lupembe Village (supra), the Court further held that: "On the argument that the plaint did not disclose the description of the suit land, we are aware of the provisions of Order VII rule 3 of the CPC, the emphasis being where the involved subject matter in a suit is immovable property, there must be such details of the requisite property in the plaint to sufficiently enable it to be identified." It should be clear that in the case of Lupembe Village (supra), the issue that the suit land has been insufficiently described was not raised in the trial court, but raised in the appeal. The Court being alive to the principle that each case should be decided based on its own facts, and after considering the relevant facts of the case, the Court was satisfied that the appellants did not raise the matter in the trial court, but was satisfied that the suit land was well understood by the parties given the testimonies and the pleadings. Besides, in the case of Olorubare Nginyu vs Kilempu Kinoka Laizer (Civil Appeal No. 416 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 598 (18 July 2024) the Court of Appeal held that: "We have considered the counsels' rival submissions and were persuaded that, the amended plaint omitted to disclose boundaries and names of li owners of the adjacent parcels of land, being particulars necessary to describe the suit property. Since disclosure of the particulars was a statutory requirement and necessary to identify the suit land, the missing information were an integral part of the plaint, whose absence could not establish the cause of action". In the case of Olorubare Nginyu (supra), the parties disputed the description of the landed property in their written statement of defence, and the court was satisfied that the omission to describe the disputed property properly was a recipe for confusion in the identification of the plot in question and the Court held that the omission to properly describe the property in dispute vitiated the proceedings. In another case of Kessy Mkaramba and 6 Others vs Hassan Mkamila and 31 Others (Civil Appeal No. 471 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 1101 (14 November 2024) the Court held that: "What we discern from the quoted excerpt is that, a plaint that founds a claim on an immovable property must be descriptive enough to sufficiently identify the property in dispute in a manner that will allay any possibility of mistaken identity. This would include a statement of the landmarks in the boundaries and neighbouring features, if any, or names of the holders of the pieces of land that surround the disputed land. In a fitting case, especially where the dispute is on a registered land, specification of the title number of the land in dispute is of invaluable importance." Emphasis added. 12 The Court also sought inspiration from other jurisdictions, and went on to hold that: "The need for having a descriptive statement of claim is imperative and it has been underscored many a time and across jurisdictions. In Laxman Singh v. Jagannath (2000) MPHT 484, the High Court in India gave a scope of applicability of Order 7 rule 3 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is in pari materia with Order VII rule 3 of the CPC, and held: "From the pleadings contained in the plaint, it is apparent that the suit property could not be identified. Specific description and boundaries of the suit property are not given in the plaint... The purpose of Order 7 Pule 3 of the Code is that unless the plaintiff indicates the identity of the property claimed by him either by means of boundaries or by means of map as required by Order 7 Rule 3 of the Code, it would be difficult for the Court to find whether the plaintiff has title to the property claimed and whether any encroachment or dispossession has been made by the defendant. Thus, the duty of the party is to give description sufficient to identify the property in dispute. If such decree is passed, it shall be unworkable. The Court can only pass a decree which can be executed under Order 21 of the Code" Emphasis added. 13 Moreover, in the case of Kessy Mkaramba and 6 Others vs Hassan Mkamila (supra), the Court when citing the case of Laxman Singh (supra) further held that without a proper description of the property by boundaries, numbers, and records of statement or certificate it is not possible to identify the property. Consequently, no effective decree can be passed which can be finally put into execution for the benefit of the succeeding party. Likewise, in a situation akin to the circumstances of the present case, where only the name of the village was mentioned as the location or address of the suit property, the Court of Appeal in the case of Kessy Mkaramba and 6 Others vs Hassan Mkamila (supra), observed that: "...the only description that the respondents gave with respect to the disputed property is that of the village in which the said property is allegedly located i.e. Kidogobasi village in Kilosa