RELIANCE INSURANCE JUDGMENT FINAL

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (DAR ES SALAAM SUB-REGISTRY) AT DAR ES SALAAM CIVIL APPEAL NO 18908 OF 2024 (Originating from Small Claim Case No. 28605 of 2023 from Resident Magistrate Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu.) RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY (TANZANIA) LIMITED…………………………………………………..….......…………APPELLANT VERSUS ROSE CHARLES (Also known as ROSE MICHAEL CHARLES……………………………………………………………..…1ST RESPONDENT MIRAJI MAULIDI SAIDI………………………………………..……2ND RESPONDENT PROCHES KAROLI SHAYO………………………………..…………3RD RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 12th September& 17th October 2024 MWANGA, J. This appeal originates from the Small Claim No. 28605 of 2023 before the Resident Magistrate of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu. The 1st respondent sued the appellant and the second and third respondents for compensation of the total amount of Tshs. 95,057,757 as the expenses incurred in medical treatment due to the accident alleged to be caused by the second respondent while in the course of employment of the car owned by the 3rd respondent 1 and insured by the appellant. He also claimed General damages to the tune of Tshs. 500,000,000/=. The brief background of this matter, as can be discerned from the record, is that, on 21/06/2021 at about 14:00 hrs, at Ubungo Riverside, along Chonya Road within the city of Dar es Salaam, the second respondent being a driver of the motorcycle with Registration No. T. 533 DGV makes Townace drive the said vehicle recklessly and negligently. To wit, he knocked the 1st respondent and thereby caused bodily injury to the 1st respondent. It is also alleged that the said motor vehicle was owned by the 3rd respondent and insured by the appellant. The second respondent was convicted of negligence in Traffic Case No. 259 of 2021 at the Resident Magistrate Court of Kivukoni at Kinondoni. It is alleged that the 1st respondent submitted her claims to the appellant, who admitted the claim and offered Tsh. 14,257,633 were final compensation, but the 1st respondent rejected them for being on the lower side. 1st respondent then filed the case at the Resident Magistrate Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu, claiming the abovementioned reliefs. After a full trial, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the 1st respondent compensation/specific damages to the tune of Tshs. 8,500,000/= General damages to the tune of Tsh. 200,000,00/= Interest 2 rate on the decretal sum at a court rate of 7% from the date of Judgment to the date of full payment and costs of the suit. Displeased, the appellant filed this appeal fronting five grounds of appeal going thus; 1. The trial court erred in law and fact for failure to exercise discretion judicially in awarding general damages of Tsh. 200, 000, 000/=, which is excessively high. 2. The trial court erred in law and fact by awarding the 1st respondent specific damages of Tsh. 8,500,000/= without any justification. 3. The trial court erred in law and fact by ordering the amount of Tsh. 200,000,000/= as general damages, Tshs 8,500,000/= as the specific damages and interest of 7% to be paid by the appellant. In fact those costs were claimed to be paid jointly and severally by the appellant, 2nd respondent and 3rd respondent. 4. The trial court erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate the evidence tendered before it, hence arriving at a wrong conclusion. 5. The trial court erred in law and fact by entertaining the matter without being vested with jurisdiction as per the law governing small claims. 3 On the strength of the said grounds, the appellant is requesting the court to allow the appeal, the judgment, and the decree of the trial court to be quashed and set aside, the appellant to be awarded a cost of appeal and that of the lower court, and any other relief this court may deem fit and just to grant. At the hearing of the appeal, which was argued by way of written submission, Mr. Adolf Runyoro represented the appellant, while the respondent had representation from Zawadi B. Lupelo, both learned advocates. In support of the first ground of appeal, Mr. Runyoro submitted that the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by exercising his discretion in awarding general damages of Tshs 200 000 000/=, which is excessively high. He said general damages are in the domain of the trial court, but the Appellant court can intervene in general damages if the amount awarded is inordinately low or inordinately high. He placed reliance on the case of Felician Muhandiki Vs The Managing Director, Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited, Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2016, whereby