CRIMIANL APPEAL NO 31 OF 2023 OMARY SAID LUBAWA VS THE REPUBLIC

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MOROGORO (CORAM: MKUYE, J.A., KAIRO. J.A. And MLACHA. J.A.l CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2023 OMARY SAID @ LUBAWA.........................................................APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC...................................... ......................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Morogoro) (Nawembe. 3.^ dated the 09th day of November, 2022 in Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 31st May & 24th June, 2024 MLACHA. J.A.: Before the District Court of Morogoro at Morogoro, in Economic Crimes Case No. 10 of 2020, the appellant, Omary Said @ Lubawa, was charged of unlawful possession of Government trophies contrary to section 86(1) (2) (b) and (3) of the Wildlife Conservation Act, No. 5 of 2009 [Cap 283] (the WCA), as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 4 of 2016 read together with paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to and sections 57(1) and 60(2) of Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act [Cap 200], R.E. 2002 i (EOCCA), as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 3 of 2016. It was alleged that he was found in possession of two (2) elephant tusks weighing 10.3 kilograms, worth USD 15,000, the property of the United Republic of Tanzania, without permit or licence from the Director of Wildlife. He was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to serve 20 years in jail. His appeal to the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2020 could not be successful hence this appeal. Before considering the grounds of appeal, we find it germane to present the background of the matter, albeit briefly, as follows: David Willison Marwa (PW3) a wildlife officer from KDU Unit (KIKOSI DHIDI YA UJANGILI) Dar es Saiam, got a tip through his boss, Abraham Julu on 2/12/2017 that, there was somebody selling elephant tusks at Mvuha Village, Morogoro. He and other wildlife officers were assigned to go and arrest him. They were given contacts of an informer who had communication with that person who turned to be the appellant. They decided to move to Morogoro to lay a trap to arrest the appellant. They made prior arrangements through the informer, pretending to be buyers. They contacted A/Inspector Pascal Simba (PW1), the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) of Mvuha Police Post, for police assistance. They arrived at Mvuha village late in the evening. They agreed with the appellant to do 2 the business early in the morning, the next day, 3/12/2017. They agreed to meet at Mvuha secondary school. They divided themselves in two groups; PW3 and his colleagues from Dar es Salaam formed the group of 'buyers' whereas PW1 and the PC Joseph were in the second group, observing security. PW3 and his team arrived at Mvuha Secondary School on a private car at 6:00 am. PW1 and PC Joseph positioned themselves in a bush, near the school, watching what could happen. The appellant arrived soon in the company of another person and entered inside the car. He told PW3 that the 'luggage' was in the forest, not very far, about 3 km away. He suggested that they should move with the car. They agreed on the price, TZS 250,000.00 per kg and left. PW3 communicated to PW1 through sms on this new turn. The car reached at a certain place where the appellant signalled the driver to stop. He dropped and entered inside the forest in the company of the other person. He returned with a sulphate bag. He opened the bag to show the elephant tusks. PW3 and his colleagues saw them. They pulled out their KDU identity cards at this stage telling the appellants that they were not 'buyers' but KDU officials. They demanded to know if the appellant had any permit or licence from the Director of Wildlife. He replied that he was just selling them to get some money to 3 sustain himself. They put him under arrest. Soon, PW1 and PC Joseph came. They found the appellant in the car with the bag containing elephant tusks. They sent the appellant with his luggage to Mvuha Police Post where a Certificate of Seizure, exhibit P.E 4 was prepared and signed by PWl, the appellant, Damas Pascal from KDU and PC Joseph. PW1 opened a police case file; number MAT/IR/293/2017. This number was fixed in the elephant tusks and the bag. PWl took the appellant and the bag containing elephant tusks to Morogoro Police Station on the same day. He handled them to STG. Hamad (PW5), the CRO. PW5 handled the elephant tusks to D/CPL Kwilinus (PW6), the exhibit keeper. Joseph Chagula Bunanyo (PW4), a wildlife officer from Morogoro, came later to see them. He identified, weighed and valued them. He issued a Trophy Valuation Certificate, exhibit P.E.5. The certificate shows that the tusks weigh 10.3 Kg, worthy USD 15,000 which was equivalent to TZS. 33,300,000.00 at the then exchange rate of TZS. 2,200.00 per USD. The prosecution evidence shows further that, the appellant recorded a cautioned statement at Mvuha Police