BWEGOGE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (DAR ES SALAAM SUB-REGISTRY) AT DAR ES SALAAM MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NO. 29855 OF 2024 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR ORDERS OF CERTIORARI, MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION; AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW REFORM (FATAL ACCIDENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT [CAP. 310 R.E. 2019); AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW REFORM (FATAL ACCIDENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEDURE AND FEES) RULES, 2014 [GN. No. 324 OF 2014] AND IN THE MATTER OF THE TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY ACT [CAP. 307] AND IN THE MATTER OF THE TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY (MEETINGS) REGULATIONS, 2020 (GN. No. 523 OF 2020); AND IN THE MATTER OF THE TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY (ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS)REGULATIONS, 2022 (GN. No. 600 OF 2022); AND 1 IN THE MATTER OF THE ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION FEE NOTICE - FINANCIAL YEAR 2025 ISSUED BY THE TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY DATED NOVEMBER 06, 2024; BETWEEN VICTOR NDUMBARO JOSEPH……………………………………1ST APPLICANT DORIS KAFUKU …………………………………………….……….2ND APPLICANT JOSEPH GIDION LAMECK ……………………………………...…3RD APPLICANT AND THE TANGANYIKA LAW SOCIETY………………………………..1ST RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL………………………………………….2ND RESPONDENT RULING 10th & 30th December, 2024 BWEGOGE, J.: The applicants herein above named instituted an application herein praying this court to be pleased to grant leave for the applicants to file a judicial review against the first respondent seeking the writ of certiorari against her decision dated 06th November, 2024 imposing a compulsory annual subscription fee against the applicants to the tune of TZS. 100,000/= for the Society’s Annual General Meeting as a necessary condition for renewal of their practising licenses for the year 2025, among others. 2 The application herein was brought under the provisions of sections 2(1), and 2(3) of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act (CAP. 358 R.E. 2019); sections 17 (2), and 19(3) of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [Cap. 310 R.E. 2019]; and rules 5(1), 5(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d); 5(3) and 6 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules, 2014 [Government Notice No. 324 of 2014]. And the application herein is supported by the joint affidavits of the applicants. In tandem with filing counter affidavits, both respondents raised preliminary objections on points of law. Respecting the 1st respondent, the objections raised are thus: 1. The application is untenable in law for being filed prematurely/ before exhausting the available alternative remedies. 2. The joint affidavit in support of the application is incurably defective for containing erroneous matters namely, extraneous matters, conclusions, arguments, beliefs, prayers, lies and hearsay in terms of Order XIX, rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2019]. 3. The application is untenable in law for contravening sections 17 (1) and (2) of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [Cap. 310] and rules 2 and 15 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules, 2014 GN. No. 324 of 2014 for containing private law prayers of stay order. 3 4. The application is untenable in law for seeking remedies in rem rather than in persona. 5. The verification clause is fatally defective in failing to specify which paragraphs of the applicant’s joint affidavit are true to the best of his knowledge and which are just beliefs and in failing to have an affidavit verifying facts from third parties. Likewise, the 2nd respondent raised the following objections: 1. That the application is untenable in law for being filed prematurely/ before exhausting the available remedy. 2. That the affidavit is incurably defective for being attested by the advocate who is in conflict of interest. 3. That the affidavit of the applicants is incurably defective for contravening the provisions of section 7 of the Notaries Public and Commissioner for Oaths Act. 4. That advocate Elisante Frank Jumbe is in conflict of interest in representing the applicants. At the scheduled date for hearing of this application, Messrs Elisante Frank Jumbe & Cletus Nziku, learned advocates, entered appearance for the applicants; the 1st respondent was represented by Messrs Hekima Mwasipu, Fredrick Msaki, Edson Kilatu & Ms Ziada Mkwazu, learned advocates; and the 2nd respondent had the services of Mr Mkama Musalama, learned state attorney. 