[2012] UGHC 429

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT **MASAKA** CIVIL SUIT NO. HCT-06-CV-CS-0042 OF 2003

## BUROORA BENON :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

$\left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right)$

### **VERSUS**

# 1. RUBAHAMYA STEPHEN

# 2. G. BAKWATEHI ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

## BEFORE: HON LADY JUSTICE KIGGUNDU JANE F. B.

#### 20 **JUDGMENT:**

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The appellant Buroora Benon was the complaint in the original claim Sembabule Land Claim No. 010 of 2004. The defendants were three but during the trial, defendants No. 2 Geoffrey Gumaho passed away. He was struck off and the matter proceeded against the other two defendants. On appeal, the $\alpha$ name of the deceased re-surfaced and learned Council for the respondent applied to have the said name removed from the record and attributed its re-appearance to an error during typing. By consensus of both parties the error was corrected.

In the Original suit, the appellant who was the claimant sought 30 among others, an order for eviction against the defendants, a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from further committing trespass a declaration that the defendants are trespassers and must vacate the suit land situated at Ssembabule and known as Ranch Number 36 B1 and 36 $\rm B2$ Mawogola Ranching Scheme. This matter was originally filed

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before the Sembabule District Land Tribunal but (It along the way the term of the land Tribunal expired before they completed it. With the issuance of Practice Direction No. ¹ of 2006, the file placed before the Magistrate G1 who proceeded with the case to its conclusion.

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This appeal is therefore against the judgment of the Magistrate Grade ¹ Sembabule, His Worship, Gimugu K. Kenneth dated 9th September, 2008. During scheduling at the trial no facts were agreed upon. During the trial however, there were facts which were not disputed or challenged. The appellants' evidence before the trial court was that he was the registered proprietor of land described as Ranch No. 36 Bl and 36 B2 Mawogola Ranching Scheme also described as LRV ULC 153/1668 Vol. 3297 Folio 9 Sembabule District. That he had enjoyed quite use, enjoyment, occupation and possession of the said land till November 2004 when the Respondents forcefully entered the suit land, stated grazing and watering their animals and destroying water points with impunity. " He further alleged that the respondents built semi-permanent structures on the land. The claimant prayed that the respondent be declared trespassers, an eviction order be issued against them and a permanent injunction be issued plus costs of the suit.

The defendants on their point testified that'they are beneficiaries of the estate of the late Ernest Kasinde the former owner of the suit land. They alleged that the claimant was not the rightful owner of the suit land but obtained registration by fraudThey prayed for a dismissal of the sui^an^X^^^ountqr -claim they

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$\mathcal{O}$ sought an eviction order to issue against the claimant from the land, cancellation of the Certificate of Title, general damages and costs of the counter-claim.

At the trial, the parties framed and agreed on the following issues:-

- 1. Whether the claimant was fraudulently registered as proprietor of the suit land, - 2. Who is the rightful owner of the land. - 3. Remedies available to the parties.

$2p$ In his judgment the learned Trial Magistrate upon perusal of the entire record and the law found that for the proper adjudication of the matter, the issues (in frame and order) should be:-

- 1. Whether the plaintiff fraudulently procured his registration as proprietor of the suit land - 2. Who is the lawful owner of the suit land?

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3. Who is entitled to what remedy in the circumstances?

his judgment the learned Trial Magistrate found that the In appellant was fraudulently registered on the certificate of titles, was not the lawful owner of the suit land, and the first defendant was dependant of the late Erinest Katsinde (and it was not in issue that the second defendant was a widow of the Late Gumaho, brother to first defendant. The learned Trial Magistrate ordered the matter to be referred to the High Court under S. 76 (1) (c) for the necessary consequential orders to deregister the claimant. He further dismissed the claim with costs to the respondents and allowed the respondents as beneficiaries

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to stay on the suit land while knowing that it is not theirs until administered. **IT**

The appellant filed this appeal upon the following grounds

- 1. That the learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he failed to properly evaluate evidence on court record thus arriving at an erroneous conclusion. - 2. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he relied on documents that were neither exhibited in court nor referred to in evidence. - 3. that the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he granted the remedies sought by the defendants.

