CIVIL APPEAL NO 432 OF 2021 MOHAMMED ENTEPRISES TANZANIA LIMITED VS BANK OF TANZANIA

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM f CORAM: LILA. J.A.. FIKIRINI. J.A. And FELESHI. J.A1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 432 OF 2021 MOHAMMED ENTERPRISES (TANZANIA) LIMITED................... APPELLANT VERSUS BANK OF TANZANIA.............................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam) fMunisi. J.t Dated 3rd day of July, 2018 in Civil Case No. 265 of 2014 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 22nd October 2024 & 14th March, 2025 FIKIRINI. J.A.: This appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, delivered on 3rd July, 2018, in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009. The appellant, Mohamed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd, challenges the High Court's decision, which ruled in favour of the respondent, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT). The appellant seeks to overturn the judgment and obtain relief for the respondent's alleged failure to comply with a court decree arising from a deed of settlement between the appellant and Mohamed Nassor @ Masoud Nasser (hereinafter referred to as "Nasser"). The appellant, Mohamed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd, initiated legal proceedings against Nasser in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009. Among other reliefs, the appellant sought payment of United States Dollars 12.5 million (USD 12.5 million), plus interest at the rate of 25% per annum from the date of judgment until the decree was fully satisfied. Subsequently, the parties entered into a deed of settlement, wherein it was agreed that the sum of TZS 3,320,275,480.00 from Nasser's Government Bond No. 019/2005/05/2011, held in trust by the Bank of Tanzania (BOT), would be utilized to satisfy the decree. Through its legal counsel, the appellant submitted a letter to the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, requesting the execution of the decree by transferring the specified amount directly to the appellant's bank account. However, the decree remained unexecuted. Instead, the bond proceeds were disbursed to Nasser following the High Court's reversal of its earlier decision on 2nd February, 2012. Nasser, a non-Tanzanian citizen, then executed the decree in his favour and allegedly left the country shortly thereafter, leaving the appellant with an unsatisfied decree. As a result, the appellant filed a lawsuit against the respondent, BOT, seeking compensation of TZS 3,320,275,480.00, the decretal amount Nasser was obligated to pay under the decree. The appellant contended that the respondent's failure to comply with the High Court's decision, stemming from the deed of settlement, enabled Nasser to unlawfully obtain a court order allowing him to withdraw the bond proceeds and departed the country. The respondent, however, denied liability, asserting that it had acted as a trustee for the proceeds of Government Bond No. 019/2005, which were disbursed to Nasser in accordance with applicable laws and procedures governing government bonds. The High Court was invited to determine the following issues: 1. Whether the defendant had a duty to comply with the directions outlined in the letter from the appellant's legal counsel regarding the disbursement o f the bond proceeds. 2. Whether the defendant breached this duty. 3. I f the answer to issue No. 2 is affirmative, whether such non- compliance entitled the plaintiff to institute legal proceedings against the defendant. 4. I f the answer to issue No. 3 is affirmative, whether the ongoing criminal investigations at the time constituted valid grounds for the defendants non-compliance. 5. The appropriate relief to which the parties were entitled. In its judgment dated 3rd July, 2018, the High Court ruled in favour of the respondent, holding that the respondent was not obligated to comply with the directions outlined in the letter from the appellant's legal counsel. The court further found that no breach of duty had occurred. Specifically, the High Court held that; one, as the custodian of the bond proceeds, the respondent was not a party to the original case and, therefore, had no duty to comply with the decree without a formal execution order; two, the appellant failed to initiate execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which would have allowed the respondent to be heard, and three, the ongoing criminal investigations by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) constituted valid grounds for the respondent's non-compliance. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellant appealed to this Court on the following grounds: 1. The trial court erred in faw in failing to hold that exhibit PI was a command imposing a duty to the respondent to pay the sum o f TZS 3,320,275,250.00 unto the appellant's account 019103000059 at NMB Kichweie branch. Having received the consent decree pursuant to the letter dated 2&h May, 2011 (exhibit. P2), the respondent's duty was to honour the contents thereof unequivocally (exhibit PI) and not otherwise. 