MKINDI LYMO, MOHAMED YUSUF AHMED, CHACHA LEMBUKA MOLLEL, JOSEPH FABIAN SHIO, PHILIPINA ONESMO, FRANCIS SAVAYO MOLLEL, HUSSEIN MBWANA, FADHIL SHABAN MOLLEL, ALFRED C. SHIRIMA, PETER TEMU, DANIEL NOAH MOLLEL, MARY JOHN LYIMO, HALIMA JUMA MSHANA, COSMAS KASMIRI NJAU, MOSES O. MASSAWE, WILSON MICHAEL LAIZER, ABISAI ELIBARIKI KILEO, SIMON KIWALE, DANIEL ELIBARIKI GADIE, ALLY SEIF SWAI, BASHIR MUSA MFINANGA vs THE REGIONAL MANAGER TANROADS ARUSHA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 000021765 OF 2026 MKINDI LYMO .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF MOHAMED YUSUF AHMED .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF CHACHA LEMBUKA MOLLEL .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF JOSEPH FABIAN SHIO .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF PHILIPINA ONESMO .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF FRANCIS SAVAYO MOLLEL .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF HUSSEIN MBWANA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF FADHIL SHABAN MOLLEL .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF ALFRED C. SHIRIMA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF PETER TEMU .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / DANIEL NOAH MOLLEL .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / PLAINTIFF Page. 1 MARY JOHN LYIMO .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF HALIMA JUMA MSHANA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF COSMAS KASMIRI NJAU .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF MOSES O. MASSAWE .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF WILSON MICHAEL LAIZER .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF ABISAI ELIBARIKI KILEO .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF SIMON KIWALE .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF DANIEL ELIBARIKI GADIE .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF ALLY SEIF SWAI .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / BASHIR MUSA MFINANGA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / PLAINTIFF APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS THE REGIONAL MANAGER TANROADS ARUSHA .............................. RESPONDENT / THE ATTORNEY GENERAL .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT DEFENDANT RULING Page. 2 BADE, J 26/08/2026 & 27/08/2026 This is an application by twenty-one Applicants against the Regional Manager, TANROADS Arusha and the Attorney General. It was filed under a certificate of urgency and seeks, in substance, to restrain further demolition or removal of the Applicants’ residential and commercial properties situated along the Arusha - Minjingu Road. The Applicants also seek an order dispensing with the expiry of the statutory notice period so as to obtain preservatory relief pending the intended substantive proceedings. The Applicants’ case, as gathered from their joint affidavit, is that they own residential and commercial premises situated along the Arusha - Minjingu Road, particularly within Kona ya Nairobi, Ngarenero, Unga Ltd, Sombetini, Elerai and Mbauda areas. They aver that the 1st Respondent has embarked upon demolition of developments along that road for purposes of the road expansion project without compensating them. In support of their alleged interests in the affected properties, they rely, among other documents, upon the certificate and property identification documents annexed as K1, K2 and K3. It is further deposed that the dispute over the developments along the road is longstanding. According to the Applicants, meetings and consultations Page. 3 involving TANROADS and other public authorities commenced around 2010 and concerned developments situated within 15 metres from the centre of the road. They contend that the affected structures were identified and valuation exercises undertaken, but no compensation was ultimately paid. Their complaint is that the current exercise has moved beyond the 15-metre area previously discussed and is now affecting developments situated within the area extending up to 22.5 metres from the centre of the road, without a fresh process of notification and compensation. On 11th August, 2026, their advocates issued a statutory notice of intention to sue which was received on 12th August, 2026. The application is opposed through a counter-affidavit sworn by Reginald R. Massawe, the Regional Manager of TANROADS Arusha Region. The Respondents dispute the Applicants’ alleged ownership of the affected portions and aver that the disputed area has formed part of the road reserve since 1932. They maintain that the lawful road reserve extends to 22.5 metres from the centre of the road and deny that there was ever an agreement reducing it to 15 metres. According to them, the Applicants have known for many years that their developments fall within the road reserve and are therefore not entitled to compensation. The Respondents also deny that TANROADS personnel are themselves demolishing the structures. Their case is that