the court page 10, while quoting the case of Cooper Motors Ltd, had this to say; “…before the appellate court can properly 4 intervene, it must be satisfied either that the judge, in assessing the damages, applied a wrong principle of law (by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out some relevant one) or short of this, that the amount awarded is so inordinately low or inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages.” He contended that, the trial court had discretion to award general damages. Still, the award of Tshs 200, 000, 000/= fall within inordinately high and it amounts to excessive damages and the trial court erroneous estimated the general damages, because the Appellant is an insurance company which serves not only the 1st Respondent but other customers. He believed that the trial court ought to consider that an award of excessive general damages in bodily injury due to motor accidents will result in the crumble of the insurance industry in the country. According to him, the trial court also ought to have known that no sum of money will fully compensate the injured person 1st Respondent for the loss of limbs. He said that in Sanlam General Insurance Tanzania Ltd (formerly known as Niko Insurance Tanzania Ltd) vs. Dennis Charles & Another, Civil Appeal 5 No. 51 OF 2021, the Court of Appeal had this to say; “We appreciate that no sum of money will fully compensate the first respondent for the loss of arm. In any event, the High Court was enjoined to ensure that its award was reasonable and moderate but also commensurate with the loss suffered. It was also important that the court ought to have reflected on the fact that excessive awards in bodily injury cases arising from motor vehicle accidents could potentially result in enormously high premiums for insurance of all kinds. This occurrence must be avoided lest the insurance industry in the country crumble”. Therefore, he submitted that, this honorable court proceed to intervene and reduce the general damages; otherwise, the insurance company would crumble. In reply, Ms. Lupelo submitted that the sum of Tshs. 200,000,000/= awarded to the 1st Respondent for losing both legs is not excessive. On the contrary, the sum of Tshs. 200,000,000/= is inordinately 6 Low. He submitted that losing all legs is a devastating and deadly tragedy; thus, it calls for reasonable and satisfactory damages. According to her, the 1stRespondent deserved to be awarded the sum of Tshs. 500,000,000/=, she claimed as the general damages in the plaint. She submitted that the case of Sanlam General Insurance, cited by the Appellant in his submission, does not help her anything. Rather, the same helps the 1st Respondent because, In the above-cited case, the court stated that the award of general damages must commensurate with the loss suffered. She contended that, in the case at hand, the 1st Respondent lost both legs and thus, the sum of Tshs 200,000,000 does not in whatever way commensurate with the loss of both legs. In her view, this award was inordinate low. She added that, in assessing general damages in motor vehicle accidents, the court must consider the extent of injury of the plaintiff or the victim. The said extent of injury reflects the pain and suffering of the plaintiff. She placed reliance on the case of S.G. Laxman versus John Mwananjela, Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2004 High Court of Tanzania, where the court stated that “In measuring the quantum of damages which were awarded to the Respondent, the trial magistrate correctly took into consideration the 7 extent of the injury that was suffered by him. According to the Medical assessment which one Doctor made, the Respondent sustained 15% disability.” She said, In Fredrick Wanjara versus Zawadi Juma Mruma, the victim suffered only 75% and was awarded the sum of Tshs 400,000,000/=She was of the view that in the present case, the 1st Respondent has suffered Permanent Total Incapacity Worthy 78% for LOSS OF BOTH LIMBS. Thus, she deserved the sum of Tshs. 500,000,000/=. According to her, it is unfair and unreasonable to award a person with the above grave disabilities the sum of Tshs. 200, 000,000/= as the general damages for pain and suffering. She insisted that this Hon. Court cannot reduce the sum of Tshs.200,000,000/- because the Trial Court did not apply a wrong principle of law as the Appellant did not mention even a single wrong principle used by the Trial Court. She said that saying the insurance would crumble is only a mere opinion and speculation since there was no evidence to prove the allegation. It was her prayer that this court would enhance the sum of Tshs. 200,000,000/- to the sum of Tshs 400,000,000/= based on the decision of Fredrick