MUSTAFA NGANE SCANNED
The application for Mareva injunction is redundant as the 90-day period after notice of intention to sue has expired, and the applicant is now at liberty to file a plaint. There is no justification for keeping the application alive.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- MUSTAFA NGANE SCANNED
- Parties
- Applicant: Mustafa Seif Ngane (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the Late Seif Ngane); 1st Respondent: Ngwilabazu Ndatwa Ludigija; 2nd Respondent: Edgar Mwebe Rushaingo ©Edgar Mwebemebzi; 3rd Respondent: Anna Hubert Magambo; 4th Respondent: Dr. Gatambwa Denis Mukandala; 5th Respondent: Honest Kessy; 1st Necessary Party: Commissioner for Land; 2nd Necessary Party: Registrar of Titles; 3rd Necessary Party: Hon. Attorney General
- Court
- TANZLII
- Jurisdiction
- Tanzania
- Judgment Date
- 31 October 2024
- Procedural Posture
- Miscellaneous Land Application (mareva Injunction) / Ruling on Application to Strike Out
- Outcome
- Application struck out
- Legal Topics
- Mareva Injunction, Striking Out Applications, Ancillary Relief, Costs
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Mustafa Seif Ngane (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the Late Seif Ngane)
Applicant
Ngwilabazu Ndatwa Ludigija
1st Respondent
Edgar Mwebe Rushaingo ©Edgar Mwebemebzi
2nd Respondent
Anna Hubert Magambo
3rd Respondent
Dr. Gatambwa Denis Mukandala
4th Respondent
Honest Kessy
5th Respondent
Commissioner for Land
1st Necessary Party
Registrar of Titles
2nd Necessary Party
Hon. Attorney General
3rd Necessary Party
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Land Application (mareva Injunction) / Ruling on Application to Strike Out
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the application for Mareva injunction should be maintained or struck out after expiry of 90 days from notice of intention to sue
Ratio Decidendi
The application for Mareva injunction is redundant as the 90-day period after notice of intention to sue has expired, and the applicant is now at liberty to file a plaint. There is no justification for keeping the application alive.
Court Disposition
Application struck out
Orders
- Application is struck out
- Each party shall bear their own costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA LAND DIVISION AT DAR ES SALAAM MISC. LAND APPLICATION NO. 28859 OF 2024 MUSTAFA SEIF NGANE (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the Late Seif Ngane)................................................................... APPLICANT Versus NGWILABAZU NDATWA LUDIGIJA...................... 1st RESPONDENT EDGAR MWEBE RUSHAINGO ©EDGAR MWEBEMEBZI....................................................... 2nd RESPONDENT ANNA HUBERT MAGAMBO.................................... 3rd RESPONDENT DR. GATAMBWA DENIS MUKANDALA.................. 4th RESPONDENT HONEST KESSY...................................................... 5™ RESPONDENT AND COMMISSIONER FOR LAND..........................1st NECESSARY PARTY REGISTRAR OF TITLES................................. 2nd NECESSARY PARTY HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL.......................... 3rd NECESSARY PARTY RULING Date of last Order: 28/2/2025 Date of Ruling: 28/2/2025 LALTAIKA, J. 1 When this Application was called for mention earlier today, representation by Counsel was as follows: For the 1st Respondent: Mr, Emmanuel Makungu learned Advocate holding brief for Mr. Benedict Bagilie, learned Advocate. For the 2nd Respondent: Mr. Godfrey Gimeno, learned Advocate. For the 3rd Respondent: Mr. Michael Nyambo, learned Advocate. For the 5th Respondent: Ms. Cypriana William, learned Advocate. For the 4th Respondent: Mr. Emanuel Makungu, learned Advocate. For the necessary parties: Mr. Emanuel Makungu holding brief for Mr. Pantaleo Urassa, learned State Attorney. Ms. William informed the court that the matter was scheduled for mention. She stated that she had just been instructed and that her client was experiencing health challenges. She explained that she had decided to appear in court to obtain the necessary orders. Mr. Nyambo expressed his opinion that the application had been overtaken by events. He pointed out that, according to paragraph 3 of the applicant's affidavit, a notice of intention to sue had been served on 31st October 2024. Since the application was for a Mareva injunction, he argued that counting from that date, the 90-day period had already lapsed. He 2 stated that the plaint could now be filed and, to that end, prayed that the matter be struck out with costs. Mr. Makungu aligned himself with the same position, emphasizing that unless the court granted their prayer, the situation could revert to a time when numerous applications remained pending. He contended that it was prudent to seek an order striking out the matter. Mr. Gimeno maintained the same stance, adding that they sought an order for costs, as they had been engaged in the matter. Having carefully considered the submissions of all parties represented as per the first paragraph above, I find that the fundamental issue for determination is whether the application should be maintained or struck out. It is not disputed that the applicants notice of intention to sue was served on 31st October 2024. Given that the application is for a Mareva injunction, it follows that its purpose was to provide temporary relief pending the institution of a substantive suit. However, the period of 90 days from the date of the notice has already expired, meaning the applicant is now at liberty to file a plaint. Consequently, I entertain no doubt that the substratum of this application has been rendered redundant. 3 The principle that an injunction is merely an ancillary remedy was well articulated in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, where the House of Lords underscored that injunctive relief serves only as an interim measure pending the resolution of the main dispute. In the present case, since the applicant has not yet instituted the main suit within the required time, there is no justification for keeping this application alive. With respect to costs, which has been strongly emphasized by the learned Advocates, I am mindful of the overriding objective principle, which requires the court to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate, and affordable resolution of disputes. While the respondents have prayed for costs, I take into account that the delay was occasioned, in part, by the circumstances beyond the applicant's control. In the interest of justice, I find it appropriate to order that each party should bear their own costs. In the upshot, this application is hereby struck out. Each party shall bear their own costs. E.I. LALTAIKA JUDGE 28.02.2025 4 Court; Ruling delivered in the Court Chambers in the presence of Mr. Emmanuel Makungu learned Advocate holding brief for Mr. Benedict Bagilie, learned Advocate for the 1st Respondent. For the 2nd Respondent: Mr. Godfrey Gimeno, learned Advocate. For the 3rd Respondent: Mr. Michael Nyambo, learned Advocate. For the 5th Respondent: Ms. Cypriana William, learned Advocate. For the 4th Respondent: Mr. Emanuel Makungu, learned Advocate. For the necessary parties: Mr. Emanuel Makungu holding brief for Mr. Pantaleo Urassa, learned State Attorney. 5