Post before D/CPL Kimea (PW2) where he confessed to be found in unlawful possession of 2 elephant tusks. The accused denied to commit the crime. He said that he was merely passing that morning near the car when he was arrested and forced into the car. He saw the elephant tusks in the car. He was sent to Mvuha Police Post where he was beaten and sent to the lock up. PW2 came at a later moment with a paper and forced him to sign on it. He was sent to Morogoro Police Station where he remained until the time when he was sent to court charged of unlawful possession of elephant tusks. He discredited the witnesses who gave evidence against him. He denied to commit the crime. The trial court found that the appellant was arrested ready handed in unlawful possession of elephant tusks. It believed prosecution witnesses. It could not doubt the chain of custody of the trophy. It rejected the defence of the appellant who was convicted and sentenced as alluded to above. The High Court was in agreement with the trial court in all fours. It dismissed the appeal hence the appeal now before the Court. The appeal is premised on 11 grounds which carry the following complaints: one, that, the charge was read to the appellant in a language which he did not understand; two, the certificate of seizure, exhibit P.E. 4, was filed and signed at Mvuha Police Station contrary to the law; three, that, the conviction of the appellant was based on the evidence of PW1 who did not execute or witness the search and seizure of exhibit P.E.l; four, that, exhibit P.E.l, was obtained contrary to the law for lack of an independent witness; five, that, exhibits P.E.l, P.E.4 and P.E.3 were illegally obtained; six, that, it was illegal to recall PW1 to give additional evidence without the opinion of the appellant; seven, that, there was contradiction in witnesses on the numbering of exhibit P.E.l - whereas PW5 said it was marked MAT/IR/193/2017, PW6 said it was marked MAT/IR/293/2017; eight, that, there was evidence from PW5 that the appellant was tortured at Mvuha Police Post which was not considered; nine, that, prosecution witnesses were incredible and unreliable due to contradictions in their evidence; ten, that, the chain of custody of exhibit P.E.l was broken and questionable; eleven, that, there was no evidence to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubts. The appellant appeared in person, fending for himself, whereas the respondent Republic was represented by Ms. Upendo Shemkole, Senior State Attorney, assisted by Mses. Rosemary Mgenyi and Veronica Chacha, both learned State Attorneys. When the appellant was invited to address the Court on the grounds of appeal, he opted for the respondent Republic to start to submit while reserving his right of rejoinder. At the outset, Ms. Shemkole intimated to the Court that grounds one, three and eight are new grounds which were not canvassed at the High Court; neither do they carry points of law. She urged the Court to strike them out. We had a brief dialogue with Ms. Shemkole which also involved the appellant on the issue. In the end we agreed with Ms. Shemkole that these grounds are new and do not carry points of law. Since they were not dealt with by the first appellate court and they are not based on points of law, we refrain from entertaining them. Thus, the appeal remains with 8 grounds of appeal only. Ms. Shemkole made the address for the respondent Republic. She opposed the appeal. She argued the grounds of appeal seriatim save for grounds 7 and 9 which she argued conjointly. In ground two, Ms. Shemkole admitted that, the certificate of seizure, was filed and signed at Mvuha Police Post but contended that this is a minor issue which cannot change the reality that the appellant was arrested ready handed with elephant tusks. Amplifying, she submitted that, the appellant was arrested following a successful trap laid by PW1 and PW3 in the company of other wildlife officers and policemen. She contended that ground two contain flimsy reasons which cannot render the certificate of seizure illegal based on the evidence around it. She cited our decision in Metwii Pusindawa Lasilasi v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 431 of 2020 [2024] TZCA 139 (23 April, 2024) TANZLII where it was stated that' we cannot therefore let the appellants who were found ready handed having the pieces o f tusks to evade the arm o f justice on flimsy reasons'. She made further reference to our decision in Gitabeka Giyaya v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 2020 [2022] TZCA 830(28th December, 2022) TANZLII to reinforce the same point. He implored the Court to disregard the omission. In ground four, while making reference to section 38(1) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act [Cap 20] R.E 2019, (the CPA) and section 106(1) of the WCA, the learned Senior State Attorney submitted that the requirement for an independent witness under section 38 (1) and (3) of the CPA shouid be read together with the provision of section 106 (1) of the WCA which does not have that