20181130 TZHC Dar es salam

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (MAIN REGISTRY) AT DAR ES SALAAM MISC. CIVIL CAUSE NO. 11 OF 2018 MICHAEL RICHARD WAMBURAII.IU..I..I.I...IUI...I.UI.IUII.APPLICANT VERSUS THE TANZANIA FOOTBALL FEDERATION... ..... ....I...RESPONDENT RULING 2810912018 & 3011112018 Masoud,J. The applicant was on 18/5/2018 granted leave of this court by Hon. Dyansobera, J. to apply for the orders of Certiorari. Subsequent to such grant of leave, the applicant commenced this application for judicial review. It was filed on 29/05/2018. The application was made under section 3(2) of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act cap. 453 R.E 2002, section 17 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act cap. 310 R.E 2002, rules 8(1)(a) and (b) and (2) of the Law Reform (Fatal Accident and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules GN No. 324 of 2014. The applicant would in this application like this court to invoke its prerogative orders of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tanzania Football Federation's (respOndent's) Ethics Committee which was upheld by the Tanzania Football Federation (respondent's) Ethics Appeals Committee in its decision dated 06/04/2018. According to the applicant, the later committee upheld the decision of the former notwithstanding that former had violated the relevant rules of the TFF Ethics Code and was in breach of natural justice. 1 The decision of Ethics Committee, which was upheld by the Ethics Appeal Committee, convicted the applicant herein for ethical offences related to fraud and receiving monies he was not entitled to receive contrary to the TFF Ethics Code of 2013 and it sentenced the applicant to a life ban from football involvement. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Michael Richard Wambura, the applicant. It was also accompanied by a statement made by the said applicant outlining grounds upon which the applicant relied on for the orders of certiorari. The grounds relied on by the applicant were failure of natural justice, wrong assumption of jurisdiction, misconception of facts, and failure of justice. The applicant was the Vice President of the respondent, a football organisation registered under the Laws of the United Republic of Tanzania with specific objective of football administration and advancement in Tanzania. He was the Vice President of the respondent from 2017 after being duly elected until 20/03/2018 when the Ethics Committee of the respondent convicted him of ethical related offences. The applicant was convicted of firstly, illegally receiving money belonging to the respondent contrary to rule 73(1) of the respondent's Ethics Code of 2013; secondly, forgery of a letter demanding payment on behalf of JEKC Systems Limited contrary to rule 73(7) of the Ethics Code; and thirdly, engaging in acts that brought the respondent into disrepute contrary to article 50(1) of the respondent's constitution (as amended in 2015). The applicant was therefore sentenced to life ban from involvement in football activity in accordance with rule 73(1) (c) of the respondent's Ethics Code of 2013. The applicant was aggrieved by the decision of the Ethics Committee of the respondent. He appealed to the Ethics Appeal Committee of the respondent against the decision which convicted him of the said offences and sentenced him to the life ban from football activity involvement. However, on 06/04/2018, the said Ethics Appeal Committee of the respondent found the applicant's appeal lacking in merit 2 - - and dismissed it in its entirety. The Ethics Appeal committee, therefore, upheld the decision of the Ethics Committee. The nature of the complaint against the decision of the respondent's committee mainly revolved around the allegation of failure of natural justice and that there was no properly signed decision of the committee as the purported decision was only signed by the Chairman contrary to rule 69 of the Ethics Code of 2013 that requires both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman to sign it. The other complaint was based on the allegation that the Ethics Committee as well as the Ethics Appeal Tribunal were not properly constituted when they purportedly. The alleged complaints were particularised in the applicant's affidavit and statement. The particulars of the allegation of failure of natural justice were set out in paragraphs 6 and 12 of the affidavit of the applicant. The paragraphs indicated how and why the failure of natural justice occurred and the corresponding provisions of the respondent's Ethic Code of 2013 that were violated. The respondent's 14 paragraph counter affidavit sworn by one, David Ndossi who is the counsel for the respondent gave a general denial to the complaints raised in relation to the proceedings that led to the conviction and sentencing of the applicant. The same was made in accordance with information received from one, Cornel Lubago Barnabas, the legal officer of the respondent. In addition, there were also the following specific averments in the counter-affidavit. One, the applicant had knowledge of the charges laid against him and the scheduled hearing in the Ethics Committee. It was so because the charges against him originated from the audit committee where the applicant appeared and defended the charges. Two, the applicant had sufficient time to prepare his defence. It was so maintained because the matter was initially tried in the Audit Committee in his presence. The applicant had therefore knowledge of the proceedings. Three, the applicant's counsel consented to continue with the hearing in the Ethics Committee. 