2. The trial court erred in iaw and fact in holding that under the circumstances, the respondent could not honour the contents o f the consent decree (exhibit PI) unless she is given a right to be heard. 3. That the trial court erred in law and fact in holding that the respondent was justified to withhold payments (in honour o f the decree exhibit PI) until the pending investigations by PCCB and DCI, exhibits D1 and D2, respectively are completed. 4. That the trial court erred in law and fact for failure to hold that in the totality o f the appellant's evidence ably proved her case on the balance o f probabilities, in particular, that the respondents acts o f dillydallying to paying TZS 3,320,275,450.00 the appellant as ordered in exhibit PI was actuated by negligence, collusion and or omission on the part o f the respondent, and she is, therefore, liable to an equal amount Prior to the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the parties filed their written submissions in support or against the appeal, in line with the requirements under rule 106 (1) and (7) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). Both submissions were adopted and formed part of the argued appeal. During the hearing, in attendance was Mr. Elisa Abel Msuya, assisted by Ms. Irene Raymond Mchau, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, whereas on the respondent's side, was Mr. Deodatus Nyoni, Principal State Attorney, assisted by Mr. Daniel Nyakiha, and Mr. Masunga Kamihanda, learned Senior State Attorneys. In arguing the appeal, Mr. Msuya framed three issues upon which his submissions were hinged: (i) whether exhibit PI is a valid and executable decree of the High Court in Civil Case No. 127 o f 2009 between Mohamed Enterprises (T) Limited v. Nasser, (ii) whether the decree imposed a duty on the respondent requiring compliance and whether the respondent abrogated its duty, and (iii) whether the appellant suffered from the respondent's failure to comply with a legal duty. Arguing on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd grounds jointly, Mr. Msuya faulted the High Court decision that there was a need for the decree holder (the appellant) to apply for execution of the decree under Order XXI rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 Revised Laws (the CPC) to permit the respondent to be heard. His assigned reason was that the respondent was not a party to that case, and the urge to be heard could not have arisen because she had no right to protect; she was only the custodian of Nasser's bond monies. The learned counsel went on arguing that, if the respondent claimed she had not been heard, she could have opted for other remedies, including preferring a revision. Otherwise, the reasons advanced by the respondent as to why she could not execute the decree as per exhibits Dl, D2 and D3 in Mr. Msuya's view had no room for consideration. This is mainly because at no point was the appellant informed of the said ongoing investigation, nor was she ever aware of the outcome of the said investigations. The respondent's duty was to execute the decree (exhibit PI) placed before her, bearing in mind that the bond had matured. Furthering his dismay, the learned counsel criticized the High Court judgment, which exonerated the respondent from its legal duty to execute a decree of the court sent to her. Yet, the very respondent acted on another order from the same court and subject matter dated 2nd February, 2022. When exhibit P5 (High Court Order dated 2nd February, 2022) was placed before the respondent, it was complied with within seven days of receipt. In contrast with the appellant, the High Court Judge pointed out that the appellant's failure to produce any enforcement order made executing the decree impossible. As such, the respondent had no legal duty to fulfil. The learned counsel emphatically contended that the respondent failed its legal duty, and there were all the signs that she abrogated her obligations. Stressing that the respondent abrogated its legal duty, the learned counsel pointed out that after receiving the High Court order dated 2nd February, 2012, Nasser was paid and is said to have left the country. That made the execution of the decree more complicated, even after the Court of Appeal had set aside the order dated 2nd February, 2012 and restored the deed of settlement signed on 26th May, 2011. The Court probed the learned counsel on how a decree is being executed and if the same mode is applied to the government and its institutions. He responded that the mode of execution was the same for all. The learned counsel, however, maintained that the case scenario before the Court was not one falling under Order XXI rule 9 of the CPC when it comes to execution since, in the present instance, the respondent was only required to comply with the court order. Asked why the respondent bank was chosen, while in exhibit PI, there were two choices, that is, the respondent or the National Bank of