District. The scanty nature of the description raises a question as to whether such description was enough to sufficiently identify the property in dispute and distinguish it from the rest of the land located in the same village. In light of the above authorities, even though were made as regards the requirements of Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC, it is a view of this court that the provision of clear particulars of a suit property is unreservedly required regardless of whether the suit is instituted by plaint or a prescribed form as is in the present case. Moreover, regulation 3(2)(b) of the Regulations, requires the address of the suit premise or location of the land involved in the dispute. This provision is not for decorative purposes, it was purposely enacted to ensure that the accurate and proper description of a suit property 14 is provided in order to ensure that the suit is properly heard and fairly determined. In the present case, clause three (03) of the application filed at the Tribunal, which described the disputed land reads as follows: "5. Location and Address of the suit premises Raranya-Rorya District" The above is the description of the land in dispute as provided in the pleading that initiated a suit for recovery of the land in dispute. It is undoubtedly very scanty, however, the Respondent took refuge in the argument that the Appellants did not raise the matter in the Tribunal. Addressing this argument, this Court, again, chooses to be guided by the observation of the Court of Appeal when responding to an argument of a similar nature in the case of Kessy Mkaramba and 6 Others vs Hassan Mkamila and 31 Others (supra) when the Respondents' counsel, in that case, argued that the issue of improper description was not raised in the written statement of defence, the Court held that: Wr. Liwewa, was of the contention that the disclosures in the plaint were enough to provide an identity, and that the appellants' written statement of defence did not dispute the location and description of the suit property. With respect, we are unable to go along with Mr. Liwewa's argument. We, instead, find plausibility in the contentions made by Mr. Rwebangira and Ms. Mwakabungu, and consider that what the plaintiffs did was to choose to be vague and too economical with facts that were relevant to their respective 15 cases. As a result, the factual revelation made in paragraph 4, which we consider to be paltry, failed to meet the threshold of descriptions set out by the law. We are convinced that such failure was a recipe for confusion and the resultant effect was to flout the imperative requirement set out under Order VII rule 3 of the CPC, rendering the plaint deficient and unable to withstand the vagaries of criticism leveled by the appellants." Emphasis added. In light of the above, this court is of the view that even though the requirement of Regulation 3(2)(b) of the Regulations, is not as detailed as that of Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC, they both intend to achieve one goal, that is a sufficient description of the property in dispute so as to avoid unnecessary ambiguity and uncalled for mistaken identity in the identification of the suit property and to enable the defendant to marshal his defence properly on the case levelled against him. This, however, was not given weight by the Tribunal as it proceeded to determine a suit on an unknown and unidentified piece of land, but ended up giving very specific orders on a property that was not, honestly speaking, pleaded in the application filed before the Tribunal. This is reflected in the Tribunal's judgment and decree where it ordered, among others, that: 'The disputed area belongs to the Applicant, the area bordered by the hill and Warwenge on the East, Omwanda Obwaio on the West, Sanda Ryaga, Joas Masoro Omoyo on the North and the Applicant's area in the Bwiri Village on the South. The area is Fifteen acres in size and it is located in the Raranya Viiaage in the Rorya District" 16 As can be glaringly seen, the order of the Tribunal provided details of the area that the Tribunal concluded that it belongs to the Respondent. However, that description as provided in the judgment and the decree of the Tribunal is nowhere in the pleadings. The said details also do not feature in the testimonies of PW1, PW2, and PW3. The piece of evidence that matches the description of the judgment and decree of the Tribunal was provided for the first time when the Tribunal visited the locus in quo on 13/10/2023 as indicated on page 72 of the proceedings. Also, the testimony of PW1 is disputed by DW1 who explained that the area which was described by PW1 during the visit of the locus in quo belongs to the Appellants and the land belonging to the Respondent was in the Bwiri Village bordering their land which is in Raryaga Village. This is indicated on pages 74 to 75 of the proceedings. The testimonies of the two witnesses show two major aspects: One, that