ROSE V FRANCIS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE SUB-REGISTRY OF MWANZA AT MWANZA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 20790 OF 2024 (Arising from Misc. Appl. No. 14 of 2023 in the Juvenile Court of Nyamagana District) ROSE MICHAEL RUZIMA......................................................... APPELLANT VERSUS FRANCIS XAVERY BUSONGO................................................... RESPONDENT RULING 4 & 15/11/2024 ROBERT, J:- This ruling addresses the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent, challenging the competence of this appeal filed by the Appellant, Rose Michael Ruzima, against the decision of the Juvenile Court of Nyamagana District in Miscellaneous Application No. 14 of 2023, dated 24th June 2024. The Appellant's counsel, Mr. Joseph Madukwa, appeared for the Appellant, while the Respondent was represented by Mr. Ondijo Silvanus. The objection raised contends that the appeal was filed out of the prescribed statutory period, rendering it time-barred. The decision from the Juvenile Court in Miscellaneous Application No. 14 of 2023, delivered on 24th June 2024, was adverse to the Appellant, prompting this appeal. The appeal was lodged on 15th July 2024, 21 days i after the decision date. The Respondent, asserting that the time limit for filing such an appeal is set at 14 days per Rule 123(1) of the Law of Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules, 2016, argues that the appeal is time- barred by eight days. Mr. Silvanus, for the Respondent, submitted that the appeal ought to have been filed by 7th July 2024, making the filing date of 15th July 2024 out of the prescribed time by eight days. He relied on Rule 123(1) of the Juvenile Court Procedure Rules, which mandates that appeals be filed within 14 days. Citing section 6(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, he argued that time for filing an appeal starts running from the decision's delivery date. Mr. Silvanus urged the Court to dismiss the appeal under section 3(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, which mandates dismissal of time-barred matters. Mr. Madukwa, for the Appellant, countered that the appeal is within the prescribed time, reasoning that although Rule 123(1) sets a 14-day limit, the appeal process required lodging it in the same court that issued the original decision, as per Rule 123(2) and (3) of the Juvenile Court Rules. After the judgment on 24th June 2024, the Appellant requested necessary documents on 27th June 2024 and received the ruling copy on 9th July 2024. Relying on section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act, Mr. 2 Madukwa argued that the time taken to obtain the ruling should be excluded from the limitation period. He cited Alex Senkoro and 3 others vs Eliambuya Lyimo (as administrator of the Estate of Frederick Lyimo, Deceased) Civil Appeal No. 16 of 2017 at page 11 and 12 and Bukoba Municipal Council Vs New Metro Merchandise, Civil Appeal No. 374 of 2021 at page 8 - 13, which support the position that time required to obtain judgment copies should be excluded. In rejoinder, Mr. Silvanus contended that the cited cases are distinguishable from the current case. He argued that the Appellant should have applied for an extension of time instead of assuming that time exclusion applies automatically. Emphasizing section 6(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, he maintained that time begins from the decision's delivery, and therefore, the appeal is time-barred. Having considered the submissions from both parties, the key issue for determination is whether this appeal was filed within the prescribed time or if it is time-barred. The respondent's objection hinges on Rule 123(1) of the Juvenile Court Rules, which indeed mandates that appeals be lodged within 14 days from the date of the decision. However, the appellant relies on Section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act, which provides that in 3 computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the time taken to obtain a copy of the decree or judgment appealed against shall be excluded. In the case at hand, the appellant requested copies of the ruling and proceedings on 27th June 2024, and the typed ruling was supplied on 9th July 2024. The appellant then filed the appeal on 15th July 2024. By excluding the period from 27th June 2024 to 9th July 2024 (the time taken to obtain necessary documents), the appeal falls within the prescribed time frame. The case of Alex Senkoro & 3 Others v. Eliambuya Lyimo (supra) is instructive, where the Court of Appeal held that the exclusion period for obtaining copies is applicable when determining the time for filing an appeal. Similarly, in Bukoba Municipal Council v. New Metro Merchandise (supra), the Court reiterated that the time spent awaiting certified copies of the judgment and decree must be excluded. In this context, the appellant's argument stands. The computation of time under Section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act supports the view that the appeal was filed within the allowable period after accounting for the exclusion of time taken to obtain the ruling copy. The respondent's argument that the appellant needed to apply for an extension of time is 4 misplaced because the exclusion under Section 19(2) applies automatically without necessitating a separate application. In light of the foregoing analysis, I find that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent lacks merit. The appeal was filed within the prescribed time, considering the exclusion period under Section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act. Consequently, the preliminary objection is hereby dismissed. The appeal shall proceed to a hearing on the merits. Costs shall be in the cause. It is so ordered. 5