Commerce; he argued that the appellant went to the respondent as that was the bank of choice for Nasser, who knew where the money was. The duty and obligation of the respondent was thus simply to effect the payment in execution of the High Court decree resulting from a deed of settlement. In any case, where there was an impediment in executing the decree, the respondent ought to have reached out to the court or the holder of the bonds who had custody of the bond certificate. All the above scenarios were in Mr. Msuya's contention, not what encumbered the execution of the said decree, which required payment of TZS. 3, 320, 275, 480.00 into the appellant's account, but the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Director of Criminal Investigations (the DCI) investigations of which the appellant was not aware of. Mr. Msuya argued that, since there was a valid High Court decree and the execution was to involve the Government Bonds held by the respondent on behalf of Nasser, nothing should have thus hampered the execution. By failing to execute the decree, the learned counsel concluded that the respondent had failed her legal duty, and sadly, the High Court failed to note such a breach of duty. When asked by the Court where the appellant was when Nasser applied to set aside the deed of settlement, the learned counsel responded that Nasser had already fled the country. From his submissions, he beseeched the Court to allow the appeal, quash the High Court judgment, and set aside the resultant orders with costs. In response, Mr. Nyoni's learned Principal State Attorney submitted that the appellant, in executing the decree of the High Court resulting from a deed settlement, ought to have applied for execution of a decree pursuant to Order XXI rules 9 and 11 of the CPC. Since the respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. 127 of 2009, a decree containing an order directing a person not a party to the suit, without an execution order, would have made the attachment of Nasser's property illegal. He further contended that after the intended execution had failed and the appellant had decided to sue the respondent, Nasser needed to be impleaded. To bolster his proposition, the learned Principal State Attorney referred the Court to the case of CRDB PLC v. UAB Insurance Co. Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 32 of 2020 (unreported). In that case, he argued that the respondent, UAB, was a guarantor of CATA Mining. After CATA Mining failed to honour the loan agreement payment, CRDB Pic sued the respondent, UAB. The Court ruled that the case could not stand without impleading CATA Mining. Comparing the above cited case to the scenario at hand, the learned Principal State Attorney's argument that after the respondent had refused to honour the decree, the appellant could have gone back and filed execution proceedings as an option. Doubting how the execution was handled, the counsel admitted that an adverse inference could easily be drawn on Nasser's handling of the matter. He said that when exhibits PI and P2 were presented to the respondent, the original bond certificate usually issued to the bond holder was not annexed. However, in a turn of events, later, Nasser successfully applied to set aside the deed of settlement, the prayer of which was granted. Immediately thereafter, Nasser could execute a decree in his favour. After producing the original bond certificate, he was paid all the bond monies in his name. On the statement that the respondent could not pay the appellant as there was a PCCB and DCI investigation, the learned counsel refuted that to be the reason, arguing that the appellant was not stopped from pursuing other measures, which she opted not to. Responding to the submission that Nasser disappeared after being paid, the learned Principal State Attorney treated the statement as one coming from the bar as there was no supporting document, such as the Police report, to prove Nasser's disappearance. In addition, he argued that the CPC has a way of dealing with foreigners as party/judgment debtors. Prodded on the appellant's impression that there was something dodgy with how the respondent acted, that they refused to honour the High Court decree and still, a while later, honoured an order from the same High Court on the same subject matter and within seven days, released the bond monies to Nasser. The learned Principal State Attorney's answer was that the original bond certificate did not accompany the initial decree, whereas it was in the second instance. And since there were no encumbrances, the payment was effected. The learned Principal State Attorney, in addressing the Court on the first ground of appeal, that the respondent failed to honour a consent decree in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009 maintained that the procedure was not followed despite the contents of the decree. He thus urged the Court not to fault the High Court judgment, in which the Judge ventured in discussing the execution process and presentation of the original bond