PASCHAL RULING NEW

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (MAIN REGISTRY)

AT DODOMA MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18729 OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR

PREROGATIVE ORDERS OF CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ON TERMINATION OF THE APPLICANT

BETWEEN PASCHAL RW ECHUNGURA....................................... ...................... APPLICANT AND THE CHIEF SECRETARY, PRESIDENT O F F IC E ......... ........... 1st RESPONDENT THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM M ISSION........ ...................... ....2 nd RESPONDENT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE LABOUR, YOUTH, EMPLOYMENT AND PERSON WITH DISABILITY..................3 rd RESPONDENT ATTORNEY G EN ER A L.............................................................. 4™ RESPONDENT 11 .09.2 024 & 20 . 0 9 . 2 0 2 4 . U.E. MADEHA, J

RULING This is an application for leave to file an application for Judicial Review for orders of certiorari and mandamus. The application has been preferred under Rule Sections 2(3) of The Judicature and Application of Laws Act [Cap 358 R.E 2019], Section 18(1) of the Law Reform (Fatal p g -1 Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, [Cap. 310 R. E. 2019] and Rules 5(1) and (3), of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules, 2014, GN No.324 of 2014. It is accompanied by an affidavit sworn by the applicant Paschal Rwechungura and accompanied by the Statement of facts. The application is brought by way of a Chamber Summons accompanied with an affidavit sworn by the applicant and statement of facts which contain the reliefs sought as listed in the Chamber Summons. The Chamber Summons bears, the following prayers: - a) That the honourable Court be pleased to grant leave to the applicant to apply for a prerogative order o f Certiorari to quash the decision o f the President o f the United Republic o f Tanzania on confirm ing term ination o f the applicant which was done by the J d respondent and confirm ed by the 2ndrespondent b) That the honourable Court be pleased to grant leave to the applicant to apply fo r a prerogative order o f Mandamus com pelling the respondent to determ ine the disciplinary charges

in accordance to the la id down procedure. c) That the costs o f this application be provided. d) Any other order (s) which this Court m ay deem fit, and ju s t to grant. Pg- 2 It is opposed by the respondents namely, the Chief Secretary President Office Public Service Commission, the Prime Minister's Office Labour, Youth, Employment and People with Disability, and the Attorney General, hereafter referred to as the 1st, 2nd 3rd, and 4th Respondent, respectively, or in their collective status simply as "the Respondents" who filed a joint counter-affidavit affirmed by one Aloyce Elphas Kirumbi, the principal officer of the 3rd Respondent and a reply statement of facts. The facts leading to this application are as follows: The applicant was employed as a Labour Officer and initially stationed at Njombe Labour Office before being transferred to Kibaha Labour Office. He later served at the Labour Commissioner's Office in the Work Permit section and was eventually appointed as a Public Prosecutor. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent revoked his legal authority as a Legal Officer without providing any reason or affording him a hearing. Additionally, his name was removed from the payroll. The applicant sought clarification regarding his removal from office and, on 18th February 2019, he received a letter requesting him to explain why disciplinary measures should not be taken against him

for allegedly issuing work permits to Dipesh Jayendra Joshi of M/S Unoplast (T) Ltd and Sanjay Kumar of M/S Sumaria Group Tanzania Ltd without Pg- 3 proper justification. In response, the applicant complied with the directive by submitting a written explanation to the disciplinary authority. Subsequently, he was issued another letter asking him to defend himself, and later he was summoned before an inquiry committee established to address the allegations. Following the proceedings, he was dismissed from public service. Dissatisfied with the 3rd respondent's decision, the applicant appealed, but the 2nd respondent upheld the decision of the 3rd respondent. He then lodged an unsuccessful appeal to the 1st respondent. The applicant is disgruntled with the decision alleging violation of natural justice, as he was unreasonably punished even before the purported charges were formally presented and resolved, and that he was not given access to key documents related to the issuance of work permits for Dipesh Jayendra Joshi of M/S Unoplast (T) Ltd and Sanjay Kumar of M/S Sumaria Group Tanzania Ltd. Crucially, the Inquiry Committee Report, which was vital for his appeal, was not made available for scrutiny. This omission was overlooked by both the first and second Respondents when considering the appeal. Furthermore, the applicant asserts that immediately after receiving the termination

