[2023] UGCA 405

-Costs upon with drawal of a petition<br> -Consider circumstances of each case. July ~<br> -Costs awarded in a PIL matter<br> -Costs awarded in a PIL matter<br> -with costs.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

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# THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Buteera; DCJ, Kiryabwire, Kibeedi, Mulyagonja & Mugenyi JJCC)

# **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 5 OF 2020**

## **BETWEEN**

2. MORRISON RWAKAKAMBA ...................................

AND

1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UGANDA 2. THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND ....................................

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## JUDGMENT OF MONICA K. MUGENYI. JCg,

### A. Introduction

- i. Agency for Transformation ('the First Petitioner') is a self-styled Think Tank that was incorporated in Uganda as a company limited by guarantee that promotes equality, non-discrimination and equal access to justice in Uganda. Meanwhile, Mr. Morrison Rwakakamba ('the Second Petitioner) is a Ugandan human rights activist and founder of the First Petitioner, who has researched and published widely on the legalframework governing social security in Uganda. - Z. The Petitioners filed a petition in this Court challenging the constitutionality of multiple sections of the National Social Security Act (NSSF), Cap 222. The petition was supported by the Second Petitioner's affidavit of 18th May 2020, as well as two supplernerrtary affidavits deposed by the same deponent and Mr. Paul Rukundo, both of which were filed on 17th June 2020. That petition was opposed by both the Office of the Attorney General ('the First Respondent) and the National Social Security Fund of Uganda ('the Second Respondent'), who each filed responses thereto on the 27th and 28th May 2020 respectively, and affidavits in support thereof deposed by Ms. Suzan Akello Pita and Mr. Patrick Byabakama Kaberenge. The Second Respondent's Answer to the Petition specifically challenged the petition on the premise that it did not demonstrate any act by that party that either contravenes or is inconsistent with the Uganda Constitution. - 3. On 8th July 2020, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition that inter alia introduced specific causes of action against the Second Respondent including actions of the NSSF Members Annual General Assembly and the failure by the Second Respondent to operationalise a Workers Bank to cater for subsidized funding to NSSF Members' businesses. The Amended Petition was similarly opposed by the Respondents, the Second Respondent particularly averring that the issues raised by the Petitioners were already the subject of the National Social Security (Amendment) Bill, 2019, that had already been laid before the Parliament of Uganda.

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- 4. On 30^th April 2021, the Petitioners filed a notice of withdrawal of the petition, and at the hearing of the Amended Petition on 7^th June 2022, both Respondents had no objection to the withdrawal of the petition. The Second Respondent did, however, seek an order for costs. That is the singular issue for determination herein. - 5. The Petitioners were represented at the hearing by Mr. John Mary Mugisha (SC) assisted by Mr. Ronald Wanda; Mr. Ambrose Ocol, holding brief for Mr. Mark Muwonge, represented the First Respondent, while Mr. Michael Mafabi appeared for the Second Respondent.

# **B. Parties' Submissions**

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- 6. The Second Respondent contends that the Petitioners are liable to pay the costs of the petition upon withdrawal in accordance with the Constitutional Court (Petitions and References) Rules, SI No. 91 of 2005 ('the Constitutional Court Rules'). It is argued that the filing of a notice of withdrawal of a petition is only but a step towards the termination of the proceedings, which would only terminate either by dismissal without costs under rule 16(4) of the Court's Rules of Procedure or by dismissal of the petition with costs under rule 16(5) thereof. - 7. It is the contention that for a petition to be dismissed without costs, the petitioner ought to secure the consent of all parties to the petition and furnish the Court Registry with proof of such consent, which was not done in this case. Furthermore, rule $16(6)$ is opined to enjoin a petitioner that seeks to withdraw a petition with no order as to costs to apply to the Court for such orders within 14 days of filing the Notice of Withdrawal. The Petitioners in this case having failed to do so for a year would, it is argued, entitle the Second Respondent to costs. - 8. Proposing that the award of costs is a matter of written law, it is argued that the peculiar circumstances of this case would warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion in favour of the Second Respondent in accordance with section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 71 (CPA). Counsel argues that there are compelling reasons for an award of costs, to wit, the petition having been brought in bad faith and in the full knowledge of the submission of a Bill in Parliament to address the issues raised therein. It nonetheless attracted elaborate conferencing notes, as

well as numerous court attendances for a scheduling conferencing that did not proceed on account of the Petitioners' failure to respond to the Second Respondent's conferencing notes.