the affected persons are Page. 4 removing their own developments following notices requiring them to vacate the road reserve to pave way for expansion of the road. They further contend that the works form part of an ongoing public infrastructure project connected with the AFCON event, to which substantial public resources have been committed, and that stopping the works would prejudice a project of national and international significance. At the hearing, Mr. Bwemelo, learned counsel for the Applicants, adopted the joint affidavit and its annexures. He submitted that the Applicants are lawful owners of the affected residential and commercial properties along the stretch extending from Kona ya Nairobi and Ngarenero towards Mbauda. He referred to annexures K1, K2 and K3 as demonstrating their interests in the properties. Counsel argued that the current demolition is being undertaken without notice and without observance of the legal process applicable before private property can be interfered with. He submitted that the discussions held from around 2010 concerned removal of developments within 15 metres from the centre of the road and that, following those discussions, affected properties were identified and valued. According to him, despite that exercise, none of the Applicants was compensated. His complaint was that the present exercise has moved into the area extending up to 22.5 metres without a corresponding fresh process. Page. 5 On the anticipated injury, counsel Mr. Bwemelo submitted that some of the affected premises are residences while others are places from which the Applicants conduct businesses and earn their livelihood. If demolition continued, he argued, some Applicants would lose their homes and others their means of sustenance. He further submitted that some Applicants are elderly persons and that once the properties are demolished there would be nothing left to preserve or to secure the Applicants’ rights. Counsel relied upon Kessy Khasim vs Temeke Municipal Council and Another, Misc. Land Application No. 413 of 2022; Al-Ushoom vs Victor Oscar and Two Others, Misc. Land Application No. 217 of 2020; and Phillipi Kimbweleza, as Attorney of Bhiku Jeka vs ICB Tanzania Limited, Land Application No. 133 of 2021. He consequently prayed that the Respondents be restrained from proceeding with the demolition until determination of the intended suit or until the applicable legal process has been followed and the Applicants compensated. In reply, Mr. Kamihanda, Senior State Attorney and learned counsel for the Respondents, adopted the counter-affidavit and relied upon the principles governing temporary injunctions as stated in Atilio vs Mbowe [1969] HCD No. 284. He submitted that the three requirements of a serious question to be tried, irreparable injury and balance of convenience must all be satisfied cumulatively. Page. 6 As regards the first condition, counsel maintained that there is no new controversy calling for preservation because the Applicants have known since 2010 or 2011 that the disputed area forms part of a 22.5-metre road reserve. He argued that the present exercise is merely an implementation of what the Applicants were informed many years ago. He also maintained that TANROADS is not physically demolishing the structures; rather, the affected persons are removing them pursuant to Government notices issued in connection with the road expansion. Mr. Kamihanda further raised the legal capacity of the 1st Respondent. He submitted that the Regional Manager TANROADS Arusha is not a body corporate capable of being sued and that the proper legal entity is the Tanzania National Roads Agency. In support of that proposition, he referred to the Executive Agencies Act and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Serikali ya Kijiji cha Kigendeka vs Jonathan Nkulege. On irreparable injury, counsel argued that the Applicants’ own case is founded upon an alleged right to compensation. That, in his view, demonstrates that the loss complained of is capable of being quantified and repaired in monetary terms. As regards the balance of convenience, he submitted that the road expansion forms part of infrastructure preparations for the AFCON event; that substantial public funds have been committed to it; and that disruption of the project would occasion greater prejudice to Government and the public than Page. 7 the prejudice likely to be suffered by the Applicants. He relied upon Oilcom vs TANROADS, Land Case No. 117 of 2006, and prayed that the application be dismissed with costs. Counsel also challenged some of the matters raised for the Applicants. He submitted that annexure K10 did not originate from either Respondent and did not amount to an undertaking by TANROADS to compensate the Applicants. He further submitted that the allegation that demolition had gone beyond 22.5 metres and the assertion that some Applicants were elderly were matters introduced from the Bar and were not supported by the joint affidavit. In a brief rejoinder, counsel