[2008] UGSC 13

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

## **AT MENGO**

## **CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO.07 OF 2005**

(CORAM: ODOKI, C. J., TSEKOOKO, MULENGA, KANYEIAMBA, KATUREEME, OKELLO, JJ. SC, EGONDA NTENDE, AG. JJ. SC).

#### **BETWEEN**

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA ::::::::::::::::::::::: **APPELLANT**

#### **AND**

**13. MASALU MUSENE WILSON** 14. KEITIRIMA JOHN AUDES 15. SEKAGYA RONALD **<u>........</u> RESPONDENTS** 16. MUHIIRWA ALAARI K.

[Appeal from the Judgment of the Constitutional Court (Hon. Lady Justice A. E. N Mpagi-Bahigeine, S. G. Engwau, A. Twinomujuni, J. A) delivered at Kampala on the 23^rd day of February, 2004 in Constitutional Petition No. 05 of 2004].

## JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

ThisisanappealagainstadecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtwherebythat courtheldbyamajorityof3to2thattheimpositionofincometaxonthe salariesoftheRespondentsasJudicialofficerswasinconsistentwithandin violationofarticle128(7)oftheConstitution,andthattheirsalaries,allowances, privilegesandretirementbenefitandotherconditionsofservicemustnotbe subjecttoanyformoftaxationwhatsoever. Theappellant,theAttorneyGeneral ofUgandawasdissatisfiedwiththatdecision,hencethisappeal.

Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:The1st,2nd,3rdand4thRespondentswere judicialofficersasRegistrar,ChiefMagistrate,MagistrateGrade1and MagistrateGrade11respectively. Theywereaggrievedbytheimplementationof Section4(1)oftheIncomeTaxActwherebytheirsalariesweresubjectedto incometaxdeductions. TheypetitionedtheConstitutionalCourt,allegingthat theapplicationofthatsectionoftheIncomeTaxActtotheirsalarieswas inconsistentwithArticle128(7)oftheConstitutionwhich,accordingtothem protectedthesalariesofJudicialofficersfrombeingvariedtotheirdisadvantage

Theysoughtdeclarationsthat:

.

- 1. theapplicationofSection4(1)oftheIncometaxActtojudicialofficers wasinconsistentwithArticle128(7)oftheConstitution, - 2. JudicialOfficerssalaries,allowancesandretirementbenefitsandother emolumentsmustnotbetaxed.

Theyalsosoughtanorderofcourtthatjudicialofficersareentitledtotheirfull paywithoutvariationtotheirdisadvantagewiththecomingintoeffectofthe 1995Constitution. Theyfurtherprayedforcostsofthepetition. Thecourt grantedthefirsttwoprayers,andorderedthatthejudicialofficersbepaidtheir fullpaywithoutdeductionoftaxwitheffectfromthedateofthejudgment. The courtmadenoorderastocosts.

Theappellantappealedagainsttheabovedeclarationsandorder. The respondentscross-appealedagainsttheordernottotaxtheiremoluments havingeffectfromthedateofthejudgment,assertingthatitshouldcommence fromthecomingintoeffectofthe1995Constitution. Theyalsocross-appealed againsttheordernottoawardthemcosts.

Theappellantfiled3groundsofappealasfollows:-

- 1. "ThatthelearnedJusticesofAppealerredinlawandinfactwhen theyheldthattheapplicationofsection4(1)oftheIncomeTaxActof 1997toJudicialOfficersisinconsistentwithandcontravenesArticle 128(7)oftheConstitution. - 2. "ThatthelearnedJusticesofAppealerredinlawandinfactwhen theydeclaredandorderedthattheJudicialofficerssalaries, allowances,privilegesandretirementbenefitsandotherconditionsof servicemustnotbesubjectedtoanytaxationwhatsoever. - 3. "ThatthelearnedJusticesofAppealerredinlawandinfactwhen theyorderedthatJudicialOfficersareentitledtotheirfullpaywithout variationtotheirdisadvantageasfromthedateofthejudgment."