The appellant prayed that the appeal be allocated and orders of the lower court be set aside. He also prayed for costs of the appeal.

court should stand. **{See: Pandya Vs. R [1957] E. A. 336}.** The appellant was represented by learned Counsel Mr. Kugonza Enock while the respondent were represented by learned counsel Mr. Ssemugera Ronald. Both handled the grounds consecutively and I intend to. do the same. This being a first appellate court, this court is under duty to re-evaluate the evidence adduced before the trial court as a whole and give it a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny. It will then draw its own conclusion of fact and determine whether on the evidence the decision of the trial

In the first ground the appellant contends that the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he failed to properly evaluate evidence on court record thus arising at an erroneous conclusion. He attached the LTM. S,.decision fo. pfisme alleging

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**('O** that the issued the LTM framed were strange, were not exactly the same with the original issues earlier agreed upon and were prejudicial to the appellant. He concluded that this was the genesis of the problem.

Learned Learned Counsel for the appellant contended strongly that such an approach and procedure was not guided by justice and fair mindedness. He argued that the most important issue was initially "Whether the claimant was fraudulently registered as proprietor of the suit land" which issue was reframed to read" wit plaintiff procured his registered as proprietor of the suit land". He submitted the LTM was not only technically wrong to unilaterally rephrase the issue but was also prejudicial. Learned counsel for the appellant explained that the initial issue as framed puts into cognizance the legal duty of the land Registrars. That whether or not there's been fraud, it was the Registrar who actually enters the particulars on the title. His view was that this was how a fair issue ought to have been framed. Counsel went on to state that by reframing issues, the LTM was bent on finding against the appellant.

of issues was gave the following explanation, subject matter of this appeal, Sembabule District Land Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondents on the framing He stated that the suit, the originally filed in the After the-. expiration of terms of land Tribunals in 2006 it was transferred to the Grade ¹ Magistrate's court Sembabule. The District Land Tribunal had conducted the preliminary hearing, scheduling conference and framing of issues. The land Tribunal had commenced the trial

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$1^{\circ}$ and had taken evidence of the witnesses. The grade $1$ Magistrate took over the matter and proceeded with the cast where it had stopped. In his judgment, the LTM reframed the issues.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the issue No. 1 as framed in District Land Tribunal as reframed by the LTM was to the same effect and purpose i.e. fraud in the process of registration by the appellant on the Certificate of Title of the suit The only difference he contended was in the wording but land. the content was the same. In his opinion, there was no prejudice and injustice occasioned to the appellant as a result of the reframing of the issues.

0.15 of the Civil Procedure Rules governs the framing of issues. In practice both parties normally frame the issues which are put before court and the court may enter them on record re-frame them for .... Where issues are framed on agreement of the parties, court is not bound by their agreed issues. $\{See\}$ Barugahare Vs. Att. Gen. Sup. C. A. 28 of 1993 a Supreme **Court decision**} Having listened to the reasoning of both learned Counsel and the discretionary powers of court to frame and reframe issues, I agree with the reasoning of learned counsel for the respondents find that the LTM was clothed with the discretion to reframe issues. I totally disagree with leaned counsel for the appellant's submission that the LTM was technically wrong to unilaterally re-phrase the issues.

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**p** The other prong of the contention by learned counsel for the appellant was that the LTM was prejudicial. It argued that the earlier issue rightly put into cognizance the legal duty of the land Registrars. He argued that it was the registrar that actually enters the particulars on the Title. Learned Counsel did not go beyond this. He never expounded on the duties of a registrar; he never quoted any statute nor any case law or any authority to bring out which law or practice the Registrar may have contravened.

Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that whereas it is the Registrar of Titles who enters the particulars on the certificate of Title, the Registrar acts on the application, documentation and information provided by the applicant and that in this case it was the appellant who provided the same in the process of registration. The appellant in his . testimony during cross-examination told court that he did the process of registration by himself so it is him who provided to the Registrar of-Titles with the documents and information that was relied on during registration of the suit land into his names.

On P.5 the Record of Proceedings, the appellant during crossexamination told court the following:-

^I processed the transfer of the suit land myself. When ^I was going to pick the transfer forms from the sellers' lawyers office, ^I went alone. ^I am not aware of the names of the person who signed my transfer form. With this evidence on record, this court fails to see the basis of the allegation of prejudice on the

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$1.0$ Court finds that the LTM was not prejudicial in LTM's part. This argument therefore fails. reframing issues.