certificate. He equally beseeched the Court to find that the appellant suffered no damages and the respondent did not abrogate its legal duty as submitted by the appellant. The Court inquired if the respondent could initiate Nasser's joinder. He argued that any of them could do so. However, considering that whoever alleges must prove, the appellant is thus more in control than the respondent, stressed the learned State Attorney. Mr. Nyakiha, learned Senior State Attorney, joined forces to fortify the respondent's case. In his submission, he argued that the appellant's position made him more in control to join Nasser in the case, similar to what had occurred in the CRDB Pic v. UAB Insurance case (supra). Prodded by the Court on what more could the respondent do? The learned State Attorney admitted that the respondent should have acted on the decree. However, that was not the end of the road for the appellant, as they could still have opted for other measures after the initial attempt had failed. The option of suing the respondent without taking other remedial measures and without joining Nasser couid not have resolved the execution hurdle in her favour. On the strength of their submission, the learned State Attorney prayed for the appeal to be dismissed with costs for lack of merit. In his rejoinder, Mr. Msuya categorically stated that the High Court decree was explicit, with no obligation posed to Nasser but solely ordering the respondent to execute it. He submitted that the provisions of Order XXI rule 9 and 11 of the CPC were not applicable. Commenting on the CRDB Pic v. UAB Insurance case (supra), on non-joinder, Mr. Msuya, refuted the assertion, contending that in the referred case, there were three parties, bank, principal debtor/borrower and the surety/guarantor, which was not the case in the present appeal. In the present case, the parties are only the appellant and the respondent, and the High Court decree (exhibit P2) and the letter (exhibit PI) from Nasser's advocate were clear instructions on what needed to be done. By then, the appellant was unaware, as evidenced by PW1 and PW2, that there were PCCB and DCI investigations. All this information came out after the appellant had sued the respondent. Mr Msuya reiterated his earlier prayer that the appeal be allowed, judgment quashed, and orders therefrom be set aside with costs. From the grounds of appeal and rival submissions by counsel for the parties, in our endeavour to resolve the issues raised, we will determine the 1st, 2nd and 3rd grounds together from which the following will be discussed: (i) whether the decree resulting from a deed of settlement in Civii Case No. 127 of 2009 issued by the High Court on 26th May, 2011 was capable of being executed based on exhibits PI and P2, (ii) whether there are other options available for the appellant to execute the decree in question. Execution is a final stage in litigation where a court order or decree is enforced or given effect, allowing the decree-holder to benefit from the court's decision. The procedures applicable in execution vary depending on the decree or order to be executed. We had concisely illustrated that in our previous decision of Millicom (Tanzania) N.V. v. James Allan Russel Bell and 5 Others, (Civil Revision No. 3 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 355 (26th July, 2018; TANZLII), in which the Court referred to the case of Re Overseas Aviation Engineering (GB) Ltd [1962] 3 All E.R, from which the term execution was defined to mean:- "Execution means, quite simply, the process o f enforcing or giving effect o f the judgment o f the Court: and it is completed when the judgment creditor gets the money or other things awarded to him by the judgm ent" There are several ways of executing a decree. The most common ones are provided under the CPC. And these are those falling under section 42 of the CPC, namely;- (a) By delivery o f any property specifically decreed; (b) By attachment and sale o f the property or by sale without attachment o f the property; (c) By arrest and detention; (d) By appointing a receiver; and (e) Such other manner as the nature o f the relief granted may require. Aside from the methods outlined above, another execution mode is applying for a 'garnishee' order under common law, A "garnishee" order is a court order obtained by a judgment creditor, allowing them to seize funds held by a third party who owes money to the creditor. The order requires the third party ("the garnishee") to withhold the attached funds and not release them until the court provides further instructions. It is noteworthy to point out that execution against the Government is different. Instead of applying the provisions in the CPC, the execution against the government is governed by the Government Proceedings Act, Cap. 5 of the Revised Laws (the Government Proceedings Act), particularly section 16. Our decision in Karata Ernest & Others v. Attorney General (Civil Revision No. 16 of 2010) [2010] TZCA 30 (29th December, 2010; TANZLII) ably illustrates the procedure