20010809 TZCA Mbeya

IN TIES C0UIT 01 APPEAL CF TA4ZAr1iA .ATMBBYA 0 0 (CORAN: J LUGAKThGIRA, J .A.) CIVIL APPEAL NC. 1+5 CF 2000 BLT ELN tj MBEYA_PUt A AUTOPARTS ° TRANSPG± T LTD. AP±LLANT \c \• A N D JESTfl.TA GE0RG) HWAKYOMA ..... PE.PONDENT 0 (Appeal from the Judgernent of the * High Court of Tanzania at Nheya) (Hwipopo, J.) dated the 16th d,r of December, 1999 •.. in RULING V When this appeal came on for hearing, learned counsel forthe respondent, Mr. Victor Mkumbe raised a preliminary objection to its comptence . He put forwird two grounds which may be rephrasQd thus (a) that the appellant has no legal standing in the proceeding as it * - was not a party t'Misc. Civil V V Application Nc. 3 of 1995; V - • (b) that leave to appeal waz not obtaed although the decision of the iigh V V Court was not niade under the Civil V Procedure Code, 1966. V The appeal and the rlir1inary objection derive from a drawn out. background which ought to be set out at length. V V / - - - 2 - The proceeding centres on a parcel of land comprised in Plot Nos. 1 and 2, Block BE, tiyole Industrial Area, Mbeya Municipality. This land was first allocated on a right, of occuDancy to M/s Kagera Canning Industry Ltd. (hereinafter KkiPA) under an ececuted offer which was registered y tie Assistant Registrar of Titles at Mbeya in October 1986. The land was then uzveied and 1ccwn simDly as Plot Nos. 1 and 2, Elck "B3, iibera unicipality, that is, without the further reference toUyole Industi.l Ac In Ap'il 1989, and with the consent of the Regiodal Lanr Officc., KGRA transferred the right of occupancy to the appellants, M/s Mbeya-Bukwa Autoparts & Transport Ltd. (referred to in the proceedings and this ruling by its acronym ?4RAPATA). The transfer was duly recorded by the Assistant Registrar of titles. Z.ubsecuently, the land was surveyed and given the description Plot Nos. 1 & 2, Block S3B:. Uyie Industrial Area, Mbeya Municirality, and at some later stage MRfiATA took steps to acQuire a certificate of cc.ncv in relacement to the offer. Meanwhile, the surveyed land was allocated to the r&podent Jestina George Mwakyora, on a 3-year right of occupancy commencing 1 October, .1991 'The allocation was followed with the a rtif±cat of out'y y the' •.-u t\ Id6 which was registered by the Assistant Iegistrar of Titltza in Mgust 1992 as Certificate of Title No. 3728-NEYLR. However, in December 1991+ the Assistant Registrar of Titles received for registrafion another certificate of occupancy over the arelan.d, this one in the. name of MPJ3 PATA. At this juncture the Assistant Registrar of Titles realised that Plot Nose I and 2, Block L3B, I1beya Municipality and Plot Nos, 1 and 2, FLock BB', Uyole Industrial Area, Mbeya Municipality .ere ie and the sane piece of land and that there -3-- h.arj been a double allocation of sane. Believ&ng that the allocation to 'the respndent wa invalid for being subsequent to MRAPATA's, the Assistant F<egistrar of Titles sent notices to the respondent under sectIon 37 (1) of the Land egistration Ordinance (Cap. 33+), requiring her to produce her certifisate of title for cancellation. The respondent failed to comply. Accordingly, and pursuant to subsection (2) of section 37, the Asitant Registx'ar of Titie iied Misc. Civil Application No. 3 of 1995 in the High Court piaying for the cancellation of the respondent's certificate. The respondent never responded to the court smonses and her Dar es Salaam-based lawyers neYer showed up when directed to. The application was therefore heard and granted e: parte by MwiDopo, J. in a ruling delivered on 24 Setember, tl.e respondent was for the first time present in person Ja tcice the ruling. The judge advised her to make an apolication to set aside the order, warned her on limitation and suo motu stayed execution of the order pending the respondont's aljcation.. It seems the application was presented in time and the cx oarte order waS aside on 3 April, 1998. Nearing of the applicc..tion inter partes took place on 1 November 1998 and ruling was reserved to 15 December. It transpired iii pleadings end counsel's subaissions that the respondcit had started building a fence around the plots- eñ questions of cornpenation and alternative plots for her had become apparent. \hile the ruling was reserved it occurred to the judge that the application might succeed. and this gave urgency to the two questions. The judge appears to have been concerned that the respondent should not suffer loss, Therefore, on 