Theappellantalsoprayedforcostsoftheappeal. Intheircross-appeal,the respondentsfiledtwogroundsasfollows:

- 1. "ThelearnedJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourterredinlawby failingtogranttherespondentscostsofthepetitionwithout assigninganyreasonsthereof. - 2. "ThelearnedJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourterredinlawandin fact,byfailingtoorderthattherespondentsareentitledtotheirfull paywithoutvariationwiththecomingintoeffectofthe1995 Constitution,yethavingmadeafindingthattheirconstitutionalrights havebeeninfringedsince1995."

Therespondentsalsopraysforcostsoftheappealandcross-appeal. Both partiesfiledwrittensubmissions.

Theappellantarguedgroundsoneandtwotogether. Theappellantsubmitted thattheapplicationofsection4(1)oftheIncomeTaxtothesalariesofthe respondentswasnotinconsistentwithorinviolationofArticle128(7)ofthe ConstitutionasheldbythemajorityofthelearnedJusticesoftheConstitutional Court. Theappellantsupportedandfullyassociatedhimselfwiththedissenting JudgmentsandrulingsofC. N. BKitumbaandC. K. Byamugisha,JJ. A. Inhisview, taxationofsalariesofJudicialofficerswasnotavariationoftheirsalaries. Therespondentshadneverenjoyedtheprivilegeoftaxexemption,ashad beenenjoyedbyJudgespriortothecomingintoeffectofthe1995,Constitution, andtheircontinuedtaxationwasnotinconflictwiththeconstitution. Heargued thatpaymentoftaxisadutyimposedonallcitizensbytheConstitutionunless therewasaspecificexemptionaccordedtoapersonorpersonswithinthe Constitutionorundertherelevantlaw. Therespondentsenjoyednosuch exemptioneitherwithintheConstitutionorunderanyotherrelevantlaw. The appellantfurthersubmittedthatthewords"vary"and"taxation"aredifferent and

cannotbeusedinterchangeably. Oneoughttofollowtheprincipleof constitutionalinterpretationthatindeterminingtheconstitutionalityofastatute, theeffectandpurposeofitsprovisionsshouldbeconsidered. Heinvitedthis courttofollowthereasoningofKitumba,J. A,inthisregard.

TheappellantfurthersubmittedthattheconstitutionalCourthadmisdirected itselfwhentheyreliedonthecaseofEVANS-Vs-GORE,ACTINGCOLLECTOR OFINTERNALREVENUE253. U. S.245(1920)toholdthataJudgessalary couldnotbetaxedbecausesuchtaxationamountedtodiminishingofhissalary.

HecitedthelatercaseofUNITEDSTATES-Vs-TERRYJ. HATTER,JR. JUDGE, UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT532U. S(2001),whereintheSupremeCourt oftheUnitedStateshasoverruledEVANSandheldthatimpositionofageneral taxwhichwaspayablebyallcitizens,wasnotadiminutionofaJudgessalary andwasnotunconstitutional. Theappellantprayedthatthiscourtbepersuaded byHATTERsinceithadexpresslyoverruledEVANS.