Mr. Bwemelo challenged the assertion that fresh notices had been issued in 2025 or 2026. He argued that no such notices were annexed to the counter-affidavit and that, had they existed, the Respondents would have placed them before the Court. He further submitted that the public importance of AFCON could not justify implementation of the project in violation of the law or at the expense of the Applicants’ rights. He reiterated that the earlier discussions concerned developments within 15 metres from the centre of the road whereas the present exercise had moved into the 22.5-metre area. He referred particularly to annexure K9 and the other historical documents. On the Respondents’ denial that they were carrying out the demolition, counsel submitted that the persons removing the structures were nevertheless doing so pursuant to the Respondents’ process and Page. 8 authority. He maintained and insists that loss of a residence is irreparable injury and repeated the prayer that the application be granted. Having considered the affidavits, annexures and the rival submissions, the central issue for determination is whether the Applicants have established sufficient grounds for the temporary injunctive relief sought. Before addressing that issue, I find it necessary to deal briefly with the prayer that the Court dispense with expiry of the statutory ninety-day notice. The notice requirement under section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act is couched in mandatory terms. In Trustees of Anglican Church Diocese of Western Tanganyika vs Bulimanyi Village Council and Two Others, Misc. Civil Application No. 1 of 2022, [2022] TZHC 719, this court was confronted with a similar prayer while the statutory notice was still running and held that it had no power to dispense with the mandatory ninety-day period. I respectfully share that view. The first prayer cannot therefore be granted. That conclusion, however, does not mean that the Court is necessarily powerless to preserve property during the period in which a party is legally prevented from instituting a substantive suit. The same decision recognized the jurisdiction of the Court, in an appropriate case, to entertain a pre-suit preservatory injunction where institution of the main action is impeded by the statutory notice period. Page. 9 Further, before I turn to the conditions governing the grant of an injunction, I find it necessary to address the point raised by counsel Mr. Kamihanda concerning the legal capacity of the 1st Respondent. The application has been brought against the “Regional Manager, TANROADS Arusha” as the 1st Respondent. Counsel argued that the Regional Manager is not a juristic person capable of being sued and that the proper entity is the Tanzania National Roads Agency. I must admit that the point is well founded. In Sebastian Abdallah Msola vs Njombe Regional Manager, TANROADS, Civil Case No. 3 of 2014, [2014] TZHC 2305, this Court held that the Regional Manager of TANROADS is not an entity known to law as capable of suing or being sued. The same general principle, that proceedings must be instituted by or against a person or entity possessing legal personality, underlies the decision cited by counsel in Serikali ya Kijiji cha Kigendeka vs Jonathan Nkulege & Another, Civil Appeal No. 825 of 2024, [2026] TZCA 955. The statutory position equally points to the executive agency itself rather than its Regional Manager. Section 6(3) of the Government Proceedings Act, Cap. 5 R.E. 2023 provides that proceedings against Government shall, after expiry of the statutory notice, be brought against, among others, the executive agency alleged to have committed the civil wrong, with the Attorney General joined as a necessary party. The Executive Agencies Act, Cap. 245 R.E. 2023 similarly recognizes the legal position of an Executive Agency and separately provides for joinder of the Attorney General in proceedings involving such an Page. 10 Agency. I therefore agree with counsel Mr. Kamihanda that the Regional Manager, TANROADS Arusha, is not the proper juristic person against whom the injunctive order sought can issue, because the Regional Manager is an office- holder within TANROADS and is not himself the juristic entity against whom the substantive relief would ordinarily issue. That finding does not, however, necessarily render the application liable to dismissal. Order I rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that proceedings are not to be defeated merely by reason of misjoinder or non- joinder of parties. More specifically, Order I rule 10(2) empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings and either upon or without an application by a party, to strike out the name of a party improperly joined and to add a person who ought to have been joined so as to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. The Court of Appeal has consistently recognized the breadth of that power. See for example, Austack Alphonce Mushi vs Bank of Africa Tanzania Ltd & Another, Civil