12 December he wrote and delivered an intcrim otder in Which he said, inter alia: - - r I ti fore before a ruling is made in .7 resoect of this atDlication recuire X_ZPPA and Municital Director/Land OIilcc-r of Mbeya r!unictality to apPear and show CaISd wfly, in case this • apclication is granted, they should not be ccndeemc!d t pay ccrn;enaation and to give equivalent alternative clots for indu5trial 6e'0elotment to :he ±espondentQ Thc proceeding of this applicticn shall be served upon the same two rJ parties with this order for them to aPpear in court and be heard accordingly. On 6 December, 1999 the Municiral Director and MIiTA appeared through learned dqd Mr. Mise respotively. The record then goes tnu.s: Court: Mr 0 Luanda l'iunicieal Solicitor for unicial Director and learned ir. Mbise Advccat for TATA are told the essence of their presence. The learned Mr. M'oise Advocate to start first for 1RAPATA because he is the second counsel to the "1c.itcr This was an invitation to learnd counsel to submit on the questions of - .ot tc r:spondent. it is not disputed that the new parties were not required to file courter—affidavits in the atlication; they were also exressly barred from adducing any evidence. The lca.: idge stated: .... -. 'j.- - - -i For th time being I allow each side to submit any factual or legal points If this court finds it necessary to have evidence tendered ... in support of or to nuntor th factual submissions. I will allow - both sides to do so and make necessary direotions ac'ordthgly. This never hapned but the court h'3axd ub rins only. rdin the points on which reactions were solicited 1 Mr. Mbise stated that MRAPATA were not prepared to compensate the respondent. The reasons he gave are not relevant, Mr. Luanda, on the other hand, stated that the Municipal Director had no industrial Diots then to offer to the respondent. These rcactions did not go well with the learned judge. He was manifestly anxious to assist the respondant and, seeing no pos.ihilitr of rinç cotr- 'ui 'rt ti,.e- upon the idea of legalising.the respondent's ownership of the land. In this strategy he took advantage of a letter by the Commissioner for Lands (la -tr rescinded) addressed to the Regional Land Officer. The • letter, prompted by the rpondnt' p)& to th c iiier4 chc.'d the Iegional Lend Officur for the double allocation and for allowing the transfer between IRA and MRAPATA in the first place. The Goeuissicner suggestd withdrawal of the application in court in order for his department to scrt out the irregularities admisistratiely and with a view to rogularising the pof.dent 1 s title. As indicated, the Commissioner rescinded the letter in a subsequent one, but the learned judge ridiculed and- dismissed the rescission as thlauthentiC in a judgment where he held as follows ._______ __-.----------.--- --_-_- ------------------------------------- - 0 - (1) I hold that the trans far of the plot fran'. Kagera Canning Industry Ltd. to R.APATA was illegal fcr being without any consideration proved and if there was siich consideration it was for no developments never made by him. JGstina Nwakyoma got the land lawfully for she was an innocent third party who did not have to lift the veil to see whether the office which had the pdwer and authority to grant him the land had done so lafully. As between Mwakyomc and Kagera Canning Industry Ltd. the one who deserves retention of this plot now is Mwakyoma because she has interest in i; and has developed it. () There is no need of giving chance to Kagera Canr.in Industry Ltd. To be heard for he won 't have any better claim over this plot than Mwakyoma. The judge went on to state hat it could not be left to the Regional Land Officer to revoke the subsitisg right of occupancy or td the Municical Director to regularis t respondnt's position and preces4ed to make the followin crders: (1) This ccurt therefore hereby revokes the Offer of ijiit of Occupancy granted to Kagera Ganninc Industry Ltd. for it was illegal forh tc transfr it to MRAPATA without following the procedures and laws referred to by the Commissioner -7- (2) This court also revokes hereby the transfer of the 2. plots to MRAPliTA for the same reason and for failure to develop it is between 1969 and 1991 or enter upon it or leave his mark upon the land in time. This court retains the offer of Right of Occupancy to Jest$.na George Mwakyo9a as Droperi register :3 by the Assistant Registrar of Titles se V ±ar 0 Kagera Canning Industry Ltd. has no remedy or relief this court can grant hini for ha already got 'paid or freely gave it and tras'ferrcd it to MRAPATA. As for the said transferee he is free to clair, and SUe. for his costs incurred on this plot and to cla for alternative plots from t1 y-elevant authorities, This application is dismissed with costs. These pronouncements enerally make difficult reading but we may have to come to that latar.. Presontly, it will be seen that these pronouncerner t - drs affcted NiAi'ATA's inerests con.sicteraiüy. It is on that account that NRAPATA brought this appal. 