[2025] UGCommC 34

# 5 **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1871 OF 2024 (ARISING FROM CIVIL SUIT NO. 536 OF 2014)**

#### **EXPORT TRADING COMPANY (U) LIMITED ] APPLICANT**

#### **VERSUS**

### 15 **OBN PRODUCE AND SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED ] RESPONDENT**

### **Before: Hon. Justice Ocaya Thomas O. R**

#### **RULING**

### **Introduction:**

This application was brought by way of Notice of Motion under Sections 99 of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 33 of the Judicature Act, Order 6 Rules 8, 10 and 30; Order 8 Rules 1(2), 3 and 19; Order 52 Rules 1 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders:

- 25 1. The Written Statement of Defense filed by the Respondent in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024: Export Trading Company (U) Limited v. OBN Produce and Supply Company, be struck out for having been filed out of time. - 2. That Judgement in Civil Suit No.536 of 2024 be entered in favor of the Applicant and the suit be set down for formal proof. - 30

The grounds of this application are supported by an affidavit sworn by Jatin Patel and briefly, they are;

That the Applicant filed Civil Suit No. 536 in the Commercial Division of the High Court against the Respondent on the 6th day of May 2024 and the Applicant served the Respondent

35 with summons to file a Defense on the 4th day of June 2024. That the Respondent filed a


5 Written Statement of Defense on the 20th day of June 2024, 19 days after it had been served with a summons to file a Defense.

That the Respondent filed its Written Statement of Defense out of time which is an abuse of the Court process and that the Respondent in its Written Statement of Defense is generally

10 defensive and evasive.

That the Written Statement of Defense be struck out and suit be set down for formal proof.

The Respondent's affidavit in reply was sworn by Mutebi Benard Mugoya, a director in the 15 Respondent company and he stated that the Applicant's application is devoid of merit, incompetent and the same ought to be struck out. That service was effected on a Supermarket Manager and the same cannot be construed as effective service upon the Respondent company according to the information he obtained from the lawyers. That the Respondent company only learned of the existence of the suit when court documents were dropped at his gate on or around 17th 20 June 2024.

That the Respondent company immediately instructed M/s Muzuusa and Co. Advocates to file a defense in the matter which was filed on the 21st of June 2024 close to only 4 days later and that the Applicants have not been prejudiced in any way by the filing of the Written Statement of Defense on the 21st 25 June 2024.

That the interest of substantive justice demands that the Respondent's Written Statement of Defense properly on record should not be struck off to allow the parties to be heard on the merits of the suit.

In rejoinder, Jatin Patel reiterated the contents of his affidavit in support and testified that the Respondent was served through Yusuf Joseph an agent of the Respondent who first had permission from Mutebi Benard Mugoya, before receiving the summons. That the Respondent learned about the suit upon receipt from Yusuf Joseph who received it with its 35 consent.

5 That the Respondent filed its written statement of defense on the 21st of June 2024, seventeen (17) days later from the date of service, outside the fifteen (15) days provided by the law.

### **Representation:**

10 The Applicant was represented by the law firm of M/s Arcadia Advocates while the Respondent was represented by M/s Muzuusa and Co. Advocates.

### **Evidence and Submissions:**

The Applicant led evidence by way of an affidavit in support and in rejoinder deponed by

15 Jatin Patel, its Finance Manager. The Respondent equally led evidence by way of an Affidavit in reply deponed by Mutebi Benard Mugoya, a director in the Respondent company.

The parties filed written submissions with permission of the Court and the same have been considered.

### **Decision:**

The present application raises two issues

- (a) Whether the Respondent's Written Statement of Defence is properly on record. - (b) Whether the Respondent's Written Statement of Defence comprises of general 25 and/or evasive denials.

### Was the defence filed in time?

There was some contestation between the parties on this issue. The Applicant framed the issue thus;

30 "Whether the Written Statement of Defence filed by the Respondent in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024 should be struck out for offending Order 6 Rules 8, 10 and 30, Order 8 Rule 1(2) ,3 & 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules"

Counsel for the Respondent opposed the framing of this issue, contending that the same was

35 argumentative and contravened Order 15. Counsel for the Respondent framed the issue thus:

5 "Whether the Written Statement of Defense filed by the Respondent vide Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024 be struck off for having been filed out of time."

