[2023] UGCommC 152

# 5 **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA [COMMERCIAL DIVISION] MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 844 OF 2023 [ARISING FROM CIVIL SUIT NO. 426 OF 2023]** 10 **PAMELA ANYOTI ] APPLICANT VERSUS**

15 **ROOT CAPITAL INC ] RESPONDENT**

**Before: Hon. Justice Ocaya Thomas O. R**

#### **RULING**

## 20

## **Introduction**

The Applicant brought this application under the provisions of Order 36 Rule 4 and Order 52 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR") and Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act ("CPA") seeking the following reliefs:

- 25 (a) The Applicant/Defendant be granted unconditional leave to appear and defend Civil Suit 426 of 2023 - (b)Costs of this Application be provided for.

The background to the present action, as far as can be deduced from the pleadings, is a 30 fairly checkered one. Between September 2013 and September 2014, the Respondent advanced two loans to a company called Sunshine Agroproducts Limited ('SAPL"). The first loan was for USD 250,000 and the second loan for USD 480,000. It is contended by the Respondent that it extracted two guarantees from the Applicant (dated 24th September 2013 and 2nd September 2014) to repay these loans (including any interest


5 and charges due) in the event that SAPL defaulted. Payment by the Applicant of the sums due and owing in the event of SAPL's default would be on demand by the Respondent.

SAPL defaulted on its loan obligations leading the Respondent to issue a demand to the Applicant for payment of USD 1,206,104.97 on both loans being the amounts it said were

10 owing as at 22nd March 2023 when the demand was issued. It is an agreed fact between the parties that the Applicant has not made payment on this demand. The Respondent then filed Civil Suit 426 of 2023 ("the main suit") by specially endorsed plaint seeking to recover the amounts it says are due and owing on the loans issued to SAPL from the Applicant as a guarantor of the said loans.

On the other hand, the Applicant commenced this application for leave to appear and defend in the main suit.

## **Representation**

20 The Applicant was represented by M/s Kasirye, Byaruhanga & Co. Advocates while the Respondent was represented by M/s S & L Advocates.

# **Evidence and Submissions**

The Applicant led evidence by way of an affidavit in support deponed by herself. The 25 Respondent led evidence by way of an affidavit in reply deponed by Martin Buyeka, the Respondent's regional risk manager for Africa.

Both parties made submissions in support of their respective cases for which I am thankful. I have not seen the need to reproduce the same below but I have read and 30 factored the same in coming to my decision below.

## **Decision**

As noted above, the main suit was commenced by way of specially endorsed plaint under the provisions of **Order 36 Rule 2** of the Civil Procedure Rules["CPR"]. This procedure is 5 used to originate liquidated or certain claims for which it is believed that the Defendant does not have a defence to the claim.

In this procedure, there is no automatic right to defend. The right to defend is only conferred by the leave of court, upon an application by the Defendant in the summary 10 suit.

Under the provisions of **Order 36 Rule 3** of the CPR, a defendant to a summary suit, who is served with summons, ought to file an application for leave to appear and defend within the timelines indicated in the summons. Failure to do so will entitle the plaintiff

15 to a judgment in default for the sums claimed. Equally so, when an application for leave to appear and defend fails, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment without further proof of the claim. [See **Order 36 Rule 5** of the CPR]

The rationale for summary procedure has been summarised in the long standing decision

- 20 of **Post Bank (U) Ltd v Abdul Ssozi SCCA 8/2015** where the Supreme Court held thus: "Order 36 was enacted to facilitate the expeditious disposal of cases involving debts and contracts of a commercial nature to prevent defendants from presenting frivolous or vexatious defences in order to unreasonably prolong litigation. Apart from assisting the courts in disposing of cases expeditiously, Order 36 also helps the economy by removing - 25 unnecessary obstructions in financial or commercial dealings." See also **Zola & Another v. Ralli Brothers Ltd. & Another [1969] EA 691, 694**.