9. Conversely, it is the Petitioners' contention that the import of section 27 of the CPA was illuminated in the case of David lvamulerne v ev General (2014) UGSC 94, where it was held to be trite law that 'the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court, the award of costs must foltow the event unless Court for good reasons orders othenrise.' Arguing that the court's discretion in that regard should be exercised judiciously, reference is further made to the case of iza Besi ni Yoweri mmission UGSC 4, where the issue of costs was elucidated as follows (per Odoki, CJ): OO

> It is well settled that costs follow the event unless the Court orders othenvise for good reason. The discretion accorded to the Court to deny a successful party costs of litigation must be exercised judicially and for good cause. Costs are an indemnity to compensate the successful litigant the expenses incurred during the litigation. Costs are not intended to be punitive but a successful litrgant may be deprived of his costs in only exceptional circumstances.

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- 10.;t is argued for the Petitioners that if a Court decides to depart from the general rule, the Court is obliged to give reason for not awarding costs to a successful litigant. ln this case. it is argued, the matter did not go to full trial but was withdrawn for having been overtaken by events. Furthermore, the petition had been lodged under the rubric of public interest litigation which in the interest of justice would require the exercise of judicialdiscretion not to award costs. lt is argued that to the extent that the petition highlighted several provisions of the impugned Act that did not serve the interests of the Fund's members, it raised legal issues that are critical to the political and constitutionaldevelopment of the country and is a befitting case for an order for each party to bear its own costs. Reference in that regard was made to the approach adoPted in Prince J Mpuqa Ruk i v Prince Solomon Iquru & rs. Constituti AoDeal No. ¹ ⁸af ¹⁹⁹⁴ (unreported ) - ¹¹. Further reference is made to Kiiza Besiq ve v Museveni Kaouta & Electoral ^C ommission (supra), where it was observed as follows (per Karokora, JSC) -l

In order to encourage people like the Petitioner to come to Court and help in the development of our legal, historical and Constitutional development in Uganda, such people should be encouraged. Costs should not be awarded by way of penalising them so that they should get scared from coming to Court.

12. In the same vein, deference is made to the proposition of Mulenga, JSC in the

same case as follows:

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In the case of Major Gen. D. Tinyefuza Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997 (SCU) (unreported) this Court ordered each party to bear its costs although the appeal was dismissed. The Court's reasons for doing so were that in order to encourage Constitutional litigation parties who go to Court should not be saddled with the opposite party's costs if they lose. If potential litigants know that they would face prohibitive costs of litigation, they would think twice before taking Constitutional issues to Court. Such discouragement would have adverse effect on development of exercise of the Court's jurisdiction of judicial review of the conduct of authorities or individuals which are unconstitutional. It would also stifle the growth of our Constitutional jurisprudence. The culture of Constitutionalism should be nurtured, not stunted in this Country, which prohibitive litigation costs would do if left to grow unchecked.

13. Furthermore, Counsel for the Petitioners cites the case of Advocates for Natural Resources Governance and Development & 2 Others v Attorney General & Another (2013) UGCC 10, where this Court held that where costs are awarded in public interest matters, the actual amounts taxed and allowed should be nominal in respect of professional fees and the rest should only be awarded in respect of disbursements. In any event, it is argued that costs in public interest litigation cases should be reserved for rare cases but, even then, a court should balance the need to compensate the successful litigant with the value that underpin public interest litigation such as the development of constitutional jurisprudence.