'dithout the necessity of setting 'out the grounds of appeal, which in ariutshell V take issue with each and every item set out above, we will go straight to consider the prelisiinary objection. The first ground was that MPJPTA had no right or locus standi to bring the acpeal becaua they WGTC not a party to the proceeding. Mr, 1.h,b: .Lhat jIiLk were never joined as a party in as muchas they were not required to file pleadings or to adduce evidence. .../8 .- .--------- -==--.--. ...... V -8 - The second ground related to went of leave to appeal. Nr. Mkumbe argued that the proceeding was determined under section 37 (2) of th Land Regiztrat 4 on Ordinance rather than the Civil Procedure Code and that the -provisions ofscction 5 (1) (C) of the Apellate. Jurisdiction Act, 1979 ceee into -i)1a'y7 In reply, Mr. Mbise started off by questioning the ccmrctencc of the nctice of preliminary objection. Ho contended that it did not comply with the law by cmlttlng to cite the provision under which i was brought. He wondered whether, it was brought under Rule 62, 100 or 106 of the Court Rules. He also pointed out that another objection bxought by notice of motion was struck out the day before and submitted that the resoondent should either have made another application or but. r a reference under Rule 57, Turning to the substance of the preliminary cbjec1.ion Nr. lThise contended that MRAPATA were Joinud inthe proceeding becausc-, (±) the judge directed the record to be served on thG "flow partie&, (ii) it was recorded that the judrsnt was :;d e livere d in the presence of all rartiec cxce'et the unic±pal Dirctor, and (iii) the right of aepea,J was clained in general terms, lie was quick to add, however, that it was not RAPATA's. fault if th joinder was improper. Regarding leave to apeal, Nr.•ibise argued that MRAPATA were joined pursuant to the provisions of section 95of the Civil Procedure Code, there ir 37 of the Lnd being no provision for that pur pose under scctn Registration Ordinance. In the alternative, rir. Mbise submitted that the procoedins wore so chaotic and the decisions reached so contrary to law and justice that this was a proper case for the Court to step in and invoke its revisional powers under section 4(3) of th 'ppe ' Jurisdiction Act. I/o I -9- To begin with, we think 1 with respect, hr. Mhise's challenge to the notice of prelininary obj:ction is untenable. Incidentally, the notice arose thus: In Civil Application No. MBY 7 of 2000 the respondent aplied for the appeol to be struck out on the same grounds later given in the notice. That application was heard and struck out by a member of this panel the day before the appeal was to be heard because the affidavit accomcnying the notice of motion was invalid. With less than twenty-four hours to the hearir.g of the appeal, lr. 11kumbe determined that the better alternative was to give notice of preliminary objection.It does not appear to us that the qmissipi to cite the provision under which it was brou 3 ht was fatal. We say so hecaus a notice of preliminary objection which, of course., falls uder Rule 100, is not an application. It is simply a notice and is given just before hearingof the appeal begins. What is essential is rc-asonable notice both to the opposite side and the Court. If the Court does not conider the notice reasonable it may adjourn the hearing of the appeal in order for reasonable notice to be given. Rule 100 is procedural rather than substantive. It does not confer any right upon litigants nor does it bestowany. power on the Co,urt, it mr-ty rg .as tj' v-w)uct of the business of the Court, isaipLi t.caproceduralt kmiq t into r,uest ion the urjsdictioi of the Court to hear and determine the matter before it and is herefox'e not fatal. . A different position obtains with applications.th these the aplicant has to cite the relevant provision from which the - Court derives the