tanzania postal bank vs charles leo lamunda 2023 tzhc 22721 20 october 2023

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ^ JUDICIARY HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA I MOROGORO DISTRICT REGISTRY ATMOROGORO LAND APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2023 (Originated from Misceiianeous iand appiication no. 207of2017ofthe DLHTfor Morogoro) TANZANIA POSTAL BANK PLC APPELLANT VERSUS CHARLES LEO LAMUNDA RESPONDENT TULVIN INVESTMENT(T)LTD 2^° RESPONDENT DICKSON BEMBE 3^° RESPONDENT JUDGEMENT Date of last Order: 25/07/2023 Date of Judgement: 20/10/2023 BEFORE: G. P. MALATA,J This Judgement is in respect of the appeal by the Tanzania Postal Bank PLC (Lender) arjsing from decision by District Land and Housing Tribunal for Morogoro in Land Appiication No.207 of 2017. Page 1 of 27 In nutshell Kharidi Hemedi Athuman (Borrower) approached the appellant 1 herein with view of securing loan of TZS 5,000,000. Finally, Borrower managed tq secure loan as evidenced by the Loan Agreement signed on 30/ I I 12/2016 Exhibit D1 The loan was secured by securities one of them being a house belonged to one Dickson Leons Matemelela, the 3'"'^ respondent herein situated at Kihonda Mbuyuni, House no.213. the 3'^^ respondent signed guarantee agreement and placed the house in dispute. This is evidenced by Mortgage Deed titled "HATI YA KUDHAMINIWA NYUMBA KWA MKOPO WA BENK YA POSTA TANZANIA" signed by Dickson Leons Matemelela and consented by his wife one Happiness A. Mgellah on 30/12/2016. It is on record that, Kharidi Hemedi Athuman (Borrower) has taken such guarantee from Dickson Leons Matemelela three times while placing the said house as security. This is evidenced by Mortgage Deed Exhibit Dl, D2 and D3 and that in all transaction the said house was placed as security. That, the third loan was not paid accordingly and in the course of realizing it from the security by selling, dispute arose. The house I in dispute was formerly known as house no.113 and after re- 1 correction Was house no.213. Tt is on record that the confusion was brought 1 Page 2 of 27 by Tanzania Revenue Authority. They tendered residence Licence of "Ardhi I Yenye Nyumba No.113 KHD Eneo la Kihonda Morogoro Manispaa" and Mortgage Deed dated 30/12/2016 were admitted admitted as exhibits D1 and D2 indicating that, the property beiongs to the 3'"^ Respondent. Going by the evidence of the appeiiant herein through, DWl, DW2, DW3 and DW4 proved that, the house belongs to 3'"'^ respondent save for the DW5 and PWl who stated that the house beiongs to the 1^ respondent. PWl the 1^ respondent herein testified that, he bought the iand in 2002 and started developing in 2004 and completed building it in 2005. He stated that, the house belongs to him and that his house is no. 213. However, Having determined the case, the DLHT decided the case in favour of 1^ respondent that, the house belongs to him. i The DLHT aggrieved the appeiiant herein thus knocked the door of this court by armed with three grounds of appeal. These are; 1. That, the trial Chairman erred in law and fact by determining the matter while the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter; 2. That, the trial Chairman erred in law and fact by holding that, procedural law does not apply retrospectively; 1 Page 3 of 27 3. That, the trial Chairman erred in law and fact by hoiding that, the respondent is a legal owner of the suit premises while he failed to provide any document for proof of ownership of the suit premises. Finally, prayed that the appeal be allowed, reversal of DLHT decision with cost. On 25^*^ July, 2023 when this matter came for hearing the parties agreed to dispose the appeal by way of written submission. As result the court's order was that; the appellant to file submission in support of appeal on 09/08/2023, reply by the respondents to be filed on 23/08/2023 and rejoinder if any to be filed on 30/08/2023 and judgement on 15/09/2023. In compliance with this court's order, the appellant filed submission on 09/08/2023 thus in line with the order whereas the 1^ respondent filed it on 07/09/2023 instead of filing on 23/08/2023. The rest of the respondents did not file. Before, determining the appeal, I shall first determine the fate of the submission filed out of the court's order dated 25/07/2023. Page 4 of 27 Guided by section 93 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap.33 R. E, 2019, if the I respondents found that, they have failed to file a reply within the time ordered by the court, they ought to have applied for extension of time under the above cited provision of law. Section 93 reads; "Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing \ofany act prescribed or aiiowed by this Code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, eniarge such period, even though the period originaiiy fixed or granted may have expired." In that regard, filing of a reply submission outside the