Wanjara (Supra), in which the general damages of the sum 8 of Tshs 400,000,000/= for grave disability suffered by the victim was upheld. In a short rejoinder, Mr. Runyoro submitted that the 1st Respondent wants this court to believe that awarding general damages is like mathematical calculation. It was his submission that the 1st Respondent is wrong. He said that he is aware of the principle laid down by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, which states that no sum of money will fully compensate the person (victim) for losing the arm. Therefore, awarding a colossal amount will not serve the loss of the 1st Respondent’s legs. He argued that, even if the award of general damages is a mathematical calculation, the loss of two legs would still not be Tshs.200, 000, 000/=. He was insistent that, in any way, the award of Tsh. 200 000 000/= is inordinately high. I have dispassionately considered and weighed the rival submission by the counsels from both sides and examined the records. It is true, as submitted by both parties, that general damage is awarded at the court's discretion. That aside, general damages are limited to those claims that the law presumes to be direct, natural, or probable consequences of the act complained of and not otherwise. See the case of African Marble Co. Ltd Vs. Tanzania Saruji Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1993 (CAT- 9 unreported). It is also settled law that the trial court must assign reasons justifying the award in awarding it. On my perusal of the record, the trial magistrate assigned some reasons before he awarded 200,000,000 as general damages, some of them being that due to an accident, the 1st respondent suffered multiple deadly injuries, which caused her two lower limbs to be amputated. She also suffered a traumatic brain injury and temporary, partial, and permanent incapacity. However, this being the first appellate court enjoys the powers of re-evaluation of evidence and coming up with its findings, particularly where the lower court has misdirected itself, acted on matters that should not have worked, or has failed to consider matters that should have been considered. Notably, it is the function of the Court to determine and quantify the general damages to be awarded to the injured party. Still, the claimant also has to aver during his evidence that such damage was suffered as it was stated by Lord Dunedin in the case of Admiralty Commissioners v SS Susquehanna [1950] 1 ALL ER 392, which was also cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Peter Joseph Kilibika Vs. Patric Aloyce Mlingi, Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2009 (CAT), where it was stated: 10 “If the damage be general, then it must be averred that such damage has been suffered, but the quantification of such damage is a jury question.” Gathered from the records, the 1st respondent demonstrated soehow to the Court how she suffered due to the accident; however, looking at the circumstances of this case, the award of Tshs. 200,000,000 as general damages is inordinate high since the 1st respondent did not explain how such damages have been suffered; for instance, she said she is a businesswoman who had a shop that could not be run for two years due to the accident. However, she could not prove to enable the court to exercise its discretion on quantifying damages. As there are not enough materials placed before the Court’s table for the consideration of such damage, and taking into account the circumstances of this case, I find the general damages of Tanzania shillings One hundred million will serve the purpose. Thus, this ground has merit. Next is the second ground of appeal in which the appellant contends that the trial court erred in law and fact by awarding the 1st respondent the specific damages of Tshs. 8,500,000/= without any justification. Mr. Runyoro submitted that, during the hearing, the 1st Respondent tendered exhibits, 11 which she claimed to be medical receipts, upon which the trial court seems to have looked and awarded specific damages to the tune of Tshs. 8,500,000/=. According to him, most of the tendered medical receipts had faded and could not be read even by the claimant and the medical doctor who appeared as witnesses. He lamented that it is questionable how the trial magistrate came up with the figure of Tshs. 8,500,000/- yet the witnesses failed to read the faded receipts' wordings. He implored the court to evaluate, access, and analyze the medical receipts. In rebuttal, Ms. Lupelo submitted that the sum of Tshs 8,500,000/= was awarded following the calculation based on the receipts, which were tendered before the court without any objection from the Appellant. According to her, the receipts were not faded; she added that, during