to be followed. Though the respondent is a Government institution regulated by the Government Proceedings Act, its application was not required in this particular instance, considering the dispute was on bond monies belonging to Nasser, owner of the bond certificate, held it in trust by the respondent. While various methods of execution have been identified, it does not mean that a decree-holder cannot enjoy the benefits of the judgment in their favour right away without recourse to those modes if not immediately applied. Executing a decree in this mode generally starts with presenting the court decree to the judgment debtor or the third party per the decree's directions. We had in the case Shell and BP Tanzania Limited v. University of Dar Es Salaam, [2002] T.L.R 225, demonstrated that:- "...that it is not necessary in ail execution cases for a decree holder to resort to Court for assistance. Court assistance shall only be sought where peaceful execution is not forthcoming." Reverting to the appeal before us, the learned Principal State Attorney's submission mainly sought to convince the Court that the respondent could not have unequivocally honoured the content of the consent decree as featured in exhibit PI for reasons that: One, that she was a stranger to Civil Case No. 127 of 2009 since she was not a party. Two, in the absence of execution proceedings initiated by the appellant where the respondent could be invited to show cause, it was difficult for her to comply with the order. Three, as she was not part of the negotiation and settlement and for not being afforded the right to be heard, the respondent had to satisfy herself as to the legality of the order. On his part, Mr. Msuya's submissions mainly contended that, being a court decree resulting from a deed of settlement between parties entered on 26th May, 2011, the decree was legally binding upon the respondent. The settlement terms under item (d) elucidates thus:- "The monies on the bond and the interest shall be disbursed to the parties directly by the Bank of Tanzania and/or National Bank o f Commerce Kichweie Branch making direct transfer upon being served with a copy o f the decree o f the court to the Plaintiffs Account No. 019103000059 at National Bank o f Commerce, Kichweie Branch and defendants account No. 019101004360 at National Bank o f Commerce, Kichweie branch as mentioned herein above clause (a) and (b)." The decree sent for execution, extracted from the deed of settlement in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009, was received by the respondent, as admitted by DW1 and DW2. However, the decree could not be honoured at that time. A few months later, the respondent received the execution order from the same court related to the same case and complied. The respondent's failure to comply initially, and then the eventual compliance, was explained as a result of pending investigations by the PCCB and DCI, which were cleared before the execution. However, this explanation was never shared with the appellant or the trial court in response to the failure to comply with the initial order to execute the decree. As rightly submitted by Mr. Msuya, a court decree is a sacred order unless set aside. Since there was no order to set aside the decree 13 until much later, we find that the respondent abrogated her duty by failing to comply. While we agree that the respondent was a stranger to Civil Case No. 127 of 2009, since she was not a party, she had an option of finding out from either the court which issued the decree or from Nasser the holder of the bond certificate. We could resonate with the respondent's complaint that she was not part of the negotiation settlement, not afforded the right to be heard, and that since there were no execution proceedings/ she could not satisfy herself with the legality of the order. The above is what had exercised our minds on whether the respondent was justified to defy exhibit PI. Despite reference to the case of Ngerengere Estate Company Limited v. Edna William Sitta, (Civil Appeal No. 209 of 2016 (unreported) by the respondent emphasizing the right to be heard, we find it irrelevant to the present situation. This is because the respondent's all the above claims and that any criticism against her was unjustified is, in our view, feeble. We say so, considering the respondent's role was merely a custodian of funds and did not require her involvement in negotiations or settlement. In this circumstance, she acted as a court agent, which did not necessitate her being heard, and if there were any issues, she could still approach the court. Looking at various methods of execution, we think that execution in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009 initiated by exhibit PI and P2 could have attracted "garnishee" order, kind of execution, where compliance was required even if the respondent was not a party to the case. With that kind of execution, the respondent's role did not require her to be part of the execution process. Instead, she was simply a court agent. Any existing query