3 The other specific averments in the said counter-affidavit were as follow. First, the applicant had been served with notice and he entered appearance in the Ethics Committee through his Advocate, Mr Emmanuel Muga and hearing was conducted in his presence. Second, the decision of the Ethics Committee was made in accordance with the procedure. Third, the Ethics Appeal Committee upheld the decision of the Ethics Committee. Fourth, members of the Committees were appointed when the applicant was still the vice-president of the respondent. And lastly, the committee proceeded on the basis of the record that the Committee had. The applicant was in this matter advocated by Dr Masumbuko Lamwai, learned counsel while the respondent was represented by Mr David Ndossi, learned counsel. The matter was with leave of this court argued by written submissions which were duly filed by both counsel as per the schedule that was set by the court. Submissions in chief filed on behalf of the applicant by Dr Masumbuko Lamwai, learned counsel, attacked the counter-affidavit for lack of statements of facts which are in the knowledge of the deponent but mere arguments and denials. He argued that the counter-affidavit was sworn by Mr David Ndossi, learned counsel based on information received from one Cornet Lubango Barnabas, principal officer of the respondent and not of the deponent's own knowledge. Since the present proceedings are not interlocutory, the said counter-affidavit is defective and ought to be struck out. Reliance was made on Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons cx parte Matovu [1966] E.A 514 at 520D and Order XIX, r. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. Submitting in reply in relation to the attack on the said counter-affidavit, Mr Ndossi, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the counter-affidavit was not defective. It complied with the requirements of verification under Order VI, rule 15(2) of the CPC. In this respect, it was submitted that the counter-affidavit clearly reveals facts that are being sworn on the deponent's own knowledge and on the basis of information received whose source is also disclosed. The learned counsel for the respondent was of the view that the objection to the counter affidavit should 4 1 have been raised and disposed of prior to the order requiring parties to proceed with the matter on merit. To such extent, the counsel fOr the respondent invited the court to decline to uphold the objection. By way of rejoinder, the counsel for the applicant told the court that it was open for the applicant whom he was acting for to challenge the counter-affidavit in the course of argument as preliminary objection is a weapon available to a respondent. To buttress his contention, the court was referred to Hasmukh Bhagwanji Masrani v Dodsal Hydrocarbons and Power (Tanzania) PVT LTD and Two Others, Civil Application No. 100 of 2013 (unreported) and Laurent Kavishe v Enely Hezron Civil Application No. 5 of 2012. I have considered the counter-affidavit in relation to the rival submissions of both counsel. Although the 14 paragraph cou nter-affi davit was not on the personal knowledge of the deponent save for the first, and second paragraph, I am content that it was in conformity to Order XIX, r. 3 of the CPC and was properly verified under Order VI, r.16 of the CPC. In Lalago Cotton Ginnery (supra), the court held thus:- "An advocate can swear and file an affidavit in proceedings which he appears for his client, but on matters which are in the advocates personal knowledge only. For example, he can swear an affidavit to state that he appeared earlier in the proceedings for his client and that he personally knew what transpired during those proceedings" The above authority was cited in the case of Adnan Kitwana Kondo and three Others versus National Housing Corporation Civil Application No. 208 of 2014 (unreported) where the advocate who sworn the impugned affidavit was not in the conduct of the previous proceedings and failed to disclose his source of information. The Court of Appeal had this to say: What is patently obvious is that the deponent did not disclose how he become seized of what transpired in the proceedings of the High Court. And yet fri the verification clause he pegged the details on personal knowledge despite not being in attendance during the High Court proceedings. 