time limit is tantamount to filing nothing as the same was not filed in compliance with any court's order to the dates so filed. As such, the filed submission without the leave of this court as per section 93 of the CPC amounts to non-filing of submission as stated herein above. The 2"^^ and 3'"'^ respondent did not any submission. The question therefore is what is effect of failure to file submission as ordered by the court. The answer has been given by courts through numerous decisions. To cite few of them, in the case of Monica Dickson vs. Hussein 3. Wasuha (KNY CHAMA CHA WAFANYABIASHARA), PC , 1 Civil Appeal no. 4 of 2019, where the court principled that; , Page 5 of 27 fit is a settled legal principle that the failure to file written submission as ordered by the court Is a manifestation of failure to prosecute the case. Failure to file written submission on the datesscheduled by the courtis as • i good as non-appearing on the date fixed for hearing. Also, in the case of Gidioni Morice Vs Amani Mambetwa, civil Appeal No. 05 Of 2023. That being the position, failure of the respondent to fiie his written submission is tantamount to non-appearance on the date fixed for hearing. The consequence therefore is provided under Order XXXIX Rule 17(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap 33 R.E 2019, which provides; "Where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appealshall be heard ex parte." The present appeal is therefore going to be heard exparte foiiowing the respondent's failure to file written submission timeiy. The filed submission out of time is expunged on the same ground. Ail said and done the appeai wili now proceed exparte against all the respondents. ■■ I I I Page 6 of 27 The appellant through Mr. Apaphro Mwego learned State Attorney conjoined ! grounds of appeal nos. 1 and argued together while abandoning ground of i appeal no.3. 1 Through his submission, Mr. Apaphro Mwego learned State Attorney submitted that, the DLHT had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter involved the appellant which is Government. Further, that the denial by the DLHT to consider retrospectively the effect of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, No.l of 2020 was erroneous in law. Basically, his submission was to the effect that, since the appellant is Government then DLHT had no jurisdiction to entertain it and that the failure to implead the Attorney General vitiated the proceedings before the Tribunal. To cement his position, he referred this court to the decision in the cases of Mbeya Cil^ Council Vs Rumuald Andrea Materu and two others. Consolidated land appeal no.59 and 66 of 2020, Fatuma Hamisi Suitani Vs TPB Bank PLC and two others. Land Case no.88 of 2020 and TPB Bank PLC Vs Umoja wa Madereva wa Mabasi Tanzania, Civil Appeal No.150/2022 all of which discussed on the effect of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, No.l of 2020 and whether it can be apply retrospectively. All of them are High Court decision. Page 7 of 27 This court has looked into the issues of failure to implead the Attorney General bearing in mind that the matter involved the Government institution I the appellant. It should be known that this case was filed in the DLHT in 2017. The appellant being a government corporate entity by virtue of its 1 establishing laws conferred legal personality and have capacity of suing and be sued its corporate name in the courts of law without involving the impleading the Attorney General. Section 4 of the Tanzania Postal Bank Act Cap,301 R.E.2002 provides that; (1) There is hereby established a bank which shaii be known as the Tanzania Postal Bank. (2) The Bankshall be a body corporate and shall- (a) have perpetualsuccession and a common seal; (b) in its corporate name, be capable ofsuing and being sued;and (c) be capable ofpurchasing or acquiring in any other way, and alienating, any movable or immovable property. The right to be heard and represented was being managed by the indoor ! I management of the Bank itself. Sometimes, they co-opted to use the legal Page 8 of 27 services of the Attorney General or use their indoor lawyers or outsourcing i private Advocates. There was no mandatory requirement of impleading the Attorney General as necessary party when suing the appellant herein. I However, ifj a party has decided to pursue the claim against the appellant i herein under Government Proceeding Act, Cap. 5 R.E.2002 then he must comply to requirement under section 6 the Act. Section 6 of the Government Proceeding Act provided that; (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, civii proceedings may be instituted against the Government subject to the provisions ofthis section. (2)No suit against the Government shaii be instituted, and heard uniess the ciaimant previousiy submits to the Government Minister, Department or officer concerned a notice ofnotiess than ninety days ofhis intention