Marianya Marwa Mwita 0001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MUSOMA SUB-REGISTRY AT MUSOMA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 000020496 OF 2024 (Arising from the District Court of Serengeti (Hon. J.M. Mwita-RM) in Criminal Case No. 76 of2023) BETWEEN MARIANYA MARWA @MWITA............................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC.................................................................................... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 25/11/2024 & 05/02/2025 Kafanabo, J.: This is a judgment in respect of an appeal that stems from the District Court of Serengeti at Mugumu (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court'), in Criminal Case No. 76 of 2023 in respect of a judgment dated 22/01/2024. A brief background of the matter is that on 29th August 2023 at around 5.00 a.m., the victim {name withheld) of the Appellant's alleged actions, who was a resident Mugumu Township, in the Serengeti District, in the Mara Region, was heading to a Church from her home. But upon reaching the area called Right to Play Stadium in the Mugumu Township, the victim was attacked and raped. Also, the victim was subsequently robbed TZS 200,000/= by the assailant who threatened to stab her with a knife. Thereafter, the assailant took to his hills and disappeared. Then the victim screamed for help and people responded and offered help. When the first person arrived at the crime scene, the victim named the Appellant as the i assailant. The victim also named the assailant to her husband who arrived at the crime scene shortly after he was followed at his home and informed about what befell the victim by one of the motorcyclists who responded to the victim's call for help. The Appellant was arrested and later arraigned before the District Court of Serengeti for two counts. In the 1st count, the Appellant was charged with rape contrary to sections 130(l)(2)(b) and 131(1) of the Penal Code, Cap. 182 R.E. 2022. It was alleged that on the 29th day of August 2023 at the Right to Play Stadium in the Mugumu Township within the Serengeti District, in the Mara Region the Appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim who was an adult woman. In the second count, the Appellant was charged with armed robbery contrary to section 287A of the Penal Code, Cap 16 R.E. 2022. In this count, it was alleged that on the 29th day of August 2023 at the Right to Play Stadium in Mugumu Township, within the Serengeti District, in the Mara Region the Appellant stole cash amounting to TZS 200,000/= the property of the victim, and immediately before such stealing, he used a knife to threaten the victim in order to obtain the said property. It is on record that the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when it was read over to him and thus the matter proceeded to a full trial. After the prosecution and defence cases were heard on 22/01/2024 the trial Court pronounced its judgment and convicted the appellant on both counts. The trial Court further sentenced the Appellant to thirty (30) years' imprisonment 2 on each count and the Appellant was ordered to pay a compensation of TZS 1,500,000/= to the victim. The Appellant was not satisfied with the said decision and thus preferred an appeal to this Court based on the five grounds of appeal whose substance is as follows: i. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact to con vict and sentence the Appellant based on exhibit PF2 (a caution statement) allegedly made by the Appellant which was tendered contrary to procedures by the public prosecutor who was not a witness, and the exhibit was not read out loudly in Court. ii. The trial Magistrate erred in law and the fact to convict and sentence the Appellant based on exhibit Pl (the alleged red bag) which was not tendered at the trial Court. Hi. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact to con vict and sentence the Appellant in the absence of evidence that there was enough tight at the scene of the crime that could have enabled the victim to positively identify the attacker. iv. The trial Magistrate erred in law and the fact to convict and sentence the appellant without considering his defense against the prosecution's case. v. The trial Magistrate erred in law and the fact to convict and sentence the Appellant in a case where the prosecution had failed to prove its case to the required standard. 3 At the hearing of the appeal, the Appellant entered an appearance in person and the Respondent was represented by Ms. Beatrice Mgumba and Ms. Natujwa Bakari, State Attorneys. The Court thus invited the parties to address their respective cases in this appeal which they duly complied with. The Court will then, albeit briefly, review the submissions made by both parties as regards the appeal. Submitting in support of the appeal the Appellant, being a lay person was very brief. He beseeched the Court to accept his grounds of appeal as filed and prayed that the court be pleased to consider both sides because his wife passed on and his kids are alone. He further submitted that he did not commit the crime as stated, the case was imposed on him by the victim. Opposing the appeal Ms. Natujwa Bakari, a learned State Attorney, submitted, as regards the first ground of appeal, that according to the record of the trial Court, no caution statement was tendered as evidence in Court. The only exhibit that was tendered was the PF3 of the victim which was tendered by PW4 whose testimony is available on pages 9 to 11 of the trial Court's proceedings. Therefore, the complaint of the Appellant has no basis because the Republic did not tender a caution statement