6-1 - - - In view of the foregoing, I adjudge the referred paragraphs 2,3, 4 and 5 to be offensive for non discloser (sic) of the source of information. To that end. I uphold the first point of preliminary objection on account that the affidavit is defective..., more so as the remaining paragraphs are merely introductory or consequential. In the above authorities as was also in ex-parte Matovu (supra) deponents did not disclose how they became seized of the information in their respective averments. Obviously, the authorities cited above are distinguishable from the present case where the learned counsel disclosed the source of information. Unlike the position in the afore cited authorities where there was information whose sources were not disclosed, the verification of the counter-affidavit in the present case was very specific as to facts which were sworn on the basis of personal knowledge of the deponent and which were sworn on the basis of information received from one, Cornet Lubango Barnabas. On account of the foregoing, I am not prepared therefore to strike out the counter-affidavit as in my view the shortfalls of the said counter-affidavit only goes to the evidential value of the counteraffidavit. As I was composing my judgment, a notice of preliminary objection on a point of law was filed by the respondent's counsel. The same was to the effect that the applicant's affidavit was incurably defective for contravening the provisions of section 8 of the Notaries Public and Commissioners for Oaths Act cap. 12 R.E 2002 as amended by section 47 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) (No.2) Act 2016. I heard the counsel on the point raised. He submitted that the amendment has made it mandatory for a name of attesting officer to be inserted in the jurat of attestation. Having heard the counsel for the respondent, it was clear to me that the gist of the objection was that the name of the attesting officer was not inserted in the proper place of jurat of attestation. According to the counsel, the jurat is normally set out by brackets just before the signature of the deponent. It was therefore argued that since the applicant's affidavit lacks such insertion, it was defective and the 6 application should be accordingly struck out. A number of authorities were cited in support. On the part of Dr Lamwai, his replying submission anchored on several points. Of significance the following points are worth noting. One, the objection was an abuse of legal and court processes for it aimed at preventing the court from delivering its scheduled ruling. No objection except on question of jurisdiction can be raised when a matter is set for judgment! ruling. Two, the objection reflected misconception suffered by the counsel for the respondent on what jurat of attestation is. Three, the name of the attesting officer is clearly set in the jurat as is his address and his signature. On my part the dispute on this objection is in the position where the name of the attesting officer was inserted and whether or not it was inserted in the wrong place in the affidavit. Although both counsel referred me to a number of authorities which I need not to reproduce them here, none of them was squarely relevant. I am however aware of the most recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Elfazi Nyatega and Three Others v Caspian Mining Ltd Civil Application No. 44/08 of 2017 MZA (unreported) which squarely touches on the issue at hand. In this case, the issue was whether the name of attesting officer which appeared after the words "Before Me" was positioned in a proper place of the jurat. It was argued in the case of Caspian Mining Ltd (supra) that the name of the attesting officer ought to have been in the part of the affidavit where the attesting officer described his knowledge of the deponents. The Court of Appeal held that the name of the attesting officer was properly inserted after the words "Before Me." The Court went further to hold that the insertion of the name in the jurat constitutes part of the description of the attesting officer before whom the affidavit was made. In the light of the above authority, it is clear that the affidavit of the applicant in this case shows that it was attested by Herieli Obedi Munisi, an Advocate and 7 1 - . Commissioner for Oath. The name is inserted at the end of the applicant's affidavit, just after the words "in my presence:-", which is according to the above authority part of the jurat containing the description of the attesting officer. I thus agree with Dr Lamwai that the proposition by the learned counsel for the respondent that the name of the attesting officer was not placed in the jurat of attestation is based on misinterpretation of the relevant law on the part of the respondent's counsel. I would as I hereby do so overrule the objection as it is devoid of merit. I am now set to consider the submissions of the counsel for the applicant and respondent in relation to the present application. Submissions in chief by the counsel for the applicant mirrored the grounds in support of the application and complaints contained in the applicant's affidavit