requirement. She contended that whether or not to call an independent witness depends on the time and place where the search and seizure was conducted. She referred the Court to page 35 of the record where PW1 was recorded telling the trial court 8 that he could not call an independent witness because the area was a forest land without people. She wondered why this issue is now being raised. She admitted that PW1 could not issue a receipt but rushed to say that failure to issue a receipt is not fatal. She relied on our decision in Gitabeka Giyaya (supra) where it was stated that, 'In a number o f decisions we have made ourselves dear thatfailure to comply with section 38 (3) o f the CPA or its kith, section 22 (3) o f Cap 200 is not a fata/ ailment.' She went on to submit that there was good evidence from PW1 and PW3 on the way they laid a trap and put the appellant under arrest who also signed the certificate of seizure making failure to issue a receipt an error which has no effect in the case. On ground five, the Senior State Attorney contended that there is no place showing that exhibits P.E.l, P.E.4 and P.E.3 were obtained illegally. She submitted that exhibit P.E.l (the elephant tusks) was obtained legally after a successful trap organised by PW1 and PW3. That also applied for exhibit P.E.4 (the certificate of seizure) which was signed at the police station because the place of arrest (forest) was not conducive. As to exhibit P.E.3 (the cautioned statement) she maintained that it was voluntarily made to PW2 and thus legal. Submitting on ground six, the Senior State Attorney made reference to section 147(4) of the Evidence Act Cap 6 R. E. 2019 (the Evidence Act) which gave the trial court the power to recall witnesses saying it had no requirement to give the accused a chance to give his opinion. He urged the Court to reject the complaint. Grounds seven and nine were argued conjointly as intimated above. The gist of the complaint in these grounds is that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is contradictory and thus incredible. The Senior State Attorney contended that the evidence which was found to be credible by both, the District Court and the High Court, cannot be challenged lightly at this stage. She conceded that the evidence of PW5 at page 42 reads MAT/IR/193/2017 as opposed to what was said by another witness who said it was MAT/IR/293/2017 but hurried to say that, this is a minor error which has no bearing in the evidence in totality, thus negligible. She relied to our decision in Emmanuel Lyamboga v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 2019 [2021] TZCA 152 (29th April, 2021) TANZLII where it was stated that minor differences in the evidence of witnesses cannot be avoided. On ground ten it was contended by the Senior State Attorney that, there was no break in the chain of custody of exhibit P.E.l. Counsel 10 submitted that, the evidence is clear that PWl and PW3 arrested the appellant with the trophy in the forest and sent him to Mvuha Police Post and later to Morogoro Police Station; on the same day. The elephant tusks were handled to the CRO in charge (PW5) at Morogoro Police Station who acknowledged receipt and kept them till the next day when he handled them to the exhibit keeper (PW6). She submitted further that, PW4 came to weigh and value the trophy but they remained with PW6 till the day when they were sent to court. She contended that, the chain of custody was intact leaving no gap in between. She implored the Court to follow is decision in Zssa Hassan Uki v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2017 [2018] TZCA 361 (9th May, 2018) TANZLII and find that the chain of custody was not broken. On ground eleven, the Senior State Attorney contended that, the evidence proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. She stressed that the appellant was arrested ready handed with two elephant tusks which he needed to sell. He also confessed. She pointed out that there is a snag in Page 54 of the record of appeal showing that the cautioned statement was not read to the appellant after being recorded but this can only affect the confession not the rest of the evidence. She contended that there was good evidence from PWl and PW3. Further, the trophy was weighed, 11 inspected and valued by PW4 who found it to be elephant tusks. He also established its value. The chain of custody was equally good proving the offence beyond reasonable doubts, she submitted. The appellant being a layman could not respond to the grounds of appeal in the order presented by the Senior State Attorney. His submission was also short. He contended that the charges were framed to incriminate him without valid cause. He added that he was arrested in 2017 and kept in remand for afl the period up to 2020 without bail. He has since 2020 remained in prison to-date. He asked the Court to examine his grounds of appeal and do justice to him. We had ample time to study the record of appeal, consider the grounds of appeal and submissions. We plan to respond in the manner adopted by the Senior State