Fortherespondents,theircounselfullysupportedthedecisionofthemajorityof theJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourtthattheapplicationofSection4(1)ofthe IncomeTaxActtoJudicialOfficerssalarieswasunconstitutional,andthat salaries,allowances,privilegesandretirementbenefitsofJudicialOfficersmust notbesubjecttoanytaxationwhatsoever. CounselarguedthatArticle128(7)of theConstitutionentrenchedtheindependenceoftheJudiciaryandcoveredall JudicialOfficersincludingbothmembersofthehigherbenchandlowerbench. TheysubmittedfurtherthatArticle128(7)wasnotmeanttobenefitonlythe Judgeswhoenjoyedthetaxexemptionbenefitsbeforethecomingintoforceof the1995Constitution,butthatbyitselfthatArticleextendedataxexemptionto allJudicialOfficers. Theycontendedthattoargueotherwisewouldmeanthat thebenefitoftaxexemptionwouldapplytoonlythoseJudgeswhowereinoffice atthetimeoftheConstitution. Counselarguedfurtherthatthelowerjudicial officershadaheavyworkloadasaresultofchangesinthelawwhichhad conferredonthemhigherjurisdictionandthereforetheyneededthetax exemptionasfurtherremunerationforaheavierworkschedule. Inthe alternative,counselarguedthatsincetheJudicialOfficershadalreadyhadthe benefitoftaxexemptionfromthedateoftheJudgment,itcouldnotnowbe takenawayfromthem.

Wehavecarefullyconsideredallthesubmissionsofcounsel. Weagreethat Article128(7)ismeanttobeapillarfortheindependenceoftheJudiciary. The needforJudicialOfficerstobewellcompensatedsoastoupholdtheir

independencecannotbeoverstated. WeagreewithMpagi-Bahigene,J. A,when shestatesinherleadjudgment;

> "TheunderlyingprincipleoftheentireArticle128istheissueof judicialindependenceandsecurityoftenure,thelatterbeing amongthetraditionalsafeguardsoftheformer. Thismeans amongstotherthingsthatthetermofoffice,emolumentsand otherconditionsofserviceofJudicialOfficersgenerallyshallnot bevariedoralteredtotheirdetrimentordisadvantage. Thisisan elementarysafeguardtobefoundinmostdevelopedlegal systemswhereittookmanyhistoricstrugglestoestablishona firmfootingasthemostfundamentalofallsafeguardsofJudicial officerssecurityoftenure. Whenthissafeguardisdestroyedby whittlingawaytheprovisionsofArticle128(7)andjudicialofficers areputatthesufferanceoftheexecutiveoratthewhimsofthe legislature,theindependenceofthejudiciaryisthefirstvictim. Therationaleunderarticle128(7)isthatthereshouldbeadequate salariesandpensionsforjudicialofficerscommensurablewith theirstatus,dignityandresponsibilityoftheiroffice."

ThesesentimentsarealsoverystronglycarriedintheJudgmentofTwinomujuni; JA.,whogoestogreatlengthtoquotefromthejudgmentsinEVANStoshow thatimpositionoftaxonaJudgessalaryamountstoavariationtothe disadvantageoftheJudgeandthereforerendersitunconstitutional.

Withgreatrespect,wethinkthatthelearnedJusticesaremixinguptwodistinct issues. Thefirstoneisabouttheneedforadequateremuneration. Thatcannot begainsaid. Judicialofficersneedtobeadequatelyremuneratedgiventhe uniquenatureoftheirworkandstatusinsociety,andtheneedtoprotectand preservetheirindependence. Thesecondiswhetherthatremuneration,whether adequateornot,canbevariedtothedisadvantageofthejudicialofficer. The

crucialwordthereis"vary"asusedinarticle128(7)oftheConstitution. For purposeofclaritywereproduceArticle128(7)asfollows:

> 128(7)"Thesalary,allowances,privilegesandretirementbenefits andotherconditionsofserviceofaJudicialofficerorother personexercisingjudicialpowershallnotbevariedtohisorher disadvantage."

ThereisnospecificexemptionfromtaxationconferredonJudicialofficers,asis thecasewith,forexample,thesalaryofthePresidentunderArticle106(4)which states:"ThePresidentisexemptedfromdirectpersonaltaxationonallowances andotherbenefitsexceptontheofficialsalary."Theseclearwordsmeanthat whereastheallowancesandotherbenefitsofthePresidentareexemptedfrom directpersonaltaxation,hissalaryisnotsoexempted. Yetarticle106(6)is virtuallyareplicaofArticle128(7). Itstates:-

> 106(6)"Thesalary,allowancesandotherbenefitsgrantedto thePresidentunderthisArticleshallnotbevariedtothe disadvantageofthePresidentwhileheorsheholdsoffice."