Appeal No. 373 of 2020, [2021] TZCA 521, Mwinyihatibu Jumaa Hatibu vs Ridhiwani Jumaa Hatibu, Civil Appeal No 70 of 2020, [2023] TZCA 17620 and Livingstone Michael Mushi vs Asha Magoti Magere & Others, Civil Application No. 247/08 of 2022, [2023] TZCA 17809. Page. 11 Therefore, had this been the only impediment to the application, the appropriate course would not necessarily have been to terminate the proceedings. The defect was capable of being addressed by substituting Tanzania National Roads Agency for the Regional Manager and directing consequential amendment of the process. Such a course would also accord with the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Code, which requires civil proceedings to be resolved justly, expeditiously, proportionately and at affordable cost. See Yakobo Magoiga Gichere vs Peninah Yusuph, Civil Appeal No. 55 of 2017, [2018] TZCA 222. In any case, in the circumstances of present matter before the court however, it would serve no practical purpose to order such amendment at this stage merely for an application that must thereafter, be determined on grounds wholly independent of the identity of the 1st Respondent. The Attorney General is already before the Court; the Agency whose conduct is complained of has throughout been unmistakably identified; and the Respondents have fully contested the application on its merits. I shall therefore not dispose of the application upon this defect, but proceed to determine whether the Applicants have satisfied the substantive conditions governing the injunctive relief sought. Having so found, I now turn to the merits of the application. The Applicants seek an equitable and discretionary remedy whose grant is governed by Page. 12 settled principles. The question is therefore whether, on the affidavit evidence and material placed before this court, they have satisfied the conditions for the grant of a temporary injunction. Those conditions were stated in Atilio vs Mbowe [1969] HCD No. 284 and require the Applicant to establish serious questions to be tried, the likelihood of suffering irreparable injury incapable of adequate compensation by damages, and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the order. The three conditions are cumulative, meaning the requirements must coexist. The cumulative character of the test has repeatedly been affirmed by the Court, a fact that found no controversy by the Applicant either. It is against that framework that I will consider the application. On the first requirement, there is plainly a disagreement as to the legal status of the affected properties. The Applicants contend that they have recognized interests in residential and commercial properties for which identification and valuation processes were undertaken but compensation was never paid. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the disputed portions have always formed part of a road reserve extending to 22.5 metres and that the Applicants are trespassers who are not entitled to compensation. I have considered the historical documents relied upon by the Applicants. They do not, in my view, establish the alleged agreement that the lawful road reserve was permanently limited to 15 metres. Annexure K9, the TANROADS Page. 13 letter dated 18th November, 2011, invited stakeholders to a meeting concerning developments situated within 15 metres from the centre of the road, but the same correspondence referred to the wider 22.5-metre road reserve. Likewise, the minutes annexed as K5 show that the issue of 22.5 metres was already known and discussed. The apparent immediate concentration on 15 metres cannot, without more, be read as an agreement permanently altering the lawful extent of the road reserve. At the same time, those documents show that there were repeated engagements involving public authorities, identification of affected structures and valuation-related exercises. Annexure K10 is presented as a valuation report relating to properties along the Arusha – Minjingu road reserve and K11 relates to valuation of improvements. Although the Respondents dispute the provenance and legal effect of those documents, their existence, together with the longstanding meetings and correspondence, is enough to demonstrate that the Applicants’ complaint is not fanciful. There are also evidential limitations on both sides which cannot properly be resolved at this interlocutory stage. The Respondents aver that the road reserve has existed since 1932, but the counter-affidavit does not annex the instrument establishing that historical position. Similarly, although it was submitted that fresh notices were issued in 2025 or 2026, none is annexed. Conversely, the Applicants have not established ownership of the affected Page. 14 portions applicant by applicant, and counsel’s oral assertion that demolition has gone beyond 22.5 metres does not reflect the case pleaded in the joint affidavit, which is that the exercise has moved beyond the previously discussed 15 metres and into the 22.5-metre