SODE MATIKU

« % \ IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MOROGORO SUB-REGISTRY [AT MOROGORO] LAND APPEAL NO. 7886 OF 2024 {Arising out ofAppiication No.12 of2021 ofthe District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kiiosa) THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH DIOCESE OF MOROGORO APPELLANT VERSUS SODE MATIKU RESPONDENT ELIBU URIO 2ND respondent JUDGMENT 06/06/2024 & 30/07/2024 KINYAKA, J.: On 30^^ March 2021, the respondent filed Application No. 12 of 2021 against the appellant in the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kiiosa hereinafter the "Tribunal". The application was premised on a dispute over the ownership of land measuring 10 acres located at lyovi area, Msimba village at Mikumi ward within Kiiosa District, Morogoro Region, hereinafter the "disputed land". It was the respondent's claim that he acquired the disputed land on 25^^ January 2017 through purchasing the same from the 2"^ respondent. After the said purchase, the respondent alleged to have developed the area by clearing and levelling the same, cultivating crops therein and built a hut worthy TZS 4,000,000 which were later on destroyed by the appellant through her servants claiming that the land belonged to the appellant. The appellant's acts prompted the institution of the Application No. 12 of 2021 at the Tribunal in which the 1^ respondent claimed for the following reliefs:- i. Declaration that he is the lawful owner of the disputed land; ii. Permanent injunction restraining the appellant and the 2"*^ respondent from interfering with his ownership of the disputed farm; iii. The appellant and the 2"^ respondent be ordered to pay specific damages of 15,000,000 to him; iv. General damages as may be assessed by the trial tribunal; V. Costs of the application; and vi. Any other reliefs the trial tribunal would deem just and equitable to grant. Through her written statement of defense lodged in the Tribunal on 21^ May 2021, the appellant strenuously disputed the 1^ respondent's claims. It was her averment that as the custodian of the properties of the Roman Catholic Church Morogoro Diocese, she acquired the land in 2014 by way of gift/offering from one Fr. Riccardo Enricco Riccion whose title to the disputed land was passed from one, the late Fr. Raphael Kigunga on 15^^ April 2014. In his written statement of defense, the 2"^^ respondent confirmed that he sold the disputed land to the 1^ respondent and that he had good title to pass to the respondent as he acquired the land on 7^^ day of January 2006 through purchasing the same from one Rashid Mbongwa. As such, it was his view that the damages claimed by the 1^ respondent ought to be paid by the appellant who had caused all the chaos to the 1^ respondent. Upon evaluating the evidence from the rival sides, the Tribunal was satisfied that the 1^ respondent had proved the case on the balance of probabilities. It thus declared 1^ respondent the lawful owner of the disputed land, found the appellant a trespasser, and ordered the appellant to pay costs of the suit. The appellant was aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal. She appealed to this Court advancing five grounds of appeal reproduced hereunder:- 1. That, the trial tribunal grossly erred in law and in fact by admitting, considering the evidence and basing its judgment on defective exhibits RE7 and AEl which contravened express requirements of law for that they neither disciosed any consideration nor proof of payment of stamp duty; 2. That, the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact by its failure to read site visit report before both parties and also by failure to consider the said report in its judgment; 3. That, the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact by totally ignoring assessor's opinion and without assigning any reason; 4. That, the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact by its failure to evaluate both oral and documentary evidence properly. Further, the trial tribunal miserably failed to notice and consider serious contradiction between the application, evidence of the applicant and that of second respondent in respect of boundaries of dispute land; 5. That, the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact by shifting the burden of proof to the first respondent therein while it was the duty of the applicant therein who alleged the ownership to prove his case on balance of probabilities. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Baraka Lweeka and Ms. Suzana Mafwere, learned advocates entered appearance on behalf of the appellant. The respondent had the legal services of Advocate James Mwakalosi whereas the 2"^ respondent appeared in person and unrepresented. The appeal was argued by way of written submissions. 