14. Seeking to distinguish the circumstances of the present case from those that obtained in Muwanga Kivumbi v Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 6 of 2011 (as cited by the Second Respondent), it is argued that the above authority did not entirely raise matters of public interest and, unlike the present petition, was withdrawn at a late stage after it had been heard in the Constitutional and Supreme Courts. Counsel disputes any connotation of bad faith in the filing of this petition as the Bill in question had not yet been tabled at the time, there is no indication that

the Petitioners were aware of its existence and, in any case, there was no guarantee that it would be passed. lt is opined that the Second Respondent has not demonstrated any prejudice to it as a result of the withdrawal of the petition so as to warrant an award of costs in relation thereto.

#### C. Determination

- 15. The facts of this case are that a notice of withdrawal of the petition was filed on 30th April 2021,long before either the scheduling conference held on 25th August 2021 or the hearing of the petition. At the scheduling conference, both Respondents did not oppose the withdrawal of the petition but sought costs. At the hearing of the matter, however, the First Respondent was agreeable to the withdrawal of the petition without costs but the Second Respondent remained emphatic on its withdrawalwith costs and filed written submissions to that effect. - 16. The withdrawal of constitutional petitions is governed by rule 16 of the Constitutional Court Rules. For brevity, that provision is reproduced below. - (1) A petitionet may at any time after presenting a petition in the Court and before the petition is called on for hearing, lodge in the Registry, notice in writing that he or she wishes to withdraw the petitaon.

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- (2) The petitioner shall, before or within seven days after lodging the notice of withdrawal, serve copies of the notice on each respondent who has complied with rule 6. - (3) Where there is more than one petitioner, the petition shall not be withdrawn without the consent of the other petitioners. - (4) lf all the parties to the oetition consent to the withdrawal of the oetition. the petitioner mav lodqe in the aooropriate reoistrv the document or documents sionifvino the consent of the oarties: and the oetition shall then be dismissed without costs. - (5) lf not all the oarties consent to the withdrawal of the petition. the oetition shall stand dismissed with costs. exceot as aoainst anv Dartv who has consented. unless the Court. on the aoolication of the oetitioner. otherwise orders. - (6) An application under subrule (5) shall be made within fourteen days after the lodging of the nolice of withdraw al. (my emphasis)

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17. Meanwhile, rule 23 of the same Rules provides for the application of the CPA, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions (Court of Appeal Rules) in the following terms:

Subject to the provisions of these Rules, the practice and procedure in respect of a petition or a reference shall be regulated, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act and the rules made under that Act and the Court of Appeal Rules, with such modifications as the Court may consider necessary in the interest of justice and expedition of the proceedings. $(my \text{ emphasis})$

- 18. To the extent that rule 23 above subjects the applicability of the CPA, CPR and Court of Appeals to the express provisions of the Constitutional Court Rules, the latter rules would take precedence over the former set of rules in relation to constitutional petitions and references. That notwithstanding, however, given the emphasis in rule 23 for the regulation of petitions and references 'as nearly as may be in accordance' with the CPA, CPR and the Court of Appeal Rules, courts are enjoined to endeavour to apply the Constitutional Court Rules with appropriate regard to related provisions in the cited substantive and procedural laws. The import of that procedural rule, in my view, is that recourse should be made to the CPA, CPR and Court of Appeal Rules to address any lacunas in the Constitutional Court Rules. - 19. Rule 16 of the Constitutional Court Rules is quite clear on the procedure for the withdrawal of petitions and would not require supplementation either by Order 25 rules 1 and 2 of the CPR or rule 94 of the Court of Appeal Rules. In any case, rule 94 of the Court of Appeal Rules is materially similar to rule 16 of the Constitutional Court Rules. However, the question of costs having arisen in this case, section 27 of the CPA sets out the substantive law on that subject and is instructive on how the award of costs should be approached, setting out the guiding parameters in the following terms: - (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incident to all suits shall be in the discretion of the Court or judge, and the Court or judge shall have full power to determine by whom and out of what property and to

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what extent those costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the PurPoses aforesaid'

(2) The fact that the court or judge has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of the powers in subsection (1); but the costs of anv action. cause or other matter or issue shall follow the event unless the court or iudoe shall for qood reason otherwise order. (my emphasis)