4 The 1st objection raised by the 1st respondent, in substance, is a replica of the 1st objection raised by the 2nd respondent. In substance, both objections bear the same charge in that the application herein has been taken prematurely as there are alternative remedies which have not been exhausted by the applicants. Mr. Musalama, the counsel for the 2nd respondent, was given the privilege to get the ball rolling. The same, in substantiating the 1st objection raised by the 2nd respondent, argued that the application herein has been raised prematurely as there are other remedies which have not been exhausted. That it is settled law that before one prefers an application for judicial review, should exhaust the available remedy. The counsel enlightened this court that the applicants herein seek leave to challenge the decision of the Governing Council (henceforth “Council”) of the 1st respondent. However, the decision of the Council is not the final decision as there are other avenues to challenge the decision of the Counsel. Such avenues are requisition of the special resolution by the Society and, or filing the notice of motion to the General Secretary of the Council of the 1st respondent who has the mandate to table such motion to the Annual General Meeting for deliberations. The counsel directed the mind of this court to the provisions of sections 22 and 25 of the Tanzania Law Society Act [Cap. 5 307 R.E. 2002]; and Regulation 21 (1)(c), and 2(c) of Tanzania Law Society (Meetings) Regulations 2020 [GN. 523 of 2020] to bolster his point. Based on the premise above, the counsel opined that the applicants herein have not exhausted two avenues explained above before filing the application in this court seeking leave for grant of judicial review. Hence, failure to exhaust the available remedy renders the application before this court incompetent. The case of Hekima Mwasipu & Others vs Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) & Others (Misc. Cause No. 2 of 2023) [2023] TZHC 17555 was cited to buttress the point. In sum, the counsel prayed this court to strike out the application herein. In substantiating the 2nd, 3rd and 4th objections which are intrinsically connected, Mr. Musalama submitted that the advocates who represent the applicant in this court namely, Mr Elisante Frank Jumbe, Cletus Nziku and one Ramadhani Mwinyi Simai who attested the affidavit, have conflict of interest in this matter. The counsel enlightened this court that the advocates who represent the applicants and those who attested the pleadings herein are the members of the Young Lawyers Association who intend to challenge the decision of the Society. That it is a law that the commissioner for oath shall not administer the oath in any proceedings or 6 matter in which he has an interest as per section 7 of the Notary Public and Commissioner for Oath Act [Cap. 12 RE 2019] read together with Regulation 35 (1) and 36 (2) of the Advocates (Professional Conducts and Etiquettes) Regulations of 2019 [GN 118 of 2018]. The cases: Clemence O. Mbowe vs. Donald A. Kimambo & Another (Civil Appeal No. 240 of 2022) TZCA 234; and UAP Insurance Tanzania Ltd vs. Akiba Commercial Bank PLC, Civil Appeal No. 135 of 2022 (Civil Appeal 135 of 2022) [2023] TZCA 17784 were cited to persuade this court. In conclusion, the counsel opined that as the counsel who represents the applicants herein has conflict of interests in this matter, the application herein is rendered incompetent and doomed to be struck out with costs. Pertaining to the objections raised by the 1st applicant, Messrs Kilatu and Mwasipu successively submitted as follows: Respecting the 1st preliminary objection, Mr Edson Kilatu, submitted that the Council of the 1st respondent is the governing body which derives its powers under section 16 of the Tanzania Law Society Act [Cap. 307] as amended by section 52 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020. That the Council is empowered to undertake the governing functions of the Society and exercise the powers of the Annual General Meeting of the 1st respondent. And to check such power, regulation 18 of the Tanganyika 7 Law Society (Council) Regulations 2022 [GN. No. 599 of 2022] dictates that the Council is answerable to the General Meeting and Annual General Meeting (AGM) to steer the spirit of accountability to the members alongside meeting the purpose of self-regulation of the Society. Hence, the applicants herein have the remedy to challenge the decision of the Council vide section 25 of the Tanzania Law Society Act by submitting a motion to that effect; and, or requisition of a General Meeting (extraordinary general meeting) under section 22 of the Act as amended by section 57 of the Written Laws (Misc. Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020 which provides room to the applicant to challenge the impugned decision. Therefore, the applicant has extra judicial machinery to lodge their complaint and exhaust the remedies thereof before coming to this court. The counsel enlightened this court that it is trite law that where there are two avenues, an extra-judicial avenue and a judicial one, the best practice is to exhaust the extra-judicial avenue before knocking the door of this court. The case of Parin AA Jaffer vs. Abdulrasul Ahmed Jafer [1996] TLR 110 was cited to bolster the point. Further, the counsel expounded that the rationale for the requirement to exhaust the available remedy is an amplification of the provision of Article 107A of the Constitution of the 8 United Republic of Tanzania which emphasizes amicable settlement of disputes. Hence, one can only knock the door of the court as a last resort. Conclusively, the counsel prayed this court to strike out the application for failure to exhaust the available