letter, he requested the Inquiry Committee Report/Findings referred to in the Pg- 4 letter. However, this request was ignored, which significantly affected his ability to prepare for the appeals before the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The sought application for leave (if granted), is intended to apply for Judicial Review for orders to challenge his removal on four (4) grounds of illegalities as contained in paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts as follows: - a) That, in line with paragraph 3 herein the applicant was unreasonably punished even before the purported charges and their disposal and that the charges came la te r to ju stify the pointed anomaly. b) That, som e necessary docum ents in the chain o f issuance o f work perm its including the work perm its allegedly issued by applicant were never brought before the third (3 d) Respondents Inquiry Committee and the same were ignored by the firs t (1st) and second (2nd) Respondents. He further that the com plaints on being availed with necessary docum ents including the proceedings o f the m atter are m ostly featured in the appeals before the first (1st) Respondents and the second (2nd) Respondents as attached herein. It is also the applicant statem ent that the third (3 d) Respondents even faile d to make a reply to h is le tte r (annexure PR8) which requested fo r the Inquiry Committee Report/ Findings. Pg- 5 c) That, in

line with the contents o f paragraph 9 and 10 and their annexures, the second (2nd) and firs t (1st) Respondents (For the President o f the United Republic) d id not com prehensively deal with a ll the grounds o f appeal brought before them, denying m y rig h t to be heard over the matter. d) That, the decision o f the second (2nd) Respondents was issued beyond the prescribed ninety (90) days and no reason was availed to that effect and the fin a l decision o f the President o f the United Republic o f Tanzania was made from the said decision which was issued very late. Hearing of this application, with leave of this Court, was conducted by way of written submissions, the applicant was represented by Mr. Henry Njowoka, a learned advocate who drafted and filed the submissions, and Mr. Nicodemus Agweyo, State Attorney, did so for the Respondents. In his submission, the applicant's counsel relied heavily on the authority in the famous case of Emma Bayo vs The Minister for Labour and Youths Development and 2 others, Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2012, where it was stated as follows: - "It is a t the stage o f leave where the High Court satisfies its e lf that the applicant fo r leave has made Pg- 6 out any arguable case to ju stify the filin g o f the main application. A t the stage o f leave the High Court is also required to consider whether the applicant is within the six m onths lim

itation period within which to seek a ju d icia l review o f the decision of a tribunal subordinate to the High Court. A t the leave stage is where the applicant shows that he or she has su fficien t interest to be allow ed to bring the main application. We cannot but em phasize our restatem ent o f the law in Attorney General vs. W ilfred Onyango M ganyi @ Dadzi & 11 Others (supra) to the effect that an "application fo r leave is a necessary step to an application for the orders. The purpose fo r this "step" is to give the court an indication that an applicant has "sufficient interest in applying for the orders" The advocate for the applicant submitted that they have demonstrated an arguable case, as outlined in the affidavit and supporting statement of facts. Specifically, paragraph 13 of the Applicant's Affidavit highlights the grounds for the application, with paragraph 13(a) focusing on the Labour Commissioner's delegation of powers. The applicant contended that while the Labour Institutions Act [Cap. 300 R.E 2019] provides for delegation, it does not grant explicit powers to revoke a Labour Officer's authority. Even if such powers are Pg- 7 implied, the applicant argued that reasons must be provided, which were absent in the revocation notice. The applicant asserted that the revocation was arbitrary, lacked justification, and violated the principles of natural justice, as

the decision had been made without due process. He cited the cases of James F. Gwagilo vs. Attorney General, 1994 TLR 73 (HC) and Tanzania Air Services Limited vs. Minister for Labour, Attorney General & The Commissioner for Labour 1996 TLR 217 (TZHC) Hamisi Rajabu Dibagula vs. Republic (Criminal Appeal 53 of 2001) 2003 TZCA 1 (14 March 2003, TANZLII) the importance of assigning reasons is also highlighted. Citing M.K. Mukherjee, 1, in Rupan Deol Baiai and An. Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and An. [1995] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 237 9 (All unreported) to bolster his arguments. Further to that, the applicant counsel contends that the Labour Commissioner overstepped his authority by revoking his powers as a Labour Officer, a role that falls under the jurisdiction of the Permanent Secretary the 3rd Respondent, as outlined in Regulation 35(2)(b) of the Public Service Regulations, 2022. Besides he was not allowed to defend himself, violating his right to be heard. Moreover, the reasons for termination, outlined in subsequent letters, appear to be retrospective Pg- 8 and do not justify the initial revocation. The applicant argues that these facts demonstrate an arguable case for judicial review, especially since the Labour Commissioner, as a subordinate to the Permanent Secretary, lacks the authority to issue directives to the latter, thus highlighting procedural irregularities in the disciplinary