Attorney. The complaint in ground two is that, the certificate of seizure was filled and signed at Mvuha Police Post; not at the place of seizure, therefore should not be acted upon. PW1 acknowledged this fact at page 33 of the record of appeal during cross examination when he said: 7 prepared a certificate o f seizure when you were at the poiice station. ...I arrested you then I prepared the certificate o f seizure" 12 So, there is no doubt that PW1 picked the appellant from the forest and took him to the police post where he prepared the certificate of seizure which was signed by all people in attendance including the appellant. The controversy is not on its contents (the elephant tusks) or mode of execution but the place of execution. The appellant seeks to rely on the rule developed under section 38 (3) of the CPA that a certificate of seizure is signed at the place of seizure. While accepting that PW1 did not comply with this rule of practice, the Senior State Attorney has implored us to find that the error is minor and not fatal given the weight of the evidence on record. She has referred us to our decisions in Metwii Rusidawa Lasilasi (supra) and Gitabeka Giyaya (supra) which has the position that, flimsy reasons must not have a bearing on the outcome of cases. On our part, with respect to the learned Senior State Attorney, we don't think that failure to fill and sign a certificate of seizure at the place of seizure is an issue which can be branded as minor or 'flimsy reason' and brushed aside in the manner she wants us to do. Signing a certificate of seizure at the place of seizure is a rule developed by the Court under section 38 (3) of the CPA and is still valid. See David Athanas® Makasi and Another v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 2017 [2018] TZCA 65 (10 July, 2018) TANZLII. We think the issue should have been 13 whether it was possible, in the circumstances of this case, to fill and sign the certificate of seizure at the place where the elephant tusks were seized. We think it was not. The evidence of PW1 should not be read in isolation of the evidence of other witnesses, particularly that of PW3. The latter told the trial court that they arrived at the school early that day hopping to get the elephant tusks as agreed, but the appellant took them to the forest some 3 km away. They stopped the car at a certain point on instructions of the appellant who moved inside the forest and came out with the sulphate bag containing elephant tusks. He entered inside the car with the bag. PW3 disclosed that he was a KDU official at this point and put the appellant under arrest. PW1 who was following the car came at this moment. He saw the appellant handcuffed with the sulphate bag behind him. He ordered the car to move to Mvuha Police Post where he filled the certificate of seizure. We think that, what was done by PW1 is what any reasonable police officer could have done for the place of arrest being a forest area was not conducive to fill and sign the certificate of seizure. Moving to the Police Post was thus not a contravention of the rule developed under section 38 (3) of the CPA but justified in the circumstances of this case. That disposes ground two. 14 The complaint on ground four is on failure to call an independent witness. PW3 said at page 35 of the record of appeal that,' We failed to call the independent witness because the incidence happened at the forest and no other person passed there at the time.' The Senior State Attorney agreed with PW3 that, it was not easy to get an independent witness in the forest at that particular moment in time (6:00 am). We agree with him. Failure to get an independent witness was thus, in the circumstances pertaining to this case, not a violation of section 38 (1) and (3) of the CPA but was caused by the fact that there was no people at the place of arrest and seizure. Neither was it possible to make a prior arrangement because it was no foreseen that the appellant could change the venue from the school to the forest. That besides, we also agree with the Senior State Attorney that, section 38 (1) and (3) of the CPA must be read with section 106(1) (b) of the WCA. The latter gives wildlife officers wide powers of entry, search and seizure without warrant or a requirement for an independent witness, save where a dwelling house is involved. Section 106 (1) (b) states: "Enter and search without warrant any land, building, tent, vehicle, aircraft or vessel in the occupation or use o f such person, open and search any luggage or other thing in his possession. 