Learned counsel for the appellant proceeded to attack the judgment basing on what he termed irregularities which he claimed were unfairly relied on by the LTM and in effect lessening the burden of proof for proving fraud on the part of the He pointed out the following: (the judgment has no respondent. page numbering) the first irregularity pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant was in respect of dates. He submitted that the different dates on the claim where the claimant was claiming as the registered proprietor whereas his registration as proprietor/transferee was effected later was on error/mistake not a design to defraud anyone. To be specific, he pointed out the following:-

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$1.2^{nd}$ last page of the judgment, point No. 4 LTM stated: "finally I have noted that whereas the claim was filed on $2^{nd}$ December 2004 ... the same was signed by counsel to the claimant on 30.0ct. 2004.

"Even the summaries of evidence have date $of$ 30.10.04.."

"So it can't be by mistake that the pleadings are dated $30.10.04$ ".

" the claimant secured his registration as transferee of the land on 5.11.04...."

"But the claim that was signed on 30.10.04 states the claimant is the registered proprietor of the suit land".

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## *"He was not registered but was already drafting a claim as a registered proprietor".*

Learned council for appellant submitted that from the kind of evaluation as seen above, the LTM pre-empted any excuse of a mistake; that it could not have been a mistake but a fraudulent design. He argued that with paragraph 4 (e) of the claim, the LTM would have seen that the late 30.10.04 was a mistake. Para 4 (e) reads: "On 15.11.04, the claimant served defendants with notice to vacate the land but defendants declined to oblige the same".

To learned counsel, this was a minor error which the LTM capitalized on and gave prominence. He argued that whereas the LTM was right to reject the annextutre for the treason that it never was exhibited, para 4 (e) above would have remedied the prejudicial conclusion. He added that by doing this, the LTM was in effect visiting suffering to a litigant because of counsel's mistake/negligence. This learned counsel submitted, was an honest mistake.

On counsel this irregularity learned for the respondents submitted that it is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and that if the claim was dated 30.10.04, then he is bound by the same. He pointed out that at,the trial, no evidence was adduced that the dating of the claim as 30.10.04 was an error/mistake. Alleging on appeal that it was a mistake/error when it was never corrected or raised at the hearing of the case was adducing evidence from the bar^^^^.opnsel ,,on appeal.

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$\iota$ Besides, counsel alleging that it was a mistake on appeal is not counsel who drafted and signed the plaint. Therefore he cannot autholitanvely tell court that it was a mistake since it was not his document.

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With respect to para 4 (e) of the plaint learned counsel submitted that the mistake could as well have been on the date of the said notice and not the pleadings. Both documents were not authored by counsel for the appellant it was him to tell court which one has a mistake and with one did not have; and more so at the time of appeal when the said correction/clarification was never made at the trial. He submitted that the LTM was light to rule out a possibility of a mistake when it was never brought to his attention at the time of the hearing of the case. I agree with The record in the lower court shows that claim this reasoning. No. 10 of 2004 was filed by Wene-Kahima Mwebesa & Co. Advocates representing the claimant who is appellant in this At the haering Counsel have missed such a mistake in appeal. Was it the duty of the LTM to tamper & several documents? change with the documents filed by learned Counsel? It is trite law that a party is bound by his/her pleadings. Is this a technicality which court could ignore in order to dispense substantive justice?

Learned Trial Magistrate considered several documents and on a balance of probabilities made a finding which this court has no reason to fault. In addition, at the hearing of this appeal on 9.11.2009, learned counsel for the appellant orally applied to this court to take additional evidence. He later abandoned the idea.

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This would have been an providence time for him to adduce additional evidence and have clarification made on such unclear [See S. 70 Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 71) and 0.43 issues. CPRI.

Next learned counsel attached the judgment of the LTM on what he called a second irregularity and this was in respect of the letters of Administration held by the alleged seller (widow His contention was that the LTM close to Catherine Katsinde). see the defendants para 14 (a) of the WSD yet he ignored para $4$ $(e)$ of the claim.

Para 14 (a) stated "purchasing and perusing registration on the Certificate of title of the suit land from the Widow Catherine Katsinde with knowledge express or implied that shc had no valid letter of Administration. That the LTM close to reply on this.

As far as learned counsel was concerned, letters of administration was not exactly the claimant's business and that there was no way these letters of administration could have been attributed to him. That this legally explained why even learned counsel for defendants both at leading evidence and at submissions could not regard it as the purchaser's direct business.

Further learned counsel contended that he did not consider the LTM's arguments or justification as to monetary jurisdiction of letters of administration as acquired by Catherine Katsinde as affecting her as administrator of E. Katisinde's estate. He then found fault with the LTM for ignoring the evidence of PW5 who

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stated in his evidence that he had seen the title without crossings and upon confirmation with the lands office that the land had a title, he vacated the land.