remedies. In substantiating the 2nd objection, Mr Mwasipu argued that the affidavit supporting the application contains arguments, extraneous matters, conclusion, beliefs, prayers and hearsay contrary to the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2019] which instructs that the affidavit must be confined to the facts of which the deponent, on his own knowledge, is able to prove. The case of Hon. Zuberi Zito Kabwe vs Board of Trustees Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (CHADEMA) & Another [2014] TLR 290; and Uganda vs Commissioner of Prison Exparte Matovu [1966] EA 154 were cited to bolster the point. The counsel directed the mind of this court to the affidavit supporting this application, specifically, paragraphs 5 to 14 which he alleges contain opinions, conclusions, hearsay, and arguments. Thus, based on the above argument, the counsel asserted that the offensive depositions ought to be expunged from the record. Consequently, only 4 paragraphs would remain intact; the same would not sustain the application herein. Hence, the case should be struck out. 9 The case of Jacqueline Ntuyabaliwe Mengi vs Abdiel Reginald Mengi & Others (Civil Application No. 332 of 2021) [2021] TZCA 58 was cited to buttress the point. Regarding the 3rd objection, Mr Kilatu argued that the reliefs prayed under paragraphs (d) and (e) of the chamber summons and statements contravene section 17 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [Cap. 310] and rule 2 and 15 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules 2014 [G.N. 324 of 2015]. He maintained that the prayed reliefs are private law remedies which are not supported by the law cited above. That the only relief for judicial review under the common law system are writs of certiorari mandamus and prohibition, not stay order. Hence, reliefs sought under paragraphs (d) and (e) are offensive. The counsel prayed this court to expunge the same from the record. Arguing the 4th objection, Mr Mwasipu alleged that the applicants seek remedy in rem rather than in persona contrary to rule 4 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules 2014 [G.N. 324 of 2015]. The case of Mkumbi Malashi Holela vs. Musa Christopher Ginawele @ Musa Balali & Six Others 10 (Misc. Land Application No. 7 of 2023) [2023] TZHC 16245 was cited to bring the point home. Further, the counsel clarified that in this application, most of the prayers are prayers in rem, for instance, items (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the chamber summons in which the applicants purport to make prayers for all members of the Society including newly enrolled advocates. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for in the statements under item (b), (c), and (d) suffer the same defect. Thus, the counsel opined that the offensive prayers should be expunged as this matter is not a representative suit. And, since expunging offensive paragraphs would leave the matter without prayers/reliefs sought, the application is doomed to be struck out. Pertaining to the 5th objection, Mr Mwasipu charged that the verification clause of the supporting affidavit is defective. That the content of verification should be as instructed by the Apex Court in the cases: Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Dodoli Kapufi & Another (Criminal Application 11 of 2008) [2011] TZCA 46 and Anatoli Peter Rwebangira vs The Principal Secretary Minister of Defence and National Service and Another (Civil Application 548 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 106. The counsel argued that in this case, the deponent deponed that the depositions were based on their knowledge and beliefs conjunctively, 11 contrary to the law which requires the deponent to declare which facts are based on beliefs, knowledge and information from another source. Based on the foregoing, the counsel opined that the defect alleged herein renders the application herein incompetent. In sum, the counsel prayed this court to sustain the objections and strike out this application with costs. Likewise, Messrs Nziku and Jumbe successively responded to the submissions made by their rivals as hereunder recounted. Replying to the 1st objection raised by both respondents herein, Mr Nziku contended that the applicants attempted to exhaust the available remedies as deponed under paragraphs 5 and 6 of the supporting affidavits which disclosed that the notice of objection has been preferred by the Young Lawyer’s Association, the applicants being the members thereof. And the proceedings of the Council have been requested as per section 28 of the Tanzania Law Society Act as evidenced by the annextures thereof. Conversely, the counsel opined that the nature of this application doesn’t require the exhaustion of such remedies for the reason that rule 3 of the Tanganyika Law Society (Meetings) Regulations, 2020, GN. No. 523 of 2020 requires the AGM to be conducted in the 2nd week of April of each calendar of the year. It follows that the meeting called for 12 would not be convened until the 2nd week of April, 2024. Therefore, based on the fact that the impugned notice was issued on 06th November, 2024, this matter should be treated with extreme urgency as the renewal of licence is due until 31st