The Applicant brought this application for unconditional leave to appear and defend the main suit. **Order 36 Rule 4** of the CPR provides thus:

30 "An application by a defendant served with a summons in Form 4 of Appendix A for leave to appear and defend the suit shall be supported by affidavit, which shall state whether the defence alleged goes to the whole or to part only, and if so, to what part of the plaintiff's claim, and the court also may allow the defendant making the application to be examined on oath. For this purpose, the court may order the defendant, or, in the case of

- 5 a corporation, any officer of the corporation, to attend and be examined upon oath, or to produce any lease, deeds, books or documents, or copies of or extracts from them. The plaintiff shall be served with notice of the application and with a copy of the affidavit filed by a defendant." - 10 As I said, summary procedure presupposes that the defendant does not have a defence and that there is no matter to try. It follows that if the defendant shows that it has a defence or that there is a matter to try, summary procedure is untenable. In **Kotecha v. Mohammed [2002] 1 EA 112**, the threshold for grant of leave to appear and defend was laid out: - 15 "Therefore English authorities on that rule are of persuasive authority and provide (a) useful guide. Under the English Rule the Defendant is granted leave to appear and defend if he is able to show that he has a good defence on the merit(s); or that a difficult point of law is involved; or a dispute as to the facts which ought to be tried; or a real dispute as to the amount claimed which requires taking an account to determine; or any other 20 circumstances showing reasonable grounds of a bona fide defence. See Saw v Hakim 5

[See also **Churanjilal & Co. v. A. H. Adam (1950) 17 EACA, 92, Hasmani v. Banque du Congo Belge (1938) 5 EACA 89 at 89**]

- 25 It follows that it is not sufficient to simply deny indebtedness. Some older decisions such as the decision of the majority **in Photo Focus (U) Ltd. v. Group Four Security Ltd CACA 30/2000** suggest that a mere denial of indebtedness, without more, is a good defence. I do not think this to be the case. This is because, first a general denial of indebtedness is not itself a valid defence under the CPR. [See **Order 6 Rule 8 of the CPR, Ecobank** - 30 **Uganda Limited v Kalson's Agrovet Concern Ltd & Anor HCCS 573/2016**]

TLR 72; Ray v Barker 4 Ex DI 279."

If the reasoning in the Photo Focus decision was to be applied, it would mean that summary procedure would never work since the defendant could easily bring an application for leave to appear and defend with three paragraphs; one introducing

- 5 himself, a second indicating he or she or it denies indebtedness and a third indicating that he believes all the averments are true and the application would have to succeed. Second, the purpose of an application for leave to appear and defend is to show that there is something to try, such that granting of a summary judgment is not in the interests of justice. - 10

Third, and as observed by Justice Irene Mulyagonja *(as she then was)* in **George Begumisa v East African Development Bank HCMA 451/2010**, the decision in Foto Focus has been departed from by the Court of Appeal which issued it, as evidence in the Kotecha Decision.

The sum total of the above is that an Applicant must show one of two things; either that they have a defence to the claim, or that there is a there is a matter to try. This can be summarised by saying that an Applicant for leave to appear and defend must show that there is a triable issue whether this is a contestation caused by their defence to the claim 20 or some other issue of fact or law affecting the matter.

Having established the threshold for determination of applications of this nature, I must now turn to the applicant's defence/grounds for the application for leave to appear and defend.

# *The Applicant's defence*

The Applicant attached a draft defence. The Applicant also spelt out their grounds of defence in the main suit, in order to enable the court to assess whether this was a sufficient to grant leave to appear and defend.

The thrust of the Applicant's defence against the main suit is

(a) The claim against the Applicant in the main suit was fully and finally determined Originating Summons No. 5 of 2021.

- 5 (b)The liability of the Applicant as well as SAPL was finally and conclusively determined in Originating Summons No. 11 of 2022 where this court found in favour of the Applicant. - (c) The main suit does not raise a cause of action against the Applicant/Defendant. - (d)The main suit is bad in law, frivolous and an attempt to harass the Applicant by 10 seeking remedies which the Respondent/Plaintiff has already been granted. - (e) The main suit is premature and incompetent as the principal debtor is not a party to the main suit. - (f) As a third-party mortgagor, the Applicant is not liable to pay the sums claimed by the Respondent, being the same sums which the main suit seeks to recover. - 15 (g) The Respondent/Plaintiff has already foreclosed the mortgaged securities and commenced collection of the sums due and owing and therefore the Applicant/Defendant cannot be held liable twice for the same debt.