Theseprovisionsusetheword"vary"ontheotherhandArticle158(1)states:

"Whereanysalaryorallowanceoftheholderofanyofficeis chargedontheConsolidatedFund,itshallnotbealteredto hisorherdisadvantageafterheorshehasbeenappointed tothatoffice."

CounselfortheappellantarguedthattheseprovisionsshowthattheConstitution makesadistinctionbetweentaxationandvariationofemoluments. Whereit soughttoconferataxexemptionitprovidedsoexpresslyasinthecaseofthe Presidentssalary.

Weagree. Inourconsideredopinion,hadtheframersoftheConstitutionwanted toconferataxexemptiononemolumentsofJudicialofficers,theywouldhave saidsoexpressly. Toequatevariationwithtaxationwouldmeanthatallthose officerscoveredbyarticle158(1)wouldalsoenjoyataxexemption. Itwould

alsoimportanunnecessaryanduncalledforconflictbetweenarticle106(4)and 106(6),asMpagi-Bahigeine,andTwinomujuni,JJ. Aattempttodo. Twinomujuni, JA.,goesfurthertotrytoshowthatArticle158(1)isdifferentfrom128(7) becauseitusestheword"alter"whichhestatestobedifferentfromtheword "vary". Inourviewthewords"vary"and"alter"canbeusedinterchangeablyas theymeanthesamething. BLACKSLAWDICTIONARYdefines"alter"Thus:

> "Tomakechangein:tomodify:tovaryinsomedegree;"to changesomeoftheelementsoringredientsordetailswithout substitutinganentirelynewthingordestroyingtheidentityofthe thingaffected. Tochangepartially. Tochangeinoneormore respects,butwithoutdestructionofexistenceoridentityofthe thingchanged,toincreaseordiminish."

Ontheotherhand,theOXFORDADVANCEDLEARNERSDICTIONARYdefines "vary"thus:

# "Tomakechangestosomethingtomakeitslightly different."

Clearly,thedraftersoftheConstitutionusedthewords"vary"and"alter" interchangeablytomeanthesamething,i.e.,theemolumentsofthepersons concernedcouldnotbechangedtotheirdisadvantage. Forthesalaryofthe President,theConstitutionstipulatesclearlythatitshallnotbetaxed. Theissue thereforeiswhetherrequiringJudicialofficerstopaytaxundersection4(1)of theIncomeTaxActamountstoavariationoftheirsalariestotheirdisadvantage.

ThelearnedJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourtreliedheavilyontheEVANScase (supra). ThatcasewasinterpretingaclauseintheAmericanConstitutionwhich issimilarinmaterialrespectstoArticle128(7)ofourConstitution. Itprovidesas follows:-

> "TheJudges,bothoftheSupremeandinferiorcourts,shall holdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour,andshallatstated ### times,receivefortheirservicesacompensation,which shallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice".

TheissuewaswhethertaxationofaJudgessalarywasadiminutionofhis compensationcontrarytotheaboveprovision. TheSupremeCourtoftheUnited StatesheldthatsuchtaxationwasindeedadiminutionofaJudges compensationandunconstitutional. Thisdecisionwasfollowedbythemajority ofJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourt.

However,itapparentlywasnotbroughttotheattentionoftheConstitutional CourtthattherehadbeenconsiderablechangesinthelawintheUnitedStates since1920whenEVANSwasdecided. Thatdecisionreceivedmuchcriticismin subsequentcasesbothintheUnitedStatesandotherCommonwealthcountries andwaseventuallyoverruled. InOMALLEY-Vs-WOODROUGH,307U. S277282 (1939,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesadoptedthereasoningofthe dissentingJusticesinEVANSthatJudgesarenotimmunefromsharingwith othercitizensthematerialburdenofthegovernment,andthereforetheir paymentofanon-discriminatorytaxlaidgenerallyonallcitizenswasnota diminutionofJudgessalaries.