and statement accompanying the chamber summons. Focusing on the failure of natural justice, the learned counsel strived to show how the same was violated. The learned counsel for the applicant drew my attention to a number of instances that indicated the extent to which the applicant's right to be heard was violated and the corresponding provisions of the Ethics Code of 2013 which were infringed. One, the applicant was given short and inadequate notice to appear and defend before the Ethics Committee. The notice which was served to the applicant and required him to appear before the committee on 14/03/2018 was dated 13/3/2018. Two, the charge sheet which the applicant was served with was not accompanied by investigation report that was the basis of the charges. He could not therefore adequately understand the nature of the allegation levelled against him. He was therefore denied opportunity to prepare his defence and call his witnesses. This contravened rule 58 of the Ethics Code regarding right of a party to defend and call witnesses. It was argued that although the above points were brought to the attention of the committee in a bid to secure• an adjournment, the prayer was not allowed. 8 - - - Three, there was no hearing as there was no witness called to testify. Rules 35, 56, 57, 58 of the TFF Ethics Code of 2013 was relied upon in relation to the alleged violation of the right to be heard. Reliance was also made on Arcado Ntagazwa v Buyogera Bunyambo [1997] TLR 242 CA; Simon Manyaki v IFM [1984] TLR 304 (HC); Mhidini Ahmad Ndolanga and Others v National Sports Council and Another [1996] TLR 325 (HC). Despite the purported hearing, it was argued that there was no valid decision that was made within the meaning of the rules of the TFF Ethics Code. There was therefore, it was argued, no decision of the TFF Ethics Committee that could have been acted upon by the appeals committee. In this respect attention was drawn to me to the following irregularities in relation to the alleged absence of a valid decision. One, the decision was not made by a properly constituted committee. To expound on this, it was shown that article 48(1) of the TFF Constitution requires Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Ethics committee to have legal qualification. On the contrary, the vice-chairman who also sat as a member of the committee was not a lawyer and thus not qualified as a member. Two, the purported decision was made in contravention of the requirements of rule 69 of the TFF Ethics Code 2013 in that it was not signed by both Chairman and Vice- Chairman as is required by rule 69(2) of the TFF Rules. It did not also contain the composition of the committee (rule 60(a) of the said Rules), a summary of the facts (rule 60(d) of the Rules), the grounds of the decision, the provisions on which the decision was based, the terms of the decision, and notice of the channels of appeal as is respectively required by rule 69(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) of the TFF Code of Ethics 2014. In addition, one of the members ought not to have sat in the said committee as the applicant had once testified against him and hence conflict of interests. Thus, had the applicant been accorded a hearing, he would have objected 9 1 him sitting as a tribunal member. Reliance was made on Mhidini Ahmad Ndolanga (supra). Three, it was contended that the Ethics Appeal Committee was likewise not properly constituted when it purportedly heard and determined the appeal. It was so submitted because the Appeals Committee was comprised by three members who were not originally appointed as members of the Appeals Committee in accordance with article 340) and 22.15 of the TFF Constitution. Accordingly, there was no record that the original members whose lifespan was still yet to expire had been removed by the General Assembly pursuant to article 34.2 of the TFF Constitution. In his replying submission, Mr Ndossi, learned counsel for the respondent opposed Dr Lamwai's submissions and insisted on the following instances showing that the applicant was given the opportunity to be heard. That, the applicant was duly summoned and served with a notice to appear before the Ethics Committee as also admitted by him in his affidavit; that it was not true that there were no pretrial proceedings; that the notice which gave options as to how the applicant may respond to the charges was accompanied by a complaint; and that the applicant opted for and indeed was represented by his learned counsel one Emmanuel Muga, and the matter proceeded as scheduled. It was therefore denied that the applicant was not given enough time to prepare his defence and that his counsel was denied opportunity to prepare a defence. After all, it was argued, no proof was shown that the applicant's counsel prayed before the committee in vain for time to prepare for hearing. As to service of documents relating to the charge levelled against the applicant, it was submitted that the same were served to him upon his own request during audit inquiry whose notice was also given to the applicant pursuant to rule 57(2) of the TFF Ethics Code 2014. It was intimated that if the applicant's counsel in the committee failed to cooperate in the course of the committee's proceedings, such omission has nothing to do with the respondent as the committee was mandated to just proceed in accordance with rule 36(5) of the Ethics Rules. 