We will explore the above heads of defence and see if they reveal a triable issue.

I note that many of the grounds of defence by the Applicant are questions of law/points of law. Points of law do not need to be tried, as they don't require evidence to dispose of. See **Odongokara & Ors v Kamuhanda & Anor [1968] EA 210, ATC Uganda v Smile Communications Limited HCMA 621/2023**

It follows that the same can be disposed of herein without having to refer them to disposal in the main suit as grounds of defence requiring trial/investigation. I will handle the first two heads of defence together namely (a) and (b) above.

# 30 The Contentions in the main suit have fully and finally been resolved in OS 5/2021 and OS 11/2022

OS 11/2022 was filed by the Respondent seeking delivery of possession of mortgaged property by the mortgagor and seeking orders of sale of the said mortgaged property.

- 5 This suit was dismissed on three preliminary points of law by this court. The court returned the finding that; - *(a)The affidavit in support deponed by Josephine Muhaise, an advocate working with S&L Advocates was fatally defective as it touched on contentious issues in violation of the Advocates Act. The same therefore rendered OS 5/2021* 10 *incompetent.* - *(b)The liability of the principal borrower, SAPL, needed to first be established before orders for delivery of mortgaged property and sale of the same could be pursued against the Applicant herein as a third-party mortgagee/guarantor.*

The Respondent then filed OS 11/2022 seeking similar reliefs as above but this time, with the affidavit in support deponed by an officer of the Respondent. The orders sought above were granted, and the Respondent thereby took over possession of the property mortgaged by the Applicant in favour ofthe Respondent as security for SAPL's repayment 20 of the loans advanced to it.

The Applicant contends that, owing to the two decisions above, the issues in dispute in the main suit have been fully and finally resolved by the court and are res judicata.

# 25 **Section 7** of the Civil Procedure Act provides thus:

"No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue has been

30 subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by that court. Explanation 1. —The expression "former suit" shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior to it.

5 Explanation 2. —For the purposes of this section, the competence of a court shall be determined irrespective of any provision as to right of appeal from the decision of that court.

Explanation 3. —The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.

10 Explanation 4. —Any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in that suit.

Explanation 5. —Any relief claimed in a suit, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.

- 15 Explanation 6. —Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in that right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating." - 20 The doctrine of Res Judicata, now codified in Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act traces its roots from the latin maxim *nemo debt bis vexari pro una et eada causa* (No one should be vexed twice for the same cause). The position of the law, therefore, is that once a matter has been fairly and correctly tried once, it should be tried again. Litigation must come to an end. See **Cwezi Properties v UDB HCMA 1315 OF 2022, ATC Uganda v** - 25 **Smile Communications Uganda Limited HCCS 842/2023, Geraldine Busingye Begumisa v EADB & Ors HCMA 436/2022**

In **Karia and another v. Attorney General and others [2005] 1 EA 83**, the court laid out a three item test to determine whether a matter was res judicata. The test is as below:

30 (a) there has to be a former suit or issue decided by a competent court

(b) the matter in dispute in the former suit between the parties must also be directly or substantially in dispute between the parties in the suit where the doctrine is pleaded as a bar, and 5 (c) the parties in the former suit should be the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title.

In **Boutique Shazim Limited v. Norattam Bhatia & Anor CACA No.36 of 2007** court held that essentially the test to be applied by court to determine the question of res

- 10 judicata is this: is the plaintiff in the second suit or subsequent action trying to bring before the court, in another way and in the form of a new cause of action which he / she has already put before a court of competent jurisdiction in earlier proceedings and which has been adjudicated upon? If the answer is in the affirmative, the plea of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the first court was actually required to adjudicate - 15 but to every point which belonged to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties or their privies exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.