December, 2024 and, or on extension, on 31st January, 2025. Given the foregoing, the counsel opined that based on the circumstances of this case, the alternative remedy is not effective; hence, not a bar to filing this application. The case of North Mara Goldmine Ltd vs. Minister of State Vice President’s Office (Union and Environment) (Misc. Cause No. 31 of 2023) [2024] TZHC 742 was cited to reinforce the point. Responding to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th objections raised by the 2nd respondent, Mr Jumbe contended that the preliminary objections raised herein require evidence to be ascertained; hence, they are not preliminary objections in the strict legal sense. The case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd vs. West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 was cited to validate the point. In the same vein, the counsel contended that this application was not brought by the Young Lawyer’s Association; and the impugned decision of the Council affects all members of the Society. 13 Further, the counsel submitted that the right to legal representation is guaranteed under article 13 (6) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as amended. Hence, this right cannot be just whittled down under the pretext of having a conflict of interest in the matter. That be that as it may, taking into consideration the circumstances of this case; this court should find an exception in this case. Otherwise, the counsel opined that the cases cited to bolster the respective objection are distinguishable from this case. Respecting the 2nd objection raised by the 1st respondent, Mr Jumbe contended that the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3 (1) of the CPC were patently misconstrued. That the provision of sub-rule 1 of the respective Order allows the party to prove the fact by the affidavit. That the affidavit was made under sections 17 (2) and 19 (3); of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [CAP. 310 R.E. 2019]. Otherwise, the counsel opined that the depositions of the supporting affidavits don’t contravene any provision of the law as they are matters of facts. Hence, the cases cited to buttress the respective objection are inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. Regarding the 3rd objection raised by the 1st respondent, Mr Nziku contended that the objection is misplaced and untenable in this matter as 14 the applicants herein seek permission to file judicial review. That the relevant provisions cited to buttress the objection would apply to the proceedings pertaining to the application for judicial review, not to proceedings respecting the application for leave. Concerning the 4th limb of the objection raised by the 1st respondent Mr Jumbe contended that the prayers made under items (b), (c), and (d), in his opinion, depict that this is a public interest matter affecting all advocates including young lawyers. And the attached affidavits speak volumes of this fact. Lastly, in countering the 5th objection raised by the 1st respondent, Mr Jumbe contended that the verification is clear in that the mentioned paragraphs were deposed based on the knowledge and beliefs of the deponents; and other facts were based on information received from the 3rd party duly mentioned who had likewise sworn the affidavit. Hence, the verification is proper in law. Otherwise, the counsel opined that even if this court finds the verification clause defective, the remedy is to order amendment, not striking out. The case of Mariam Khairuddin & Glenrich Transportation Co. Ltd (Labour Revision 825 of 2019) [2020] TZHCLD 3814; and Geita Gold Mining Limited vs Lukas Ntobi, 15 (Labour Revision 46 of 2022) [2019] TZCA 106 were cited to buttress the point. Based on the above counterarguments, the counsel prayed this court to overrule the objections raised by the respondents for being devoid of substance. In rejoinder, respecting the 1st objection raised by the 2nd respondent, Mr Musalama reiterated that it is not disputed that the applicants herein have not exhausted the available remedy for failure to move the Council to conduct a special meeting prior to the scheduled period. The counsel opined that the case of North Mara Goldmine Ltd vs. Minister of State Vice President’s Office (Union and Environment) (supra) cited by the applicant’s counsel is distinguished from this case as in the relevant case it was found that there was no available and operative remedy. Otherwise, in respect of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th objections, the counsel maintained his previous stance. Likewise, respecting the 1st objection raised by the 1st respondent, Mr Kilatu maintained that through the requisition of an extraordinary General Meeting under section 22 of the Tanzania Law Society Act, the General Meeting would have been convened before 31st December, 2024. 