Thereasoningin0MALLEYwasadoptedinUNITEDSTATES—Vs-TERRY HATTERJ. JUDGE,UNITED STATESDISTRICTCOURTFORTHECENTRAL DISTRICTOFCLALIFONIA—532U. S.(2001). TheSupremeCourtinthiscase overruledEVANSinsofarasitholdsthatthecompensationclauseforbids Congresstoapplyagenerallyapplicable,non-discriminatorytaxtothesalariesof FederalJudges. Thecourtlaiddownauthoritativelytheprinciplethatanondiscriminatorytaxthattreatedjudgesthesamewayittreatedothercitizensis notforbiddenbythecompensationclause. Thecourtdidsupportthereasoning inEVANSwithregardtotheindependenceoftheJudiciaryandtheneedto protectit,butdidnotthinkthatrequiringaJudgetopayataxthatallother

citizenswererequiredtopaywasinanywayanaffronttotheJudges independence.

IntheCanadianCaseofTHEQUEEN—Vs-BEAUREGARD[1986]2S. C. R56,a JudgeoftheSupremeCourtofQuebecappointedinJuly1975challengeda December1975lawrequiringhimtocontribute6%ofhissalarytopensioncosts forbeinginconsistentwithsection100oftheCanadianConstitutionalAct1867 whichprovidedasfollows:-

# "Thesalaries,allowances,andpensionsoftheJudgesof theSuperior,DistrictandCountyCourtsshallbefixedand providedbytheParliamentofCanada."

The1975statuterequiredthatJudgesappointedpriortoFebruary1975should contribute1.5%oftheirpaytopensioncostswhichpromptedtheJudgetoalso claimthathisequalityrightsundertheCanadianbillofrightswerebeing infringed,becausehewasbeingtreateddifferentlyfromotherincumbentjudges. TheSupremeCourtrejectedthischallenge. TheCourtheldthatalthough financialsecuritywasanimportantpartofjudicialindependence,andalthough thelawinissuetargetedJudgesonly,thisdidnotdamageJudicialindependence. CanadianJudgeswereCanadianCitizensandmustbeartheirfairshareofthe financialburdenofadministeringthecountry. Thecourtdidnotfindthefinancial obligationsimposedonJudgestouchingonthetruepurposeofjudicial independencewhichisfreedomfrommanipulationandtheseparationofpowers. The1975lawwasheldtobemerelyestablishinga"conventionalform"of pensionandwhichdidsowithaconsiderableraiseinsalaries. Accordingto Dickson,C. J,whodeliveredthemajorityjudgment,althoughParliamentarypower insection100oftheConstitutionActwasnotabsolute,whatwastobeguarded againstwere"decisionswithsinistermotivationsanddiscriminationagainst Judges."

AsthelearnedJusticesoftheConstitutionalCourtopined,decisionsofthe Superiorcourtsofothercountriesonmattersoflawsimilartoourownareof highpersuasivevalue. Twinomujuni,

JA,inapplyingEVANS,statedasfollows:-

"Ihavegonetothislengthtoshowthesimilarityofthe Americanprovisionstooursandtoopinethatthedecisions oftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,whichIamgoingto discussbelowarenotmerelypersuasivebutoughttobe givenmuchmoreweightthanthatusuallyaccordedto foreignauthorities."

Weagree,butwishtoaddthatdecisionsofSuperiorCourtsfromthe Commonwealth,e.g. Canada,alsooughttobegivenconsiderableweight. But wherethosedecisionshavesincebeenoverruledandarenolongerlawinthose countries,thentheycannotbeadoptedbyourcourts,unlessoneclearly distinguishesthem.