4 Amplifying the first ground of appeal, the learned advocates for the appellant substantiated that Exhibit RE7, the sale agreement between the 2"^ respondent and one Rashid Mbogwa and Exhibit AEl, the sale agreement between the respondent herein and the 2"^ respondent, have several incurable defects to the effect that, exhibit RE7 lacks consideration contrary to sections 10 and 25(1) of Law of Contract Act, Cap. 345 R.E. 2019, and that both Exhibits RE7 and AEl lacks proof of payment of stamp duty tax and proper description of the disputed land. They further complained that during the sale transactions, neighbors surrounding the disputed land including the appellant were neither consulted nor Involved in boundaries verification and that there is discrepancy in 2"^ respondent's signature in Exhibit RE7 and the one in exhibit AEl. As for Exhibit RE7, on the basis of the pointed defects, the learned counsels urged the Court to expunge the same from records and rule out that the 2"^ respondent never purchased the dispute land. In their view, the 2""^ respondent had no title to pass to the 1^ respondent herein, and that by basing its decision on the said Exhibit RE7 without affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard on the validity of the same, the Tribunal was in a total misdirection. It was their further averment that Exhibit AEl did not describe the disputed land sufficiently therefore it was 5 not proper for Tribunal to declare the respondent the owner of dispute land. On the second ground, the learned advocates relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in the case of Sikuzani Saidi Magambo & Another vs Mohamed Roble, Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2018 [2019] TZCA 322 (1 October 2019) on page 5, 6 and 7 which laid down the procedures to be followed during a locus in visit and contended that the Tribunal did not adhere to some of the procedures to wit, reading the notes taken during the visit to parties as well as receiving any comment and evidence in respect of facts which transpired at the focus in quo. In relation to the third ground, the counsels referred the Court to the provisions of Section 23(1)(2)(3) and 24 of the Land Disputes Courts Act Cap. 216 R.E. 2019 and Regulation 19 (2) of The Land Disputes Courts (District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations, G.N. No. 174 of 2003 and argued that, in the present matter, the honorable trial Chairperson did not assign any reason for differing with assessor's opinion. Bolded by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Tubone Mwambeta V. Mbeya City Council, Civil Appeal No. 287 of 2017 [2018] TZCA 392 (5 December 2018) on page 15, it was the learned counsels' submission that the Tribunal committed a gross incurable irregularity. In support of the fourth ground, the learned advocates faulted the Tribunal for not properly evaluating the evidence of the appellant's six witnesses who according to them they clearly testified that the original owner of disputed land was one Padre Raphael Kigunga and several documents were admitted to that effect. As for the variance of number of acres from initial local measurements and the current measurements, the learned counsels for the appellant stated that the same was duly explained to the effect that the local measurements by footsteps did not consider road reserve while the current measurements were obtained after the survey which used modern equipment in which road reserve was considered and it took substantive part of the land. Submitting on the fifth ground, the learned counsels cited sections 110 (1) & (2), 111 and 112 of Evidence Act, Cap. 6 R.E. 2022 as well as the judgment of Court of Appeal in Jasson Samson Rweikiza v. Novatus Rwechungura Nkwama, Civil Appeal No. 305 of 2020[2021] TZCA 699 (29 November 2021) on page 12. On the basis of the foregoing, the learned counsels made reference to page 5 to 6 of the Tribunal's judgment and attacked the Tribunal for shifting the burden of proof to the appellant herein. Relying on the above submissions, it was the appellant's prayer that this Court be pleased to allow the present appeal with costs and quash and set aside the Tribunal's judgment. The appellant further implored the Court be pleased to re-evaluate the evidence and declare the appellant the lawful owner of disputed land. She also pressed for costs for defending the Application No. 12 of 2021 at the Tribunal. The 1^ respondent resisted the appeal. Responding to the first ground of appeal, Mr. Mwakalosi, learned counsel for the 1^ respondent clarified on the pointed out defects on Exhibit EAl and R7 as highlighted by the learned counsels for the appellant. As regards to the lack of stamp duty on the respective exhibits, Mr. Mwakalosi averred that it is now the current position through case laws that failure to pay stamp duty is not fatal and cannot vitiate admlsslbility of the document, especially for the documents which have been executed before the government authorities and bears the stamp of the government authority as per Section 47(1)(e) of the