power to hear and dotermin the application. This may be illustrated with one or two decisions. N.B.C.v.SainHi, Civil Appli.caton No 20 o 1997, was an application for revision which was - . V expressed as brought under section 1 (2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. The Court rejected the application observing that the power vested in the Court by subsecticn (2) in exercisable for the purpose of and incidental to the hearing nd determination of an appeal, but bon instituted. The Court said: It follo thcrcfora that the ljation has been filed by notice of motion under an inaDplicable section of the law. Coeuntly 1 as the Court was not properly moveA, the application is likewise incomoetent. *.-C-e.aé '-li-ci to pted wth rv±s ion suo noth ur4er sc4to (3) stating: he f os-c th9 C.uurt by notice of motion ... It has to be dealt • • with in me - the Court was moved ena not otherwise. • This decision was alied - by Padhani, J.A.• in AJr.az die_Mwini - -----• N..C. & other, Civj2 pl tic No. 88 of aoolicatn stay of execution whcrc the provisions relied upon were not cite at all. It was argued that the Court had not been moved at all because of the omission. The learned judge upheld the argtent end said thathracicc of the Court has always been that the pro on of law relied uoon to move the Court be-cited, eferring to *Sadrud he said that i a wrong citation of a law renders an ap;licatiqfl neopetence Ihave not a flicker of doubt in my mind that non- citation of law is worse and equally renders an application incompetent.' It may well be that Hr. Mbise had such situations in mind. But as no doubt evident, both these cases.involved an application by notice of rdotion and both cases involyed.non—cjtatjon of an enabling provision, Section 4 (3) 1 ,which should have been cited in Sadrudin Neghji, md Rule 9 (2) (b), which should have been cited in Almas Iddie Mwinyi, are substantive provisions. The foimer vests the Court with power to revise High Court. proceedings sue motu, the latter empowers the Court to stay execution in civil proceedings. In contrast, ule 100 is nct enabling, in other wds 1 it is not a provis ion from 'hich thc Court derives powar to transact anything but it regulates the manner of exercising a power granted elsewhere. As otated earlier, what matters under the rule is roa5onable notice and Mr. Nbise did. not ecp1ain.about the roaaenableness of the notice. The omission to cite the rule, although this is by no means encouraged, was t}crefore inconsc-quential. Nr. Nb±se' other arguxiient that the respondent should have.:mad another application or brought a. rQ'Lerence following the striking àut 31 Civil Application Nc. IIBL 7 of 2000 has no merit, either. FinSt another application was impractical in point of tirna and could, only haa resu..ltd in delaying the hearing of the •real. We think,. n the other hand, it was uimecessary to make such application be.ause that was not the only or beet Pptirm open to the respondent. She could give notice of preliminary objection, if it could be done reasonably, or she could sit back and wait for the hearing of the appeal at whic}r she could have siugt leave of the Ceut to raise - - the objection pursuant t. Rule 106 (b). She took the former option and the rsojiab1uness of the notice is not in questien. iscond, Rule 57 does not come into this. The rule provides for reference - 12 - tQ the Court whre a party to an applicatioi befor a sin&-e udis. with the d.cisior of thD judge. The dcisicn•n i inedo4 ±c refer o a ciecision on the merits of the cn but not any The rule cannot fo t reas a1v ljticn is struck out without being heard as it* instant cas As hr. Nknbc rightly observed, when an all.tjo is out it ceases to exist and there is nothiIIG to puce on reference. - We are satisfied 4= the whole that Mr. Mbise's challge to the notice of pralizinay b4ctiei wo not justified and we jrood t- cors- thr.. €"ondz of the obj.ection. itrt qziG aticz is whether MRAPATA had the capacity to rin the appeal, and this turts. on whether they were a. party to the z'oceeding Rule 76 (1) states: (1) Any person who desires to appeal to the Court shall lodge a. written notice in duplicate with the Registrar of the High Court. In A.G. j1iKack,u &Othe z"_1 99f TLR 69 t' 'ourt held that the wordz 4any in the Rule refer to any of the parties involvad in the original suit and not sny other person. This position is also necessarily imnlied in section 5 of the AppeJ.J.ate Jurisdiction Act,, where