16 Apart from the above rejoinder, Messrs, Kilatu and Mwasipu reiterated their previous stance in respect of the remaining objections which I find it needles to replicate herein. Now, the question to be resolved is whether the objections raised by the respondents herein are meritorious. At first, I would delve into the 1st objection raised by both respondents. As aforesaid, the respondents herein allege that the applicants have other remedies/avenues to lodge their cause of which they have not exhausted. Foremost, it is a law that judicial review, though available as a means for attaining redress for litigants aggrieved by administrative actions, yet the litigants are obliged to exhaust available remedies before approaching this court. See the cases: Attorney General vs. Lohay Akonaay and Another [1995] TLR 80; Michael David Nungu vs. Institute of Finance Management, Civil appeal No. 170 of 2020 [2023] TZCA 176; among others. The obligation on litigants to exhaust available local remedy was appositely restated by this court in the case of Parin AA Jaffer vs. Abdulrasul Ahmed Jafer (supra) as under: “......where the law provides extra-judicial machinery alongside a judicial one for resolving a certain cause, the extra-judicial machinery should, in general, be exhausted before recourse is had to the judicial process.” 17 See also the cases: Commissioner General Tanzania Revenues Authority & Attorney General vs. Milambo Limited, Civil Appeal No. 62 of 2022 [2022] TZCA 348; and Hekima Mwasipu & Others vs. Tanzania Law Society and Others (supra), among a plethora of decided cases in this respect. Fortunately, the rule of law explained herein above is not without exception. A litigant who failed to exhaust local remedy and, or extrajudicial machinery has to satisfy the court that no appropriate/effective remedy is available in the local avenue and, or extrajudicial machinery for his legal recourse to prevail the preliminary objection of like nature. See in this respect the cases: Abdiah Salehe vs. Dodoma Wine Co. Ltd [1990] TLR 113; North Mara Goldmine Ltd vs. Minister of State Vice President’s Office (Union and Environment) (Misc. Cause No. 31 of 2023); Chalinze Cement CO. Ltd & Another vs. Registrar of Companies & Another (Misc. Cause No.46 of 2023) [2023] TZHC 22890 and Tanzania Electric Supply Company vs Attorney General and 3 Others, Civil Application No. 54 of 2019, HC (unreported), among others. Having revisited the above guiding rules, I revert to the matter at hand. Primarily, I agree with Mr Nziku in that the Council normally convenes the 18 Annual General Meeting of the Society the second week of April, of each calendar year in terms of section 56 of the Written Laws (Misc. Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020 which amended the provision of 21 of the Tanzania Law Society Act. Thus, arguably, waiting until April, in the circumstances of this case, might be unreasonable. However, as rightly submitted by Mr Kilatu, the Council is accountable/ answerable to the members at the General Meeting and Annual General Meeting in terms of regulation 18 of the Tanganyika Law Society (Council) Regulations 2022 [GN No. 599 of 2022]. Both parties herein are at one in that the General Meeting of the Society is enjoined with power to alter and, or rescind the resolution passed by the Council in terms of section 25 of the relevant Act. And, I am constrained to make it clear that Mr. Nziku doesn’t dispute the availability of the alternative remedy provided by law. However, the counsel expressed his displeasure with the available local remedy for the reason that it is not speedy; hence, ineffective in the circumstances of this case though he asserted that the applicants made an attempt to exhaust the available remedy. I have scrutinized the provisions of section 22 of the Tanzania Law Society Act as amended by section 57 of the Written Laws (Misc. Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020. It is apparent that the relevant provisions enjoin 19 members of good standing of the society with power, at any time requisition a general meeting by written notice in that behalf signed by them, specifying the object of the proposed meeting and deposit with the Executive Director. Further, the law enjoins power the requisitioning members to convene the general meeting by themselves, to be held at any time within two months after such deposit, if the Council fails for fourteen days after that deposit to convene a general meeting. Now, the pertinent question arises herein; whether the applicants herein exhausted the remedy provided through the procedure mentioned above. This question constrains me to revisit the depositions in the supporting affidavit. It is deponed in the supporting affidavit that on 06th November, 2024 the 1st respondent issued a Notice titled; “Re: Annual Subscription Fee Notice - Financial Year 2025 Requiring Compulsory Payment of TZS. 100,000= for the Annual General Meeting ….” That consequent to the issue of the impugned notice, many advocates including the members of the Tanganyika Law Society Association of Young Lawyers, through social networks including WhatsApp groups in which the 1st respondent’s leaders 20 and members of the Council are subscribers, communicated their dissatisfaction and eventually objected the compulsory subscription vide notice dated 10th November, 2024 forming part of the annextures herein. Moreso, it is deposed that correspondence was issued to the 1st respondent requesting access to the meeting minutes of the Council and the proceedings of the Council respecting the impugned resolution and consequential notice for scrutiny. The notice