could, therefore, be directed to it. Similarly, the CRDB Pic case (supra), which the respondent relied on, does not support their situation. Details in that case involved three parties: CRDB Pic, which issued a loan to CATA Mining, and UAP Insurance, which guaranteed the loan. This differs significantly from the current case, where the respondent was only the custodian of Nasser's bond monies. Thus, she was not part of the business relationship between the appellant and Nasser. The issue of non-joinder is thus misplaced, and we agree with Mr. Msuya's observation on this matter. Confident that the court decree is absolute, once one mode of execution fails, that should not be the end of the road to justice. The appellant still had an opportunity to execute her decree. Strictly speaking, 20 she could have returned to court and resorted to a formal execution process as provided under section 42 of the CPC. Relying on Order XXI rule 9 of the CPC, the court had to be moved to act at this stage. The provision provides thus:- " When the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions herein before contained to another court then to such court or to the proper officer thereof." [Emphasis added] The decree subject of the present appeal had the following instructions: "i. The suit is hereby marked "settled" with no orders as to costs on the following terms:- (a)In consideration o f the Promissory Note issued by the plaintiff to the defendant in consideration for the defendant's facilitation o f the Investment fund based on the debt swap agreement on the basis o f plaintiff's proposals, the monies secured by Government Bond No. 019/2005 now held by the bank o f Tanzania shall be shared equally between parties. (b)AH interest occurred in respect the said bond shall also be equally shared between the parties. Provided that the amount o f interest already drawn by the defendant shall include and feature his share o f interest already received and will be included in his share o f 50% on the interest accrued. (c) The defendant has already drawn Tshs. 1,671,258,768/= towards the interest o f 4 years. Now it hereby agreed. Tshs. 4,551,440,000/= Principal Tshs. 2,089,110,960/= Interest Tshs. 6,640,550,960/= Total Tshs. 6,640,550,960/= be equally divided which gives a sum o f Tshs. 3,320,275,480/= for each party. The plaintiff shall get direct transfer o f Tshs. 3,320,275,480/= into their below mentioned account. From the defendants 1,671,258,786/= so balance Tshs. 1,649,016,712/= shall be transferred to the defendants below mentioned account (d) The monies on the bond and the interest shall be disbursed to the parties directly by the Bank o f Tanzania and/or National Bank o f Commerce Kichwele Branch making direct transfer upon being served with a copy o f the decree o f the 22 court to the Plaintiffs Account No. 019103000059 at National Bank o f Commerce, Kichwele Branch and defendant's account No. 019101004360 at National Bank o f Commerce, Kichwele branch as mentioned herein above clause (a) and (b). 2. This settlement is final and conclusive on all claims between the plaintiff and the defendant. It is without prejudice to any ancillary claims the parties may have against any other parties." Being a decree involving monies in a third party's custody, lodging an application for execution seeking the court to issue a "garnishee" order against the judgment debtor would have been the most feasible approach. This mode of execution is among the modes known and applicable in this jurisdiction. Execution under this mode would not have required the respondent to be a party to the suit. A "garnishee" order as discussed in the case of Simon Matafu (As Liquidator of Tanzania Housing Bank) v. M/S Concrete Structures Building Contractors, Civil Appeal No. 171 of 2004, in reference to a definition of the term "garnishee" in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary Sixth Edition, meant:- "A debtor in whose hands a debt has been attached: i.e. he is warned not to pay his debt to anyone other than the third party who has obtained judgment against the debtor's creditor. A garnishee order is the order served on a garnishee attaching a debt in h is hands." [Emphasis added] The effect of the "garnishee" order issued is to set in motion the exercise of binding the debt in the hands of the "garnishee." Despite not being a party to the case, the respondent had no reason not to comply with the "garnishee" order unless valid reasons existed. This option was never attempted. Another opportunity for the appellant to execute the decree in her favour arose but was not seized. Nasser lodged an application on 24th June, 2011, under sections 68 (e) and 95 of the CPC, seeking to set aside the consent order. During the pendency of the application, the appellant could have moved the court seeking an attachment before judgment under Order XXXVI rules 6(l)(b), 6(2) &(3), 7(1), and 7(2), along with sections 68 (c), (e ) and 95 of the CPC. An attachment before judgment is an order issued by the court pending the final determination