as an exhibit. In opposition to the second ground of appeal, it was submitted that according to the evidence on record, exhibit Pl is not a red bag as insinuated by the Appellant, but a PF3 (a medical examination report), and there is no red bag mentioned in the proceedings of the trial Court. Therefore, the ground of appeal is irrelevant to the present case. It was further argued that even if the Appellant was talking about the handbag that was robbed from 4 the victim, there is no requirement that the prosecution should tender the stolen item in order to prove the offences of armed robbery and rape. Regarding the third ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney submitted that PWl's testimony proved that at the crime scene where the offence was committed there was sufficient light of electric tubers which enabled identification of the appellant and there was no possibility of mistaken identity. On pages 4 to 6 of the trial Court's proceedings, the victim explained well what transpired at 05.00 a.m. on a fateful day, and she said she could identify the attacker because there was sufficient light at the place where the offence was committed and it was because she was tied on the electric light pole with an electric light. The learned State Attorney argued that PW1, the victim, also explained that she recognized the Appellant because they were close to each other when the offence was committed. It was also submitted that the victim knew the Appellant as a person who was working as a potter at the bus stand. The victim also explained the dressing of the Appellant and that he stole TZS 200,000/= from her. The victim also mentioned the Appellant as his attacker at the earliest opportunity to the persons who went to assist her after she had screamed for help. The victim also mentioned the Appellant as the attacker to her husband when he arrived at the crime scene. The victim maintained her story and managed to identify the Appellant in Court. The victim was consistent in her testimony on identifying the Appellant as the attacker. The victim, apart from identifying the Appellant, knew the appellant before the commission of the offence and thus there was no possibility of mistaken identity. 5 As regards the fourth ground of appeal, it was submitted that the defence of the Appellant was summarized on pages 05 to 08 of the judgment. However, the trial Court did not analyse the evidence of the defence, but the learned State Attorney was quick to submit that since this is the first appellate Court, the Court be pleased to step into the shoes of the trial Court and analyse the evidence of both parties. It was also argued that the Appellant's defence that he was not at the crime scene is weak, and an afterthought because he did not cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses from PW1 to PW4 on his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence. It was further argued that it is true that the Appellant could not be convicted on the weakness of his defence, but in order for his defence of alibi to be established he was supposed to issue a notice of alibi or by asking the prosecution's witnesses relevant questions with a view to establishing that he was somewhere else. However, it was argued, that no notice of alibi was issued by the Appellant. It follows that even though the Appellant's defence was not analysed by the learned Magistrate, the same could not shake the prosecution's case. In opposition to the fifth ground of appeal, it was submitted that the prosecution proved the offence of rape against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellant was charged under sections 130(l)(2)(b) and 131(1) of the Penal Code and thus the prosecution was supposed to prove penetration, lack of consent from the victim, and that the Appellant was the one who penetrated the victim. PWl's testimony on page 5 of the trial Court's proceedings, demonstrates how the victim was throttled from behind and apprehended by the Appellant, then tied to the electric pole and 6 raped. Lines 6-10 of page five of the trial Court's proceedings provided all the details needed to establish the offence of rape. Moreover, the victim was 53 years old and thus understood what she said that she was raped and that she was threatened with a knife by the Appellant who was mentioned by the victim at the earliest possible opportunity to the persons who went to assist her. The testimony of PW4 which is on page 10 of the trial Court's proceedings also supports the testimony of the victim. It was thus submitted that the offence of rape was proved as required by law. Regarding the offence of armed robbery committed contrary to section 287(a) of the Penal Code, it was submitted that the prosecution was supposed to prove that the Appellant used the weapon or threatened to use the same against the victim and managed to steal from the victim and that it is the Appellant who committed the offence. It was further argued that the testimony of the victim on page 05 of the trial Court's proceedings, all ingredients of armed robbery were proved. PW1 explained on page 5 how the Appellant was holding the knife all the time, and that she was threatened by the Appellant using a knife, and that is why she failed to raise an alarm. It was also clear that the Appellant stole the handbag of the victim and TZS 200,000/=. All those were done by the Appellant against the victim. It follows that the submissions of the parties being certain, it is opportune for this court to determine the grounds of appeal in light of the submissions of the parties and the law. Commencing with the first ground of appeal, the Appellant challenges his conviction based on