area. The assertion that some Applicants are elderly was similarly not deposed to and cannot supplement the affidavit evidence. I therefore find, without determining ownership, the lawful width of the road reserve or entitlement to compensation, that there is a serious controversy which is fit for determination in substantive proceedings. The first condition is accordingly satisfied. That finding should not, however, be mistaken for a determination that the Applicants have established title to the disputed portions or a right to compensation. Those remain matters for the intended suit which shall adjudicate on those factual / legal matters. The more difficult question for the Applicants right now concerns irreparable injury. Their affidavit states that the affected developments comprise residential and commercial premises and that demolition will cause substantial loss. Substantial loss, however, is not necessarily irreparable loss. The relevant inquiry is whether the injury is of such a nature that an award of damages would not provide adequate redress. In T.A. Kaare vs General Manager, Mara Cooperative Union (1984) Ltd [1987] TLR 17, the Court emphasised that the injury contemplated for Page. 15 purposes of temporary injunction is one which cannot adequately be remedied by damages. Of particular relevance to the present circumstances is the decision in Gwabo Mwansasu and Others vs Tanzania National Roads Agency, Misc. Land Application No. 72 of 2020, [2020] TZHC 4093. In that case, the applicants sought to restrain TANROADS from interfering with properties said to be affected by a road reserve and maintained that their properties ought first to be valued and compensated. The Court declined the injunction upon finding, among other things, that the very nature of the claim showed that the anticipated loss was capable of being atoned by monetary compensation and that the cumulative requirements in Atilio vs Mbowe had therefore not been met. The resemblance to the present application is significant. That is because the Applicants’ complaint throughout, is that their properties were identified and valued but compensation was not paid. More tellingly, the statutory notice dated 11th August, 2026 expressly signals an intended claim arising from non-payment of compensation for the affected properties. The material placed before this court therefore demonstrates that the affected developments are, at least in principle, capable of valuation and monetary assessment. In any case, I do not overlook the submission that residential premises and businesses are affected. Loss of a home or business may, depending upon the evidence, constitute injury that cannot adequately be answered simply by Page. 16 an award of money. But as it can be appreciated, the difficulty here is evidential. Twenty-one Applicants have approached the Court collectively, yet their single affidavit does not particularize which Applicant occupies which affected structure as a residence, who would thereby be rendered homeless, which particular business or livelihood would be destroyed, or what circumstances make monetary compensation inadequate in relation to any individual Applicant. The Court cannot infer irreparability merely from the general description of the properties as residential and commercial. I have also considered Kessy Khasim vs Temeke Municipal Council and Another, Misc. Land Application No. 413 of 2022, [2022] TZHCLandD 12224, relied upon by the counsel for the Applicants. That case is distinguishable. The property sought to be protected was a specifically identified family home and the evidence established that the applicant and his family resided therein, such that demolition would render them homeless. A substantive land case concerning that very property was also already pending before the Court then. In the present matter, the Applicants have not supplied comparable particularized evidence in relation to their respective circumstances. Emphatically, the authority placed before me does not in any chance therefore, relieve them of the obligation to establish irreparable injury on the evidence before this Court. Page. 17 I accordingly find that the second condition has not been established. Since the conditions governing temporary injunctions are cumulative, that finding is itself sufficient to defeat the application. As was observed in Aunali K. Khalfan and Others vs National Housing Corporation, Land Case No. 75 of 2012, [2013] TZHC 2067, where one of the indispensable requirements has not been proved, an application for injunction may fail on that ground alone. Nevertheless, because considerable argument was addressed to the balance of convenience, I will deal with it too. The Applicants are correct that public interest cannot be invoked as a licence to act outside the law. The fact that an infrastructure project serves an important public purpose does not extinguish a lawful proprietary right or an entitlement to compensation which may ultimately be established. But then