20131129 TZHC Iringa
The period spent by the appellant in diligently pursuing a copy of the judgment must be excluded from the computation of the limitation period for filing an appeal. The appeal was not time-barred as the appellant acted promptly to obtain the judgment, and the preliminary objection is dismissed.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- 20131129 TZHC Iringa
- Parties
- Appellant: Vitus K. Asike; Respondent: Elizabeth Nindi
- Court
- TZHC
- Jurisdiction
- Tanzania
- Judgment Date
- 29 November 2013
- Procedural Posture
- Miscellaneous Land Case Appeal / Ruling on Preliminary Objection
- Outcome
- Preliminary objection dismissed with costs
- Legal Topics
- Limitation Period for Appeals, Requirement of Judgment Copy for Appeal, Computation of Limitation Period, Preliminary Objection Procedure
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Vitus K. Asike
Appellant
Elizabeth Nindi
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Land Case Appeal / Ruling on Preliminary Objection
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the appeal was filed out of time under section 38 of the Land Disputes Court Act
- 2 Whether time spent obtaining a copy of judgment should be excluded in computing limitation period for appeal
- 3 Whether a copy of judgment is necessary for filing an appeal from the District Land and Housing Tribunal
Ratio Decidendi
The period spent by the appellant in diligently pursuing a copy of the judgment must be excluded from the computation of the limitation period for filing an appeal. The appeal was not time-barred as the appellant acted promptly to obtain the judgment, and the preliminary objection is dismissed.
Court Disposition
Preliminary objection dismissed with costs
Orders
- Preliminary objection dismissed
- Respondent to pay costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
(LAND DTVIS101'{} . AT IRINGA MISCELLANEOUS LAND CASE APPEAL NO. 17 OF 2010 (From the Decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Iringa District at Iringa in Land Case Appeal No. 3 of 2010 and Original Ward Tribunal of Mkwawa Ward Application VITUS K.ASIKE ...........................................-: .. APPELLANT VERSUS ELIZABETH..NINDI ··············'.······················ RESPONDENT (Date of last Order 3. 10.2013 Date of Ruling 29.11.2013) RULING MADAM SHANGALI, J The appellant VITUS K.ASIME has filed this appeal intending to challenge the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Iringa in Misc. Land Application No. 3 qf 1 · .., ·. ) . the aecree 1n favour of the present respondent ELIZABTH .. NINDI Vira.s rejecteci. Before the hearing of the appeal Mr. · Mkwata, learned advocate for the respondent has filed preliminary objection on two poirits of law, namely: (a) That the appeal 1s improperly before the court on account of being lodged out of prescribed period and ,. · : without leave of the court. • I ;":·: (b) In the alternative the appeal is improperly -, before ~e ·· · · •.".' .coutt on account of not been accompanied . by a copy "-.of the deci:-ee appealed from. On the request made to the court by both Mr. Mkwata learned advocate for the respondent arid Mr. Kingwe, learned advocate for the appellant the court allowed the parties to argue the preliminary objection by way of ·written submission. · In his written submission, Mr. Mkwata opted to drop the second paint of preliminary objection and concentrated on the first point only. In support of his point, he submitted that, there is no -dispute that . the matter originates in the Ward Tribunal and ; •, therefore it is , .goven;1:ed by section 38 b( the Land Disputes · · • ~.v .... ... .. ... ~.,_ ~- • • •.• -r , 2 ., • Court, Act· Chapter 216. That, according to that provision of 211- a~neals 1:-,/ l of- ;1--i• ........ 8 -1-f-o-:-c;;; o.rigirrati::..1.g f:~0111 the \7\T ard L. _ _ _ ......, ..... ......, Tribunal to this court has to be filed ,vi.thin sixty (60) days after the date of the decision or order app~aled against. That, according to that provision of the law there is no !'."equirerhent of attaching copies of decree and judgment. for such appeal; and that once the . petition .. has been filed irr:~-~:.the District. Land . . . . and Housing Tribunal, the later is require,¢; within a period of 14 days to dispatch the petition, together with the record of the _proceedings of the· Ward Tribunal and District Land and ·9;. . -- ..,_ ,;,• ·..... _ . _J-Iousing Tribunai to the_High Court. - Mr. Mkwata ~ubmitted ,- I~~': .