the act of tendering the respective receipts, the counsel for the Appellant went through the respective receipts and agreed the same to be received in evidence because he was satisfied that the same was so that why the same were received without any objection. She submitted that the Appellant conceded that the 1st Respondent tendered the receipts to prove the amount incurred, which were admitted as Exhibit P2. She was of the view that if the sum of Tshs. 8,500,000/= was not proved the remedy is only 12 to set it aside and replace it with the correct figures as per the case of Zuberi Augustino vs Anicet Mugabe (1992) TLR 137 (CA), where the court set aside the sum of 2,000,000/= and replaced it with the sum of Tshs. 1,250,000/. I have keenly examined the contending submissions by the parties in the light of this ground of appeal with the weight it deserves. I have also inquisitively perused the lower court records. In determining the said ground of appeal, I find it appropriate to begin with a Pertinent assertion that he who alleges must prove. Looking at the impugned judgment, especially on pages 16-18, the trial magistrate evaluated the evidence before him, and in concluding on page 18, the trial court had this to say; “Based on the analysis of the evidence above, I am satisfied that, out of the amount of Tsh. 95,057,757 claimed as specific damages. The evidence adduced by Pw1 and documentary evidence, as evidenced in exhibit P2, strictly proves the amount of Tzs 5,000,000/= incurred as expenses for surgery and costs for medication amounting to Tzs. 2,500,000/= and transport costs amounting to Tzs. 1,000,000/=, thus making the total expenses incurred amounting to Tsh. 8,500,000/= the 13 rest of the amount claimed as specific damages are not proved”. Looking at the above excerpt and the evaluation done by the trial magistrate, it is apparent that, before awarding the specific damages to the tune of 8,500,000, the court analyzed the evidence and was satisfied that the 1st respondent proved the amount of Tshs. 8,500,000. Thus, I find no need to interfere with this finding. Thus, the second ground is destitute of merit, and the same is dismissed. Next is the third ground of appeal in which the appellant contends that the trial Court erred in law and fact by ordering the amount of Tshs. 200,000,000/= and general damages, Tshs. 8,500,000= as specific damages and interest of 7% to be paid by the appellant while those costs were claimed to be paid jointly and severally by the appellant, 2nd respondent, and 3rd respondent. In this, Mr. Runyoro submitted that this ground of appeal is featured in the 1st respondent’s statement of claim where, in her prayers, she prayed for judgment and decree against the appellant, 2nd respondent, and 3rd respondent jointly and severally. He said he understands that this is an insurance claim and that in case the 3rd respondent, who is the 2nd respondent in the statement of claim, is found liable, it is the appellant who is supposed to satisfy the judgment against the persons insured. However, 14 there are some qualifications that the 3rd respondent must fulfill for the appellant to settle the judgment in his favor. Firstly, he must inform the appellant (insurer) of the suit within 14 days before filing his defense as per Section 10 (2) (a) of The Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Cap 169. He further stated that, during the hearing, the 3rd respondent did not tender any notice to the insurer as a notification of the suit against him. According to him, even if they assume that the appellant was aware of the suit because he was a party to the claim in court, the law does not exempt him from notifying his insurer of the suit against him. He contended further that if the 2nd and 3rd respondents wanted the appellant to satisfy their share of judgment and decree, they were supposed to bring the appellant as a Third Party under Order 1, Rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap 33 R.E 2019. According to him, the failure of the 2nd and 3rd Respondent to bring the appellant as a Third Party to the suit even though he was a party to the suit meant that they were ready to satisfy the judgment on their own. He added that, per the pleadings, the 1st Respondent wanted the appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to fulfill the decree jointly and severally. He was insistent that the pleadings bind parties. From the above principle of law, he submitted 15 that it is clear that the trial court erred to order the Appellant alone to satisfy the judgment and decree contrary to the prayers of the 1st respondent. In response, Ms. Lupelo submitted that this issue can be ignored for three obvious reasons. Firstly, there is no ground of appeal concerning