process. In his submission, the counsel for the applicant emphasized the 3rd Respondent's deliberate failure to provide all the necessary documents referred to during the proceedings. He noted the absence of evidence, such as a dispatch book extract, proving the receipt of the crucial Inquiry Committee Report, which the applicant only saw for the first time as annexure OSG2 in the Counter Affidavit. The applicant argued that this report was essential for preparing his appeal to the 2nd respondent and the President. Additionally, he highlighted the incomplete documentation, such as missing work permits and attachments, further asserting that these omissions suggest the documents were never presented during the initial hearing. It was the applicant's counsel's view that the absence of key documents, such as the two work permits and other relevant evidence supporting the charges, effectively denied him the right to a fair hearing. He argued that he was not given the opportunity to examine the Pg-9 documents or cross-examine the witnesses who presented them. Referencing the case of Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Rajabu Mjema Ramadhani Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 2020, the applicant's counsel cited the Court of Appeal's clear stance on the importance of the right to be heard, emphasizing that any decision made without affording a party such a right is a nullity, even if the same

decision would have been arrived at had the affected party been heard. Tine applicant asserted that this principle of natural justice, which is enshrined in Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution, was violated in this case, warranting permission to file the main application. The applicant counsel further argues that the 1st and 2nd respondents, failed to address all the grounds of appeal submitted to them. Referring to annexures PR6 and PR7, the Applicant contends that the decisions issued on 23rd November 2021 and 1st March 2023, respectively, did not consider key complaints outlined in paragraphs 13(a), (b), and (c) of the Applicant's affidavit. This oversight, according to the applicant, breaches principles of natural justice, as courts and quasi-judicial bodies are obligated to address all issues presented. Citing the case of France Michael Nyoni vs. Republic, the applicant pg. 10 stresses the duty of higher courts to review all grounds of appeal comprehensively. Moreover, the applicant's counsel highlights the issue in paragraph 13(d) of their affidavit. They refer to the requirement under Regulation 62(3) of the Public Service Regulations, 2022, that appeals be heard within 90 days. However, the appeal, lodged on 10th October 2019, was decided by the second respondent only on 23rd November 2021, a delay of two years. Citing the precedent from Emma Bayo vs. The Minister for

Labour and Youths Development & Others (2013), the applicant asserts that the Court should acknowledge the existence of an arguable case and proceed accordingly. The applicant's counsel argued that the present matter was timely lodged given that the decision to be challenged was passed on 7/12/2023 and this matter was lodged around April 2024. Two, they have demonstrated sufficient interest to warrant a grant of the orders to be sought. The applicant's counsel concluded that the matter was timely lodged. The order by Manyanda J in Paschal Rwechungura vs Chief Secretary, President's Office and 3 Others, Misc. Civil Application No. 10096 of 2024 [2024] TZHC 6215, dated 3rd July 2024, extended the pg. 11 deadline for the applicant, thereby validating the timeliness of this application. In reply, the State Attorney for the respondents adopted the counter-affidavit and the reply to the statement, incorporating them as part of his submission. He conceded that the case of Emma Bayo vs. The Minister for Labour and Youth Development and Others, Civil Appeal 79 of 2012 [2023] TZCA 190 established the foundation for granting leave in judicial review cases within Tanzania jurisprudence. However, he respectfully noted that other cases have further refined these conditions. Specifically, he referred to the case of Nandhra Engineering and Another vs. The Minister of Constitution and Legal