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Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand did not agree with the contentions of learned counsel for the claimant. He pointed out that Exhibit Pl i.e, the sale agreement of the suit land stated that the appellant purchased the suit land on the basis and strength of the letters of Administration possessed by Catherine Katsinde. Further that the said agreement did not state that Catherine Katsinde was the owner of the suit land by virtue of being registered thereon but according to para 2 of the said agreement, the said ownership was by virtue of the said C. Katsinde being the administrator of her husband's estate (Erinesti Katsinde - deceased). Further still that the appellant having purchased the suit land on the basis of letters pf administration referred to in the sale agreement cannot turn around and say that they were not his business since he relied on them to purchase the land.

Learned counsel submitted that among the grounds of the particulars of fraud pleaded by the respondent in their counterclaim was that the appellant acquired and procured registration of the suit land with full knowledge that C. Katsinde had no valid letters of Administration. And having pleads that, the burden or onus was on the appellant to prove that Catherine Katsinde had valid letters of Administration upon which he bought the suit land as stated in the agreement. The Respondent had denied the existence of the said L/A; the appellant had claimed in his **U 4.i ^J ^J u. C; ' 1\* f \**

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exhibit P1 that $L/A$ did exist. The burden was therefore on win to prove the existence of valid $L/A$ upon which he acted and not He quoted the case of J. K. Tatel Vs. Spear the respondents. Motors Ltd C. A. No. 4/94 where court held that where one party denies receiving payment and the other alleges otherwise, the onus is on the party alleging payment to prove payment because it is difficult to prove the negative.

Learned Counsel submitted that the principle in that was that where one party is alleging something the other party is denying the same, it is not the party denying to prove the thing but the party alleging that it does exist. Therefore it was the appellant to prove the existence of valid $L/A$ upon which he acted to purchase the land since he claimed. It was on the basis of that document that he bought the land.

Evidence on record according to PW2 (Catherine Katsinde allegedly the administrator of her late husband's estate, shows that $L/A$ never existed. PW2 denied ever being the administrator of the Estate of the late Erimesti Katisinde. She testified that she did not know who has L/A of her late husband's estate. To make things worse, learned counsel submitted the appellant testified in court that to him, L/A were not his concern. Counsel questioned whether there ever were valid $L/A$ . The respondent's case was that they were not there. The evidence as stated above indicates they were not there. It was the appellant who relied on them upon the alleged purchase of the suit land to prove that they were there.

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no way the respondent could exhibit documents whose existence had been denied by a person who had been claimed to have acquired them. The denial of the existence of L/A by PW2 proved the respondents' claim that there was no valid L/A. Learned counsel went to explain to court the reason why the respondents did not exhibit in court the L/A that had been annexed on to the WSD since PW2 had denied them. There was

Learned Counsel also argued that since it was the appellant who had claimed that it was Catherine Katende (PW2) who had the L/A upon which he bought the land then he should have put to her questions about those said L/A which were referred to in the agreement to show that they did actually exist. Failure to exhibit the L/A annexed to the WSD was not a mistake on an oversight on the part of the resp. but their denial by the person who allegedly obtained them rendered them useless. They were of more evidential value to the appellant than the respondent.

3 Learned Counsel also pointed out that Catharine Katsinde (PW2) denied ever signing the sale agreement of the suit land. However on looking at it, it had been signed by Catherine Katsinde and Katungi Lazaro as joint vendors. The appellant should have called Katungi Lazaro as a witness to prove that the sale agreement had been executed between the said parties but he did not.

He On the evidence of PW5 (Senoga) Learned counsel submitted that the LTM was right to disregard it because it was full of lies and that is why the LTM could not believe it and rightly so.

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**/p** Further that PW5 lied that at the time the another lie because in her evidence C. Katsinde told court that she was never been registered as proprietor of the suit land. a dispute between the respondents on one side and Senoga (PW5) and Semadali on the other side. That this showed that PW5 was not telling the truth. appellant and Catherine went to insect the land the latter had a certificate of Title of the land and that he saw it. That this was pointed out that PW5 had lied about a dispute between himself and the respondents over the suit land. The first respondent (Rubahamya) in his evidence told court that before the dispute with the appellant, they had had a dispute with PW5 (Senoga) which was finally resolved in the RDC's (Sembabule) office. The RDC was a witness in the case and he told court that he handled

was done names. Para 4 of the sale agreement read: Again according to PW2 the appellant, inspection before the sale agreement was executed. Anne Mulindwa (appellant's witness in the trial court who drafted the sale agreement told court that at the time the agreement was made, Catherine Katsinde did not have a certificate of Title in her