exhibit PF2 (a caution statement) allegedly prepared 7 by the Appellant and tendered in Court contrary to procedures. This ground of appeal will not detain this Court because, as rightly argued by the learned State Attorney, according to the proceedings of the trial Court and the judgment thereof, no caution statement was tendered as an exhibit. There is neither a mention of the caution statement nor exhibit PF2 in both the trial Court's proceedings and the judgment subject matter of this appeal. Therefore, the first ground of appeal is misconceived and unmeritorious, and it is hereby dismissed. Ploughing into the second ground of appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial Court for convicting him based on exhibit Pl (the alleged red bag) which was not tendered at the trial Court. Again, as rightly submitted by the learned State Attorney, there is no red bag that was mentioned in the judgment or proceedings of the trial Court and no finding of guilt or conviction that was based on a red bag. Moreover, even the charge sheet did not mention any item stolen except for the amount of money in TZS 200,000/= cash. Further exhibit Pl was not an item stolen from the victim, but a PF3, a medical examination report tendered by PW4, a medical doctor. In light of the above, the red bag being a ground of conviction is the Appellant's makeup, not based on the proceedings of the trial Court. It follows that the second ground of appeal also collapses. The third ground of appeal is hinged on the absence of evidence that there was enough light at the scene of the crime that could have enabled the victim to positively identify the attacker. The learned State Attorney 8 disputed the Appellant's stance and argued that the victim testified that she identified the attacker because there was sufficient light at the place where the offence was committed and it was because she was tied to the electric light pole which had an electric light. This Court, in determining the issue of the Appellant's identification by PW1, the victim of the assault, bears in mind the challenges of visual identification, and that, in our jurisdiction, it is settled that visual identification is one of the weakest forms of identification. In the case of Waziri Amani vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 55 of 1979) [1980] TZCA 23 (6 May 1980): the Court of Appeal observed: "Evidence of visual identification is not only of the weakest kind, but it is also most unreliable and a court should not act on it unless all possibilities of mistaken identity are eliminated and it is satisfied that the evidence before it is absolutely watertight".' Moreover, on the issue of identification in general, in the case Frank Joseph @ Sengerema vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 378 of 2015) [2016] TZCA 216 (25 April 2016) the Court of Appeal referred the case of Waziri Amani (supra) and observed that: "In that case the Court laid down some guidelines which are to be followed in order to establish whether or not identification evidence is watertight. The following factors must be established: (i) The time the witness had the Appellant under observation. (ii) The distance at which he observed him. 9 (Hi) The conditions in which such observation occurred, for instance, whether it was day or night time. Whether there was good or poor lighting at the scene. (iv) Whether the witness knew or had seen the Appellant before or not." Moreover, in the present case identification of the Appellant by recognition by PW1, the victim of the assault, was of paramount importance. In the case of Frank Joseph @ Sengerema vs Republic (supra) the Court of Appeal had this to say on evidence of recognition: "Evidence of recognition has been taken to be more reliable than that of identification. Notwithstanding that position, we are mindful of the requirement that care must be taken before any court acts on that kind of evidence. In Shamir s/o John v The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 166 of2004 (unreported) the Court observed as follows: - "...recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger, but even when the witness is purporting to recognize someone whom he knows, the Court should always be aware that mistakes in recognition of those relatives and friends are sometimes made." This Court, armed with the above guidance as regards identification both by visual and recognition, finds no basis in the Appellant's third ground of appeal because of several factors as discussed herein below. First, is that, as rightly submitted by the Respondent's counsel, the victim made it very clear that after being attacked she was hauled to the 10 trees, and by using the Appellant's belt she was tied by the neck, to the electric power pole which was laid down at the crime scene. Moreover, at the place where she was tied to the pole, there was an electric light that enabled her to identify the assailant, who was the Appellant herein. Second, after the victim was tied to the electric power pole, the Appellant went ahead raping her whilst threatening the victim with a knife. It is also on record that the Appellant stole the TZS 200,000/=from the victim whilst threatening her with a knife. There is no evidence on record that the victim was blindfolded at the time the offence was committed or that she was forced to close her eyes. This means that the victim was seeing all that was being done against her by the assailant whom she identified to be the Appellant. Third, given the narration of events by the victim as available on pages 4-6 of the trial Court's proceedings, it is clear that the Appellant spent considerable time very close to the victim when