Affairs and Another Misc. Civil Cause No. 8968 of 2024 [2024] TZHC 5894, where the court elaborated on the conditions for leave to apply for judicial review as hereunder; 1. There m ust be prim a facie or arguable or case; 2. The applicant has sufficient interest in the m atter; 3. The m atter m ust have been brought w ithin tim e lim it o f six (06) months; 4. There m ust be a decision over the m atter made by a public body; 5. There m ust be exhaustion o f rem edies; 6. That the Application m ust be made in good faith. pg. 12 On the same note, he conceded that the application was filed within the permitted timeframe, following a request for an extension from the court. However, he pointed out that the applicant failed to satisfy the three remaining conditions, and his arguments were misplaced specifically, the applicant's attempt to address the three conditions outlined in the Emma Bayo case (Supra) involved merely presenting factual assertions about the alleged infringements by the respondents, without establishing a compelling case or demonstrating sufficient facts to apply for judicial review. Mr. Agweyo argued that the applicant failed to establish a solid case or provide sufficient evidence to justify a request for leave for judicial review. As leave acts as a preliminary screening process to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed with judicial review.

He referenced Nandhra's case, which approved the decision in Kikonda Butema Farms Ltd vs. The Inspector General of Police, Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2002. He further stated that the applicant presented facts irrelevant to a judicial review application, seeking to challenge the procedural aspects of his employment termination, which exceeds the scope at the leave stage. He requested the court to disregard these facts, emphasizing that Pg- 13 the applicant failed to demonstrate an arguable case, as highlighted in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the joint counter affidavits. Furthermore, the respondent contended that the applicant had not sufficiently shown a vested interest in the matter, as noted in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, and failed to address key conditions, such as the existence of a public decision, exhaustion of remedies, and good faith. To reinforce his argument, he cited the case of Lujuna Shubi Ballonzi, senior v. Registered Trustees of Chama Cha Mapinduzi [1996] TLR 203 and John Mhina vs Attorney General [1999] TLR 313. Mr Agweyo argued that Section 110 of The Evidence Act [Cap 6 R.E. 2022] stipulates that anyone seeking a court judgment on a legal right or liability based on alleged facts must prove their existence. This means that the burden of proof lies with the person making the assertion. The applicant failed to address the required three criteria in their affidavit,

statement of fact or submissions, neglecting to tackle all five mandatory criteria for this type of application. Moreover, he respectfully requests that the court dismiss the application, as the applicants have not demonstrated sufficient and valid reasons to warrant leave for prerogative orders of certiorari and mandamus. He emphasizes that public policy and justice necessitate the pg. 14 finality of litigation. Therefore, he prays for the dismissal of this application with costs. In rejoinder the applicant counsel, addressing the respondents' Counsel's issue on the omission of the three criteria in their submission, stated that, it's important to highlight the doctrine of stare decisis, or precedent. This principle dictates that decisions from higher courts, such as the Court of Appeal, bind lower courts. Therefore, the criteria established in Emma Bayo vs. The Minister for Labour and Youths Development & Others (supra) should take precedence over the criteria from the High Court case of Nandhra Engineering & Another vs. The Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs & Another (supra). As stated in Tanzania Breweries Limited vs Anthony Nyingi (supra), the Court of Appeal's decision is authoritative and must be followed until a higher court revisits or amends it. He further stated that the applicant met the three unsubmitted criteria as outlined in his affidavit and

statement of facts. The first criterion requires a decision by a public body; however, no preliminary objection was raised to dispute this, implying that the respondents are indeed public bodies whose decisions are under application of leave to file judicial review. The applicant's affidavit includes the decisions being pg. 15 challenged, and since the respondents' counsel represents them under the Office of the Attorney General (Discharge of Duties) Act, it confirms that the Respondents are public bodies. In addition, the final criterion requires that the application be made in good faith. The Respondents' Joint Counter Affidavit and their submissions do not address any claim of bad faith in the applicant's Chamber Application. Consequently, the Chamber Summons, Affidavit, and supporting statements suggest that the application is indeed made in good faith, thus satisfying this criterion as well. Moreover, the applicant's submissions in chief expand upon his Affidavit and statement of facts, providing an analysis supported by legal authorities to establish an arguable case. He referenced the case of Emma Bayo vs. The Minister for Labour and Youths Development & Others, clarifying that at the leave stage, detailed adjudication is not required; instead, it is about establishing a prima facie arguable issue. Thus, the submissions aim to substantiate the Applicant's position rather