15 Provided that no dwelling house shall be entered into without a warrant except in the presence o f a least one Independent witness (Emphasis added) That disposes ground four. The complaint in ground five is that, exhibits P.E.l (the elephant tusks), P.E.4 (the certificate of seizure) and P.E.3 (the cautioned statement) were obtained illegally. We have explained at length the way the certificate of seizure was filled in the previous discussions. We said that it was filed at the Police post because the circumstance did not allow for it to be filled and signed in the forest. We found justification in what was done by the police. We see nothing to fault the process and call it an illegal document at this stage. That means that even the elephant tusks (Exhibit P.E.l) which were seized cannot be said to have been seized illegally. That was also the reasoning of the Senior State Attorney in her response under this ground. We agree with her. As for exhibit P.E. 3, we have revisited the proceedings and the ruling delivered after the inquiry but could not see any procedural irregularities. We join hands with the views of the two lower courts that exhibit P.E.3 was admitted properly. Like the Senior State attorney, we find that the confession was voluntarily made and thus legal. That disposed ground five. The complaint on ground six is on failure to seek the opinion of the appellant before recalling PW1. The learned Senior State attorney find this as a baseless ground arguing that there is no legal requirement of demanding the opinion of the accused before making an order to recall a prosecution witness. We agree entirely with the learned Senior State Attorney. We shall try to demonstrate. Recall of witnesses is done under section 147 (4) of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E.2019 which reads: "The court may in all cases permit a witness to be recalled either for further examination-in-chief or for further cross examination, and if it does so, the parties have the right o f further cross-examination and re-examination respectively". This provision have been interpreted by the Court in various cases including Remmy Gerald Sipuka v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2019 [2021] TZCA 328 (28 July, 2021) TANZLII where it was stated that: .. That section empowers the trial court to permit witnesses to be recalled for further examination in chief, cross examination or re-examination". 17 See also our recent decision in Kennedy Paul Mosha v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 2020 [2024] TZCA 413 (7 June, 2024) TANZLII where it was stated thus: "Therefore, after engaging the advocate who prayed for the witnesses to be recalled for further cross examination; there ought to have been sufficient reasons stated by the appellant's advocate for consideration by the magistrate. Reading from page 23 o f the record o f appeal, it is vivid that Mr. Raymond Cosmas, learned advocate did not cite any reason for the witnesses to be recalled for further cross examination. Therefore, provided that section 147(4) o f the Evidence Act is not couched in mandatory terms, we uphold Ms. Mienza's submission that the advocate's prayer was unwarranted and unjustified". (Emphasis added) It is thus obvious that the court has power to allow a party to recall a witness for further examination in chief or further cross examination. If this is allowed, the opposite party has a right for further cross examination which goes with a right for further re-examination. There is nowhere written that the opposite party or the accused as was in this case, has to 18 be consulted before making the order. What was read into the provisions by the Court, as per our decision in Kennedy Paul Mosha (supra), is the requirement to give reasons. The party seeking to recall a witness must say why he wants the witness to come back. Based on the reasons, the court may grant the request. The language used is ' The court may in all cases permit* meaning that with good reasons, the court should freely allow the recall of witnesses. The prayer to recall PWl was done by Ms. Masawe, Senior State Attorney, as appearing in page 32 of the record of appeal. Ms. Masawe, assigned reasons that PWl was being recalled to produce a search warrant The trial court considered the reason advanced and granted the prayer. The accused who was present in court did not raise any objection to the prayer. PWl was recalled, gave evidence and finally tendered the certificate of seizure, exhibit P.E.4. The appellant did the cross examination as required by the law. A re-examination was made and the evidence was closed. The complaint is thus baseless which is rejected. That disposes ground six. As for grounds seven and nine, we share the views of the Senior State Attorney that there was no serious contradiction in the evidence of witnesses making them incredible. Ground seven allege contradiction in 19 the testimonies of PW5 and PW6 which is based on the police case number. PW1 said at page 12 of the record of appeal that he opened a case at Mvuha Police Post, number MAT/IR/293/2017 in respect of the crime committed by the appellant. He marked this number on both the elephant tusks and the sulphate bag. PW3 said at page 35 and 36 that the bag was marked MAT/IR/293/2017. PW5 said at page 42 that it was marked MAT/IR/193/2017, whereas PW6 said at page 44 that it was MAT/IR/293/2017. The difference is on one digit which was brought by PW5 who did not say 293 like others. He replaced the 2 with 1 to get 193. We think this is not a contradiction but may be the result