the Appellant was committing undesirable and awful acts against the Appellant. It is thus clear that the time spent by the Appellant and the close range of body-to-body between him and the victim, especially when having the carnal knowledge of the victim, enabled the victim to identify him without the possibility of mistaken identity. Fourth, it is also on record that the victim knew the Appellant well before the fateful day as the person who was working at the new bus stand as a porter and a carter. The Appellant also had, in the past, conveyed consignments to the victim's place of business and thus she knew him well. 11 Fifth, the Appellant's testimony indicated that he and the victim knew each other, they lived on the same street. This eliminated the possibility of mistaken identity. The sixth factor showing that the Appellant was properly identified, is that the victim named the Appellant by his name to the first person who arrived at the crime scene (PW2). Both PW1 and PW2 testified that when the victim was asked what happened to her she responded that the Appellant attacked her, raped her, and stole money from her amounting to TZS 200,000/=. This means that the victim named the Appellant at the earliest opportunity when her memories were still fresh and before they faded. Moreover, when still at the crime scene the victim also mentioned the name of the Appellant to her husband (PW3) who also went to the crime scene after being informed that his wife had been attacked. This shows that the victim was certain about what she witnessed and was consistent with the person who assaulted and robbed her. See the cases of Frank Joseph @ Sengerema vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 378 of 2015) [2016] TZCA 216 and Abel Orua @ Matiku & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 441 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 78. Seventh, the victim provided the prior description of the clothes of the Appellant that he wore at the time of the attack being black clothes, a hat, and a jacket. See the case of Daud William @ Macha vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No.333 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 17548 (29 August 2023). The above-explained factors indicate unambiguously that the Appellant was properly identified and there was no possibility of a mistaken identity. 12 Having revisited the record of the trial Court, this Court finds that the trial Court properly acted on the evidence of the victim on identification of the Appellant because her evidence was credible and there was no reason to disbelieve her given that every witness is entitled to credence. See the cases of Mathias Bundala vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 62 of 2004) [2007] TZCA 16 and Goodluck Kyando v. Republic 2006 TLR 363. Regarding the fourth ground of appeal where the Appellant challenges that the trial Court did not consider his defence, the learned State Attorney submitted that the defence of the Appellant was summarized on pages 05 to 08 of the judgment. However, the trial Court did not analyse the evidence of the defence, but the learned State Attorney was quick to submit that since this is the first appellate Court, the Court should step into the shoes of the trial Court and analyse the evidence on record. As rightly submitted by the learned State Attorney, this being the first appellate Court may evaluate the evidence on record and come up with its own findings on whether the Appellant was rightly convicted by the trial Court. The Court of Appeal in the case of Registered Trustees of Joy in The Harvest vs Hamza K. Sungura (Civil Appeal 149 of 2017) [2021] TZCA 139 (28 April 2021) held that: "On our part, we are in agreement with both learned advocates that it is part of our jurisprudence that a first appellate court is entitled to reevaluate the entire evidence adduced at the trial and subject it to critical scrutiny and arrive at its independent decision." 13 In the case of Massanja Maliasanga Masunga & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 328 of 2021) [2023] TZCA 17780 (26 October 2023) it was held that: ' We agree that where the trial court or the first appellate court does not consider a party's defence, it is an irregularity but the same is curable. The first appellate court has to consider the defence as a remedy and if it does not, the second appellate court has a duty to consider the defence and make a decision' That being the position, this Court will proceed to consider the Appellant's defence and make a relevant determination. As per DWl's testimony which is found on pages 17-19 of the trial Court's proceedings, the major defence in his testimony was that at the time the alleged offence was committed he was sleeping at home and he left his home at 09:00 a.m. on a fateful day, and thus he was not involved in the commission of the offence levelled against him which was committed at 05.00 a.m. As intimated by the Respondent's learned counsel the Appellant's defence of being elsewhere when the offence was committed, amounted to a defence of alibi in respect of which notice should have been issued according to the requirements of the law. It is also clear that no sufficient details were provided during the said testimony regarding the Appellant's whereabouts. Further, no corroboration was provided by any other witness to support the Appellant's version of alibi. Under the law, when a party (the accused) does not give the required notice of alibi to the prosecution as per dictates of the law, the Court may 14 accord no weight to the defence of the alibi of the accused. Section 194(4)(5)(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 