The burden of proving res judicata is on the Respondent who alleges it. See **Onzia Elizabeth v Shaban Fadul & Anor HCCA 19/2013**, Mary Luswata v Exim Bank HCMA 20 1118 OF 2023

It is true that there is a former suit(s) (requirement (a) above) and the parties in that suit/those suits are the same as the ones in the main suit (requirement (b) above). It is clear that the main suit is for the recovery of USD 1,206,104.94 arising from the alleged 25 breach of guaranty agreements by the Applicant. The allegations in the specially endorsed plaint are that the Applicant guaranteed loans to SAPL, SAPL defaulted on those loans, a demand was made to the Applicant in her capacity as a guarantor, she refused to honor the demand and perform her contract of guarantorship and therefore, there is a breach of the said agreement entitling the Respondent to recover the said sums. (See 30 Paras 4-5 of the specially endorsed plaint).

OS 5/2022 and OS 11/2022 sought for orders to obtain possession of the mortgaged property which the Applicant mortgaged to the Respondent as security for the repayment of loans advanced to SAPL. Whereas I will deal with this a little later, it must

- 5 be understood that the mortgaged property is a separate and distinct security from a guarantee which is another security. OS 5/2022 and OS 11/2022 sought to enable the Respondent to recover and liquidate one security namely the mortgaged property while the main suit seeks to call on and liquidate the second security namely the guarantees. In my view, those are separate and distinct claims. The claim in the main suit has not been - 10 handled and disposed of and is therefore not Res Judicata. I therefore return the finding that heads of defence (a) and (b) neither impeach the competency of the main suit nor disclose a triable issue warranting grant of leave to appear and defend.

## *(c) The main suit does not raise a cause of action against the* 15 *Applicant/defendant.*

The ingredients of a cause of action were laid down in the long standing authority of in **Auto Garage v. Motokov [1971] E. A 514**, as

- (a) the plaintiff enjoyed a right; - 20 (b)the right had been violated; and - (c) that it was the defendant that is liable.

All the three elements should be present in the plaint for there to be a cause of action. In considering whether a suit discloses a cause of action or not, one looks ordinarily only at 25 the plaint and assumes that the facts alleged therein are true. **See Tororo Cement Co. Ltd v Frokina International Limited SCCA No.2 of2001, Attorney General v. Oluoch [1972] E. A 392 at 394**, **Sullivan v. Mohamed Osman [1959] E. A 239, Kings Collage Buddo Staff Savings Scheme Limited v Lukanga Bosco and Another HCCS 26/2020, Kapeka Coffee Works Ltd v NPART CACA No. 3 of 2000.**

A perusal of the specially endorsed plaint shows that the Respondent asserts that the Applicant guaranteed two loans to SAPL, those loans fell in default, the Respondent called on the Applicant's guarantees and the Applicant has failed/refused to honour its obligations under the guarantees by making good SAPL's default. In short, the

- 5 Respondent asserts that it enjoyed a right to obtain payment of any sums due and owing in the event of SAPL's default from the Applicant as guarantor (ingredient (a)), the Applicant has violated that right by refusing or failing to make payment of the sums due and owing (ingredients (b) and (c)). In my view, a cause of action has been made out in the Respondent's pleadings in the main suit. I therefore return the finding that heads of - 10 defence (a) and (b) neither impeach the competency of the main suit nor disclose a triable issue warranting grant of leave to appear and defend.

# *(d)The main suit is bad in law, frivolous and an attempt to harass the Applicant by seeking remedies which the Respondent/Plaintiff has already been granted (the*

## 15 *suit is vexatious).*

While the Applicant in her defence and supporting affidavit argued that the main suit is bad in law, the Applicant did not refer to a specific law rendering the suit bad in law. Even if it could be said that this assertion was made in respect of Section 7 of the CPA, the same would be without merit as I have already found above.

In **John Garuga Musinguzi & Anor v Dr. Chris Baryomunsi & Anor HCMC 817/2016**, court defined a vexatious thus:

"A "vexatious" claim or complaint is one (or a series of many) that is specifically being pursued to simply harass, annoy or cause financial cost to their recipient."