to sue the 1 _ i Government, specifying the basis of his daim against the Government, and he shaii send a copy of his daim to the Attorney-Generai. Page 9 of 27 I \(3)AH suits against the Government shaii, after the expiry of the notice be brought against the Attorney-General, I \and a copy of the piaint shaii be served upon the i .Government Ministry, Department or Officer that is aiieged to have committed the civii wrong on which the civii suit is based. (4)AH suits against the Government shaii be instituted in the High Court by deiivering in the Registry of the High Court within the area where the ciaim arose. (5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3), the Attorney Generai may, uniess another person ought to be sued be sued or bejoined as a co-defendant, in proceedings against the Government. A party who wanted to sue the Public Corporation, the appellant inclusive was not mandatorily required to go through the procedures under the Government Proceedings Act but to opt and sue under either the respective Public Corporation under the establishing law or otherwise. Claimants were Page 10 of 27 allowed to sue the Tanzania Postal Bank Act, Cap. 301 R. E. 2002 under section 4(2)(c) which reads that; i (2) The Bank shall be a body corporate and shall- (a) have perpetualsuccession and a common seal; (b) in its corporate name,be capable ofsuing and being sued; Section 6 (1) of the Government Proceedings Act used the word "May" which presupposes optional to prefer suit under the Government Proceedings Act or the relevant establishing law but should one opt to prefer under the Government Proceeding Act, then all what is stated under the Government must be complied with. The present case was instituted in 2017 before the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, No.l of 2020 which changed that position. The New amendment came with many changes including; one, definition of the word "Government", two, what comprises Government, and three, requirement of impleading the Attorney General and four, effect of failure to implead the Attorney General. Sections 6 and 16 of the Government Page 11 of 27 Proceedings Act were amended and adding subsection. Section 6(3) and (4) reads; "(3)AH suits against the Government shaii, upon the expiry \ of the notice period, be brought against the Government, I ministry, government department, iocai government authority, executive agency, pubiic corporation, parastatai organization or pubiic company that is aiieged to have committed the civii wrong on which the civii suit is based, and the Attorney Generai shaii be joined as a necessary party. (4) Non-joinder of the Attorney Generaias prescribed under subsection(3)shall vitiate the proceedings ofany suit brought in terms ofsubsection(3)" Section 16(4)ofthe Actreads; "(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the word "Governmen shaii inciude a Government ministry, iocai government authority, independent department, executive agency, pubiic corporation, parastatai organization or a Page 12 of 27 public company established under any written iaw to which the Governmentis a majority shareholder. Under the |new amendment whoever wants to institute a case against the "Government" he is mandatorily required to comply with the Government Proceedings Act, including; one, issuing a ninety (90) days notice of intention to sue addressing the notice to the respective institution falling two, submit a copy of that notice to the Attorney General and Solicitor General, three, upon expiry of the ninety days' notice, institute a case against that institution and Attorney General, four, submit a copy of the plaint to that institution. Attorney and Solicitor General. Here, the Solicitor General is accountable and in charge of defending the Government in all civil litigation and arbitration within and outside the United Republic of Tanzania and five, failure to implead the Attorney General vitiates the proceedings of the suit brought in terms of subsection (3) of the Government Proceedings Act. Having said all what I wanted to say, I conclude the issue of jurisdiction by stating that, the opinion by the appellant that, the Attorney General was not made a party is untenable in law as the amendment cannot apply retrospective, that is in a year 2017. This ground therefore fails. Page 13 of 27 However, this court went through the DLHT's decision and noted that, the same was erroneously ended. Leaving such judgement which is against the I law amount to nothing but unjust enrichment on benefiting party. Borrowing experience jfrom by foreign decisions, this court came across with various court decisions and literatures on the same. In the case of Madhupaper International Ltd and another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd and others[2003] 2 EA 562(HCK. Hon. Kuloba J principled that "From the now abundantly available literature on the subject of restitution on account