>:. -: . . .· . ., · '\:/·,·that, the computation of the prescribed period of 60 days for such appeals begin ·to run from the date of the decision· and .not from the q.ate of obtaining certified copies of the decision because such copies are not necessary for lodging such appeals.· The learned advocate stressed that . for the aggrieved . party who fails to appeal before the High Court within the prescribed period because he was not supplied with the copy of the decision which he had requested for, the law under the proviso to section 38(1) of the Land Disputes Court Act comes to his aid. The learned advocate submitted that such a party has to move the court to permit him to file his appeal out of the prescribed period. That, it is in that very application wh:e~e he will have t_o satisfy the court_ in first place, that he -- ' . llad requested for a copy of the decision· in- time 'but the --~·ou-i-f · <,.::- 3 . l :'.1.aa. fa.fieci to- supply the sarne ii--1 ttae; a.i.7.d further ti1.at·he ·will riav·e to satisfy the court . . ·with- sufficient r-easons as to v;rh,r he . . . ~ required to o bta1.~ a copy of decision · before preferring his appeal v;rhen the law does not require such a document. :rv1:r. Mkwata emphasized that an aggrieved party who fails to appeal before· the High Court ·within the presented time because he was not supplied with the copy of the judgment has ·to move the court to permit him to file his appeal out of the prescribed period. ·. __ .: · The learned advocate argued further that the canons of . ' °il)~erpretatio~' demand ·that similar provision o( two different ·statutes or more . be given similar interpretation to the extent -· · that this · court has··. in a number of cases consistently interpreted the ·provisions of section 25 of the Magistrate's Court Act (Cap 11 R.E. 2002) which govern appeals to the High Court ·in relation to matters originating iri primary courts, which is in pari-materia with section 38 of the Land Dispute Court Act with exception of the prescribed period. That, the computation of time begins to run from the date of the decision and not from the date of getting a certified copy of the decision because there is no legal requirement that a petition be accompanied by such a document. Mr. Mkwata referred this court to the decision in the cases of Gregory Raphael Vs. Pastory _Rwehabula (2005) TLR 99 and Abdallah S. Mkumba Vs. Mohamed: Lilame (2001) TLR 326 . . ;, ' .. - ., :- . . _ •~. -- .i....--· .... , ... .; ...... -·· , •• •• ! 4 .. M'.r.lvih._,--,wata ur~ed thiS court to accord similar interpretation to S ,=,.c+-·1',....., - !_ •..., ".:!;~',;,F.+-~'r"" T .-..-:.:r yl..J:· '<..J•~ U'.L '->.L .... ~ .l....la..!..li_.:_ D· .;sp .s..· . 10 -'-c Co-,--. /,-c ... ~LL-...:~ l.Ll. i.. ~-s... L~ In conclusion the learned advocate emphasized and stressed to the effect that the instant appeal is improperly before the court on account of being lodged out of the prescribed period, and without leave of the court bearing in mind that the appeal _was lodged on 27 th July 2010 while the· decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal was delivered on 30 th April 2010. He finaly invited the court to dismjss the appeal with costs. In response, Mr. Kingwe learned advocate for the appellant conceded that the appeal was indeed filed out of prescribed period of sixty days but qualified his statement to· the effect that the so called delay was caused by the fact that the appellant was waiting for a copy of judgment from the District Land and Housing Tribunal. He contended that even . though section 38 is silent on whether a petition of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of decree and the judgment, the court should observe the importance of such a document in the exercise of preparing a petition of appeal_. The learned advocate drew the attention of this court to Order XXXIX Rule ( 1) of the Civil Procedure Code which requires an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from unless the High . Court dispenses with it. He cited· the case of Mariki Vs. . ~ · 'NgQmio,;:( I 981) TLR 143. . 5 .,;: "" - .~\. ....... -~• e - ."r"•· _:....;,"l_~ . l :; ~ .. 