InourviewtheConstitutionalCourterredwhenitfollowedthedecisioninEVANS whichhadlongbeenoverruledbyHATTER. Wedrewtheattentionofcounselfor therespondenttoHATTERwhichhadbeencitedbycounselfortheappellant,but counselmadetonoattempttoexplainordistinguishthetwocases.

WeareoftheconsideredopinionthatthedecisionsinHATTERandin BEAUREGARDfromU. S. AandCanada,respectively,areverypersuasiveand oughttobeappliedininterpretingArticle128(7)oftheConstitution. Wedonot thinkthatrequiringjudicialofficerstopaytaxlikeallcitizensdoispersean affronttotheindependenceoftheJudiciary. Inthatregardweagreewiththe opinionofKitumba,JA,whenshestatesinherdissentingjudgment:

"Counsel for the petitioners strong contention was that Article 128(7) was enacted to ensure the independence of the judiciary. It prohibits variation of judicial officers salaries and taxation is such variation. In fact the whole of Article 128 of the Constitution is on independence of the judiciary. I am of the considered view that taxation of a judicial officials salary is not variation of salary. It is a compliance with a Constitutional duty. Taxation per se does not and would not take away the independence of judiciary. It would not amount to subjecting that taxpayer to the whims of the tax officials, as argued by counsel for the Petitioners. The duty is upon the employer to withhold the tax from the employment income. (See section 116 of the Income Tax Act). It is the accounting officer of the Judiciary to effect the taxation and remit the tax to the Uganda Revenue Authority. It is my humble view that there is no likelihood of the judicial officer and the tax officials of coming into contact and thereby exposing the judicial officer to the dangers of being compromised..............

I agree that maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary is a cardinal principle of the rule of law. Taxation of the judicial officers salaries and allowances is not interference with that independence. Judicial officers in the two East African Countries of Kenya and Tanzania and many Commonwealth Countries do pay tax on their emoluments. I cannot say that the independence of the Judiciary does not exist in those countries. It is also common knowledge that the government for the common good of the country should use money taxed from citizens income. When that is put into consideration one would not be right to say that the taxation of the judicial officers is to vary salaries to their disadvantage. I am not persuaded by the decision in EVANS –Vs- GORE. I will not follow it."

Although she apparently did not know it, in effect the learned Justice was following the decisions in **HATTER** and **BEAUREGARD** which reflect the current state of the law in those countries. We are persuaded by the reasoning in those decisions. Accordingly we find that the majority in the Constitutional Court erred in law and fact when they held that section 4(1) of the Income Tax Act was inconsistent with and in contravention of Article 128(7) of the Constitution. A fortiori, the decision that the respondents salaries cannot be subject to tax whatsoever cannot stand.

We wish to add, however, for clarity that the Income Tax Act did provide for the Minister of Finance to grant a tax exemption to any person. The Cabinet of Uganda did decide in 1991 to extend exemption from payment of tax to Judges. The language of the statutory Instrument that was subsequently passed is very clear. It reads in part:

## **GENERAL NOTICE NO.140 OF 1997 THE INCOME TAX DECREE (DECREE 1 OF 1974) NOTICE**

PURSUANT to the provisions of subsection(2) of section 12 of the *Income Tax Decree, NOTICE HEREBY GIVEN that income in respect of* gains from employment payable to the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Principal Judge, a Justice of the Supreme Court, a Justice of *Court of Appeal or <u>a</u> Judge of the High Court is exempted from tax."*

Clearly this applied to these Judges as a class irrespective of whether they were in office at the time the exemption was given. When the law refers to "a Justice **of the High Court**" it can only mean that any person holding that office is affected. What the government did was to extend a special privilege to Judges

byintroducinganewtermofservice,i.e.exemptionfromtax. Thisrecognised thatJudgeswereliabletopaytaxbutwereallowedanexemptionaspermitted bylaw.