the issue of the notice in the memorandum of appeal, as the ground of appeal lamented the issue of being jointly sued and not the issue of the failure to issue a 14-day notice. She said the issue of failure to communicate the notice of the existence of the case is an afterthought. Secondly, she submitted, this issue of failure to communicate the notice of the existence of the case, which was never pleaded in the written statement of defense; therefore, this is a new issue that cannot be entertained at the appeal stage. She placed reliance on the case of Crescent Impex (T) Limited Vs Mtibwa Sugar Estates Limited Civil Appeal No. 455 OF 2020. She insisted that the notice is required only where the insurer is not a party to the case between the victim and the insured. Regarding the issue of being sued severally and jointly, Ms. Lupelo underlined that the insurer is automatically liable to pay the victim under section 10 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. She clarified that the insurer is obligated to pay the claim even if not a party to the suit, and the Appellant 16 could have been liable even if the case had proceeded against the 2nd and 3rd Respondent alone. This is because Section 10 has already imposed the insurer with an automatic obligation to settle the victims' claims. To reinforce her position, she cited the case of Lucas A. Nzegula versus Royal Insurance Tanzania Limited, Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2008. In a brief rejoinder, Mr. Runyoro pointed out that in a Civil Case, the Plaintiff is the dominant of his case (dominus litis). The 1st Respondent was the Plaintiff in his case at the trial court, and she decided to file the case against the 2nd Respondent, 3rd Respondent, and Appellant and fronted her prayers jointly and severally. All those prayers are fronted in the plaint that falls within the pleadings' purview. He insisted that the pleadings bind parties and the court, but the trial court ordered the Appellant alone to indemnify the 1st Respondent in total disregard that the 1st Respondent’s prayers were sued jointly and severally. He stressed that the order requiring the Appellant only to indemnify the 1st Respondent Tshs 200, 000, 000/= in total disregard of the 1st Respondent’s prayers jointly and severally is no more than a departure from the pleadings. He, therefore, prays that this court proceeds to quash and set aside the trial court proceedings based on what is submitted above. 17 I have dispassionately considered the submission by the learned legal minds and the lower court records I had to scrutinize. This process has been thorough, ensuring that all aspects of the case have been carefully examined. I also embrace Mr. Runyoro’s submission that parties are bound by their pleadings. However, in my view, this ground need not detain this court. The reasons I hold are not farfetched; firstly, the issue of notice, as claimed by the applicant, was not raised in the trial court; thus, it is a new issue in this appellate court. Now, as rightly submitted by Ms. Lupelo, and in cherishing the principle that matters which were not raised and dealt with by the trial court or tribunal cannot be entertained by an appellate court, and as stated in the case of Jafari Mohamed vs. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2006 [2013] TZCA 344 (15 March 2013) where the court held that, Our Decision-making process is guided by the principle that 'this Court will only look into matters which came up in the lower court and were decided; not on matters which were not raised nor decided by neither the trial court nor the High Court on appeal.' This principle 18 ensures the validity of our judgment and our adherence to legal principles. Thus the same cannot be entertained by this court. Secondly, the appellant was a party to the suit in the trial court and thus was fully aware of all proceedings. Therefore, the issue of third-party notice cannot be raised now; he could not be joined as the third party since he was already part of the case. Thirdly, the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, a crucial and weighty piece of legislation in this case, obligates the insurer to compensate the victim under any court judgment regarding the injury or fatal accident. As soon as an insurance policy has been effected, the insurer becomes liable to compensate a third party in case of injury or death resulting from an accident caused by the vehicle so insured. This is supported by the case of Sanlam General Insurance Tanzania Ltd (supra), where the court of Appeal stated thus: - It is also established in the evidence that the bus had a valid third- party insurance cover issued by the appellant in favor of the third respondent. As the insurer of the bus, the