of unjust enrichment In North America and the common law Diaspora^ establishedjudicial recognition and exposition I I ■ ■ and a vibrant academic scholarship shown In esteemed monographs and a stream oflearned articles In world classjournals and reviews whose citation Is encouraged by the courts as helpfulguides, one sees that the law on unjust enrichment or unjust benefit is aimed I ' . • atpreventing a person from retaining the money of, orsome benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep. From these sources, it is possible to highlight, aibeit in summary fashion (for in this space of a \ Page 14 of 27 i I i I judgment)some ofthe common unjustfactors which the law i i recognizes as caiiing for restitution. You may caii them grounds which form the basis ofa restitutionary ciaim. At the momentIsample the following: "1. Non-voluntary conferment ofa benefit, such as through mistake or on account ofcompulsion, necessity, or In Ignorance, or due to an unequal condition between the payer and payee. 2. Voluntary conferment ofbenefit for total failure of consideration. 3. Benefit conferred In consequence ofa wrongful act, such as i ■ ■ 'where a trustee benefits from a breach oftrust. 4. Ultra vires demand. 5. Abuse ofa power entrusted to the defendant by Parliament or by a contractualInstrumentsuch as a debenture or other agreement. 6. Illegitimate use ofself-help sanctions. 7. Vindication ofequitable title to property''. Page 15 of 27 In short, on the part of the plaintiff there must be found, in truth, factors which negative the voluntary character of the transfer of benefit to the defendant The plaintiff must be found to have had a I ! quaiiiied or vitiated intent that the defendant should be enriched. On the sifie of the defendant, there must have been free acceptance of the transfer, in the sense that the defendant had a choice whether to accept or rejectand had sufficientknowledge ofthe facts to make that choice a reai one. The defendant must know that a benefit is being offered to him non-gratuitousiy and, having the opportunity to reject, elect to accept. Those are some ofthe most outstanding restitution-yielding events. I [ , ■ ■ ■ I am hot forgetting situations where the defendant has behaved unconscionably; for we aii know equity's iong-estabiishedjurisdiction to setaside a bargain ifthere issome impropriety, both in the conduct ofthe stronger party and in the terms ofthe transaction itseif which in the traditionalphrase 'shocks the conscience ofthe courtand makes it against equity andgood conscience for the stronger party to retain the benefit ofa transaction he has unfairly obtained; per Miiiet J in Aiec Lobb limited v Totai Oii GB Limited[1983]1 WLR 87at 94-95. Page 16 of 27 In the English case of Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Comb and Barbour Limited [1 AC 32 Lord Wright had these to say: "Itis dear thatany dviUzedsystem oflaw is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been caiied unjust enrichment or unjust benefit ... such remedies... are genericaiiy differentfrom remedies in contract or in tort and are now recognized to faii within a third category ofthe common iaw which has been caiied quasi-contract or restitution". Further, English courts have recognized that there are four steps involved in establishing a claim to restitution for unjust enrichment. This analytic framework yvas developed by academics such as Professor Peter Birks. The I four steps i were expressly endorsed by the House of Lor6s m Banque Financiere de la Cite v Pare (Battersea) Ltd [1999] AC 221 in the form of four questions, one, is a defendant enriched or benefited?, two, is the enrichment at the claimant's expense?, three, is the enrichment unjust? and four are there any defences? Having that in mind, this court thought of the rationale of behind revisional powers to the court. It noted that, revision is there for purposes of the higher i ■ ' . court going Ithrough the proceedings and decisions of lowers courts/tribunals I and satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, I • . ' Page 17 of 27 order or ariy other decision made thereon and as to the regularity of any I proceedings. If it is satisfied that, the decision was incorrect and illegal then I it falls with'n the power of that higher court to enter correction and order accordingly, I I In view thereof and bearing in mind what this court observed some errors in the DLHT's decision which touched the root or substantive part of justice, thus benefiting a party unjustly. As such, this finds plausible to invoke revisional powers under section 43 of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap.216 R.E.2019 rectify the errors and order accordingly. The section speaks that; (1)In addition to any other powers in that behaifconferred upon the j ■ ■■ , High Court, the High Court- (a)shaii exercise generai powers ofsupervision over aii District Land and Housing Tribunals