than invite adjudication on procedural matters. He further pointed out that, the facts submitted by the applicant are detailed in the Affidavit and the statement of facts, which are crucial pg. 16 documents for presenting an arguable case. As highlighted in the case of Rehema Sadick Shemliwa vs. Lushoto District Council and The Attorney General, Misc. Cause No. 3392 of 2024, the High Court relies on these documents to determine the validity of an arguable case. Therefore, the call to disregard these facts is baseless. Counsel for applicant, further stated that the applicant's affidavit and statement do present tangible grounds, which is why the respondent has failed to address the key points raised in the Applicant's submissions, particularly regarding the Labour Commissioner's decision. The counter affidavit similarly neglects to address these issues effectively, rendering the submissions baseless. He concluded that the case of Nandhra Engineering & Another vs The Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs & Another (Supra), clarified that sufficient interest means having the right to bring a case, either directly or indirectly affected. The applicant has clearly shown such interest by seeking to recover unpaid funds and requesting an extension from the 1st Respondent, who has refused. This qualifies as sufficient interest under the law. Those were the parties' submissions.

Having considered the said submissions and the pleadings, I find that the key issue for Pg 17 determination is whether the application for leave is tenable in law. Since this is an application for leave, the relevant guidance is derived from the English case of Re-Hirji Transport Services [1961] All ER 88 where the condition for grant of leave was stated to be the establishment of a prima facie case. In Tanzania, the conditions have been stated in several decisions, including Emma Bayo vs. The Minister for Labour and Youth Development and Others (Supra) and the case of Nandhra Engineering & Another vs The Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs & Another (Supra), as submitted by the parties. Similarly in the case of Cheavo Juma Mshana vs. Tanapa and 2 Others (Misc. Civil Cause 7 of 2020) [2021] TZHC 2254 Mkapa J (as she then was) cited Republic vs. Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division and Another [2006] 1 EA 321, where it was held that; "Leave should be granted, if on the m aterial available the court considers, w ithout going into the m atter in depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave and that the leave stage is a filte r whose purpose is to weed out hopeless cases a t earliest possible time, thus saving the pressure on the courts and needless expense fo r the applicant by allow ing m alicious and futile claim s." pg. 18 As such in Cheavo Juma

Mshana (supra) citing R.V.T.R R.C Exp National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd (1982) A.C. 617 where it was held that, the applicant must demonstrate that there is an arguable case, thus a ground for seeking judicial review exists, the applicant has to show sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates, and that the applicant has acted promptly. Having considered all cases mentioned above, therefore there are six conditions to be considered before granting leave to file judicial review as follows: - 1) Applicant has sufficient interest in the m atter; 2) There m ust be an arguable or prim a facie case; 3) There m ust be a decision over the m atter made by a public body; 4) There m ust be exhaustion o f the rem edies; 5) The m atter m ust have been brought within a tim e lim it o f six months.

6) That the Application m ust be made in good faith. In the matter at hand, as seen from the submissions, the parties do not dispute the conditions about a time limit both agree that the application is brought within time after the application for an extension of time was granted. However, they battle on conditions of existence of an arguable or prima facie case which goes with the good faith of the pg. 19 applicant, the existence of a decision by a public body and the exhaustion of remedy. I will start with the issue of the existence of an arguable or prima facie case. While the counsel for respondents in his written submission in reply opposing the application pointed out that the applicant has not demonstrated an arguable case without justifying more. The counsel for the applicant, however, strongly opposes that view. In both the written submission in chief and the rejoinder, he maintains that he has sufficiently established an arguable case warranting him the grant of leave to apply for judicial review as he was not granted the right to be heard. I think the applicant is right. As far as the test of potential arguability is concerned, it is the consideration of whether the materials before the court disclose matters which might, on further consideration, demonstrate an arguable case for the grant of the relief claimed. At the leave stage, it is not necessary to show an