R.E. 2022 provides that: "(4) Where an accused person intends to rely upon an alibi in his defence, he shall give to the court and the prosecution notice of his intention to rely on such defence before the hearing of the case. (5) Where an accused person does not give notice of his intention to rely on the defence of alibi before the hearing of the case, he shall furnish the prosecution with the particulars of the alibi at any time before the case for the prosecution is dosed. (6) Where the accused person raises a defence ofalibi without having first furnished the prosecution pursuant to this section, the court may, in its discretion, accord no weight of any kind to the defence." Moreover, in determining the validity of the Appellant's defence of alibi, this Court is steered by the guidance of the Court of Appeal in the case of Abel Orua @ Matiku & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 441 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 78 where it was observed that: "On this ground, we think we should begin by restating a cardinal principle that an Appellant person is not required to establish that his alibi is reasonably true. All what he is required to do is to create doubts as to the strength of the prosecution case against him. Where the prosecution case is accepted as nothing than the truth or where the case was on visual identification and the identification is foundpositive, the defence of alibi is diminished. See- Kenedy Owino Onyachi & 2 15 Others (supra) and Kubezya John v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 488 of 2015(unreported). In light of the above authorities, it is clear that the Appellant's defence of alibi was unreliable for lacking any other corroborative evidence, and, even if for argument's sake, it would have been corroborated the same could have been accorded no weight under section 196(6), for failure to comply with section 196(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Further, the identification of the Appellant has been found positive, and thus the defence of alibi shrunk. In respect of the fifth ground of appeal that the Respondent failed to prove the case against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, the learned State Attorney, as alluded to hereinabove, submitted that the prosecution proved both counts against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. As regards the first count the Appellant was charged under sections 130(l)(2)(b) and 131(1) of the Penal Code. At this juncture, it is vital to consider the relevant law in respect of which the Appellant was charged. Sections 130(1) and (2)(b) and of the Penal Code, by which the appellant was charged with rape provides that: "130. -(1) It is an offence for a male person to rape a giri or a woman. (2) A male person commits the offence ofrape ifhe has sexual intercourse with a girl or a woman under circumstances falling under any of the following descriptions: (a) N/A 16 (b) with her consent where the consent has been obtained by the use offorce, threats or intimidation by putting her in fear of death or of hurt or while she is in unlawful detention; Moreover, section 130(4) Penal Code, Cap. 16 R.E. 2019 provides that: "(4) For the purposes ofproving the offence of rape- (a) penetration however slight is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence; " In the light of the above provisions of the law, in order to prove the offence of rape the prosecution was supposed to prove penetration, lack of consent from the victim, and that the accused, in this case, the Appellant, was the one who penetrated the victim. However, before, considering the above ingredients of rape this Court asks itself whether there was a proper charge against the Appellant in respect of the first count of rape. The particulars of the offence, as regards the first count of rape, reads: "PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE MARIANYA S/O MARWA@ MWITA on 29h August2023 at Right to Play Stadium in Mugumu Township within Serengeti District in Mara Region, had carnal knowledge of one 'YS' who is an adult' Swotting the above particulars, this Court does not find necessary elements of the offence of rape as per section 130(2)(b) of the Penal Code above reproduced. The particulars above are simply an unfeasible report that 17 the Appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. Section 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that: "132. Every charge or information shall contain, and shall be sufficient ifit contains, a statement ofthe specific offence or offences with which the Appellant person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged." Reverting to the present case as regards the particulars of the 1st count in the charge levelled against the Appellant, this Court finds that the Respondent omitted very key information in the particulars of the offence. In light of section 130(2)(b) of the Penal Code, the particulars of the offence do not indicate whether the Appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim with her consent and that the consent was obtained by the use of force, threats or intimidation by putting her in fear of death or of hurt, in order to constitute the offence of rape. The manner particulars of the offence were presented in the first count, as reproduced herein above, were insufficient to constitute the offence of rape because no reasonable details were given in order to enable the Appellant to marshal his defence according to the law. The said insufficiency rendered the charge, as regards the first count, defective. The situation analogous to the present case was considerably discussed in the