and may, at any time, caii for and inspect the records of such tribunal and give directions as it considers necessary in the interests ofjustice, and aii such tribunals shaii comply with such direction without undue delay; Page 18 of 27 (b)may in any proceedings determined in the District Land and \Housing Tribunai in the exercise of its originai, appeiiate or I 1 I revisionaijurisdiction, on appiication being made in that behaif by any party or ofits own motion, ifit appears that there has been an error materiai to the merits of the case invoiving injustice, revise the proceedings and make such decision or order therein asit may think fit. (2)In the exercise ofits revisionaijurisdiction, the High Courtshaii have aii the powers in the exercise ofits appeiiatejurisdiction Through the evidence on record and as briefly stated herein above, the most ! fundamental question to be determined is whether there was enough evidence to establish that, the house in dispute belongs to the respondent herein. Before responding to the raised issue, I found indebted to highlight some of general and specific principles in proving land cases. The burden of proof in civil case fall on the shoulders of he who alleges. This legal duty never shifts unless expressly stated by law. The general principles of law are founded in sections 110, 112 and 115 of the Evidence Act, Cap.6 R.E 2022. Section 110 reads Page 19 of 27 (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgement as to any iegai right or iiabiiity dependent on the existence offacts which he asserts mustprove that those facts exist (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence ofany fact, it is said that the burden ofproofties on that person. i Section 111 provides that; The burden ofproofin a suitproceeding iies on thatperson who would fail ifno evidence at aii were given on either Section 112 provides; ; The burden ofproofas to any particular fact lies on thatperson I \ who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by law that the proofofthat fact shall He on any other person. This position was repeated in the case of Lamshore Limited & another vs. Bazanje K.U.D K,[1999] T.L.R 330, the court held: - I ' . • "The duty to prove the alleged facts is on the party alleging its existence" Courts have, given special consideration to some of the civil suits and placed them under strict proof by whoever desires any court to give judgement as Page 20 of 27 to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts. A good example is civil cases for claims of special damages. Reference is made to the case of Bamprass Star Service Station Limited vs. Mrs Fatuma Mwale,[2000]T.L.R 390 where Mr. Justice Rutakangwa as then was had these to say; i "It is trite iaw that speciai damages being "exceptionai in their character" and which may consist of "off-pocket expenses and ioss ofearnings incurred down to the date of triai" must not only be claimed specifically but also I "strictlyproved". I - ■ i " ■ " Further in the case of British Transport Commission v. Courley [1956] AC 185 at 206 where it was held: "In an action for personai injuries the damages are aiways divided into two main parts. First, there is what is referred j • , • to as special damages^ which has to be specifically pleaded and proved. This consists of out-of-pocket expenses and loss ofearnings incurred down to the date of the trial and is generally capable of Page 21 of 27 substantially exact calculation. Secondly there Is general damages which the law Implies and Is not specially pleaded. This Includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like, and. Ifthe Injuries suffered are such that as to lead continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss ofearning power In the future. This court has in a number of authorities principled that, proof of ownership of iand must be strict. The rationale behind is based on the sensitivity of land and that without it no life no development. That there huge mushrooming conflicts on land which has gone to the extent of causing demises. It is iand I ■ ■ ' ■ ■ I ■ ■- . - - " which provides for limit and existence of the country. The ongoing fighting and killing all the world mostly are rooted from land disputes. In our country, we have individual and group iand disputes, Morogoro region inclusive. This court has gone through the case of Ramadhani Rashidi Kuhuka Vs Jela Maiko Meja And 44 Others, Land Case No.25/2022 holding that; "The property involvedbeing land which Ispeculiar andsensitive one. Its ownership must be provedstrictly. In other words, there must be sufficient evidence to prove ownership strictly." Page 22 of 27 Placing standard of proof of ownership of land on balance of probability like any other civil suits, regardless of its sensitivity, ongoing conflicts and frauds involved is to reduce the efforts to carb challenges on land matters. In other words, lane means life and without