Stamp Duty Act Cap. 189 R.E. 2019. He said, Exhibit EAl and R7 were executed before the Chairperson of Msimba Mikumi Area and they bear the seal of the said local government authority hence their admission by the court as the evidence does not need the payment of the stamp duty. He cemented his submission with 8 ^ the case of Esther Magese v_ Erasto Sayi noni, Misc. Land Appeal No. 52 of 2021, High Court Land Division on Page 7 and that of Fatuma S. Basebe v, Jason Mutagulwa Rwiza, Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2021, on page 22 which cited with approval the case of Elizabeth Mboya v. Amina Abeid (2000) T.L.R 122. As regards to the issue of lack of consideration on the sale of the disputed land, while admitting that the consideration is nowhere to be found In Exhibit R7, the learned counsel told the Court that in his evidence before the Tribunal, the 2^^ respondent testified to have bought the disputed land from one Rashidi Mgaitwa Mbongwa in 2006 for consideration of TZS 160,000. As such he was of the view that section 10 of the Law of Contract was not violated as by joining the 2"^^ respondent at the Tribunal, the consideration of the contract between the two was made known. He was also of the view that the claim that Exhibit AEl does not sufficiently describe the disputed land is of no basis since in the application before the Tribunal, the applicant explained into the detail his neighbours which included the appellant. Submitting against the second ground, it was the learned counsel's opinion that failure by the Tribunal to read the site report and consider the said visit is not fatal. Buttressed by the case of Hemed Said v. Mohamed Mbilu (1984)T.L.R 113, which held that the person whose Q <fe> evidence is heavier than that of the other is the one who must win, Mr. Mwakalosi's contention was that the evidence adduced by the respondent was heavier compared to that of the appellant and that the same enabled the respondent to win the case even in absence of the site visit evidence. He implored the Court to apply Article 107A (1)(e) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 and section 45 of the Land Disputes Courts Act to cure the situation as to him, the said defect does not in any how occasion miscarriage of justice to the appellant due to heavy evidence adduced by both the 1^^ and the 2"^ respondents at the Tribunal. It was his view that even assuming that this Court finds the defect caused miscarriage of justice to the appellant, the proper remedy ought to be either remitting the file to the Tribunal to conduct the locus in guoafresh, or to order a trial de nova but not to declare the appellant as the owner of the disputed land. In submitting as such, the learned counsel was fortified by the case of Phanuel Kisota (Suing as the legal Representative of the late Syra Mburumburu) v. Joseph Mungaya, Mathias Mungaya & Wilson Ole Ngarashi, Land Appeal No. 13 of 2020, Land Division Arusha on page 20. 10 On the third ground, Mr. MwakalosI referred the Court to the fourth page of the judgment of the Tribunal and submitted that the trial Chairperson acknowledged the opinion of the assessor known as Mama Lila who opined that the respondent (the appellant herein) is the lawful owner of the disputed land. According to him, the Chairperson gave out the reason for departing from the assessor's opinion by pointing out the .V • weaknesses in the appellant's case on page 5 of the Tribunal's judgment. In relation to the fourth ground, the learned counsel attacked the same for being baseless and thus ought to be disregarded. He referred the Court to page 5 of the Tribunal's judgment and contended that the evidence adduced by the respondent and his witnesses and supported with that of the 2"^ respondent was heavy. In that regard, he was of the view that the Tribunal Chairperson discussed, well evaluated, considered and examined both oral and documentary evidence from both parties hence reaching into a fair judgment. As for the fifth ground, it was the counsel's substantiation that the respondent fulfilled the requirement of the law under sections 110 and 111 of the Law of Evidence Cap. 6 R.E. 2022 by parading four witnesses and tendering a valid sale agreement evidencing that he bought the disputed land from the 2"^ respondent. He said, as there is nowhere on 11 record reflecting the shift of the burden of proof from the respondent to the appellant, the ground lacks legs to stand. In conclusion, the learned counsel submitted that the appeal is devoid of merit. He therefore prayed for the same to be dismissed with costs. On his part, the 2"^ respondent also opposed the appellant's appeal. On the first ground of appeal, he was of the opinion that Exhibit AEl and RE7 were duly tendered and admitted by the Tribunal fairly. He said, although there was no consideration to the sale of the disputed land as reflected in the contract of sale, but the same was revealed through