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- 20. The Second Respondent invoked this Court's discretionary power as encapsulated in section 27(1) of the CPA to urge the award of costs to it. However, the discretionary power granted to courts to determine the question of costs is in that statutory provision subject to 'such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force.' With regard to the withdrawal of constitutional petitions, these laws, conditions and O limitations are articulated in section 27(2) of the CPAand rule 16(4) and (5) of the constitutional court Rules, as well as applicable case law. - 2l. Section 27(2) explicitly prescribes the general rule that costs should follow the event unless a court for good reason decides otherwise. Accordingly, the discretion in sub-rule (1) of that section would be judiciously exercised within the ambit of that general rule. Furthermore, it is recognised that the requirement in section 27(2) for costs to follow the event literally means costs should be awarded to the successful party in any litigation. However, a petition that is withdrawn before it has been heard as envisaged under section 16(1) of the Constitutional Court Rules can scarcely be considered to have yielded a successful party to which the costs of the litigation may be awarded under section 27(2) of the CPA- Parties' consent to such a withdrawal would further compound the question as to where 'the event'lies, which might perhaps explain the position in rule 16(4) of the Constitutional Court Rules that in those circumstances the withdrawn petition would be dismissed without costs. - 22. Bethat as it may, section 27(2)does additionally prescribe an exceptionalcondition under which courts may depart from the general rule espoused thereunder, to wit, that costs need not follow the event where 'the court or judge shall for good reason order.' As quite correctly argued by learned Counsel for the Petitioners, public interest litigation has emerged as one of the circumstances that constitute

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good reason to depart from the general rule espoused in section 27(2) of the CPA. See Kiiza Besigye v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta & Electoral Commission (supra).

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- 23. However, it is recognised that in yet other exceptional circumstances costs may be awarded in accordance with the general rule despite a matter entailing public interest litigation. Hence, in in Advocates for Natural Resources Governance and Development & 2 Others v Attorney General & Another (supra) it was observed by this Court that where costs are awarded in public interest litigation 'the actual amounts taxed and allowed should be nominal in respect of professional fees, the rest should simply be awarded only in respect of disbursements.' - 24. More importantly, rule 16(4) and (5) of the Constitutional Court Rules is yet another legal provision that delimits the discretionary powers of courts under section $27(1)$ of the CPA insofar as it hinges the award of costs upon the withdraw of a petition on parties' consent or lack thereof. So that, where the consent of all parties is secured the petition would be dismissed without costs under rule 16(4), but where such consent is not forthcoming, the petition would stand dismissed with costs under rule $16(5)$ 'unless the Court, on the application of the petitioner, otherwise orders.' No such application was filed in this case. - 25. Consequently, faced with the withdrawal of a constitutional petition, this Court's discretionary power as stipulated in section $27(1)$ would be tempered by the general rule in section 27(2) of the CPA, as well as the more explicit provisions of rule 16(4) and (5) of the Constitutional Court Rules. Whereas public interest litigation might ordinarily be considered a good reason to depart from the general rule in section 27(2) of the CPA where a petition has gone to full trial; the unequivocal provisions of rule 16(4) and (5) of the Constitutional Court Rules clearly delimit the procedure in the event of the withdrawal of a petition. Indeed, all the constitutional appeals cited to us by learned Counsel for the Petitioner where public interest formed the basis for the departure from the general rule were determined on their merits. This is not the case presently and for that reason I would decline to follow them in deference to the legal imperatives set out in rule 16 of the Constitutional Court Rules. $\overline{0}$