issued to the 1st respondent had to be responded until 18th December, 2024; allegedly, to date, the 1st respondent is yet to respond. Further, it is deposed in the supporting affidavit that the impugned resolution requiring payment of the subscription fee issued by the Council of the 1st respondent was not participatory, lacked transparency and contravened the law/rules which the Council was required to abide by. And recently, the 1st respondent has issued a notice demanding payment of the impugned subscription fee especially to the young lawyers as a condition to admission in the roll. Hence, the deponents deposed, the members of the Tanganyika Law Society Association of Young Lawyers have exhausted all available remedies within the framework and set up of the first respondent which entitles them grant of leave sought. 21 The annexture VIND 3 to the supporting affidavit speaks volumes in that on 10th November, 2024 the Tanganyika Law Society Association of Young Lawyers issued notice of the intended objection of compulsory AGM fee of TZS 100,000/= for the financial year 2025 to its members and informed them in that the Association leadership was intending to object the unconscionable compulsory fees aforementioned. And the members were informed that the leadership was engaging with the Society for amicable resolution; upon failure to strike the compromise, they would institute an action for judicial review. Likewise, annexture VIND 4 depicts that on 15th November, 2024, Mr Steven Kitale Cleophace, learned advocate, issued correspondence to the Council of the Society requesting access to the Council meeting minutes and proceedings respecting the impugned notice issued on 06th November, 2024. At the back of the letter, there is a list of 15 advocates who requested the information. This is all respecting the procedure invoked by the applicants to challenge the impugned notice of compulsory payment of subscription fee of TZS 100,000/= for the financial year 2025. Thus, I subscribe to the contention made by Messrs Musalama and Kilatu that the applicants herein have not tacitly invoked the provision of section 22 of the Tanzania Law Society Act as amended by section 57 of the 22 Written laws (Misc. Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020 for requisition of the special resolution by the Society as a first step in exhausting the local remedy available before knocking the door of this court for redress. I have no materials availed to persuade me to arrive at the conclusion that the remedy available is either cumbersome and, or ineffective to warrant entertaining this matter. And, as I earlier demonstrated, the mechanism provided by the law is a speedy one, contrary to the view given by the applicant’s counsel. I apprehend that when the counsel alleged delay in the procedure provided by the law he had in mind the procedure in which ordinarily the Council convenes the Annual General Meeting of the Society the second week of April, of each calendar year in terms of section 56 of the Written Laws (Misc. Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2020 which amended the provision of 21 of the the Tanzania Law Society Act of which I agreed that it would be unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Presumably, the counsel was not alive with the procedure for requisition of a General Meeting (extraordinary general meeting) under section 22 of the Act, as amended, as one of the avenues to challenge the impugned decision of the Council, unless he deliberately unheeded the same. 23 In view of the foregoing, I purchase wholesale the opinions made by Messrs Musalama and Kilatu in that the application herein is untenable for the reason that the 1st respondent has the extra-judicial machinery to which the applicants were obliged to exhaust before applying for leave to institute an action for judicial review. In passing, I find constrained to borrow a leaf from the holding in Pavisa Enterprises vs. Minister of Labour and Youth Development and Another (Misc. Civil Cause 65 of 2003) [2007] TZHC 13 on page 8 wherein the court quoting the Book “JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN PUBLIC LAW, Second Edition, by Clive Lewis on 263 stated: “The requirement of permission is designed to filter out applications which are groundless or hopeless at an early stage. The purpose is to prevent the time of the court being wasted by busy bodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative error and to remove the uncertainties.......” [quoted from a dictum in the case of R.V.T.R.C. Exparte National Federation of Self Employed and Small Business Ltd. [1982] A.C.617 at p.643]. 24 As the finding herein above disposes of this matter, I find it needless to further delve into the remaining objections raised by both respondents herein. In fine, I find merit in the 1st limb of the objection raised by the 1st respondent which is the replica of the 1st objection raised by the 2nd respondent. I hereby sustain the respective objections. Accordingly, I hereby strike out the application herein for being filed prematurely. Based on the circumstances of this case, I make no order as for costs. I so rule. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 31st December, 2024 O. F. BWEGOGE JUDGE 25