10 - . It was also argued that the allegation that the decision was not signed by vice- chairman was baseless because it is only when a party to a complaint requests for the grounds of the decision under rule 68(1)-(3) and rule 69(2) of the Ethics Code that the decision has to be signed by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Rejoinder submission essentially reiterated the submissions in chief. Dr Lamwai however went further to insist on the following. That, there were submissions that were not answered by the counsel for the respondent, such as, the submission that the TFF Ethics Committee and the Ethics Appeal Committee were not properly constituted. He also referred the court to submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that the applicant was notified of the investigation through the audit inquiry and upon his own request supplied with audit report which were made from the bar. He further insisted that his counsel's request for time to prepare for hearing was declined by the Ethics Committee, but there were no record of proceedings properly kept which proceedings would have evidenced what transpired in the Committee. No such proceedings were produced by the respondent to reveal the conducts of such proceedings. It is common ground that the applicant's conviction by the Ethics Committee was predicated upon a hearing that was conducted by the Committee. The hearing was preceded by a notice that was given to the applicant informing him of the proceedings that were to commence against him., The said notice was accompanied by a charge sheet but not along with a report on investigation into the charges laid against the applicant. It is not disputed that the applicant appeared in the Ethics Committee through one, Emmanuel Muga, learned Counsel. Similarly, there is no dispute that the matter 11 1. - . - -. before the Ethics Committee proceeded as scheduled and a decision was given by C the Committee against the applicant. It is equally not in dispute that the decision was appealed against by the applicant to the Ethics Appeal Committee which dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Ethics Committee. There were however issues raised with regard to the notice in respect of the scheduled hearing of the matter before the Ethics Committee. I have considered the respective rival arguments. As to whether the notice was sufficient and whether the applicant was served with any report on investigation into the charges laid against him in order to prepare for hearing and his defence, I have had regard to the relevant notice (Annexure Al) which was accompanied by the charge sheet. Clearly, the notice was dated on 13/03/2018 and it required the applicant to appear before the Committee on the following day (i.e 14/03/2018) at 18:00 hours. This is, in my considered view, such a very short notice. it is evident at page 2 of the impugned decision that the counsel for the applicant asked the committee to adjourn the matter so that the applicant could have ample time to prepare his defence. Clearly, the applicant's counsel request was declined because members of the Committee were of the view that the matter was not new to the applicant. As such, the applicant could defend against the charges levelled against him. It is apparent that the members of the Ethics Committee did not consider whether the applicant had enough time to prepare for the hearing, having been served with the summons dated 13/3/2018 requiring him to appear for hearing on 14/3/2017. There is no indication in the impugned that the applicant was in addition to the notice and charge sheet also duly served with a report on the investigation that informed the charges laid against the applicant. This supports the relevant submission by the applicant's counsel that he was neither served with such report nor with any notice as to the opening of the investigation into the charges against him. 12 The counter-affidavit sworn by the learned counsel for the respondent had it that the applicant had knowledge of the charges levelled against him as the same originated from the audit committee in which the applicant appeared and defended the charges. However, the averment in the said counter-affidavit was in accordance with information received from Cornet Lubango Barnabas. Regrettably, there was no affidavit of the latter in relation to such information which was produced in this court. Consequently, the relevant averment is at best a hearsay. Notwithstanding the value of such averment, it is worthwhile to note that the audit committee proceedings in which the applicant allegedly appeared were not produced to fortify the learned counsel's contention. The absence of such