arguable case. Besides, arguability cannot be judged in a vacuum, that is, without reference to the nature and gravity of the issue to be argued. It is a test which is flexible in its application and normally is proved in the substantive application, not at the leave stage. It will be recalled that this test has been adopted and applied in decided cases. pg. 20 In Tanzania, the same position obtains. For instance, this court (Kalegeya, J.) in Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 144 of 1993 (High Court at Dar es Salaam) between Workers of Tanganyika Textile Industries Ltd v. the Registrar of the Industrial Court of Tanzania and others, when dealing with an application for leave for orders of certiorari and mandamus had this to say: - 'I should out rig h tly p oin t that seeking leave to apply fo r prerogative orders requires the applicant to m erely raise arguable points. He is not required to prove the alleged errors, that p ro o f would only be required, during hearing o f the m ain application if leave is granted. Regarding the statem ent and the attached supporting docum ent' This position was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Emma Bayo case (supra), whereby, speaking through his Lordship Juma, J.A. (as he then was), at p. 9 of the judgment, was emphatic that the High Court exercising judicial discretion in determining issue of leave, should not indulge itself in considering the

main application as doing so is to go "beyond what was expected of the trial court at the stage/step of application for leave. The Court described such conduct as "overstepping" on the main application. This decision provides the best line of authority that as far as the test of potential arguability is concerned, it is the consideration pg. 21 whether the materials before the court disclose matters which might, on further consideration, demonstrate an arguable case for the grant of the relief claimed. I have dispassionately reviewed the documents which found this application. My particular attention is drawn to the applicant's affidavit and statement of facts. The narration of the grounds laid and the reliefs sought to convince me to hold the view that a prima facie case has been made out. The contentions such as; failure to allow the applicant to appear and be heard on the allegations are some of the contentions which bring up the argument that the applicant's position as a labour officer was cast away through a process that drifted from the irregularity set out in the procedures governing expelling him from work. While this is a mere allegation which requires proof, I take the view that he has done enough to demonstrate that there lies a bunch of issues which would require enlisting the Court's supervisory jurisdiction to come up with a finding on the veracity or otherwise

of the applicants' contention. I am overly convinced, and without stating any absolutes, that the applicant has shown that a prima facie case exists in the impending application Pg- 22 The other battleground area touches on the applicants' contention that the decision was not given by the public body. A lot has been submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant and the respondents. Besides the applicant’s affidavit and statements of facts prove that the decision in question was issued by a public body. The respondent has not raised any preliminary objections or legal challenges disputing this, which confirms that the respondents are indeed public bodies. The decisions contested by the applicant are included in the affidavit, rendering it unnecessary to provide additional evidence of the public body's decision. Furthermore, the involvement of the Respondents' Counsel under the Attorney General (Discharge of Duties) Act [Cap 268 R.E 2019] verifies that these bodies are public entities, as their decisions are subject to judicial review. There is also a nagging question of exhaustion of remedies, it is evident that the applicant has fully pursued all available remedies within the Public Service bodies, as clearly outlined in their affidavit and statements of facts. These bodies, as governed by the Public Service Act [Cap 298 R.E 2019] and its regulations, are the 1st, 2nd, and

3rd Respondents. pg- 23 Additionally, no preliminary objection or legal issue has been raised to suggest that the applicant has failed to exhaust the available remedies within the Public Service. It is a trite position that, one reason why the remedy, in this case, grant of leave, may be refused is if there is some other remedy, judicial or non-judicial, which is available to the applicant for review, and which is equally or more appropriate (See: S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed., London, Stevens, 1980 at p. 457). The alternative remedy may be in the form of the statutory right of appeal or a contractual right to review or appeal. In the instant case, where the gravamen of the applicant complaint is the alleged breach of the principles of natural justice, the applicant's move is correct per common law writs which are especially intended to tame excesses allegedly committed by bodies that are vested with powers of determining people's rights. In the upshot of all this, I take the view that the application has met the threshold for its grant. Consequently, this Court grants the applicant leave to seek prerogative orders of certiorari and mandamus within fourteen (14) days from the date of this ruling to challenge the actions of the respondents. No orders as to Costs. It is so ordered. pg. 24 DATED at Dodoma this 20th day of September, 2024. U. E. Madeha.

JUDGE 20/ 9/2024 COURT: Delivered at Dodoma this 20th day of September, 2024 by virtual court in the presence of Mr. Henry Njowoka, the counsel for the Applicant, Mr. Omary Ngatanda, State Attorney for the Respondents. Right of appeal explained to the parties. U. E. Madeha.

JUDGE 20/ 9/2024 pg. 25