his evidence at the Tribunal which was to the effect that he sold the land to the respondent at the consideration of TZS 160,000. Regarding the second ground, it was the 2"^ respondent's assertion that the evidence adduced by the 1^ respondent during trial supported by his evidence was heavy to determine the case without the site report being read over to the parties and considered in the trial tribunal's judgment. It was therefore his view that the omission was not fatal. On the third ground, the 2"*^ respondent briefly submitted that the assessor's opinion was fully considered as depicted on page 4 of the Tribunal's judgment. As for the fourth ground, the 2"^ respondent supported the Tribunal's evaluation of both oral and documentary evidence. He said, the 12 respondent's evidence was straight forward compared to the appellant's evidence which was marred with contradictions regarding the size of the disputed land. On that basis, he prayed for the Court to disregard the fourth ground of appeal. Submitting against the fifth ground, it was the 2"'' respondent's averment that there was no shifting of burden of proof from the l"* respondent to the appellant as during the trial each party was afforded with the opportunity to prove his case in the standard required by the law. As such, he prayed for the ground of appeal be disregarded and dismissed. In the end, the 2"'^ respondent was of a fortified view that the appellant's appeal is devoid of merit and prayed for the same to be dismissed and the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the instant appeal to the respondents. Rejoining on the first ground, the learned counsels for the appellant stressed that section 47(l)(e) of Stamp Duty Act is applied only when the agreement is executed by or on behalf of the Government as opposed to private business as it was in this matter in which the local Government leader just witnessed the said agreements but the government was not a party to the same. As for the concern raised on the inadmissibility of the sale agreements for want of stamp duty, it was the counsels' assertion that it is not possible 13 for this Court to grant leave to stamp the contacts at this stage as there is neither an application to that effect nor a consideration on exhibit RE7 in which the payment of the stamp duty will be based. As for complaint on the Tribunal's non consideration of what transpired at the locus in quo, the learned advocates pressed that the site visit was part and parcel of the Tribunal's proceeding and since it was conducted, it was crucial aspect In the Tribunal's determination of the dispute. Finally, they reiterated the appellant's prayers in her submission in chief. Upon reading the grounds of appeal, the written submissions of the parties and the proceedings of the Tribunal, I have noted that among the appellant's five grounds of appeal, the second and third grounds involves matters of law that I should determine them first. If need be, I will determine the first, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal. The appellant's complaint in the second ground of appeal is on the failure by the Tribunal to read the site visit report before both parties and to consider the same in its judgment. As I intimated above, I have read the handwritten proceedings of the Tribunal in Land Application No. 12 of 2021. Surprisingly, there is no record of the visit to the focus in quo. The proceedings are totally silent on the said visit as nothina has been indicated or recorded in the proceedings. As submitted by both parties, even the judgement of the 14 ^ Tribunal did not speak anything about the findings or at least that there was a visitation to the locus in quo. Had it not been for the parties to point out in the present appeal that the Tribunal visited the focus in quo, this Court would not find out that there was a visit to the iocus in quo. The peculiarity of the conduct of the Tribunal not only raises a concern on its failure to read the findings at the focus fn quo, and its failure to point out or consider the same in the judgement, but also lack of any record of the visitation to the focus fn quo. As correctly submitted by the appellant's learned advocates, the visitation to the focus fn quo is not mandatory, but is normally done only in exceptional circumstances. When the court finds it necessary to conduct a visit to the focus in quo, it is bound to carry it out properly so as to establish whether the evidence in respect of the property is in tandem with what pertains physically on the ground, as the visit is not for the purpose of filling gaps in evidence. It was held in the case of Salum Mayombya & Another v. Lucas Ndahuzi [2024] TZCA 613 (19 July 2024) that:- '\..the faw is settled that a visit of the focus in quo is not mandatory, and it is done onfy in exceptional circumstances. However, where the trial court, or fn thfs case, the Tribunal deems ft necessary to visit the focus