again, that does not make public interest irrelevant to the exercise of the Court’s equitable discretion. The Respondents have deposed that the road expansion forms part of infrastructure preparations connected with the AFCON event, that substantial public funds have been committed to the project and that interruption of the works would prejudice a project extending beyond the interests of the immediate parties. Those matters are contained in the counter-affidavit (paragraph 9) and are therefore properly before the Court. In any case, this court is not oblivious to the public character and time-sensitive nature of the Page. 18 AFCON-related infrastructure project referred to in the counter-affidavit. The approach to such competing considerations was carefully explained in Aunali K. Khalfan and Others vs National Housing Corporation (supra), where this court held pithily that public interest is not an independent fourth condition which must automatically prevail over individual rights. It is, however, a relevant factor in determining the balance of convenience and, where the circumstances justify it, may tilt that balance against the grant of an injunction. On one side of the scale are the Applicants, whose properties may be affected but whose anticipated loss, on the evidence presented, has not been shown to be incapable of monetary redress should they ultimately succeed. On the other is an ongoing public road expansion project involving committed public resources and wider public consequences should the works be interrupted. In addition, the Applicants seek restraint extending into substantive proceedings which have not yet been instituted. Such an order would expose the public project to an uncertain and potentially lengthy interruption before the parties’ respective legal rights have even been adjudicated. In those circumstances, I am unable to find that greater hardship would arise from refusing the injunction than from granting it. The balance of convenience therefore does not favour the Applicants. Page. 19 I have also considered the Respondents’ contention that TANROADS itself is not physically carrying out the demolition because the affected persons are removing their own structures. That averment does not entirely answer the Applicants’ complaint, since according to the Respondents themselves the removal follows notices and an enforcement process connected with the road expansion. I therefore think it is quite unnecessary to determine the application merely by identifying who physically pulls down the structures. The remaining authorities cited by the Applicants on preservation of property do not alter the requirement that the conditions governing injunctive relief must be proved upon the facts of the particular case, and specifically on the material presented before the court. Equally, the public interest relied upon by the Respondents cannot retrospectively validate any unlawful act or extinguish a right to compensation if one is ultimately established. Those are questions which properly belong to the substantive proceedings. In the final analysis, I find that the material before the Court discloses a serious controversy fit for determination in the intended suit. The Applicants have, however, failed to demonstrate that the injury complained of is incapable of adequate compensation in damages. The balance of convenience likewise does not favour restraining an ongoing public infrastructure project for an uncertain period when the substantive proceedings have yet to be instituted. The three conditions under Atilio vs Page. 20 Mbowe being cumulative, makes the failure to establish the latter two is fatal to the Application before the court. For those reasons, I answer the issue for determination in the negative and order as follows: 1. The prayer to dispense with expiry of the statutory ninety-day notice is refused. 2. The prayer for a Mareva/temporary injunction restraining further demolition or removal of the disputed properties has failed, and is therefore refused. 3. Any interim preservation order subsisting which was pending determination of the Application on merit and delivery of this Ruling is hereby discharged. 4. For avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Ruling shall be construed as a determination of the Applicants’ ownership of the affected properties, the lawful extent of the road reserve, or their entitlement, if any, to compensation. Those matters remain open for determination in the intended substantive proceedings upon compliance with the applicable law. 5. As the substantive dispute between the parties is yet to be instituted and determined, and that the application has failed only on the interlocutory requirements, there is a reasonable basis for not burdening either side with costs at this stage. I consider it appropriate that each party shall bear its own costs of this application. Page. 21 It is so ordered. Dated at ARUSHA this 27th of August 2026 . A. Z BADE JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 22