*"The parties hereto have agreed that the administrator shall process and obtain a Certificate of Title into her names for purpose of transferring the same into the purchaser's name as soon as practicable".*

The para show that at that time, Certificate of Title was not there contrary to what PW5 told court. Learned counsel submitted that for the reasons above, the LTM was justified in not believing the evidence of PW5 because it was not credibly-,,,..;,

*1°* What court gathers from the above elaborates arguments by both learned Counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents is a question of ownership of the disputed land and construction exhibit Pl, the Purchase agreement. ^I will briefly look at the question of ownership of the land in dispute. It is not in dispute that the suit land belonged to the late Emesti Katsinde who died in 1995. this clearly came out in crossexamination of PW1 (Buroora Benon) appellant in this case. The respondents said the same and that this was interstate property/land. That being the case, the law requires all deaths to be reported to the Adm. General (See S. 4 Adm. General's Act Cap. 157) with full particulars as to property. The said Adm. General may apply to the court for letters of Administration. Should the Adm. Gen. decline to administer the estate, whoever wishes to apply for letters of administration must give written notice to the Adm Gen of his or her intention to apply for the grant. On receipt of such notice, the Adm. General may call upon the applicant for such particulars as he/she may reasonably require in order to determine whether to oppose or consent to grant being made.

(Cap. 156). In practice, the Adm Gen. opens a file for the deceased, holds family meetings and the beneficiaries decide on who should take on the grant of L/A. A certificate of no objection is issued to the applicant who submits to court for a grant. This applies big estate.\_ For small estates these were governed by the Administration of Estate (Small Estates) (special provisions) Act Letters of administration would be issued by $\overline{10}$ magistrates and it was not a requirement to get the clearance of the Administration General

The effect of letters of Administration in either case would be to make the holder of the grant a representative of the deceased until the grant is revoked. The holder of the grant of $L/A$ was empowered to distribute the property of the deceased to the beneficiaries settle debts dispose of the property of deceased and indeed stand in the shoes of the deceased.

In either case the process of obtaining a grant of letters of administration is elaborate and

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it is not likely that one who has gone through it will forget it so fast-unless of course the person has a mental illness or a debilitating disease which was not the case in the instant suit. PW2 (Catherine) denied any involvement.

In the absence of letters of administration, who could have sold to the appellant? Who could inter-meddled with the estate of Ernest Katsinde to the extent of effecting a sale? These questions remained unanswered.

As for the purchase Agreement rejected by the LTM I agree with Learned Counsel for the respondents reasoning. The requirement to make a certificate of translation under S. 4 of the Illiterates Protection Act (Cap. 78) is couched in mandatory All persons making documents to be signed by parties terms. who do not understand the language in which it is made must w. Ms. Anne Mulindwa<br>Hisza sopurt or unanga comply with the provision of that law.

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contents. In that case court held: Quoting the case of *Abdalla f Vs. AH Omar & Adimba Advocates, HCCS 962 of 1986 learned Counsel* augmented his argument. (PW4) a provision of their law. illiterates from executing It is therefore no wonder that PW3 denied the document and its lawyer by training should have compiled with the The purpose of that is to protect documents they do not understand.

That certificate must be thereon the documents. That failure by an advocate to certify that he was the author of a document of the illiterate person renders the document illegal and unenforceable and that a person who makes the document on behalf of an Metered must append a kind of Certificate consenting of that persons particulars certifying that he was the writer thereof and that the document was written on the induction of the illiterate and that he read it to him and that the illiterate indicted that he understood the document.

person to the oppression. It was further held that the importance thereof is to ensure documents written of the metenater persons are understood if they are to be bound and that S.4 must be so.interpreted whom the document contested in such a manner as to benefit the

That where the illiterate assists that he did not know the of the Act. contents of the document in issue the opposing party claims to have explained, the court will assist that the only assurance that the illiterate understood in the certificate in accordance with S. 4 That in the absence of such Certificate, the illiterate is not bound by that document. This holding equally applied to

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**IO** Alltestation). PW1 (Bunora Benon) told court that he did the process of Registration by himself and among the documents for registration to the Registrar, a Certificate of attestation was not among them. all documents where an illiterate person has to sign on thumbprint. The same should have been done for the transfer forms. *[See also S. 148 of the Reqn of Titles (Cap. 230) Act, and schedule 18 thereof]* PW6 (Counsel Abaine Jonathan admitted in court that he did not make the Certificate of

The lawyers were involved in the process and execution of the documents required for registration of the appellant on the certificate of Title. These were Anne Mulindwa, Abaine Jonathan and Kasumba Patrick. These ought to have detected the legal requirements but they did' not hence there is no way that the LTM would have ruled that the appellant was validly registered as the proprietor.