1\/lr. Kin~re emphasied that the· copy of judgment 1s i:1d.ispensable· in appes:l process since· a. party ·who is aggrie9ed by a decision of court and Virho wishes to appeal against such decision needs a copy that decision in order to farm ulate his ·ground,s of appeal. · He further submitted that, due to the significance of a copy of a judgment the computation of 60 ··. days . of appealing should run from the date a copy of j"µ_d~ent was. issued by the lower court. In support of his ·. proposition he cited the case . of Joseph Mniga Vs. Abbas Fadh:il and Hassan , Khatib Pandu (2001) TLR 213 which . . cement~ the imp_ortance _of. a copy of judgment in appeal - .. ·~ process and clearly states that the time requisite for obtaining '· . ·,:. , ' - a: copy of decree or Order. appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded in computing the period of Limitations prescribed for an appeal. Mr. Kingwe also submitted that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent is based on a mere technicality and ~ . . that dismissing this appeal will result into great injustice to the appellant. He referred this court to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania urging the court not to allow a mere technicality to overide the substantial justice. In rejoinder, Mr. Mkwata argued that Order XXXIX Rule ( 1) of the Civil Procedure Code cited by the appellant have no applic.~tion to the instant appeal because the said provisions . governs. appeals ..on matter·s :-oiigin~ating ·in· the District Court 6 ., . . - . , '.!'f"~':_,.d.-:..,.¥:;~~~-y~~•~f."'·••~~~~-~""".',...~-•>!L_,...-___~:_........,..__:~.,--a,:,;><~-:e...,-:-__ .,,,,,.._~...,.._ ,. . ~•. ,.'.,,,s,..-.,.w.'..z.~ ... ,=.•.•l,!.•: . . :~_ •..,_i.:.,7.,_~L•~'~£-•c1•••~_,, . .-.,:~----4,:-.,,.«"f';lc_.~-,,:,:,,,_:::,,,..d,..y--.-..i{j,,}~ot:_'l._,~~~~- ..... ~ ~ • . . : . , . • ~ • • >~.. I .I in. th~ : _e):i:~rsise .of its odgihated jurisciiction \iirhiie the pres~nt .. . ' oriszinates 2.boeal :::.. . from -the Distdc-c" La;:1d ar1.d Housins;z Tribunal. . ,. '-,.• ~ in·. t:he • exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. He further con,tended that even if it is assumed that this appeal was cov~red by the said provision of the law, yet it would be, incompetent before this court because the petition of.appeal is not accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from. On the allegation that the appellant required the copy of .judgment in order,, to formulate his grounds of appeal, Mr. M:kwata responded 1n two fold. In the · first place he submitted ·. that there is no evidence · showing that the appellant had ·~equested for a copy of the judgment for that purpose and that the District Land and Housing Tribunal had failed to supply the same in time. Secondly, Mr. Mkwata argued that, where an aggrieved party has requested for a copy of the decision for his use in the appeal, and the District Land and Housing Tribunal has failed to furnish the same in time he h-as to file· an application for leave to lodge his appeal out of time under section 38 and advance such sufficient reasons to convince the court for extension of time. The crucial issue in. this matter is based on the computation of limitation period under section 38 of the Land Disputes court Act, chapter 216 of the Laws Revised Edition, 2002. As rightly submitted· by Mr. Mkwata matters originating from-the Ward Tribunal to this eourt has to be · ', '' ~.~·. :-: ·filed,. -witlrirr si5{ty ·'(E1'6y days after""the date·,·of the·'"de~fsion'.: br. 7 oraer appealed against. It is. unfortunate that section· 38 of· . the L,2-:1.d Disputes Court i\.ct, is &iient on hoVi, to· co1npu.-ce the prescribed period of sixty days. HoVirever, it is a Virell knovvn practice that in the exercise of its jurisdiction on land matters, the High Court · and District Land and Housing Tribunal have · a mandate to apply both the Civil Procedure Code, 1966, the Evidence Act, 1967 and the Law of Limitation Act, 1971. (See Sectio_n 51 and 52 (2) 4>f the Land Disputes Court Act). The Magistrate Court Act Cap 11 R.E. 2002 is not · .. · among the list. . • . ·r~ . A living example is found in the case of -~gness S.ekeroto Vs Asinati J. Lajzer, Land Appeal No. 18 of . ·. 2009, High of Tanzania at Aru~ha Registry (Unreported) ~-. where the court found that the Land Dispute Court Act does not provide .. for time limit within which an aggrieved party may .. , lodge an app:eal to the High Court in matters originating from the District Land and Housing Tribunal in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. In order to fill that lacuna, the court resolved for guidance from the Law of Limitation Act and relied on the provision at the second Schedule which provide for an appeal which no provision of limitation is provided by the Act or any other written law. Back to our instant matter, according to the record of proceedings of the District Land and Housing Tribunal, the ruling was delivered on 10 / 4 / 20 i o·. It further indicated that on 6/5/201 C? the appellant applied for a copy of ruling. That .. , application was foflowed.by anotlfer·:i:•e·quesf dated~ 15/6/2010. 