in quo, then it is bound to carry it out properly." " , cb- 15 4, In the instant appeal, despite the Tribunal's visitation to the locus in quo, It did not record anything on the proceedings conducted at the focus in quo both in the proceedings or relied on the same in Its judgement. Reading the proceedings, there were matters that the Tribunal decided which would have been meaningful to state their relevance from what the Tribunal found at the focus in quo. These matters include, contradictions on the actual size of the land between the appellant's pleadings, testimony df her witnesses and the size Indicated in the certificate of title. This would have been clarified at the focus fn quo^s to whether the alleged 60 acres or 50 acres or 44.98 acres pleaded or adduced in evidence, were part and parcel of the 10 acres that the 1^ respondent claimed to own. Relying on the Nigerian case of Akosile v. Adeye (2011) 17 NNWLR (Pt 1276) on page 263, the Court of Appeal determined the essence of conducting the focus in quo\}\s\\. in the case of Avit Thadeus Massawe V. Isidory Assenga, Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2017 (unfeported) that:- "The essence ofa visit fn focus fn quo fn land matters includes location of the disputed fand, the extent, boundaries and boundary neighbour, and physical features on the iand. The purpose is to enable the Courtsee objects and places referred to in evidence physically and to dear doubts arising frorh conflicting evidence ifariy aboutphysical objects. 16 The foregoing means that the Tribunal erred in not recording the proceedings relating to its visit to the locus in which prejudiced both parties to the suit. The Tribunal ought to have a clear record of the proceedings conducted at the focus in quo for transparency and interest of the parties to the suit. Again, it was necessary for the Tribunal to record what transpired at the focus in quo including the exact testimony of the witnesses; if the witnesses'testimonies were taken under oath; and if parties were allowed to cross examine the witnesses. In my scanning of the Tribunal's proceedings, there is no record of any view, opinion or conclusion of the Tribunal and an indication that the same was made known to the parties and their advocates. The above were necessary regardless of whether or not, the findings would be considered at a later stage in the Tribunal's judgement. In my respective view, the Tribunal's conduct of the proceedings especially its visitation to the focus in quo fall short of the principles and requirements of the conduct of proceedings when courts decide to conduct visitation to the focus in quo. This was articulated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Kimonidimitri Mantheakis v. Ally Azim Dewji 17 _L_: ■ I *111*1 i> & others, Civil Appeal 4 of 2018[2021]TZCA 663(3 November 2021) on page 8 through to 9 that:- '7/7 the light ofthe cited decisions, for the visit ofthe iocus in quo to be meaningful, it is instructive for the trial Judge or Magistrate to: one, ensure thataiiparties, their witnesses, and advocates (if any) are present Two, aiiow the parties and their witnesses to adduce evidence on oath at the iocus in quo; three, aiiow cross-examination by either party, or his counsel, four, record all the proceedings at the locus in quo;and five record any observation, view, opinion or conclusion of the court including drawing a sketch plan if necessary which must be made known to the parties and advocates, //■^////'[Emphasis added] As there is no record of the proceedings evidencing what exactly transpired at the iocus in quo, it is clear that there is no account of what happened in the absence of such record. That said, I do not accept the invitation by the respondents that the Tribunal's misdeeds are not fatal and had not prejudiced the appellant as the evidence was very clear to establish the 1^ respondent's ownership of the disputed land. To the contrary,I find the irregularity fatal which goes to the root of the conduct of the proceedings by the Tribunal. Again, I cannot safely conclude that the proceedings at the iocus in quo was conducted properly, transparently and fairly In absence of such 18 record. Not only that the parties were prejudiced for lack of such record, but also this Court has also been deprived with an opportunity to scrutinize and re-evaluate such proceedings and make an informed decision particularly on the fourth and fifth grounds of appeal. Addressing the omission to record what transpired in the locus visit in relation to the court's evaluation of entire evidence adduced by the parties, the Court of Appeal in Salum Mayombya & Another vs Lucas Ndahuzi (Supra) on page 7 of its judgment underscored; ''According to the record ofappeal, ItIs apparent thatsave for Indicating the coram stated above, the record ofproceedings during the visit to the iocus in quo is notshown. Therefore, it is not known as to what transpired during the said visit The omission certainly occasioned a miscarriage ofjustice as the first appellate court could not make a proper re-evaluation of the entire evidence tendered by the parties atthe DLHTin the absence of the proceedings on what transpired at the visit to the iocus in quo ifit was really conducted. Guided by the authority above, I find the irregularity as fundamental which vitiates the proceedings and judgment of the Tribunal. The second ground of appeal is merited and therefore allowed. The third ground of appeal relates to the appellant's complaint that the Tribunal ignored the opinion of the assessor without assigning any reason. 