appellant is liable, in terms of section 10 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act, Cap. 169, to satisfy whatever judgment passed against the third respondent, as the insured, 19 regarding third-party losses. The defense of being sued jointly and severally cannot be used to avoid liability. This is provided under Section 10 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. Thus, the allegations that the award has to be paid severally and jointly lack basis. Having said so, this ground is also bound to fail. In the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in law and fact for failure to evaluate evidence tendered before it, hence arriving at a wrong conclusion. It was his submission that the trial court did not exercise its duty correctly by considering the evidence tendered before it; he said, in rare circumstances, the appellate court would interfere with the trial court findings of fact, as stated in the case of Materu Leison & J. Oya Vs Sospeter (1988) T. L. R 102, According to him, it is clear that the trial court misconstrued material evidence tendered before it and erred in approach in evaluation of the evidence. He said the trial tribunal did not consider whether the Appellant was an insurance company that would crumble if the court awarded excessive general damages and failed to think that no sum would fully compensate the 1st Respondent for the loss of the limbs. Thus, failure to use that approach in evaluating the evidence led to 20 the wrong conclusion. In those circumstances, the trial court had a duty to evaluate the evidence properly. He, therefore, implores the court to assess correctly the evidence tendered before this honorable court to arrive at a proper conclusion that the 1st Respondent is not entitled to general damages of Tshs 200 000 000/= In response, Ms. Lupelo submitted that the Trial Court correctly evaluated the evidence on record and, thus, the conclusion based on the evidence on record. She said there was no proof before the court that the insurance would crumble if the court awarded the sum of Tshs. 200,000,000/= or more. According to her, the issue of economic loss and, thus, ultimate bankruptcy is not the issue to be said from the bar, as the Appellant was supposed and required to bring compelling evidence to support the claim that the insurance could crumble in the event the sum of Tshs. 500,000,000/= claimed would have been awarded. She said this kind of damages has been granted by the Court now and then. She cited the case of Fredrick Wanjara versus Zawadi Juma Mruma, Civil Appeal No. 80 OF 2009, in which the court upholds the general damages of the sum of Tshs 400,000,000/= after considering the disability of 75% suffered by the Claimant, pain and suffering and the deterioration of the Claimant’s 21 earning capacity. She believed the insurance companies had been established to compensate the accident victims. To her, the sum of Tshs. 200,000,000/= is not excessive and cannot be a reason for the insurance to crumble. She argued that, in assessing general damages in motor vehicle accidents, the court must consider the extent of the plaintiff's injury, which reflects the plaintiff's pain and suffering. After fully considering the arguments of both counsels on this ground, I consider that the main point to be determined is whether the trial court evaluated the evidence before arriving at its conclusion. In my profound view, this ground need not detain this court as the trial magistrate evaluated the evidence before reaching its conclusion. Whether the trial court arrived at a wrong or right conclusion after evaluating the evidence, the same is covered under grounds 1 and 2. Lastly is the 5th ground of appeal, in which the appellant contends that the court erred in law and fact by entertaining the matter without being vested with jurisdiction as per the law governing small claims. According to him, this ground emanates from the amount claimed by the claimant in the statement of claim, where among her prayers was One sum of general damages to the tune of Tsh. 500,000,000/= against the respondents jointly 22 and severally Two; Tsh. Ninety-five million fifty-seven thousand seven hundred fifty-seven as specific damages. Three are transport and associated costs of Th. 19,000,000/= Four; Loss of Profit /Income of Tsh. 50,400,000/=In his view, the amount claimed in the statement of claim is far beyond the one prescribed by the Rules under which the claim was brought. He cited Rule 4 of The Magistrates’ Courts (Small Claims Procedure) Rules, 2023, which defines Small claims to mean a claim of a civil nature, the value of which does not exceed one hundred million shillings but does not fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the primary