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IN THE HIGH|COURT OF TANZANIA (LAND DIVISION) AT DAR ES SALAAM LAND APPEAL NO. 12623 OF 2024 (Originating From Application No. 241 of 2024, Ilala District Land and Housing Tribunal) SYMPHORIAN REVELIAN KITARE APPELLANT VERSUS SYLVIA NICO BALINDA 1®^ RESPONDENT NICO BALINDA .2^° RESPONDENT RULING 14'^^ to IS'" August, 2024 E.B. LUVANDA,J This appeal is against the decision of the taxing officer in respect of the application preferred by the Appellant who claimed to be paid TZS 3,245,500 being balance of the instruction fee, attendance and transportation costs. At the Tribunal, the application was made under the enabling provision of order 5(1), (2), (3) of the Advocate Remuneration Order, G.N. 263 of 2015. This appeal was made by way of memorandum of appeal. In view of the above, I invited parties to address me regarding the competence of this appeal in terms of order 7(1),(2) G.N. 263 of 2015 (supra). Mr. Joseph Mandele learned Counsel for Appellant submitted that order 7(1), (2) of G.N. 263 of 2015 (supra) requires the party aggrieved by the decision of the taxation officer to seek reference to this Court. He submitted that the above 1 provision is quite distant from the pending appeal for reason that the Appellant is not complaining about the ruling of the bill of costs of the Tribunal rather he is complaining about the dismissal of his application where the Appellant was complaining of the Respondents' denial to be granted (sic) the instruction fee, costs for attendance and transportation as taxed in the ruling. He submitted that the Chairman was not acting as taxation officer. He submitted that at the Tribunal the Appellant was seeking for the Respondents to comply with the Tribunal's ruling of the bill of costs in Maombi Na. 175 of 2012 dated 26/10/2022. The Respondents submitted the view that the appeal is incompetent for reason that the application at the Tribunal was preferred under the provisions of the Advocates Remuneration Order, arguing the Chairman of the Tribunal was acting as taxing officer. They submitted therefore that the only remedy available for an aggrieved party was to file reference before a Judge of the High Court by way of chamber summons supported by affidavit and not by way of appeal. They submitted that the remedy of appeal is not provided for by the Advocates Remuneration Orders which has specific provisions for an aggrieved party to follow. As I have prefaced above, at the Tribunal, the application was made under the enabling provision of order 5(1), (2), (3), G.N. 263 of 2015. Therefore, the Chairperson was acting as a taxing officer. A mere fact that the Chairperson signed as such, is immaterial. This because at the Tribunal, the cornerstone of the dispute was hinged on availability of the remuneration agreement. Therefor for all purpose and intend, the proceedings before the Tribunal were taxation proceedings which are defined under Order 3 G.N. 263 of 2015 (supra), as follows, "taxation proceedings''shall mean an application for taxation of a biii of costs or an application to enforce, set aside, or determine any question as to validity or effect' Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that at the Tribunal the Appellant was seeking for the Respondents to comply with the Tribunars ruling of the bill of costs in Maombi Na. 175 of 2012 dated 26/10/2022, or that the Appellant was complaining of the Respondents' denial to be granted the instruction fee, costs for attendance and transportation as taxed in the ruling, still fall within the ambit of the taxation proceedings. As alluded by the Respondents, that the only remedy available for an aggrieved party was to file reference before a Judge of the High Court by way of chamber summons supported by affidavit and not by way of appeal. This is in accordance with the dictum of order 7(1),(2) G.N. 263 of 2015 (supra), provide XI)Any person aggrieved by a decision ofthe Taxing officer, may file reference to ajudge ofthe High Court. (2)A reference under order(1), shall be instituted by way of chambersummonssupposed by an affidavit and shall be filed within 21 days offrom the date ofthe decision. (3) The applicant shall within seven dear days of filing reference save copies all parties entitled to appear on such taxation. (4) For purpose of service under sub order (30^ it shall be sufficient if the chamber summons has been endorsed and stamped by the Registry Officer' Herein, the Appellant who was supposed to dub as Applicant, presented his aggrievement by way of appeal instead of reference; it was made by way of memorandum of appeal instead of a chamber summons; it was preferred by way of grounds of appeal instead of being supported by an affidavit; it was filed beyond the twenty-one days prescribed by the law; there is no evidence that he served the opposite party with chamber summons or reference within seven days from the date of filing. In fact, the entire provision was flawed by the Appellant. Therefore, this appeal is incompetent and un-maintainable. The appeal is struck out. No order for costs LUV A JU GE 8/2024^ Ruling delivered in the presence of the Respondents and Mr. Denice Machui Advocate holding brief for Mr. Joseph Mandela learned Counsel for the Appellant. c 3. LUyANDA ^GE ^1 3/08/20241