Thisnewtermofservicewasinforceatthecomingintoforceofthe1995 Constitution. Therefore,inaccordancewithArticle 128(7)oftheConstitution itcouldnotbetakenawayfromtheclassofJudgesasthiswouldamounttoa variationoftheirtermsandconditionsofservicetotheirdisadvantage.

Unfortunately,judicialofficersofthelowerBenchliketherespondentshadnot yethadtheprivilegeoftaxexemptionextendedtothemasatthecominginto forceoftheConstitution. Therefore,theywerenotenjoyingthethatprivilegei.e, taxexemption. Ofcourseitisonethingtoarguethatthisprivilegeshouldbe extendedtoalljudicialofficersasameasuretoenhancetheirsalariesbutitis quiteanothertosaythattotaxtheirsalariesisavariationofthosesalariesto theirdisadvantage. Thetwoconceptsaredifferent.

Intheresultgrounds1and2oftheappealmustsucceed. Thatineffectalso disposesinground3oftheappealaswellasthecounterclaimcrossappeal.

Wenoteinthiscase,thatasaresultofthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourt, notaxhasbeenwithheldfromthesalariesofallJudicialOfficersfromthedate ofthatjudgment. Intheirwrittensubmissions,counselfortherespondents submittedthatsincethegovernment(Appellant)hadnotsoughtastayof executionofthejudgmentoftheConstitutionalCourtandhadfullyimplemented thatdecisionbynottaxingtheirsalaries,governmentcouldnotnowseektotax theirsalariesasthiswasabenefitnowbeingenjoyedandtotakeitawaywould causethemagreatinjusticeasthismightleadtodemandsforrefundofthetax thathasnotbeenwithheld. Theappellant/AttorneyGeneralacknowledgedthe factthathehadnotsoughtastayofexecutionandthattherespondentswere enjoyingthebenefitoftaxexemption. Heattributedhisfailuretoseekastayof

exemptionto"aninadvertenterroronthepartoftheappellant". Mostcuriously, theappellantsoughttoblametheimplementationofthedecisionofthecourton theJudicialServiceCommissionwhohaddoneso"withoutpriorconsultation andapprovalfromtheMinistryofFinance."Wethinkthisargumentbythe AttorneyGeneralisillconceivedandmeanttomislead. Aspointedoutby Kitumba,JA,thewithholdingoftaxfromsalariesisdonebytheAccounting OfficeroftheJudiciary. TheAccountingOfficerisanappointeeoftheSecretary ToTreasuryandreportstothatoffice. TheJudicialServiceCommissionhas nothingtodowiththepaymentofsalariesorwithholdingoftaxes. Thiswasan unacceptableexcusebytheAttorneyGeneralwhorepresentsthewhole governmentofUganda,includingtheJudicialServiceCommission. Indeedthe AttorneyGeneralisamemberoftheJudicialServiceCommission.

However,aswehavealreadynoted,theappellantsandotherjudicialofficersof therankofRegistrarormagistratehavebeenenjoyingtheprivilegeoftax exemptionforoverthreeyears. Theappellantdidnotapplyforstayofexecution ofthejudgmentoftheConstitutionalCourtandtheGovernmenthasinits wisdomnotbeentaxingtheemolumentsofthesaidjudicialofficers. Itwouldbe unconscionableandcontrarytothespiritofprovisionsofArticle128(7)ofthe Constitutiontoremovethetaxexemption.

Withregardtotheissueofcosts,wethinkthiswasamatterofpublicinterest andeachpartyshouldbearitsowncosts. DatedatMengothis14thdayofOctober2008.

B. Odoki ChiefJustice

J. W. N. Tsekooko

### JusticeoftheSupremeCourt

J. A. Mulenga JusticeoftheSupremeCourt

G. W. Kanyeihamba JusticeoftheSupremeCourt

BartM. Katureebe JusticeoftheSupremeCourt

G. Okello

### JusticeoftheSupremeCourt

F. EgondaNtende

Ag. JusticeoftheSupremeCourt