case of Frank Kanani vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 501 (10 December 2019) and the Court of Appeal held that: 18 "In the instant case, since the victim was 24 years of age, it was imperative for the information in respect of her age to appear in the particulars of the offence and such particulars to expressly state that there was no consent given by the victim in the forced sexual intercourse. In the absence of that vital information in the particulars of the offence, the charge was defective and obviously it prejudiced the appellant" Moreover, it is also settled that a defective charge cannot be cured under section 388 of the Criminal Procedure Act, especially at the appellate stage, the same should have been amended at the trial Court under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Amending the charge at this stage would, undoubtedly, prejudice the Appellant. The above observation of this Court is invigorated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Frank Kanani vs Republic (supra) where the Court held that: "Since section 388 of the CPA cannot cure this kind of defect, then the first appellate judge lacked jurisdiction to amend and correct the charge at the appellate stage as stated in Antidius Augustine V. R, Criminal Appeal No. 89 of2017 (unreported) that:- "We have indicated that the charge which was laid before the trial court was defective and therefore it could not have been corrected at an appellate stage." In light of the above this Court finds that the Appellant was wrongly convicted on a defective charge as regards the first count of rape. The Court, therefore, invokes the provisions of sections 372(1) and 373(1) of the 19 Criminal Procedure Act. The Court, therefore, quashes and nullifies the conviction of the Appellant on the 1st count of rape, and also sets aside the sentence of thirty years imprisonment imposed on the Appellant in that regard. The above decision of the Court is fortified by the position of the Court of Appeal in the case of Simon Kitalika & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 468 of 2016) [2019] TZCA 105 (15 May 2019). Steering, now, to consider whether the second count of armed robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt. As regards the second count, the Appellant was charged under section 287A of the Penal Code which provides that: "/I person who steals anything, and, at or immediately before or after stealing is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument and at or immediately before or after stealing uses or threatens to use violence to any person in order to obtain or retain the stolen property, commits an offence of armed robbery and shall, on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years with or without corporal punishment." The above-reproduced section makes it clear regarding the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery which, to a greater extent, were considered in the case of Shabani Said Ally vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 270 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 382 (6 November 2019) where the Court of Appeal held that: 'It follows from the above provision ofthe law that in order to establish an offence of armed robbery, the prosecution must prove the following: - 20 1. There must be proof of theft; see the case of Dickson Luvana v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No.l of 2005 (unreported); 2. There must be proof of the use of a dangerous or offensive weapon or robbery instrument against at or immediately after the commission ofrobbery. 3. That use of dangerous or offensive weapon or robbery instrument must be directed against a person. See:- Kashima Mnadi v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 2011 (unreported). Guided by the above authorities, and after review of the trial Court's proceedings, and given the discussions herein above on other grounds of appeal, it is undoubtedly clear that the relevant ingredients of the offence of armed robbery were methodically considered by the trial Court. On page 11 of the judgment, an analysis of the facts and the law was made and the trial Court decided that the Respondent proved the offence of armed robbery against the Appellant herein beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court finds no reason to differ with the trial Court taking into account the fact that the Appellant, as alluded herein above, was properly identified as the person who stole money from the victim, the Appellant used a knife which is a dangerous weapon to threaten the victim, and as a result, she could not scream for help when the Appellant was committing the awful acts against her. 21 Therefore, it is a finding of this Court that the offence of armed robbery was proved beyond a reasonable doubt against the Appellant. In the final analysis, and as alluded hereinabove, the decision of this Court in respect of the first count is that in the exercise of its revisional powers, the Court has quashed and nullified the finding of guilt and conviction regarding the offence of rape and the sentence of thirty (30) years imprisonment in that respect has been set aside. However, the conviction and sentence in respect of the second count of armed robbery are upheld, and the Appellant shall continue to serve a sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment as ordered by the trial Court. In that respect, this appeal stands dismissed. It is so ordered. The Judgment was delivered in the presence of Mr. Michael Kayombo, a learned State Attorney for the Respondent, and in the presence of the Appellant. Right of Appeal explained. K. I. Kafanabo Judge 05/02/2025 22