proceedings meant that the court could not establish that the charges laid against the applicant were also a subject of the alleged audit committee and that the applicant needed not to be served with a report on investigation that informed the charges. At any rate, I do not think that proceedings of the audit committee on any audit concern which involved the applicant can be used to compromise his right to be heard in any subsequent proceedings before the Ethics Committee. In contrast to the said averment in the said counter-affidavit, the learned counsel for the respondent made a statement from the bar that the applicant was notified of the investigation through the audit inquiry and upon his own request supplied with audit report. Despite obvious issues as to the value of such statement before the court which I need not mention, proof of service of the audit report to the applicant was not produced before this court by the respondent. Besides, even if the applicant was served with the audit report, it was not shown to the satisfaction of this court that the same was a substitute of a report on the investigation into the charges with which the applicant was convicted and sentenced. Going by the foregoing, I am of a considered view that the applicant was never served with the report on the investigation into the charges levelled against him; which investigation ought to have been commenced and accordingly notified to the applicant pursuant to rules 56 and 57 of the Ethics Code, 2013. It was necessary for 13 p the said report to be served to the applicant along with the charge sheet ahead of the scheduled hearing to enable him understand the nature of the charge laid against him and prepare for the scheduled hearing and his defence. In line with the above, there is no proof that prior to the scheduled hearing, the requirements of rule 58 of the Ethics Code were complied with. The provision of the said rule reads thus: The chairman in consultation with members of the Ethics Committee shall set a time limit for the parties to submit positions containing a statement of defence, any defence of lack of jurisdiction, upon which the parties intend to rely, and a motivated request for a hearing including witnesses whom the parties intend to call. The parties shall submit a brief summaiy of the witnesses' expected testimony together with the position. Clearly, the rule relates to the setting of a schedule and time limit by the committee for parties to submit written defence, evidence that parties intend to rely, witnesses parties intend to call and brief summary of the witnesses' expected testimony ahead of a hearing and/or deliberations pursuant to rules 64, 65 and 66 of the Ethics Code as the case may be. Couched in mandatory terms, rule 58 of the Ethics Code is undoubtedly hinged on the demands of natural justice and fair trial. Although the point in relation to non-compliance with rule 58 of the said Code was raised in the affidavit of the applicant and formed part of the submissions of the applicant's counsel, it was seemingly avoided in the counter affidavit deposed by the counsel for the respondent. Despite its significance to the complaint of failure to accord the applicant a right to be heard, it was disputed by the deponent without saying anything as to how the relevant provision was complied with. It was in the submission by the counsel for the respondent where it was stated that the claim as to the failure to comply with the requirements of rule 58 of the Ethics Code was unfounded. It was argued in that respect because, according to the counsel for the respondent, the applicant admitted that he was served with the notice to defend himself either by written submission, appearance in person or through his representative as shown in Annexure Al. 14 - - As far as I am concerned, the subsequent statement by the respondent's counsel was nothing but a mere statement from the bar which is devoid of any value. It was in any case clear to me that the notice was not made in accordance with rule 58 of the Ethics Code. I say so because the contents of the said notice do not at all mirror the requirements of rule 58 of the said Code which was reproduced verbatim herein above. As I understood the relevant provisions of the Ethics Code, once a notice by the Committee setting the time limit for submissions is issued to parties under rule 58 of the Code, the Committee Chairman must issue another notice under rule 59 as to conclusion of investigation proceedings. A subsequent notice may also issue, pursuant to rules 64 and 65 of the Code, to summon parties for oral hearing as may be appropriate. I do not see anything on the •record suggesting that such requirements under the said rules were complied with. In view of the record before me, I am of the finding that the Ethics Committee did not comply with rule 58 of the Ethics Code when it purported to try the applicant on charges laid against him before the Ethics Committee. In any event, the applicant could not prepare anything in terms of the requirements of the rule, unless he was adequately served with materials on which the charges were based. Unfortunately, on the record before me the applicant was not duly served with such materials and could not therefore prepare for the scheduled hearing. There is also another issue that emerge from the submissions. It concerns the decision of the Ethics Committee which was acted upon by the Ethics Appeal Committee. The issue is whether the decision is valid within the meaning of the relevant rules of the Ethics Code of 2013. On this issue, I was referred to rule 69 of the Ethics Code, 2013 which prescribes how a decision of the Ethics Committee should be. The relevant rule reads: 15 68. Grounds for decision 1......................... 