ssetion 2 (a) (i) and (b) specifically refer to the partie& and a party respectively. The question therefore becomes whether HURAPATA were a party involved in the orignl apDlication. We think, with respet they were not; the fact that the trial judge referred tothe nd to the Nrnicipal Director as 1 new partie& did not have - 13 - the magic of making them parties in fact or in law. If the learned c-aasidnred 1 ,1RAPATAS prence before the court necessary in or.er to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the application, he .ba- -eoo.ded c' -the an.alogY OT joinder of prtics in civil suits to make NRAPATA a party to the application. To that end, the ffi.4vit& and countefuiyjts in the aiplication sbould havQ served on them and they should have been given, the oppertn'ity to thQ- o cou.ntr—affidavits. Assuming the dGcl.znents were served as iuirecttd in the trial jdges interim order, it is clear from the pocedings of 6 December 1 999, and not diBpu.td, that tuxitr to file such counter—affictavjts was not given to them. That being the position, it is not correct 'to' say that MRAPATA became a party to the 1erely being required, as they were, to appear and show, muse why they should not be ec demad to compensate the respondent did not make them a party in the original proceeding. ..It is clear to u.s that the whole purpose of summoning them before the court was to ist the court in its preoccupation with the respondent's rights. ht the i.ct - rt oiio t'. party to t1­10 appliction and was ixcapable .nf bringing any appeal. Having said so -milable, rza11y, to ­ r' ­ £ •• ihether the appeal requirnd iAsave.. Lee t<r mpDeal, where required, can only be applied for by, and to a party entitled to appeai, but not strangers. As MRAPATA had no right of appeal, the question of leave becomes irrelevant.. In view of the foregoing, we strike out the appeal. ./11+ - 11+ - Mr. Mbise prayed. the Court in the alternative to exercise its revisicnal jurisdiction suo motu. The prayer was based on what he teied the chaotic nature of the proceedings and the decisions cáde contrary tc the principles of natural justice. In Halais Prhernie v. WeaAG99/P 269, this Ccurt held that itwilJ. revisesuo motu the proceedings in the g' Court where, for instance, thc agievcd party or Derson has no right of aD.eal; it will also do so where in the circumstances of any given case an injustice would other'.iise be condoned. The instant case is a tynical example in which bot1}i these ac•tors Qbtn. As just demcnstrated MRAPATA had no right of appeal; on the other hand, the decision todeclare illcgl the transfer byKARA and to rvoko the same as well as the right of occupancy was a grave ,=P, yet it was taken without the aarties concerned beina heard... The learned judge took the decision on the basis of the respondoirts. counter-affidavit and her so-called supploxn'ntary counter-äffidavi i which she claimed that KA(EP.A had in the first niace breached the di±ia .oi tho right of occuaancy and had therafore ot acctd:'. the plots'. On that basis she argued in the supplocontary counter- ffidavit that Y.&TdA had no title to 'pass on to tPATA. She further elaimed that the transfer did not receive the consent of the C.as.sicn.r for Lands In gerral the .up.lor_crtary courter-affidavit is five paces of aliugatiori submissions and argimentation rather t}'an facts, but what is worse is that MRAPATA had no oDDorturiity to respond thereto. . ...A5 - ...-----=- --.---.. --_-1 It isacardinal principle of natural justice that a person should not be condemned unheard but faixprocdure demands that both sádes s.ou1d be heard: audialteramjartom. In Baldwin T96gAo +O, the lading English case on the subject, it was held., that a power which affects rights cust be exercised judicially, ic. We agree and therefore hold that it is not a fair and judicious exercise of po.:èr, but a neat.on of justice, where a party is denied a hearing before its rights are taken away. As similarly -tat-d by Lord i4orris inurno1l Hirh chool Bprd L '977 AC 660, 679, Natural justice is but fairness writ larg,an. judicial1y. We wish to add that it made no differonce,- that in the instant case counsel appeared fcr MIb\PATA and addressed the court. What counsel was callod upon to do was to adc.ves the court on why, his client should not be concLimud to pay coirnnsation0 He was not required or peiitted to adduce evidence on the merits of his client's title to the suit land but wi's cxprcssly barred from doing so. Indeed hearing of the applicaticn had been concluded but the court was having problens rcaching a decision favou.rable to the respondent incaso she lost. In this country g natural rjustice is not merely a principle of the ion law s it has becptea fi ts ortjttjons.l riht. _ AdV Article 13 (6) (a)- includes the right to be heardIonionttho attributes of equality before the law s and doclar in part - - (a) - - vinahjiifiwauamuziwama1ia- kama au chombo kinvinccho_kinacho..