of the matter. It can be withdrawn if the adverse party provides the required security or if the suit is dismissed. The unexplained delay in executing the decree could have been cured by an application for attachment before judgment, specifically after an application to set aside the consent decree was lodged. That would have been an appropriate intervention by the appellant, who was party to the application, filed by the judgment debtor on the one hand and later the decree holder on the other. Nasser, the judgment debtor, was a Libyan citizen and, as a foreign national, the court could have considered him a flight risk. Against that background, the court might have considered and granted the application or issued the necessary orders based on the information before it. This option, for unexplained reasons, was not pursued. We consider the appellant to have deliberately violated her rights by not applying one of the available legal options. From the valid court decree obtained from the deed of settlement, the appellant plausibly had no cause of action against the respondent. In contrast, all the above stated alternatives were to be employed. After the ruling setting aside the deed of settlement dated 2nd February 2012, the appellant preferred a revision to this Court. The Court set aside the order dated 2nd February, 2012 in Civil Application No. 33 of 2012. It restored the consent decree entered in Civil Case No. 127 of 2009, dated 26th May, 2009, in its decision dated 23rd August, 2012. A court decree is a legal instrument recognized globally in jurisdictions where courts function appropriately. Allowing a decree issued in one country to be enforced in another, provided there are applicable laws governing enforcement, it should thus not be impossible to execute a valid court decree. Notably, the restored decree is and remains valid, and the appellant retains the right to execute it. We do not doubt that under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Cap. 8 Revised Laws (the Foreign Judgments Act), or other applicable legal provisions governing the enforcement of foreign judgments and decrees in Nasser's country, the appellant could enforce the restored decree. This brings us to the last ground of appeal. On this ground, the complaint was that the High Court Judge erred in law and fact for failing to hold that the respondent's dillydallying in paying TZS 3,320,275,450.00 to the appellant as ordered in exhibit PI was actuated by negligence, collusion, and/or omission on the part of the respondent. She is, therefore, liable to an equal amount. The appellant's complaint in her final ground of appeal is that the High Court Judge erred in law and fact by not recognizing that the respondent's delay in paying the appellant TZS 3,320,275,450.00, as ordered in exhibit PI, was due to negligence, collusion, or omission. Therefore, the respondent should be held liable for the amount. Mr. Msuya, invited the Court in terms of rule 36 (1) (a) of the Rules and as per our previous position in Paulina Samson Ndawavya v. Theresia Thomasi Madaha (Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 453 (11th December, 2019; TANZLII ), that as the first appellate body, we re­ evaluate the evidence and reach different conclusions from the trial Judge. At issue in this ground was the ruling dated 2nd February, 2012, when Nasser, through his lawyers, informed the respondent that the consent decree was set aside and requested payment of the monies, which was to be deposited in a different account. While a court order is paramount, the respondent had the right to investigate any issues about monies in her custody. Ttie respondent failed to comply with the court's decree, citing ongoing investigations by the PCCB and DCI. However, the court noted that the respondent did not formally communicate these concerns to the court or the decree holder, which would have been the proper course of action. Despite the lapse, we find that PCCB and DCI’s investigations was significant, and the trial court did not see the respondent’s reaction as deliberate negligence or collusion. Additionally, the appellant had not initially provided the original bond certificate, making it inappropriate to base findings on speculation. The payment of the disputed bond money on 14th February, 2012, after receiving clearance from the PCCB, in our view, did not suggest that the respondent intentionally delayed payment. In the final analysis, we find the appeal lacks merit and proceed to dismiss it entirely with costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 7th day of March, 2025. S. A. LILA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. S. FIKIRINI JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. E. FELESHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 14th day of March, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Elisa Msuya, learned Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. Pantaleo Urassa, learned State Attorney for the Respondent, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.