As for the 4th irregularity, learned counsel invited court to look at the last paragraph of the first issue as resolved by the LTM. This last petrography is a long one and I took time to read it. Indeed as stated by Counsel, the LTM made a finding that the appellants, (an educated man with political responsibilities did not carry out any search before purchasing the land. This he based on the evidence of Ann Mulindwa. who informed court that at the time she drafted the agreement, C. Katisinde did not have a title to the suit land. This again reflected in the sale agreement in which the seller had to process a title, register it in her names for the purpose of effecting a transfer.... This shows .. ■■. • l9

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1 o that at the time of sale, there was no certificate of Title in C. Katsinde's names which he could have seen for this reason, the appellant was not being truthful when he testified that he saw that which was not in existence at the time.

Learned Counsel for appellant then relied on the case of Narsensio Begumisa & 3 ors Vs. Erick Tibebaga Sup. Crt. Civ. App. No. 17/02 to state that a Certificate of title was involved except for fraud. The Hon Lordships stated in that $case:=$

" It is trite law that a certificate of Title issued under S.56 RTA (Cap. 218) then, (It is now S. 59, LTA Cap. 230) is conclusive evidence that the person named in the certificate is proprietor is possesses of the estate in the land described in the certificate. Such Certificate of Title can only be preached for fraud"

It follows that the inviolability of Title is circumscribed in as much as it is conferred to the particulars in the certificate.

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This law is well-stated and both Counsel agreed so/ P.3 of the Record of proceedings shows that the appellant did a search in land Registry. It revealed that C. Katsinde was the administrator of Ernest Katsinde's estate, and was registered as As both Counsel agree, the Land Registry at Masaka owner. does not keep lease Certificate of Title. The appellant was not truthful and was rightly found to have committed a fraud by the FIGH COURT OF UGANDA LTM.

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In addition if a person procures registration to registered interest on the part of another person of which he is proved to have knowledge, then that person is guilty of fraud. *{See Katarikaive Vs. Katwirem.u {1977} II. C. B. 187 &> Matovu &, 2 Ors. Vs. Seviiri & Anor[1979] H. C. B. 174-}.* defeat an

The appellant procured the registration on this title to defeat the interest of the respondent of which he had full knowledge before he got registered. Once again the LTM was right & I cannot find fault with his finding. The first ground of appeal which I found all encompassing falls.

All in all, the interest of justice in this case- demand that the appeal be dismissed with costs and the Judgment and orders of the LTM be upheld.

The LTM on remedies stated:-

*cc In the result the claimant* . *cannot remain the Registered owner of the suit land and it is hereby declared that he fraudulently secured his registration as transferee. The matter shall be referred to the High Court for the necessary conseguential orders under S.*

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## *¹⁰ I 76 (1) (c) as amended bij the amendment Act of2003. want to believe the LTM meant S. 76 (1) (c) of the Land Act (Cap. 227) as amended in 2004.*

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Having heard the appeal and agreed with the findings of the LTM in his judgment dated 9.9.2008 in land suit No. 10 of 2004, it would not be fair on the parties to defer the matter for another application.

holder of Letters of Administration in whose names the certificate would be registered. Indeed the appellant cannot remain the registered owner oft the suit land because of the fraud. Yet court notes that there is no

^I accordingly, order as follows

(a) The registration of land comprised in Ranch Numbers 36B1 and 26B2, Mawogola Ranching Scheme, Sembabule LRV 3297 Folio 9 in the names of Burora Benon be cancelled;

(b) The name of Emesti Katsinde be registered as the proprietor of the said land; and

(c) The Registrar be notified.

**KIGGUNDU JANE F. B. JUDGE 14.3.2012**

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Time: 4.00 p.m. 10

## In Attendance:

- Appellant - Respondent (1)

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- Both Counsel absent - Judgment delivered in open Court

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## KIGGUNDU JANE F. B.

## **JUDGE**

14.3.2012

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