2......................... 3....................... 69.Form and Contents of the decision with grounds 1. Without prejudice to the application of art. 68 above, the decision shall contain the composition of the committee; the names of the parties; (C) the date of the decision; a summary of the facts; the grounds of the decision; (i) the provision on which the decision was based, the terms of the decision; notice of the channels for appeal; 2. The deasion shall be s,ined by the Chairman and the Vice chairman. The question is whether the relevant decision was duly signed as is required by rule 69(2) of the Ethics Code of 2013. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the decision was not signed by the vice-chairman because it was not requested by the applicant. On the other hand, the counsel for the applicant was of a strong view that the decision should have mandatorily been signed by both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Ethics committee. He told the court that he brought this point to the attention of the Ethics Appeal Committee in vain. It is not in dispute that the impugned decision was a subject of appeal in the Ethics Appeal Committee. The said decision was annexed to the applicant's affidavit in support of this application as Annexure A2 which annexure was also adopted by the learned counsel for the respondent in his submissions in reply. In view of the requirements of rule 68 of the Ethics Rule, it is not my take that the decision (Annexure A2) is "only the terms of the decision" which according to the learned counsel for the respondent "is not required to be signed by both the chairman and Vice-Chairman". I simply do not read such a requirement under rule 68 of the Ethics Code. In fact, a careful consideration of rule 69(2) of the Ethics Code shows that a decision of the said committee must be duly "signed by the chairman and the Vice chairman." The impugned decision was not signed by the chairman and Vice Chairman of the Ethics Committee. It was signed only by the Chairman. The vice chairman did not 16 - .- 51 sign. This is contrary to the provision of rule 69(2) of the Ethics Code. There was therefore no a valid decision by the Ethics Committee capable of being acted upon by the Ethics Appeal Committee. It is not out of place to also point out that the composition of the committee was not indicated as is the date of the decision. As the composition of the Committee was not shown and there is no record showing members who sat in the committee, I would decline to uphold the submission that there was a member, namely, Amin M. Salim, who sat as a member although he ought to disqualify himself due to conflict of interest. I am also not inclined to buy the applicant's counsel submission as to composition of the Ethics Appeal Committee due to lack of supporting materials showing that indeed the alleged members do not have legal qualification or were otherwise not properly appointed as such. In the absence of such materials, I cannot hold that the members acted without qualifications or without being properly appointed as members. In view of the cumulative effect of my findings on the failure of the Ethics Committee to observe natural justice and the failure to act in accordance with the law in issuing its decision, I am settled that there was no decision to be acted upon and upheld by the Ethics Committee. Had the Ethics Appeal Committee acted properly, it would not have upheld it as it did. Consequently, it is in my view not necessary to deal with the other complaints raised by the applicant. I say so because what I have dealt with and found out suffices to dispose of the matter in its entirety. In the end and for the reasons given above, I find merit in the application. I would therefore as I hereby do so grant the order of certiorari sought by the applicant and hence quash the decision of the respondent's Ethics Committee that sat in Dar es Salaam on 14/3/2018 and that of the respondent's Ethics Appeal Committee dated 6/4/2018. I would also award costs to the applicant. I order accordingly. 17 - 1-_ - Dated at Dar es Salaam this 30th day of November, 2018 -Benhajj S. Masoud JUDGE Cour Q. gV hf h4~ rO t~ of the Applicant and in the absence of the respondents and ps6-1.for.bbthilicant and Respondent this 30/11/2018. ............ LU enhajj S. Masoud Ica JUDGE 18