- 26. Turning to the merits of this case, the Second Respondent's Answer to the Petition clearly contested the Petition for disclosing no cause of action against it in the form of any act by that party that amounted to a constitutional violation. The Petitioners responded by amending the petition to introduce a cause of action by way of acts of the Second Respondent's Annual General Assembly, as well as its failure to operationalise a Workers Bank for its membership. Aside from the fact that the amendment of pleadings to introduce a cause of action where there was none is legally questionable; the Second Respondent countered the Amended Petition with the assertion in paragraph 21 ol its affidavit in support of the Answer to the Amended Petition that the issues raised by the Petitioners were the subject of an amendment to the NSSF Act that was already before the Parliarnent. A year later, the Petitioners filed the notice of withdraw of the petition' - 2T. Firsland foremost, t do not find the petition to have been overtaken by events. On the contrary, the chronology of events is that the NSSF (Amendment) Bill had been presented to Parliament in August 2019, the petition was filed in May 2020 and subsequently amended in July 2020. The Petitioners as self-styled Think-Tank in the area of equal access to justice and expert on the Ugandan social security legal framework respectively, ought to have known that the NSSF (Amendment) Bill had been presented to Parliament six months before they filed their petition. The subsequent amendment of the petition to raise issues that were canvassed in the Bill supports the view that they prematurely filed a petition before this Court that they subsequently had no choice but withdraw. ln so doing they occasioned costs upon the Second Respondent for which it seeks recompense. ln my considered view, the provisions of rule 16(4) and (5) of this Court's rules of procedure were intended to avert such misguided filing of constitutional petitions with the resultant expenses to opposite parties. I do not think those procedural rules stifle the withdrawal of petitions: they obviate the filing of unnecessary petitions. - 28. Secondly, there is no consent by the Second Respondent to the withdrawal of the petition so as to bring it within the confines of rule 16(4) of this Court's rules of procedure. ln my view, the consent that is envisaged in that sub-rule ought to include a waiver of costs. That would appear to be the import of rule 16(5), which is couched in terms that would suggest that the dismissal of a petition upon its

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('pttstittlllttttltl ['}ctilitrtt \.. i .l ]tlllt withdrawal is inevitable, with or without the consent of the parties, the only bone of contention being the award of costs. The fact that the costs awardable thereunder would only be available to the party that withheld its consent would suggest that its consent to the withdrawal per se is immaterial if it nonetheless claims the costs incidental thereto. Stated differently, consent to the withdrawal of a petition as contemplated under rule 16 of the Constitutional Court Rules would only be recognised where it includes a waiver of costs and proof of the said consent is duly filed in the court in accordance with rule 16(4) of the Rules. Such proof of consent was not forthcoming in this matter.

29. A similar approach was adopted in Crane Bank Limited (in Receivership) v Sudhir Ruparelia & Meera Investments Limited (2022) UGSC 4, where the withdrawal of an appeal before the Supreme Court under rule 90(1) of the Supreme Court Rules was opposed in writing by the respondent under rule 90(4) of the said Rules on the ground inter alia that the procedure for consensual withdrawal of the appeal had not been followed. Rule 90(4) reads as follows:

If all the parties to the appeal do not consent to the withdrawal of the appeal, the appeal shall stand dismissed with costs, except as against any party who has consented, unless the court on the application of the appellant, otherwise orders.

30. The foregoing rule is in all material aspects similar to rule 16(5) of the Constitutional Court Rules that is in issue before us presently, which is reproduced below for ease of reference.

If not all the parties consent to the withdrawal of the petition, the petition shall stand dismissed with costs, except as against any party who has consented, unless the Court, on the application of the petitioner, otherwise orders.

31. In Crane Bank Limited (in Receivership) v Sudhir Ruparelia & Meera Investments Limited (supra), the Supreme Court construed rule 90(4) of the Supreme Court Rules as follows:

In line with rule 90(4) of the rules of this court, where either party to the appeal objects to the withdrawal, the appeal stands dismissed with costs.

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Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 2020

- 32. Similarly, in the matter before us where the Second Respondent seeks costs, that party is deemed to have withheld its consent to the withdrawal and would accordingly be entitled to costs under rule 16(5) of the Constitutional Court Rules. - 33. Unlike Crane Bank Limited (in Receivership) v Sudhir Ruparelia & Meera Investments Limited (supra), it is acknowledged that the present petition does indeed raise issues of public interest. In accordance with the position advanced in **Advocates for Natural Resources Governance and Development & 2 Others** v Attorney General & Another (supra), therefore, I would award such costs in this petition as are restricted to disbursements and nominal professional fees.

#### D. Conclusion

34. The upshot of my consideration hereof is that this petition stands dismissed with costs to the Second Respondent, such costs to be restricted to disbursements and nominal professional fees.