the Respondent and the Appellants possess neighboring pieces of land. However, the Appellants occupy and own the land which was also identified by the Respondent as the disputed land and belonged to him, and it is during the visit of the locus in quo when the boundaries of the said land were mentioned by the Respondent, and the identified land is in Raryaga Village. Two, the Appellants (through DW1) testified that their land borders with that of the Respondent which is in the neighbouring village of Bwiri. This means that the Appellants became aware of the actual land claimed by the Respondent during the visit of the locus in quo which did not feature in the 17 pleadings or testimonies of the Respondent and his witnesses before the visit of the locus in quo. The above illustrates that the proper description of the disputed land was provided when the Tribunal visited the locus in quo which description was new to the Tribunal and the Appellants. It should be remembered that the testimony of the parties in the Tribunal and during the visit of the locus in quo was supposed to prove what was submitted as a claim by way of pleadings and not otherwise. In the case of Olorubare Nginyu vs Kilempu Kinoka Laizer, the Court quoted with approval the excerpt in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 36, Paragraph 38, on the importance of particulars in the pleadings and stated that: "The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises, and incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variously stated, namely either to limit the generality of the allegations in the pleadings or to define the issues which have to be tried and for which discovery is required." Moreover, accentuating the importance of pleadings in the case of Paulina Samson Ndawavya vs Theresia Thomasi Madaha (Civil Appeal 45 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 453 (11 December 2019) the Court of Appeal held that: 'The other remark which we find ourselves compelled to make relates to pleadings. In doing so we cannot do better than 18 reiterate what we said in James Funke Gwagilo vs. Attorney General [2004] TLR 161 whereby we underscored the function of pleadings being to put notice of the case which the opponent has to make lest he is taken by surprise. From that same decision we reiterated another equally important principle of law that parties are bound by their own pleadings and that no party should be allowed to depart from his pleadings thereby changing his case from which he had originally pleaded.' In light of the above is quite clear that the Respondent failed to provide the particulars of the disputed land in his pleadings which would make it easy for the identification of the property in dispute for purposes of a fair hearing and determination of a dispute. The proper description of the land in dispute would also have enabled the Appellants to properly prepare their defence, taking into account that the provision of proper boundaries of the disputed land could give the true nature of the claim of ownership by the Respondent against the Appellants which unfortunately, in the present case, were lacking. It is thus harmless to conclude that the Tribunal, unjustifiably and unlawfully, departed from the pleadings before it when it declared the Respondent the owner of the land in dispute by providing specific details of boundaries that were not provided in the pleadings initiating the claim that was eventually determined by the Tribunal. 19 At this juncture, it is also important to state that the case of Evelyn Even Gardens NIC Ltd and the Hon. Minister, Federal Capital Territory, and two Others, Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1036/2014; Motion No. FCT/HC/CV/M/5468/2017 borrowed by the Respondent's counsel from Nigeria on the importance of visiting the locus in quo would only be relevant if the land in dispute is properly described in the pleadings, not in the present case where the land in dispute is elusively explained. The same applies to the case of Avit Thadeus Massawe vs Isidory Assenga (supra), which is distinguishable from the present case. Therefore, this Court finds merits in the first ground of appeal and thus allows it. The first ground of appeal being found meritorious, disposes of the entire appeal and therefore, the determination of the remaining grounds of appeal becomes superfluous. In light of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed. This Court, therefore, nullifies the entire proceedings of the Tribunal, quashes the judgment, and sets aside the ensuing decree of the Tribunal dated 19th January 2024. Under the circumstances of this case and given the manner in which the appeal has been determined, each party shall bear their costs. It is so ordered. 20 The judgment was delivered in the presence of the Appellants save for the 2nd Appellant who was duly notified, and in the presence of Mr. Paul Obwana, Advocate for the Respondent. K. Il Kafanabo Judge 03/12/2024 21