25 See Also **Meera Investments & Ors v Nathan Lukozi HCMA 399/2022, Allan Makula v First Finance Bank Limited HCMA 848/2022, ATC v Smile Communications Uganda Limited (above), Mary Luswata v Exim Bank (above)**

In my view, the claims in the main suit are not vexatious. My assessment is that the main 30 suit is an action to enforce a set of guarantees and the same cannot be said, in any way to vexatious. The fact that there are many suits between the same parties, even if commenced totally or largely by one party, does not make them, without more, vexatious. What is required is to demonstrate that the action is one which, on the face of the

- 5 pleadings, is without merit and is intended, at least in part, merely to annoy or cause financial cost, hardship or discomfort to the other party. - (a) The main suit is premature and incompetent as the principal debtor is not a party to the main suit. - (b)As a third-party mortgagor, the Applicant is not liable to pay the sums claimed by the - 10 Respondent, being the same sums which the main suit seeks to recover. - (c) The Respondent/Plaintiff has already foreclosed the mortgaged securities and commenced collection of the sums due and owing and therefore the Applicant/Defendant cannot be held liable twice for the same debt. - 15 These heads of defence are very interconnected and I felt it appropriate to resolve them at the same time.

It is not disputed that the Applicant gave two guarantees in favour of the Respondent securing the repayment of the loans advanced to SAPL. Whereas the Applicant argued 20 that it is a third party mortgagor and not a guarantor, the guarantee agreements adduced by the Respondent were not challenged, meaning that they were authentic.

The guarantees were not capped but were continuing securities. The guarantees were also absolute, unconditional, irrevocable and continued in force notwithstanding any 25 amendment, modification, waiver or consent in respect of the loan agreement or any other related documents (See Clauses 1-3 of Annexure R1 and Clauses 2,3,4, 7,8 of Annex R² of the Respondent's affidavit in reply)

The Applicant has not challenged the validity or enforceability of these agreements. It is 30 not in dispute that SAPL, the borrower has defaulted on its obligations under the loan agreements.

**Section 71** of the Contracts Act, 2010 provides thus

"(1) The liability of a guarantor shall be to the extent to which a principal debtor is liable, unless otherwise provided by a contract.

# 5 (2) For the purpose of this section the liability of a guarantor takes effect upon default by the principal debtor."

A guarantee is a contractual agreement to make payment of sums due and owing in the event of default by the principal borrower. The Guarantee is a separate security from any 10 of other securities that may have been provided and is enforceable if there is a default by the principal borrower (in this case, it is common ground that the principal borrower SAPL has defaulted). In the event of a default, unless there is a contrary provision of law, a mortgagee is entitled to pursue all securities available simultaneously. The mortgagee does not need to first attempt recovery or fail to recover as against the principal 15 borrower for them to pursue the guarantor(s). See **Barclays Bank of Uganda v Jing Hong & Guo Odong HCCS 35/2009, Moschi V Lep Air Services and Ors [1973] AC 345, Paul Kasagga and Another v Barclays Bank (U) Ltd HCMA 0113/2008, Uganda Finance Trust Limited v Alloys Muhumuza & Anor HCCA 111/2015.**

20 As regards the non-joinder of SAPL, a contract of guarantor ship is a separate and distinct security, its only relationship with the "principal" agreements (loan agreement or mortgage or other such documents) being that it is default therein that triggers liability under the mortgage. Accordingly, it is not necessary to join the borrower/mortgagor when pursuing enforcement of the guarantee, as is the case in the main suit. See **MTK**

25 **Uganda Limited v Housing Finance Bank HCMA 62/2021**

Therefore, the Applicant's assertions on these heads of defence are without merit.