it nothing can be done. Ail living and non-living things live oh or in land and ail human being socio-economic development are effected on land, this is what it means on one hand. No land no iifemo development as in land, we get water, grow crops for food, industries, build shelters, etc. This is what it means on the other hand, thus every creature needs land for survivorship and or for development. It is on that ground, this court through numerous decision placed proof of land cases under strictly alike cases on special damages. That is and done, ownership of land can therefore strictly be proved through various means; these are, one, allocation by Government authority, two, inheritance, purchase, four, adverse possession, ^Ve, clearing of unowned, unoccupied or unreserved bush, six, gift, and seven, allocation from matrimonial property. The plaintiff who claims to have good title over the land must strictly prove ■ i ■ ■ how he acquired, developed, occupied and owned it. Certainly, the plaintiff Page 23 of 27 can through one of the above mentioned means of acquiring prove strictly how he acquired the title. i I In the present case, the then plaintiff the respondent instituted a case in the DLHT claiming ownership of landed property in question which has been used in securing mortgage for three loans. He explained how he acquired the title over the land, that is by "purchase" in 2002 and started developing in 2004 and completed in 2005. However, no document was tendered to prove such ownership. No purchase agreement was tendered and no person who sold the said land to the respondent was called and testify to that effect. Further, he tendered no document from any authority recognizing him as owner and occupier as opposed to the appellant who tabled the . . . I documents issued by the Government. Amazingly, the respondent who mortgaged the landed property and whose land; bears his name did not turn up and testify before the court as I he absented himself. Exhibits, Dl, D2, D3 and D4 indicates who is the owner of the said land and the same have not been contradicted. Further, even the wife of 3'"'^ respondent who consented to the mortgaging of land was not called as witness. In this case, there was element of i I Page 24 of 27 criminality but the respondent did not report to the investigation organs to go through if there was forgery or not. There is no single document tendered in the DLHT mentioning and linking the respondent with the land in dispute. All the tendered documents points thatjthe 3™ respondent is the owner of the land in dispute with her beloved wife one Happiness A. Mgellah which position has not been controverted. Further, even Khalidi H. Athuman the borrower was not called as witness or condemned; for anything. Certainly, the respondent is aware of whereabout the 3''^ respondent and his wife Happiness A. Mgellah and Khalidi 1 I H. Athuman who is appearing on all documents. I I Additionally; the respondent did not call the Officers who issued the i Residential licence (leseni ya makaazi) to the 3''^ respondent to confirm otherwise on version of evidence that, the house does not belong to anybody but the t-espondent. All said and done, this court is satisfied by the evidence of DWl, DW2, DW3 and DW4 and Exhibits Dl, D2, D3 and D4 which remained uncontroverted by the respondent's version of evidence. In the event, the evidence by Page 25 of 27 appellant withstands as it proved what really transpired and who is the owner of the landed property. On the other, the respondent has been declared the lawful owner of the mortgaged landed property at the detriment of the appellant w thout any proof of ownership. The person who appears on the documents issued by the Government and mortgaged the landed property three times ito secure loans from the appellant did not appear in courts. This court finds something unusual and the respondent has been declared the lawful owner of such sensitive asset without any tangible evidence. This can be equated as unjust enrichment in the absence evidence proving otherwise. In my view, I think this court need not keep quite in the circumstances but to do some hing for interest of justice and that the parties must get what he/she is entitled to. In the event therefore, I hereby invoke section 43 of the Land Disputes I ' Courts Act, pap.216 R.E.2019 revise the DLHT's decision and order that, the declaration that the respondent is a lawful owner of the landed property in dispute is reversed for want of evidence. Page 26 of 27 IT IS SO ORDERED DATED at MOROGORO this 20^^ October, 2023 G. A JUDG 20/10/2023 JUDGEMENT delivered at MOROGORO in Chambers this 20^^^ October, 2023 in the;presence of Epafra Mwego learned counsel for appellant and in i ! the absence of Respondents. A. W. MMBANDO DEPUTY REGISTRAR 20/10/2023 Court: Right to appeal to the Court of Appeal explained. A. W. IjlHfiANDO DEPUTY REGISTRAR 20/10/2023 ^ m ROC> Page 27 of 27