- - - hakia1wafura yakusikilizwa kwa_ukarnilifu ... - - 16 - hisparagraph of the Ccrstitution MRPATA had the right not on ly to be heard but to be heard fully. We hold that a decision reached without regard to the principles of natural justice and or in çontrventiOn of the Corstt'...tion is void and of no effect. There is yet another ground for holding the High Courts deisisn unconstitutional and void. It violnts the doctrine of searat-ion powers. The Constitution sets out in cicr terms the sDhercs of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, to the end that ths organs will not ursurp or infringe on each other's powers .lthough t -idisiary may be said to exercise residuni lgistive Dowers when interrreting the law, in reality it does no more than give meaning to the intent-gn of trio 10gislatur0 It is otherwise 1crsihJe for the judiciary to intrude into legislative or executive szther€. Under the Ld Ordinance (CaD e 113;' which was in force when this proceeding as decided and under the present law, powers to grant and revoke rights of occuancy are vested in the President. They are executive powers. Such Dowers cannot be wielded by the courts, as was done in this case, without bringing the judiciary into contempt and ridicule The learned udRe with resoect, went terribly wrong wien he puortcd to revoke the FTAiRAPATA right or ccUnL and when he p zrbortad to granfr a right of occupancy- tths rcndcnt. These decisions were illegal, void and of no effect. Although, finally, KARA did not appear before uswe are duty bound to rem ark that it was s is ilarly c cntrtIass to condemn them without being heard. The learned judge's contention that there was no need of giving thea a chance to be heard. :bC C5C he won't have sny better claim ... than Mwdiroma, was untenable. As stated by Chandrac hud, C . J in T ellis vBOmbaYMufl1CiDalCorporation L1982/ LPC (Const) 351, 3763 - a The pr000sition that notice need not be' given of a proposed,..:.action because theE , .1W, £.p•4t '.i. Lji can possibly be 'no answer to it s is ., . -. contrary to the well-recognised under tadi.ng o fthe'ireal vport ' o fthe of,bearing. The proposition overlooks.fl - ,-,- ... ..pj that justice must not only, be 'don buti -. - 4-I.' -. •' _____ must 'maiiifstly seentô b done iad 'confuss e á**iiil This decision was applisd by, the High Court in this1 Athjani v .Republic 98Lfl 235 anc4;oc agr Qcpre.5ed therein. ' ... There is one final matter'ovident iA recc' 1 requires rtied, We noterthat 'after the" Assistanii filed a reply to the respondcni:'s counter-if 1avit. • -, :-.. replied to the reply an a.rojo3nder con ngoftI her o, dated 30 June, h ander,FiLIDOM - dated 23 June, 1998 and thatof flninanuol 'Simo Such a procedure is unco outra cithi5 ca of th chaotic nature of proceedings. - Pl2ac aro suppso4 .4. .e pleteThith the ap)_icant' the respondent s s counter -.affjdavjt. ,Thereshou Lb • to a reply for the apDlicantbei'1g entitled to I ''• T then have to reply to the oply to the reply • 1io - does not show that leave sganted-for presenta '. '----...'-r - - ot acco affidavits ,- hence it is curious how they record. Finally, the. tee'aociunetits are express - from Kiwahili by Mr. Mktbe;but they do not be - certificate as to theiracàuracy. These dQcumnt j4 hearsay apart from having- been mproper1y - introdu 1' In the 1it of the foregoir, we mke tha following orders. First, the three affidvjts .just referred to are ezpged.fr. cease to be part, of, the record. Second, we set wide all th0`- 4. 1) roceethn.gs and decii trai1acted.d given 98 when the Bigh Cot re-'ed H it3 ruU.n. Thud, the •k-i ' - directed to decid4 tb.. a1cat .j on the O13 of the Proca crcqp tr £t ber_°8 DD at DAr . 3AIJi..z: th 9th thy of ...... . - - - JUS TME. - OF .4pppAL D. Z. LUUVA - JliSTrr_'OF APPLAJJ • •.• • •.• • . •- . ______ 4 K.S .LLUGfdcINGflA.,.. . . • • 1 '• It - ____ 44- I certify tat tu ia truJ c' t: • - • i - ____________ • -• - ,. - ... . . • .•4_ 4 C L;I. WtNBAIiI- ) •--- ' . _ • 4••4 ••- - -- ,4.