Accordingly, the Respondent having asserted that (a) there was a principal set of 30 agreements with SAPL requiring repayment of loan sums (b) SAPL's repayment obligations were irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed by SAPL, (c) SAPL had defaulted in respect of those obligations and the Applicant having admitted that the above was true, it, on the face of it, became apparent that the Respondent was entitled to commence an action by summary suit to enforce the guarantees. The Applicant, in this


- 5 application, ought to have demonstrated to the court why the obligations under the agreement should not be enforced. The Applicant attempted to demonstrate that the action itself was unmaintainable but this is not so, as already held above. On the merits of the action itself, the Applicant only volunteered denials to liability which, as we have seen above, are not sufficient to show triable issues warranting grant of leave. - 10

### Question of Liability owing to Foreclosure

It was common ground that the mortgaged property mortgaged by the applicant as security for repayment of the loaned sums by the borrower has already been foreclosed

15 by the respondent with the aim of recovering the loaned sums. It was not demonstrated that a recovery had been undertaken but it is not inconceivable that the same may be undertaken in the near future.

In my view, considering that the liability of a guarantor is contingent on the liability of 20 the principal borrower, it is possible that there can be a change in the sums owing and claimed by the Respondent.

It follows that the applicant ought to be given leave on this question, in order to establish whether indeed, the liability of the principal borrower has not been in anyway reduced, 25 especially in light of the foreclosure by the Respondent.

Accordingly, I find that the Applicant is entitled to leave to appear and defend only on the issue regarding its liability contingent and on the liability of the principal borrower.

#### 30 **Security**

### **Order 36 Rule 8** of the CPR provides thus

"Leave to appear and defend the suit may be given unconditionally, or subject to such terms as to the payment of monies into court, giving security, or time or mode of trial or otherwise, as the court may think fit."

- 5 In my view, some of the situations where this provision can be invoked where the defence has, in its presentation at this stage, been somewhat doubtful or less persuasive or barely met the legal threshold. See **Joseph Muyinza Bunoli v William Tumusiime HCMA 820/2023** - 10 As noted above, the presentation of the Applicant's application has only revealed one triable issue; namely the question of the applicant's liable contingent on the liability of the borrower. Accordingly, I find it necessary to require the applicant to pay a portion of the claim into court as security in accordance with Order 36 Rule 8 of the CPR. - 15 I accordingly find that the Applicant shall pay into court as security USD 402,035 (being 30% of the sum claimed in the main suit) or provide a security satisfactory to the registrar of this court for the same sum within a period of one (1) month from the date of this ruling, failing which the applicant's leave to appear and defend in HCCS 426/2023 shall be revoked, any pleadings or documents filed struck off the record and default 20 judgment shall be entered for the Respondent.

#### **Costs**

As a rule of law, costs ordinarily follow the event and a successful litigant receives his or her costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order. Where the 25 successful party has been guilty of some misconduct, an order of costs may not be granted. **Section 27(2) Civil Procedure Act, Harry Ssempa v Kambagambire David HCCS 408/2014, Iyamuleme David vs. AG SCCA NO.4 of 2013, Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v. Paphos Wine Industries Ltd, [1951] 1 All ER 873**.

30 In light of my findings above, costs will abide the outcome of the suit.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion therefore, the Applicant's application revealed only one triable issue and I make the following orders:

- 5 The Applicant is granted conditional leave to appear and defend as below: - i) The Applicant's defence shall be confined to a challenge on the quantum of money claimed by the Respondent against to the applicant, relative to the established indebtedness of Sunshine Agroproducts Limited. - ii) The Applicant shall pay into court as security USD 402,035 (being 30% of the 10 sum claimed in the main suit) or provide a security satisfactory to the registrar of this court for the same sum within a period of one (1) month from the date of this ruling, failing which the applicant's leave to appear and defend in HCCS 426/2023 shall be revoked, any pleadings or documents filed struck off the record and default judgment shall be entered for the Respondent. - 15 iii) The Applicant shall file and serve a defence complaint with the leave granted in (1) above within fifteen (15) days from the date of this ruling and thereafter the Respondent shall take the necessary pre-trial steps to ensure that this matter is tried. - iv) Costs of this application shall abide the outcome of the suit. - 20

I so order.

Delivered electronically this\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_2023 and uploaded on ECCMIS. 27th November

**Ocaya Thomas O. R Judge**

**27th November, 2023**