8 copy on the same day. Nevertheless) at that period the prescribed period of 60 days had already expired. The petition of appeal was filed on 27 th July 2010. So far as Section 38 of the Land Dispute Court Act 1s silent on how to compute the limitation period of Sixty days, guidance must be. sought from the Law of Limitation Act, (Cap. 89 R.E. 2002). - Section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act States: "In computing the period of Limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was delivered_, and the period of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded" (Emphasis added) That is the position of the law, I am also aware that the above ·section refers to decree or order appealed from, but in my understanding that cover also a judgment or decision. Therefore taking intC? consideration the requirements of the law that the appeal must be filed by psing a petition· of appeal, and considering the efforts made '1Jy the appellant to secure a copy of judgment in order to prepare his petition of .. . ,. appeal, it 1s obvious that ·the -period of time r~quisite for . obtaining a copy •'of J{ia.g@'eiit; ~i{·§f~·•E;;·:i;~-~xtlLcied ..;~:' The I 9 :fy ;:_ ff ,, . . . !' '':,, importance. of a copy ·of Judgement 1n preparation of such - •' ... ,. ~. - • - .. & • appeals has been 1oudect in numerous_ cases by this court. Among them is the cases of Joseph Mniga {supra) and the case of Mary Kimaro Vs. Khal_fan Mohamed ( 1995) TLR 202 where it was held that: "A copy of proceedings and a copy of judgment are necessary for the purposes of framing a sound - memorandum of appeat It is from the time of supply of both such documents thqt the limitation ·of time for appeal begins to run" • On the other side I do admit that the arguments advartced by the respondents advocate are very attractive but I can not vitualise a situation where the law gives a right of app~al against a decision and yet create a situation aimed to . frustrate· that right or withhold that decision to the detriment of the appellant. In order the appellant to exercise his right of appeal the first stage is to obtain a cqpy of juc!gment in order to prepare his petition of appeal; especially where the notice of appeal is not prerequisite. Furthermore, the issue of expiry of the prescribed period of sixty days arises only after a lawful computation of prescribed period as provided under the Law of Limitation Act. In other words section 38 of the Land Dispute Court, Act comes to play or to the -aid of the belated appeal after a_ genµine computation .... of th~ prescribed period. Again~ .tpe:re 1s 10 i-. .. 'i "'!. proceedings that the s~ppellar~.t ·was· seeking the cop3~ ofju¢.grne::1t o:- decree in order to ·be accompanied in his appeal or petition. The appeilant was simply asking for a copy of judgment in order to prepare his grounds of appeal hence to exercise his right of appeal. I entirely agree with the decision in the case of Usharika wa Misiwa-DKK/DKKKT Vs. Cosmas Mwanguila, Misc. Land Case Appeal No. 28 of 2010, High. C<?urt of Tanzania, Iringa Registry (unreported) where in dep~ting fn;;>m the decision in the case of Gregory Raphael Vs Pastory Rwehabula (Supra) my Learned brother Hon. Kihio, J, observed; "No doubt this court is not bound by the ' . decision in- the case of Gregory Raphael Vs Pasto-ry Rwehabula. Iri my view, the decision in the case of Mary Kimaro Vs Khalfan is more sound than that iri the case of Gregory Raphael Vs. Pastory Rwehabula." - I am also convinced to the same view. In the circumstances of this case, equity, justice and the ·law requires computation of period of Limitation for an appeal to exclude period of time spent by the appellant in diligently ~pursuing 11 -;~·>-~:>.}:. ·.er~F{ - ~~.~ : ..... r. ,. ; his copy of judgment. In the upshot, the preiimina.1y objection raised by the respondent is hereby disrnisseci ·wit:h costs . . M.S.SrIAN<;ALi ·· JUDGE 29/11/2013 ,, Ruling delivered todate 29 / 11/2013 1n the presence of both parties in person and in the absence of their advocates. M.S.SHANGALI JUDGE 29/11/2013 12