court’ he was insistent that, the claimed amount as well stated above, is far beyond the legal requirement as the law limits the amount to One Hundred Million Tanzania Shillings. The law does not explicitly state whether the amount should be specific damages or general damages. He believed that, while the 1st Respondent knocked on the door, the trial court claimed more than Tshs 600, 000, 000/=. In his view, the 1st respondent had to file an average plaint under the Civil Procedure Code and not otherwise. In reply, Ms. Lupelo submitted that, the sum of Tsh. 95,057,757/=, which was claimed as the special damages, is within the ambit of the rules that established the small claim as the same does not exceed 100,000,000/, 23 which is the limit of the small claim. She submitted that Special damages are different from general damages. She clarified that, in law, there are two kinds of damages, as explained in the case of Tangamano Transport Service Ltd versus Elias Raymond, Commercial Case No. 50 of 2004 High Court of Tanzania. She was insistent that, the sum of Tshs. 100,000,000/=, which can be claimed as a small claim, is nothing but the special damages. She submitted further that, since in law, damages are categorized into two types and personal injury claim, a victim is allowed to claim both special and general damages, and given the fact that the court lacks jurisdiction only where the plaintiff/claimant has claimed the special damages, which exceed Tshs. 100,000,000/= the 1st Respondent was therefore entitled to claim the sum of Tshs 95,057,757/= as the special damages and the sum of Tshs. 500,000,000/= as the general damages. In a short rejoinder, Mr. Runyoro reiterated his submission in chief. He maintained that the 1st respondent claimed the amount over and above Tshs 100,000,000/= beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this court on small claims as the law does not state whether the amount should be specific or general damages. Still, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the 24 matter so long as the Claimant claims the amount in her statement of claim above Tshs 100 000 000/=. I have keenly considered the submission advanced by the learned counsels for the parties concerning this ground and the lower court records. The main issue is whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter since, as per the appellant, the 1st respondent claimed an amount over the prescribed one in small claims. In determining the same, I wish to start by quoting the provision of Rule 4 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Small Claims Procedure) Rules, 2023, the term small claim is defined to mean: “Small claim” means a claim of a civil nature the value of which does not exceed one hundred million shillings but does not fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the primary court. To my understanding, the phrase the value of which does not exceed one hundred million shillings but does not fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the primary court) connotes that the respective amounts are specific damages. The reasons I say so are not farfetched; it is settled law that substantive claims and not general damages determine the jurisdiction of the court in civil matters, as the Court of Appeal held it in the cases of 25 Tanzania - China Friendship Textile Co. Ltd. Vs. Our Lady of the Usambara Sisters [2006] TLR 70, John Mome Morro vs. Gratian Mbelwa and 3 Others, Civil Case No. 80 of 2011 and Tanzania Breweries vs. Anthony Nyingi, Civil Appeal No. 119 of 2014 (all unreported) and Mwananchi Communication Limited and two others vs. Joshua K. Kajula and 2 Others, Civil Appeal No.126/01 of 2016 (Unreported) In the latter case, the Court of Appeal, page 21, stated that; “In determining the jurisdiction of the High Court, what should be considered is the specific claims and not general damages claimed …” In the instant case, the 1st respondent claimed Tsh. 95,057,757/= as specific damages. Therefore, the appellant’s allegations that the court had no jurisdiction under small claims based on general damages are unfounded. Thus, this ground is also baseless, and the same is dismissed. Given those above, the appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. To avoid doubt, the general damages are reduced to Tshs. 100,000,000/=. The other orders of the trial court are left to stand. Each part bears its own cost. 26 It is so ordered. MWANGA JUDGE 17/10/2024 COURT: Judgment delivered at Dar es Salaam in chambers this 17th October 2024 in the presence of Timothy Mwamakimbula Adv for the Appellant; Mudhihir Magii Adv assisted by Zawadi Lupelo Adv for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. Right of appeal explained. MWANGA JUDGE 17/10/2024 27