19 ' -1.1.V ' »<• The proceedings reveal that after the death of one assessor In the middle of the proceedings, the remaining assessor, Ms. Marlam Llla gave her opinion on S'*" April 2023. The excerpt of her opinion In the conclusion part reads "Mjibu maombi No. 1 ushahidi wake uHkuwa mzito kuhko ushahidi wa mieta maombi. Kwa maoni yangu napendekeza kwamba Mjibu maombi namba moja ambae ni "The Registered Trustees of Roman Cathoiic Church Diocese of Morogoro"aachiwe eneo bishaniwa kwaniaiipewa na Kijijicha Msimba kihaiaii tangu mwaka 1991 tarehe 2/1/91 na miaka mingi nyuma, muhtasari ya mikutano na vieieiezo vingine vyote nimeviona kwenyeJaiada." In the judgement of the Tribunal, the trial Chairperson duly reproduced the general opinion of the assessor that the appellant was the lawful owner of the disputed land. However, the decision of the Tribunal was that the P' respondent was the lawful owner of the disputed land, contrary to the opinion of the assessor. There Is nowhere In the judgement of the Tribunal where the trial Chairperson provided his reasons for his departure to the opinion of the assessor. Though the trial Chairperson was not bound by the opinion of the assessor, but his silence on the reasons for his departure from her opinion went contrary to the dictates of section 24 of the Land Disputes Courts 20 Act, Cap 219 R.E 2019 hereinafter the "LDCA" which require the Honourable Chairperson of the Tribunal to give reasons for differing with opinions of the assessors in the judgement. Section 24 of the LDCA provides:- '7/7 reaching decisions, the Chairman shaii take into account the opinion of the assessors but shaii not be bound by it, except that the Chairman shaii in thejudgment give reasons for differing with such opinion. I am not convinced with the respondents' submissions that the trial Chairperson reproduced the assessor's opinion and gave reason for departing from the assessor's opinion by pointing out the weaknesses in the appellant's case on page 5 of the judgment. As observed above, the Hon. Chairperson proceeded with determination of the appeal which departed from the assessor's opinion without giving reasons for such departure. It is my position that the contradictions pointed out by the trial Chairperson was his findings that led to the decision against the appellant, contrary to the opinion of the assessor. The same is not synonymous to reasons for his departure from the assessor's opinion which should have been specifically stated. 21 The omission by the trial Chairperson to state reasons for departure from the assessor's opinion, renders the proceedings and the resultant judgement a nullity. I am fortified by the decision of this Court in Eng. Justin D. Rweyemamu v. James Rugakingira and 3 Others, Land Case Appeal No. 61 of 2021 where it was held in the last paragraph of page 7 through to 8 that:- " The chairman seemed to depart from the assessors' opinions which are nowhere to be found and he does notgive reasons for his departure. These two irregularities vitiate the proceedings ofthe trial court. Ihereby quash the proceedings and setaside the decision ofthe Tribunal." I take similar stance in this matter. That failure by the Honourable Chairperson of the Tribunal to state reasons for his departure from the assessor's opinion is a fundamental irregularity which vitiates the entire proceedings, judgement and the resultant orders of the Tribunal. The third ground of appeal is allowed for being merited. As the irregularities in the Tribunal's proceedings and judgement pointed out in the second and third grounds of appeal are sufficient to dispose of the present appeal, I find no essence of determining the first, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal. 22 In consequence, I nullify the proceedings, quash and set aside both the judgement and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Kllosa in Land Application No. 12 of 2021. I further order an expedited retrial before another Chairperson of the Tribunal. Considering that the irregularity in the proceedings were occasioned by the Tribunal and not the parties, I make no order as to costs. It is so ordered. Right of appeal fully explained. DATED at MOROGORO this 30^^" day of July 2024, \ H. A. KINYAKA A A JUDGE 4 30/07/2024 y •>;. fr L • •• A ■ . 23