tanzania marketing board vs cogecot cotton company sa 2002 tzca 13 2 september 2002
The petition was an application under the Arbitration Ordinance, not a suit, and was subject to a 60-day limitation period, which was exceeded. Section 21 of the Limitation Act did not apply as the previous proceeding was not prosecuted in an incompetent court.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- tanzania marketing board vs cogecot cotton company sa 2002 tzca 13 2 september 2002
- Parties
- Appellant: Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board; Respondent: Cogecot Cotton Company S.A.
- Court
- TZCA
- Jurisdiction
- Tanzania
- Judgment Date
- 2 September 2002
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Limitation Period for Arbitration Award Challenge, Application Versus Suit Distinction, Exclusion of Time Under Limitation Act
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board
Appellant
Cogecot Cotton Company S.A.
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the petition to impeach the arbitration award was time-barred
- 2 Whether the limitation period is 60 days or 12 years
- 3 Whether time spent in previous proceedings should be excluded under section 21 of the Limitation Act
Ratio Decidendi
The petition was an application under the Arbitration Ordinance, not a suit, and was subject to a 60-day limitation period, which was exceeded. Section 21 of the Limitation Act did not apply as the previous proceeding was not prosecuted in an incompetent court.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed
Orders
- Appeal dismissed with costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
IN TH3 COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA iiT D a k JLS & j- iXj* (CORJ1: RiMipEJNI* LPGAKINGIRAV J.A.,_ r ^ m O Z O A_ J ^ ._ ) CIVIL .iPF3.iL NO. 60 OF 1998 BS-TWEiSN TANZANIA COT-ION M.lRKSTING BOiiKD.............................. . iiPPiiLL'*NT AND COGiiCOT CCl'TCN COMPLY S .A ............ . POiSPGNDENT (ap p e a l from the decision ox the High Court o f Tanzania at Dar es -Salaam) J_.) dated the 25th day o f November, 1997 in Misc . C i v i l Causo_ Nqtj ^ o f JUDGMENT OF THE COURT LUGAKINGIKii,.. J . A . : The ap p ella n t Board's p e t it io n to impeach an award under s . 15 o f the a r b itr a tio n Ordinance (Cap. 15) and r r . 5 and 6 o f the A r b itr a tio n R ules, 1957, was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that i t . was tim e-barred. This appeal is again st that d e c is io n . Counsel fo r the appellan t had two a lte r n a tiv e arguments: F i r s t , that the High Court erred in holding that the time o f lim ita tio n was 60 days. In his submission the p e t it io n was a s u it founded on a. judgment, namely the award, th e re fo re the time o f lim ita tio n is 12 years reckoned from the dvite the n o tic e o f f i l i n g the award was served on the a p p ella n t. In the a lt e r n a t iv e , that s . 21 o f the L im ita tio n A c t, 1971» a p p lied .and that the p eriod spent prosecu tin g a previous proceeding between the same p a rtie s which term inated on 16/6/97 ought to have been excluded. 2 There is no m erit in e ith e r o f these arguments. With the f i r s t argument, and as observed by counsel fo r the respondent, the issue about the p e t it io n being a s u it was never canvassed b e fo re the High C ourt. 'That court cannot be judged on an issue i t never had an opportu nity to consider and express an op in ion . In fa c t the p o s itio n taken then virus the o p p o s ite . Counsel who appeared fo r the a p p ella n t b efo re the High Court s ta te d c a t e g o r ic a lly th at "This is not a s u i t . " That was, indeed, c o rro c t and not a s l i p . ** p e t it io n under r r . 5 "*-nd 6 o f the io rb itra tio n Rules is an a p p lic a tio n ra th er than a s u it . Rule 5 s ta te s in p a rt: a l l a p p lic a tio n s made under the Ordinance s h a ll be made by way o f p e t it io n . " ji p e t it io n is th e re fo re the p rescrib ed mode o f making an a p p lic a tio n under the A r b itr a tio n Ordinance, .and i t is common knowledge that oth er modes are p rescrib ed under other law s. A p p lic a tio n s under the Ordinance f a l l under Item 21 o f P a rt H I o f the F ir s t Schedule to the L im ita tio n n e t, sin ce the Ordinance i t s e l f does not provide fo r the p erio d o f lim it a t io n , and the p e rio d is 60 days. Although the High Court reckoned the p erio d from 1 1 / 12/9 6 , the c o rre c t date was, in our view , 11/3/96, that bein g the date the a p p ellan t acknowledged r e c e iv in g n o tic e o f the f i l i n g o f the award. The p e t it io n , the su bject o f th is appeal, was f i l e d on 2/7/S7> w e ll beyond the 60-day l i m i t . The High Court was th e re fo re c o rre c t in holding as i t did even on the basis o f the date i t adopted. The a lte r n a tiv e argument is e q u a lly m isconceived. In order fo r s . 21 to apply, and fo r t i m s p e n t in the prosecution o f another proceeding to be excluded, i t lias to be shown, in te r a l i a , that • • »/3 that oth er proceeding was prcswcutucl in a court which, from d e fe c t o f ju r is d ic t io n , was incompetent to e n te rta in i t . Counsel fo r the a p p ella n t was not heard to say that the proceeding which term inated on 16/6/97 (s e e / I 997/ TI jR 165) was prosecuted in a court incompetent to e n te rta in i t . I t is obvious to us that the whole o f the in stan t proceedin g is a bad t a c t i c e The appeal is dismissed with c o s ts 0 DATED a t DAR ES SALAAM th is 2nd day o f September, 2002. A .S . L . RAMADHANI JUSTICE OF APPEAL JUSTICE OF APPEAL J .A . MROSO JUSTICE OF I c c r t i f y that th is is a true copy o f the o r ig in a l, U - f — j- I y. - /j.. ( F .L .K . '1J2G.JL1 T DEPUTY REGISTRAR