The starting point is that Order 15 of the CPR applies to all suits. Under Section 2(x) of the Civil Procedure Act, applications such as the present one. In my considered view, the issue 10 as framed by the Applicant did not offend Order 15 merely because it stated the rules claimed to be impugned. In any case, the court, in the exercise of Order 15 can reframe the issues. In exercise of this power, the court has simply framed the question thus; "Whether the Respondent's Written Statement of Defence is properly on record".

- 15 Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the Respondent did not adhere to the provision of the law under Order 8 rule 1(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules that makes it mandatory for the Respondent (Defendant) to file its written statement of defense within the stipulated 15 days from receipt of the summons to file its defense. That in the instant case, the Respondent was served with a summons to file its defense in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024 on the 4th day of - 20 June 2024. However, the Respondent did not adhere to the same until the 21st day of June 2024. This was seventeen (17) days after it had been served with the summons as Seen in annexures "B", "C, and "D" of the Affidavit in support of the Application.

Counsel cited the case of *Simon Tendo Kabenge v. Barclays Bank Uganda Ltd, SCCA NO. 17 Of* 25 *2025*, that the Supreme Court held that a Written Statement of Defense must be filed and served within 15 days.

That despite the Respondent being out of the mandatory fifteen (15) days, it did not seek leave to enlarge the time within which to file its defense as required by law but rather went

30 ahead and just filed. Therefore, they filed out of time. That the Respondent's allegations contained in the affidavit in reply are excuses that should have been brought in the application to file out time.

Counsel further submitted that Order 6 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides for 35 denial to be specific and that Order 8 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules Provides for specific denial that; Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary 5 implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, shall be taken to be admitted, except as against a person under disability. Still, the court may in its discretion require any facts so admitted to be proved otherwise than by that admission.

Counsel also submitted that Order 6 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that when 10 a party in any pleading denies an allegation of fact in the previous pleading of the opposite party, he or she must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance.

That the Written Statement of Defense filed by the Respondent on the 21st day of June 2024 was a general denial of the claims put forward by the Applicant and thus offending the 15 provision of Order 6 Rule 8. That it is not sufficient for a Defendant in his defense to deny generally the allegations in the statement of claim. Each party must traverse specifically each allegation of fact, which he does not intend to admit. The party pleading must make it clear how much of his opponent's case he disputes.

- 20 Counsel submitted that the Respondent generally denies that the Applicant (Plaintiff) has never moved to the premises demanding any monies. That the Respondent's defense does not give clear and specific responses to the Applicant's allegations and consists of evasive denials, therefore offending Order 6 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Counsel cited the case of *Eco Bank Uganda Limited v Kalsons Agrovet Concerns Ltd & 2 Others, Civil Suit NO. 573* - 25 *Of 2016*, that the court contended that it is not sufficient for a defendant in his defense to deny generally the allegations in the statement of claim of the Plaintiff in his reply to deny generally the allegations in a counterclaim. - Counsel also cited Order 6 rule 30(1) which provides for striking out pleadings and that the 30 rule empowers the court to Order any pleading in defense to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable answer or where the defense is shown to be frivolous or vexatious, the court may order that judgment be entered accordingly as the court may deem just. Counsel cited the case of *MHK Engineering Services (U) Ltd v Macdowell Limited, Miscellaneous Application No. 825 of 2018*.

- 5 Counsel for Respondent submitted that whereas the Applicant in his Notice of Motion solely prays for order to have the Written statement of Defense of the Respondent in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024 to be struck off for having been filed out of time, he departs from the same to seek for other orders of striking out the Written statement of Defense for being evasive and containing general denials. That the Respondent shall restrict its submission as to whether - 10 the Written statement of Defense was filed out of time.

Counsel submitted that the affidavit of service indicated that it was affected upon a Supermarket Manager, one Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko, who is neither a Company Secretary, Director or principal officer of the respondent, or its agent.

That the said Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko while receiving the summons as per Annexure A and B of the Application inscribe the words, "Received on his behalf", that one wonders on whose behalf was the said Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko received the summons. That the Defendant/Respondent is a limited liability company against whom service of the court 20 process is duly prescribed under Order 29 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. That from the facts of the case, service upon a supermarket manager who purportedly received on behalf of "Ben" cannot be construed to amount to either effective or good service of court process upon the Defendant/Respondent herein as alleged by the applicant.

25 That notwithstanding, the Respondent company only learned about the suit on the 17th of June 2024 and the bedrock of service of summons of court process against the defendant is to notify him about the existence of the suit against him. That for all intents and purposes, the Respondent only learned about the suit on 17th June 2024 and that is the date the 15 days started to run.

In conclusion, Counsel submitted that there was non-service of court process in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024 against the Defendant as the affidavit of service relied upon by the Applicant discloses no facts as to service upon the Defendant.

35 Time for filing a Written Statement of Defense is provided for under Order 8 Rule 1(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules that a defense should be filed within 15 days following service of the

## 5 summons. See also **Stop and See (U) Ltd v Tropical Africa Bank Ltd, Miscellaneous Application No. 333 of 2010**

The position of the law is that filing of a defence is only complete, not upon lodgment in the court, but on service of the defence on the plaintiff(s). The filing and service of a defence

10 must all be done within fifteen (15) days. See **Simon Tendo Kabenge v. Barclays Bank Uganda Ltd, SCCA NO. 17 Of 2015**

Of course, if the failure to comply with the above requirement is owing to circumstances beyond the litigant's control (such as delayed endorsement of pleadings by court) or where 15 the interests of justice so require the court can excuse non-compliance or enlarge time for

compliance. In my view, the starting point is the affidavit of service deponed by Opio Moses Ekusai, the

process server who served the plaint and summons. Briefly he swears that:

- 20 (a) Summons were issued on 30 May 2024 - (b) He proceeded to the defendant's premises on 4 June 2024 to effect service, arriving at 5:00 PM. He went to the manager who he identifies as Dennis and who he had served with a notice of intention to sue on 4 April 2024. - (c) Upon explaining the purposes of his visit, the said Dennis informed him that he 25 had been blamed for accepting service of the notice of intention to sue and had been stopped from receiving documents. Dennis asked him to engage another person named Allan via 0775303532. - (d) On engaging Allan, he asked him to call the director named Ben on 0782394841 - (e) The said number could not be reached and he engaged Allan who asked him to 30 find Ben physically at Agroben Supermarket Jinja. - (f) On reaching Agroben Supermarket, he asked to speak to Ben and he was informed that he wasn't around, and for more information he should contact the manager. - (g) He engaged the manager who introduced himself as Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko. Mr. Ekusai introduced himself and the purpose of his visit and he said he was 35 delivering a plaint and summons for Ben. He said Ben had some problems in the

- 5 village and had not been around for three days but the said Mr. Wojombuko indicated that he could receive the said documents and deliver them to Ben. Accordingly, he was availed the documents, read through and acknowledged receipt. - 10 The Respondent's witness, Mutebi Bernard Mugoya denied the contentions above and contended that he only became aware of the existence of the suit when the suit documents were dropped at his gate on 17 June 2024 (and not 4 June 2024).

The Respondent argues that Defendant/Respondent is a Company Limited by Liability 15 where the said Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko is neither a company secretary, director, principal officer of the respondent, nor its agent.

**Order 29 Rule 2** of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that: -

"Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a 20 corporation, the summons may be served—

- (a) on the secretary, or any director or other principal officer of the corporation; or - (b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the corporation carries on business."

#### 25

The above provision is subject to other provisions on service of process, including **Order 5 Rule 10** which reads as below:

"Wherever it is practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he or she has an agent empowered to accept service, in which case service on the 30 agent shall be sufficient."

A company is an abstraction. It is a legal fiction in which a thing is conferred on legal personality akin to that which a natural person typically possesses. See **Halsbury's Laws of England, 5th Edition, Vol 14 P 137, Para 115 and P 342-343, Para 268, Lennard's**

35 **Carrying Co. Lrd v Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd (1915) AC 705, Stephen Kasako v Christ's** 5 In so far as Order 5 Rule 10 provides for personal service on a defendant, where the defendant is a company, the ordinary mode of personal service to wit, delivering the summons and plaint to the person cannot work, as the company doesn't have a human existence the same way natural persons do. It follows that Order 29 Rule 2 provides the mode of personal service for corporations.

The question that then arises is who a principal officer is for purposes of Order 29 Rule 2 of the CPR.

Hon. Justice Stephen Mubiru in **Specon Services Limited v Onencan Habib, Civil Appeal** 15 **No. 92 of 2016** expounded on this and held that: -

"The rule (Rule 2 of Order 29) though does not define who a "principal officer of the corporation is. However, considering the mischief aimed at by the provision, it seems to me that the determination of who in the corporation qualifies as such must be determined on the basis of the nature of the duties the person performs in the 20 corporation. It is a functional determination. Interpreting the provision on an *ejusdem generis* basis, it includes such persons in the corporation who are authorized to exercise substantial executive or managerial powers, such as signing contracts and making major business and administrative decisions as distinguished from regular employees. In the instant case, the person served was identified as Stephen, the Administrator of 25 the applicant. It is not clear to me that the position of Administrator involves the exercise of substantial executive or managerial powers in the Applicant corporation."

The Hon. Justice went on to add that: -

"It is important that the identity of the post held by such principal officer in the 30 company must be specified. In other words, if such an officer is neither secretary nor director, his position in the company must be specified. It is not enough just to say that such a person is a principal officer. (see *Kiganga and Associates Gold Mining Co Ltd v. Universal Gold NL [2000] 1 EA 134 at 138*)."

- 5 In **Remco Ltd. v. Mistry Jadva Parbat and Co. Ltd. and others [2002] 1 EA 233**, the Service of summons intended for a corporation was served on the receptionist of the company. Regarding the issue of whether such service was effective on the company, the court held that it was not in dispute that the receptionist was neither a director nor a secretary nor a principal officer of the Defendant Company. - 10

The sum effect of the above authorities is to answer the question of whether, the individual who acknowledged the receipt of the summons in Civil Suit No. 536 of 2024, Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko is an individual envisaged under Order 29 Rule (2). The affidavit of service deponed by Opio Moris Ekusai in paragraph 11 stated that he, the process server entered the 15 office of the Manager of the supermarket who introduced himself as Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko.

However, the deponent of the affidavit of service did not state whether Yusuf Joseph Wojombuko identified himself as the Manager of the Respondent company as being a 20 principal officer envisaged under Order 29 Rule 2. In my considered view, it is important to note that it is not denied that Mr. Wojombuko was an employee of the Respondent at the time of service. Additionally, all other subordinate officials of the Respondent who the process server engaged with referred him to Mr. Wojombuko. Additionally, Mr. Wojombuko was represented as a manager and appeared to be in charge in the absence of Mr. Bernard Mutebi.

25 In my view, this itself is evidence that he exercised sufficient authority to be considered a principal officer of the Respondent.

Furthermore, as can be observed under Order 5 Rule 10, service on a company is not confined to the modes in Order 29 Rule 2. Service on a company can also be made on an agent 30 empowered to accept service such as a trading agent or an advocate.

Agency is created either by conduct or law. See **Besigye Kiiza v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta and Another [2001] UGSC 3**

35 A person not being a principal officer does not mean they are not an agent empowered to accept service. In many corporations, front desk officers, records officers, executive 5 assistants and staff who are not principal agents are empowered to accept court service. It follows that service can be made on such persons notwithstanding that they are not principal officers.

Accordingly, even if it was to be said that Mr. Wojombuko was not an employee, he was 10 nonetheless, from the evidence, an agent designated to accept service on behalf of the Respondent as its agent and transmit the same to its directors or other such principal officers.

Additionally, the evidence led by the Respondent as to how its controlling mind came to be 15 aware of the existence of the suit is not on questionable but not believable. It was not shown who the said person was that delivered the documents on to the deponent's gate. There was no detail on the time that the documents were discovered. There was, on the whole, a lack of detail in the evidence that one normally comes to find with truthful witnesses who are recounting an experience/event they witnessed.

In the circumstances, this court is inclined to believe that the said documents were indeed received from Mr. Wojombuko shortly after service.

#### In **James Bahiguza & Anor v Attorney General CACA 269 of 2013** court held thus;

25 "The Court should therefore not tolerate disobedience of the law out of sympathy to the offending party, or on the mere assertion that no prejudice has been caused to the innocent party. Absence of prejudice is no excuse for disobeying the law. Rules and timelines set by law must be complied with by all. It is through such compliance that certainty, confidence and clarity become the bedrock of Court adjudication of causes. 30 That way the rules and regulations become the means guiding the Court and the parties in obtaining justice from the Courts. Every party to a cause must therefore take care and pay scrupulous attention to complying with the Court Rules: See: Court of Appeal of Kenya: Civil Appeal Application No. 228 of 2013: Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korr Salt Vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Wilfred Rottich Lesan."

5 It is settled law that a failure to file a defence in time will entitle *interalia*, to have the suit set down for formal proof. See **Twine Amos v Tamsuza James HC REV 11/2009**

Accordingly, it is my finding that the Written Statement of Defence is not properly on court record.

## General denial in the Written of Defense.

**Order 6 Rule 8** of CPR provides:

"It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his or her written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the statement of claim, or for the Plaintiff in his or her 15 Written Statement in reply to deny generally the grounds alleged in a defence by way of counterclaim, but each party must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he or she does not admit the truth, except damages."

Rule 10 adds that: -

- 20 When a party in any pleading denies an allegation of fact in the previous pleading of the opposite party, he or she must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he or she received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he or she received that particular amount, but he or she must deny that he or she received that sum or any part of it, or else set out how much he or she received. If the 25 allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along.

#### General/Evasive Denials

## **Order 6 Rule 8** of CPR (*Supra*)

30 In **Ecobank Uganda Limited v Kalson's Agrovet Concern Ltd & Anor HCCS 573/2016** the court, considering an allegation of general denials, held thus:

> "It is clear in the instant case that the plaintiff made a claim basing on a loan facility advanced to the defendants. They attached a copy of an offer letter; the respective guarantees letters, repayment schedules and a formal demand to their plaint.

- 5 On the other hand, the Defendants denied each claim and never responded to it in specific terms as required by the law. The defendants in their respective defences merely averred illegality and fraud and intended attempt by the plaintiff to enrich themselves. I have not seen any substantial defence or any intelligible response to the claim. Consequently, I find that the defence did not raise a reasonable answer to the applicant's claim and thus offended - 10 the provisions of O 6.r 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It is accordingly struck out."

The purpose of pleadings is to ensure that a party's claim or defence is clearly known, and the issues in dispute are easily capable of being ascertained. Therefore, a party's claim or defence should be stated clearly and be capable of being made out simply. In respect of a 15 defence, it must give specific responses to the allegations of the plaintiff. See **Nile Bank v Thomas Kato & Ors HCMA 1190/1999, Vambeco Enterprises v Attorney General HCMA**

**265/2014, MHK Engineering Services Limited v Macdowell Limited HCMA 723/2018.**

I have read the decision of my learned brother Justice Vincent Wagona in **Byaruhanga** 20 **Africano v UEDCL HCMA 67/2022** wherein his Lordship held that once a Defendant disputes the allegations of the plaint and indicates that they will put the Plaintiff to strict proof of the same, the Plaintiff has supplied a sufficient defence within the provisions of the CPR.

- 25 A review of Order 8 Rule 1 and 3, 16, 17 of the CPR brings me to a contrary view. A Plaintiff is required to make out their claim in a plaint by indicating clearly the grounds for their claim and the reliefs sought. The Defendant must, in their defence, in a manner that is clear and concise (relative to the circumstances of the case) indicate whether they deny or acede to the claim or any part of it, and where they deny the claim, indicate the grounds on which they - 30 deny.

There are virtually limitless grounds on available to parties to deny claims. They may be immature, void, brought against a wrong party, brought in the wrong forum, be fraudulent, be contested on the basis of non-delivery or over billing among others. If a defendant says "I

35 deny liability", it would in theory mean each and every of these defences are available to the defendant and a court must try them. To cure this mischief, the Defendant is required to show

- 5 if they contest the claim, and why they contest it. That "why" should show the grounds why they contest the same and the facts supporting those grounds of objection. It is not enough to say "I deny liability and will put you to strict proof". This is because a trial is a trial of both the Plaintiff's grounds of its claim as well as the Defence's grounds for their defence. To achieve the same, the grounds underpinning the averments of both sides must be clear, as - 10 should the factual narration supporting those grounds. That way, a court will inquire into the factual narration underpinning the grounds (or the legal basis if such grounds are pure questions of law), identify whether such ground of claim or objection are made out, and enter a decision. - 15 In my view, for a defence to comply with the relevant rules above, the grounds of defence must be made out, the narration underpinning such grounds should be made out and both must be made out in a manner that is reasonably clear.

A general or evasive denial renders the defense incurably defective and liable to be struck 20 out and not even Article 126 (2) (e) of the 1995 Constitution as amended can save such. See **Byaruhanga Africano v Uganda Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd (UEDCL), HCMA No. 067 of 2022**.

Whereas the Respondent contended that this contention was not pleaded, paragraph 5 of the 25 notice of motion clearly shows that the Applicant alleged that the said defence comprised of general and/or evasive denials. This contention is therefore without merit.

In this instant case, the Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the Respondent generally denies that the Applicant/Plaintiff has never moved to its premises to demand any money

30 and the Respondent/Defendant avers in its Written Statement of defense that it has never deprived the Applicant of any money. However, it does not specifically deny the amount claimed by the Applicant.

I have perused the Written Statement of Defense of the Respondent/Defendant in Annexure 35 D of the affidavit in support and in paragraph 4 the Defendant stated that - Paragraphs 3 & 4 of the Plaint is expressly denied. The Defendant shall aver and contend that the Plaintiff is 5 not at all entitled to any of the reliefs therein sought and the Plaintiff shall be put to strict proof of.

In paragraph 6, the Defendant stated that Paragraph 5 of the Plaint is denied, the Plaintiff has never moved to the Defendant's premises as claimed demanding the alleged outstanding 10 balance, the Plaintiff shall be put to Strict proof thereof.

In Paragraph 7, the Defendant stated that Paragraph 6 is denied, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff is misconceived and that the Defendant has never deprived the Plaintiff of any money and therefore the Plaintiff shall be put to strict proof.

# In *MHK Engineering Services (U) Ltd vs Macdowell Limited, Miscellaneous Application No. 825 of 2018*, court held thus: -

"It is not sufficient for a defendant in his defense to deny generally the allegations in the statement of claim … Each party must traverse specifically each allegation of fact, 20 which he does not intend to admit. The party pleading must make it clear how much of his opponent's case he disputes…Further Asbury, J., in Weinberger V. Inglis (1916- 17) All E. R. Rep. 843, noted in relation to the issue I am investigating thus: "As a general rule, the court never orders a defendant to give particulars of facts and matters which the plaintiff has to prove in order to succeed, and this is especially the case where a 25 defendant has confined himself to putting the plaintiff to the proof of allegations in the statement of claim, the onus of establishing which lies upon him."

In my view, the reading of the law is that whereas the rules do not require a defendant to plead facts in extensive detail, general denial of pleaded facts is not sufficient. Such denials

30 ought to be accompanied with sufficient pleading of the facts supporting such denials. Naked denials alone will not do.

## **Conclusion:**

I accordingly make the following orders;

35 a) The Respondent's defence was filed out of time and is improperly on record.


- 5 b) The Written Statement of Defense comprises of general and evasive denials and the same is accordingly struck out. - c) Default judgment is entered for the Applicant in the main suit and the same is to be set down for formal proof. - d) The Respondent shall bear the costs of this application. - 10

I so order.

Delivered electronically this\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_2025 and uploaded on ECCMIS. 12th March

**Ocaya Thomas O. R Judge, 12th March 2025**

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