of a loss of memory on the part of the witness or a slip of the pen on the part of the trial magistrate. In whatever case the contradiction is minor and negligible. See Marmo s/o Slaa Hofu & 3 others v. R, criminal Appeal No.246/2011 (unreported) where we stated: "... normaI discrepancies are bound to occur in the testimonies o f witnesses, due to normal errors of observations such as errors in memory due to lapse o f time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time o f occurrence. Minor inconsistencies, embellishmentsor improvements, on trivial matters which do not affect the case of the prosecution case 20 should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety". (Emphasis added) See also Chrisant John v. R, criminal Appeal No.313 of 2015, [2016] TZCA 655 (22 February, 2016) TANZLII and Dickson Elia Nsamba Shapwata and another v. R, Criminal Appeal No.92 of 2007 [2008] TZCA 17 (30 May, 2008) TANZLII. The gist of ground 9 is on credibility of witnesses which is challenged based on the contradictions pointed above. As there was no serious contradictions, we see no way in which the credibility of any of the witnesses can be challenged. That beside, credibility of witnesses is in the domain of the trial court and cannot be challenged lightly in the manner the appellant wants us to do. See; Pia Joseph v. The Republic [1984] TLR 161, a decision of the High Court which we subscribe. That disposes grounds seven and nine. Ground ten is on the chain of custody of exhibit P.E.l. The principles of chain of custody are contained in various decisions of this Court including, Chacha Jeremiah Murimi & 3 others v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 2015 [2019] TZCA 52 (4 April, 2019) TANZLII where we stated: "The movement o f the exhibit from one person to another should be handled with great care to eliminate any possibility that there may have been tampering o f that exhibit ... Generally, there should be no vital missing link in handling the exhibit from the time it was seized in the hands of the suspect to the time o f chemical analysis, until finally received as evidence in court after being satisfied that there was no meddling or tampering done in the whole process. In establishing chain o f custody we are convinced that the most accurate method is on documentation as stated in Paulo Maduka and Others vs. R., Criminal Appeal No. 110 o f2007 and followed in Makoye Samwe/@ Kashinje and Kashindye Bundata, Criminal Appeal No. 32 o f 2014, (both cases unreported). However, documentation will not be the only requirement in dealing with exhibits. An exhibit will not fail the test merely because there was no documentation. Other factors have to be looked at depending on the prevailing circumstances in every particular case. See also Joseph Leonard Manyota v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2017 [2017] TZCA 261 (11 August, 2017) TANZLII and Jibril 22 Okash Mohamed v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 331 of 2017 [2021] TZCA 13 (11 February, 2021) TANZLII. We agree with the leaned Senior State Attorney that there is good evidence from PW1 and PW3 showing that the appellant was arrested with the trophy in the forest on 3/12/2017 and sent to Mvuha Police Post where it was given a case number and marked. PW1 moved with both the appellant and the exhibit to Morogoro Police Station on the same day. He handled the exhibit to the CRO in charge (PW5). The latter acknowledged receipt and kept the trophy till the next day when he handled them to the exhibit keeper (PW6). They were recorded in the exhibit register and kept in the store. PW4 came to weigh and value the trophy but left them with PW6. The elephant tusks remained with PW6 at the store until 8/4/2020 when they were tendered in court as exhibit. The evidence shows a chronological flow of events which does not suggest any tempering in between. The chain of custody was thus intact making ground ten baseless. Ground eleven is on the proof. We agree with the learned Senior State Attorney that there was good evidence to convict the appellant on the offence charged based on the evidence of PW1 and PW3 and the exhibits tendered. We also see a good chain of custody of exhibit P.E.l as 23 we have demonstrated above. We find this ground baseless thus is rejected. In view of what we have endeavoured to demonstrate, we do not find cogent reasons to vary the decision of the High Court because the case was proved beyond reasonable doubts. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in its entirety. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 21st day of June, 2024. R. K. MKUYE JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. G. KAIRO JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. M. MLACHA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 24th day of June, 2024 in the presence of the appellant via video facility from remand prison at Morogoro and Ms. Daria Sanga, learned State Attorney from High Court Morogoro for the Respondent/Republic, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.