I would so order.

Dated and delivered at Kampala this ... $\frac{2}{3}$ c $\frac{1}{2}$ day of ....... $\frac{1}{2}$ c $\frac{1}{2}$ ....................................

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mungemy,

Monica K. Mugenyi **Justice of the Constitutional Court**

Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 2020

## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Buteera-DCJ, Kiryabwire, Kibeedi, Mulyagonja & Mugenyi JJCC)

## CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 5 OF 2020

1. AGENCY FOR TRANSFORMATION **PETITIONERS** 2. MORRIOSN RWAKAKAMBA $\scriptstyle\scriptstyle\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=}$

#### **VERSUS**

### 1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UGANDA 2. THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND $==$ RESPONDENTS

## JUDGMENT OF RICHARD BUTEERA, DCJ

I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the Judgment of Justice Monica K. Mugenyi, JCC.

I agree with her reasoning, decision and declarations she proposed. I have nothing useful to add.

As Kiryabwire, Kibeedi and Mulyagonja, JJCC members of this Coram also agree, this Petition stands dismissed with costs to the $2^{nd}$ Respondent, such costs to be restricted to disbursements and nominal professional fees.

Dated this ....................................

IRD. to a

hard Buteera DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE


# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 05 OF 2020**

1. AGENCY FOR TRANSFORMATION **================= PETITIONERS** 2. MORRISON RWAKAKAMBA

#### **VERSUS**

1. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UGANDA 2. THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND $\vdash$ ===============RESPONDENTS

CORAM: Hon. Mr. Justice Richard Buteera, DCJ

Hon. Mr. Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire, JA/JCC

Hon. Mr. Justice Muzamiru M. Kibeedi, JA/JCC

Hon. Lady. Justice Irene Mulyagonja, JA/JCC

Hon. Mr. Justice Oscar Kihika, JA/JCC

# JUDGMENT OF MR. JUSTICE GEOFFREY KIRYABWIRE, JA/JCC

I have had the opportunity of reading the lead Judgment of the Hon. Lady. Justice Monica K. Mugenyi, JA/JCC in draft.

I agree with it and I have nothing more useful to add.

2023. day of $\frac{\text{NOV}}{\text{NOV}}$ $30^m$ Dated at Kampala this\_

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HON. MR. JÚSTICE GEOFFREY KIRYABWIRE JUSTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

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### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

## IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Buteera, DCJ; Kiryabwire, Kibeedi, Mulyagonja & Mugenyi, JJCC)

## **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO 05 OF 2020**

#### 1. AGENCY FOR TRANSFORMATION] **EXAMPLE 2017** PETITIONERS $\mathbf{1}$

2. MORRISON RWAKAKAMBA

### **VERSUS**

$10$

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1. ATTORNEY GENERAL 2. NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND ]

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## JUDGMENT OF MUZAMIRU MUTANGULA KIBEEDI, JCC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the Lead Judgment prepared by my learned sister, Hon. Lady Justice Monica K. Mugenyi, JCC. I concur with the orders proposed based on the analysis and conclusions she has made.

Delivered and dated at Kampala this $\frac{20.3}{2}$ day $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Micikessi

Muzamiru Mutangula Kibeedi JUSTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

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### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

Coram: Buteera; DCJ, Kiryabwire, Kibeedi, Mulyagonja & Mugenyi, JJCC

CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 5 OF 2020

#### **BETWEEN**

### **EXAMPLE 11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:** 1. AGENCY FOR TRANSFORMATION 2. MORRISON RWAKAKAMBA

AND

1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UGANDA 2. THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND :::::::: RESPONDENTS

## RULING OF IRENE MULYAGONJA, JCC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the ruling of my sister, Monica K. Mugenyi, JCC. I agree that the petition should be dismissed on account of withdrawal with costs to the $2^{nd}$ respondent.

Date at Kampala this $30^{\circ}$ day of $\frac{\text{Nov}}{2023}$ .

Damysonje.

Irene Mulyagonja JUSTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT