[2018] UGSC 89

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 16 OF 2015

#### **BETWEEN**

#### **IMERE DEO ..................................** .................. APPELLANT

#### **VERSUS**

#### **UGANDA ........** ......................................

## CORAM: [KATUREEBE, C. J; ARACH - AMOKO; OPIO-AWERI; MWONDHA; TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; JJ. S. C]

(Appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal before Kasule, Mwangusya and Egonda. Ntende, JJA, IN Criminal Appeal No. 065/2012, 15 dated 19^th January 2015)

#### **JUDGMENT OF COURT**

#### Introduction.

This is a second appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal that was delivered on the 19^th day of January, 2015. It arose from the 20 judgment of the High Court (Anti Corruption Division) at Kampala.

The appellant was indicted on 3 counts for the following offences:-

- a. Corruption contrary to Section 2(a) of the Anti Corruption Act, 2009. - b. Abuse of Office Contrary to Section 11(i) of the Anti Corruption Act, 2009.

#### BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL

The appellant was an employee of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) at Crested Towers, Kampala. He was employed as a Revenue Officer and deployed in the Domestic Taxes Department. He was subsequently appointed as a Supervisor in the same department.

During the month of October, 2010, URA decided to conduct a comprehensive audit on Lumbarks Investments Limited (hereinafter

$\mathbf{1}$

- referred to as Taxpayer Company). The task of conducting the audit was $\mathsf{S}$ done by three employees, namely Imere Deo (appellant), Kyomuhangi Alice (PW2) and Kasigazi Charity (PW3). The team was led by the appellant. - The audit found that the taxpayer company had a tax liability sum of shs $1,019,878,753$ (One billion, nineteen million, eight hundred seventy 10 eight thousand, seven hundred and fifty three shillings). This tax liability was communicated to Mr. Sebyala Moses, a director of the Taxpayer Company. Mr. Sebyala disputed the assessment and offered to provide the team with evidence to substantiate the fact that his tax position was less than the assessed sum of shs 1,019,878,753/=. The team agreed to 15 halt the process on the disputed assessment to enable the director to provide further documentation to substantiate his dispute on the assessed sum. In the meantime, PW2 and PW3 proceeded on their annual leave. - The appellant however by himself approached Mr. Sebyala and solicited 20 for shs $100,000,000/$ = (one hundred million shillings) for the benefit of himself in exchange for facilitating the reduction of the Taxpayer Company's tax liability from shs $1,019,878,753/$ = to shs $230,000,000/$ = (two hundred thirty million shillings). As the negotiations between the 25 appellant and Mr Sebyala were on going, the appellant called Komuhangi Alice (PW2) to his office to conclude the audit only for her to find that the appellant had reduced the tax liability to 230,000,000/= (Two Hundred and Thirty Million shillings). Komuhangi (PW2) sought for clarification from the appellant as to why the assessment had been reduced, to no avail. 30

On the other hand, Mr. Sebyala became uncomfortable with the appellant's demand for the shs 100,000,000 (one hundred million shillings) and consequently consulted a friend, Jenifer Nyakwera (PW4) working with URA. PW4 linked Mr. Sebyala to the Manager Central Service Office who referred the complaint to the Commissioner Domestic

Taxes and further to the Internal Audit and Compliance Unit of URA. The $\mathsf{S}$ investigators from the Compliance Unit got in touch with Mr. Sebyala to verify the complaint. Upon verification, the investigators then earmarked Ug Shs 5,000,000/= (Five Million shillings), recorded, photocopied and gave it to Mr. Sebyala to give to the appellant as the initial deposit. Mr. Sebyala called the appellant to the Parking yard at Crested Towers where 10 the appellant received the shs. $5,000,000/$ =. In the process of receiving the money, he was arrested and indicted for corruption on two counts and abuse of office on the third count.

The prosecution led 10 witnesses to prove the ingredients of the above offences. 15

In his defence, the appellant denied the offences. He testified that Mr. Sebyala threatened to lock him up in a safe-house where no one would trace him unless he reduced the tax position of the Taxpayer Company to $230,000,000/$ =. The appellant further testified that on the fateful day, Mr. Sebyala called him to the Parking Yard at Crested Towers where he ordered him to take the envelope, put it in his socks and get out of his car at gunpoint. That it was on his way out that the officers arrested him and charged him.

Further in his defence, the Appellant's wife (DW2) testified that the appellant and Mr. Sebyala had met at the appellant's home. 25

The High Court acquitted the appellant on count one of Corruption contrary to Section 2(a) of the Anti-Corruption Act and count three of Abuse of Office Contrary to Section 11(i) of the same. He was however convicted on Count two of Corruption contrary to Section 2(a) of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2009.

The appellant being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court.

$\overline{3}$

- The appellant was still aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal. $\mathsf{S}$ He lodged an appeal to this Court on two grounds as follows:- - 1. The Learned Justices of Appeal erred in law by upholding the Appellant's conviction based on defective indictment on Count $2.$ - 2. The Learned Justices of Appeal erred in law by failing to 10 adequately re-evaluate circumstantial evidence that was illegally dramatically placed upon the appellant occasioning miscarriage of justice thereby wrongly confirmed (sic) appellant's conviction of corruption C/S 2 (a) Act No. 6 of 15 2009.

The appellant prayed that this Court quashes his conviction and sets aside the sentence.

### Representation

The appellant was represented by Mr. Rukundo Henry Seith on private brief while the respondent was represented by Mr. George Okello, 20 Assistant Commissioner Litigation, URA appearing together with Ms Christina Namutebi, Supervisor Prosecution, URA.

Both counsel filed written submissions.

#### Ground One

The Learned Justices of Appeal erred in law by upholding the Appellant's 25 conviction based on defective indictment on Count 2.

### Appellant's arguments.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that it was erroneous for the Court of Appeal to confirm the appellant's conviction based on a defective indictment regarding count 2 upon which the appellant was convicted. Counsel argued that in the Indictment, no person was referred to from

whom the appellant had received the shs $5,000,000/$ = for the benefit of $\mathsf{S}$ himself in exchange for reducing the tax liability.

Counsel stated that it was an illegality for court to convict the appellant for receiving the alleged 5,000,000/= from an unknown person in the indictment. Counsel relied on Section 25(c) of the Trial on Indictments Act Cap 23 which stipulates that the description or designation in an indictment of an accused or of any person to whom reference is made in the indictment shall be such as is reasonably sufficient to identify him or her.

Counsel further submitted on count two, that the Indictment cited the Section that defines the offence of corruption but did not cite the 15 provision prescribing the punishment in the punishment Section of the Anti corruption Act No. 2009.

Counsel prayed that Court allows this ground.

### Respondent's arguments

Counsel for the respondent submitted that the indictment contained 20 particulars that gave reasonable information as to the nature of the offence that the appellant was indicted for. Counsel contended that, in the summary of the case which was read to the appellant in the trial court, it was clear that the appellant who at the time of the offence was an employee of Uganda Revenue Authority, during the course of his work 25 had solicited and received a sum of shs. $5,000,000/$ = from Mr. Sebyala as an initial deposit and in return reduced the company's tax liability to $230,000,000/=$ .

Counsel further contended that while there was no mention of a summary of case in the Trial Indictment Act, Section 168 of the MCA makes a provision for it in cases to be tried by the High Court.

Counsel argued that Section 25 of the Trial on Indictments Act spelt out the rules of framing an indictment and that citing the section providing

for punishment was not a requirement. He further argued that the $\mathsf{S}$ appellant was neither prejudiced, nor did he suffer any miscarriage of justice due to the failure of citing the punishment section.

Counsel relied on Rule 62 of the Rules of this Court and also contended that the issue in this ground was not raised either before the trial court or in the first appellate court. In his view, the ground could not be entertained by this Court on a second appeal for the first time.

Counsel prayed that Court this dismisses ground one.

## Court's consideration

We shall first address the preliminary point of law raised by the respondent's counsel. It was the contention of the respondent that the 15 above ground was being raised for the first time as it was not raised both at trial court and before the first appellate Court. This contravened Rule 62 (2) of the Rules of this Court which provides as follows:-

"The memorandum of Appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads numbered consecutively, without argument, the ground of objection 20 to the decision appealed against, specifying in the case of a Constitutional Appeal, the points of fact or law or mixed law and fact which are alleged, and in third Appeal, the matters of public or general importance wrongly decided". Emphasis added.

- Another supporting rule on this point is Rule 70 (1) (a) of the Rules of 25 this Court, which provides as follows:- - "At the hearing of an appeal:- $I.$ - a) The appellant shall not without leave of the Court argue any ground of Appeal not specified in the memorandum of appeal or in any supplementary memorandum lodged under rule 63 of these Rules"

The above Rules have been considered by this Court in a number of cases: see Bashir Ssali v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2003. Be

that as it may, it has to be noted that the above rules are rules of general $\mathsf{S}$ application. There are exceptions where this Court may step outside the above rules. This is especially so in cases where the impugned ground touches on legality of the trial or the orders made thereto.

As a matter of law this Court has inherent jurisdiction to take cognizance of such grounds suo moto (on its own motion). [see Bashir Ssali v 10 <u>Uganda</u> (supra). For the above reasons, we agree that such an issue can be raised anytime without flouting/offending Rule 62 (2) and 70 (1) of the Rules of this Court. From the above, we come to the conclusion that a new ground of appeal, not raised in the lower court may be raised for the first time on a second appeal. Also see: Eliabeth Nalumansi Wamala vs 15 Jolly Kasande & others SCCA No. 10 of 2015. That goes for the preliminary point of law raised.

As far as the merits of the arguments of both counsel are concerned, the contention was that appellant had been convicted on a defective indictment. Propriety of an indictment is a constitutional requirement 20 provided under Article 28 of the constitution and also backed by statutory provisions. It goes to the root of a fair trial and a fair hearing. A badly framed indictment is so fundamental that it goes to the legality of the trial by the trial Court.

Contents of an indictment are provided for under Section 22 of the Trial 25 **on Indictment Act**. It states as follows;

"Every indictment shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged."

The indictment in the instant case regarding count two reads as follows; "COUNT 2: STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Corruption, contrary to Section 2(a) of the Anti Corruption Act, 2009

# PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

$\mathsf{S}$

IMERE DEO, on the 4^th day of April 2011 at Crested Towers Kampala in the Kampala district received shs 5,000,000 for the benefit of himself in exchange of reducing tax liability of Lumbarks investments limited from shs 1,019,878,753 to shs 230,000,000".

The above indictment specifies the offence as corruption and the particulars of the offence clearly mention the entity which was to benefit from the payment of the shs 5 million. It is our view that the above indictment gives reasonable information as to the nature of the offence against the appellant as required by Article 28 of the constitution and Section 22 of the Trial on Indictment Act.

The appellant further argued that the indictment did not embody the sanctioning provision regarding the offence the accused was indicted for. Section 25(b) of the Trial Indictment Act. The rules governing the framing

of an indictment are well stipulated in Section 25 of the Trial on 20 **Indictment Act** as follows:-

following provisions shall apply to all indictments "The and. notwithstanding any rule of law or practice, an indictment shall, subject to this Act, not be open to objection in respect of its form or contents if it is framed in accordance with this Act—

(a) a count of an indictment shall commence with a statement of the offence $\mathcal{L}$ charged, called the statement of offence;

(b) the statement of offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms and without

- necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence, and it shall 30 contain a reference to the section of the enactment creating the offence; $(c)$ after the statement of the offence, particulars of that offence shall be set out in ordinary language, in which the use of technical terms shall not be - necessary: but where any written law limits the particulars of an offence 35

paragraph shall require any more particulars to be given than those so $\mathsf{S}$ *required;*" [Emphasis of Court]

The above section stipulates very clearly that an indictment must contain the statement of offence, description of the offence in ordinary language with reference to the section creating the offence and particular of the offence. It does not mention the sanctioning provision as a mandatory requirement. The instant indictment satisfies all the above requirement. We accordingly find no defect in the impugned indictment.

- In any case, it is not every obvious irregularity and defect in the indictment which makes it bad in law and thus rendering the ensuing proceedings a 15 nullity. The criterion which has to be applied in such cases is well established. The test to be applied to answer the question is: what has been the effect of the defect in the indictment on the trial and conviction of the accused and whether there has been a failure of justice. See; Uganda Vs - Dickens Elatu & Anor Criminal Revision No. 71/1972 (Unreported) 20 Furthermore section 139 of the Trial Inducement Act is very instructive. It provides as follows:-

"No finding, sentence or order passed by the High Court shall be reversed or altered on appeal on account of any error ,omission, irregularity or

misdirection on the summons, warrant, indictment, order, judgment or other 25 proceedings before or during the trial unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact caused a failure of justice" (Empasis ours).

This position was echoed by this Court in the case of **Androa Asenua& Anor** Vs Ug SC Crim Appl No. 1 of 1998 where the court while relying on the authority of R Vs Thakar Singh S/o Kahir Singh (1934)1 EACA 110 held 30 "objection to a defect in an indictment should be taken during trial and that where no failure of justice having occurred and accused not having been embarrassed or prejudiced, the conviction should stand".

In the instant case, the indictment did not prejudice the accused at all, neither 35 did it occasion a miscarriage of justice. The respondent further contended that the summary of the case stipulated in $\mathsf{S}$ detail the offence against the accused and was read to him together with the indictment. A summary of the case is provided for in Section 168 of the Magistrates' Courts Act as follows:-

"(1) When a person is charged in a magistrate's court with an offence to be tried by the High Court, the Director of Public 10 Prosecutions shall file in the magistrate's court an indictment and a summary of the case signed by him or her or by an officer authorised by him or her in that behalf acting in accordance with his or her general or special instructions.

(2) The summary of the case referred to in subsection (1) shall contain such particulars as are necessary to give the accused person reasonable information as to the nature of the offence with which he or she is charged.

(3) When a person charged with an offence to be tried by the High Court appears before a magistrate and the Director of Public Prosecutions has complied with subsection (1), the magistrate shall—

(a) give the accused person a copy of the indictment together with the 25 summary of the case;

(b) read out the indictment and the summary of the case and explain to the accused person the nature of the accusation against him or her in

a language he or she understands and inform him or her that he or 30 she is not required to plead to the indictment;" (Emphasis Ours)

In the instant case, the summary of the case contained all particulars of the case and was read to the accused together with the indictment to ensure that he understood the nature of the offence against him before he took plea.

After taking plea denying the charges the appellant was accorded a fair 35 hearing.

This ground is devoid of merit, and must fail. $\mathsf{S}$

## Ground two

## Ground two was framed as follows:-

"The Learned Justices of Appeal erred in law by failing to adequately circumstantial evidence that was illegally dramatically placed upon the 10 appellant occasioning miscarriage of justice thereby wrongly confirmed appellant's conviction of corruption C/S.2 (a) Act No. 6 of 2009" [sic].

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate court failed in its duty to re-evaluate and reappraise the alleged circumstantial evidence in regard to how the appellant obtained the shs. 5,000,000/= 15 that he was found with at the time of his arrest. He contended that had the Court of Appeal properly done its duty, it would have found that the money was dramatically placed upon the appellant.

Counsel further contended that the learned Justices of Appeal failed to appreciate the testimony of the director of the tax payer company, Mr. 20 Sebyala Moses against the testimony of the appellant and thereby came to an erroneous decision that the appellant had received money from the tax payer company voluntarily. He also contended that the Justices of Appeal failed to reappraise and re-evaluate the credibility and quality of each witness plus the role each witness had played in relation to 25 corruption contrary to S. 2(a) of the Anti Corruption Act. Counsel relied on the case of R Vs Akbarali Jetha (1947) 14 EACA 122 where court held that motive which animates the giver if he gives either an account of some past act or omission in his favor or with the expectation that this gift may influence the donee that something may thereafter be done or 30 omitted in his favor, the offence is complete. It is not necessary that there should be a corrupt and express bargain between giver and donee.

- Counsel further drew court's attention to the case of Sewa Singh $\mathsf{S}$ Mandhia Vs R (1966) EA 315 where court relied on the case of Brad fold Election Petition No. 2 (1869) 19 LT 728 and held that the word corruptly means a thing done with an evil mind or an evil intention and if there is no evil intention accompanying the act, it is not corruptly done. - Counsel contended that there was no evidence of a formal tax 10 assessment formalized, signed and adduced before court of the shs $1,019,878,753$ = tax assessment against Lumbarks investment. He also contended that there was no evidence of an expert in bank notes before the court to prove that the trap cash of shs $5,000,000/$ = was legal 15 tender.

In support of the submission that the appellant had received the money under duress (at gunpoint), counsel relied on the case of Lynch Vs Director Public Prosecutions of Northern Ireland (1975) 1 ALLER 917 where Lord Morris observed that "if someone is really threatened with death or serious injury unless he does what he is told to do in law to pay no heed to the miserable agonizing plight of such a person? For the law to understand not only how the timid but also the stalwart may in a moment of crisis behave is not to make law weak but to make it just."

Counsel prayed court to allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside the sentence. 25

## Respondent

In response, Counsel for the respondent contended that the Justices of Appeal properly re-evaluated the evidence and came to their own findings. He submitted that the Justices of Appeal in their judgment referred to Rule 30 (i) of the Court of Appeal Rules, and Pandya V R (1957) EA 570 and Kifamunte Vs Ug, SCCA 10 of 1997, which lay down the principles of evaluation of evidence by a first appellate court.

Counsel further stated that the proof of the tax liability of Uganda $\mathsf{S}$ shillings $1,019,878,753$ = assessed was got from the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW7.

He further submitted that it was not open on a second appeal for this court to go into the sufficiency of the evidence or reasonableness of the finding. In Counsel's view, this was a preserve of the first appellate court.

## Court's Consideration.

The thrust of this ground and submissions thereto allude to the issue whether the Trial Court and the Court of Appeal correctly evaluated the evidence on record, rightly applied the law on circumstantial evidence and thereby correctly convicted the appellant.

As a second appellate court, we are aware that the two lower courts reached concurrent findings that the appellant was guilty of corruption. Consequently, this Court can only interfere with concurrent findings if satisfied that the two lower Courts were grossly wrong or applied wrong principles of law. Further, we are mindful of the fact that we did not have the chance to see or hear the witnesses as did the trial court. See; Kakooza Godfrey Versus Uganda SC Crim Appeal No. 03 of 2008- See also; Kifamunte Henry versus Uganda SCCrim Appeal No. 10 of 1997. Akbar Godi Vs Ug SC Criminal Appela No. 3 of 2015.

That said, we note that the Court of Appeal was aware of its duty as a $1^{st}$ 25 appellate court when it stated in its judgment as follows:-

"As a first appellate court, this court is required to review and re evaluate the evidence adduced before the trial court and reach its own conclusions taking into account that the appellate court does not have the same opportunity as that of the trial court to see and hear the witnesses testify and assess their demeanor, see Rule 30(i)(a) of the Court of Appeal Rules and the cases of Kifamunte Henry Vs Ug SC Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997 [1998], Pandya V R EA 336.

The Court of Appeal guided itself as to the law regarding its duty to re $\mathsf{S}$ evaluate the entire evidence on record. The court further considered in great detail the entire evidence on record before coming to the same conclusion as the trial court had reached. The court cited with approval a detailed analysis of the evidence by the trial judge and agreed with his conclusions. In agreeing with those findings, the court held as follows:-10

"We find the appellant's version of the story unbelievable. The investigations into the tax liability of PW7 had been conducted by the appellant together with PW2 and PW3. When PW2 returned from her leave and found that the figure had been revised from shs $1,019,878,753/$ = to shs 230,000,000/= million, his response was that the tax payer had 15 produced more documents. She asked him for the documents and he told her that he had returned them to the tax payer. So the question that PW7 had refused to release the documents never arose. A question was raised as to why the Appellant went to pick the documents from a car park. The explanation from his counsel was that a diligent officer would pick 20 documents from anywhere. This is difficult to believe especially when the taxpayer is a difficult person, like PW7 was described to be, and had threatened to make the Appellant disappear. The appellant also testified that he was threatened with a gun and forced to stuff the envelope containing money in his socks, but if the appellant entered in the car to $25$ pick the documents as promised by PW7, there was no suggestion that he refused to receive them, there would be no need to force him to take them and stuff them in his socks. We believe that the Appellant simply fell into trap set by PW9 and PW10 and when he went to PW7's car the arrangement was that he was going to pick money from PW7. He might not 30 have known the exact amount PW7 had prepared for him, but when PW7 handed over the envelope he informed him that it contained 5 million shs. He stuffed the envelope in his socks when he knew its contents and hence the finding by the trial judge, which we agree with that he received a

gratification which established the ingredients of the offence. [emphasis is $5$ $ours$

We shall briefly comment on the evidence of the wife of the Appellant who testified as DW2. She testified that PW7 had visited their home in January and in February and that her husband told her that he had been threatened by him. So between November 2010 when the investigations into the tax liability of PW7 started up to April 2011 when he was arrested the Appellant was in constant touch with PW7 which is consistent with PW7 's own testimony that he was constantly pestered by the Appellant to pay him a bribe. The visit of PW7 to the home of the appellant and the

- arrangement to meet in the car shows that the relationship between the 15 Appellant and PW7 had gone beyond the official level to the extent that PW 7 could visit his home, whatever the reason. Contrary to the assertion by the appellant that PW7 threatened to make him disappear, they had a cordial relationship. The assertion that PW7 threatened the appellant to - make him (appellant) disappear was in our view, an afterthought on the 20 part of the appellant and his wife, DW2 ..... "

The appellant's argument basically is that the court relied on weak circumstantial evidence thereby wrongfully convicting him. The position of the law is that before court decides to convict an accused based on circumstantial evidence, it must find that the inculpatory facts are incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. [See Simon Musoke Vs R (1958) E. A.715, Teper Vs R (1952)2 AER 447].

In their judgment as seen above, the learned Justices of Appeal 30 explained in detail the circumstances against the appellant embodied in the evidence. All the inculpatory facts do not support the innocence of the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of corruption contrary to **Section 2(a)** of the $\mathsf{S}$ Anti Corruption Act. The Section provides that any public official who does an act of solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly of any goods of monetary value or benefits, such as a gift, favor, promise, advantage or any other form of gratification for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the 10 performance of his or her public functions commits the offence of corruption. [Emphasis of Court].

There was evidence on record that the appellant was a public official who solicited and later received/accepted shs $5,000,000/$ = that was given to him by PW7 in the Parking Area at Crested Towers Kampala. Rather, the 15 prosecution evidence as observed by the Justices of Appeal was overwhelming and did not leave any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant.

The appellant contended that the Justices of Appeal did not properly re evaluate the testimony of Mr. Sebyala (PW7) against the appellant's 20 testimony.

We dismiss that argument because the testimony of PW7 as a whole was accurate and was consistent with the testimonies of all the other prosecution witnesses. Further, PW7'S testimony regarding the money that the appellant was found with upon his arrest was corroborated by the testimonies of PW9 and PW10.

We accordingly hold that the testimony of PW7 in this particular regard was corroborated by independent testimonies of PW9 and PW10 wherein it was proved that the appellant stuffed the money in his socks because he knew that it was a down payment on the agreed sum of 30 100,000,000/=. The trap money was voluntarily received and not dramatically placed upon the appellant. Upon receipt of that money, the offence of corruption as defined in Sewa Singh Mandla (supra) was completed. We further find that the Court of Appeal correctly observed

that the explanation given by the appellant as to how he found himself $\mathsf{S}$ with the money in the socks was neither reasonable nor convincing. The appellant did not receive the money under gun point. The court was therefore right to reject the allegation of duress as a mere afterthought. We find the case of Lynch v The Director Public Prosection of **Northern Ireland**(supra) cited out of context. 10

The appellant further argued that there was no proof of a formal tax assessment of 1,019,878,753 as tax liability for the tax payer company. Court relied on the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW7 who consistently stated that the tax position that the team computed was over one billion shillings.

PW2 and PW3 worked with the appellant in the tax audit of the tax payer company. PW2, PW3 and the appellant assessed and computed the tax liability of the company to a sum of shs.1,019878,753. This position was communicated to PW7, a director in the taxpayer company who disputed the said assessment. We find that these witnesses gave direct oral evidence, which the trial court and the Court of Appeal rightly relied upon to come to their findings.

We find the evidence on record very credible and pointed to nothing but the appellant's guilt and therefore there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the two concurrent findings of the lower courts.

We accordingly dismiss the contention by the appellant that he was framed by his colleagues because he was rising ahead of them in promotion in the organization. That was concoction incarnate. The evidence on record does not back this assertion either. To the contrary, the evidence as appraised and re-evaluated respectively by the trial court and Court of Appeal showed that the appellant was the architect of his own downfall when he unilaterally planned and received a bribe to reduce the tax liability of the Tax Payer company. He was squarely to blame for messing his allegedly bright career.

We find that the lower courts labored in detail to evaluate the evidence $\mathsf{S}$ on record and rightly convicted the appellant. In the result, we find no merit in ground 2 as well.

As a result, the appeal is dismissed. the decision and the orders of the Court of Appeal are upheld.

17th December 2018. Dated at Kampala this...

KATUREEBE, C. J

ARACH - AMOKO, JSC

**OPIO -AWERI, JSC**

Mundadel **MWONDHA, JSC**

Usalem. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC

10