[2024] UGHC 851

#### **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT FORT PORTAL**

#### **HCT-01-CV-LD-CS-045 OF 2021**

**1. TEOPISTA KABANEKERA**

**2. KABAGWERI VENERANDA**

**:::::::::::::::::::::::::: PLAINTIFFS**

# **VERSUS**

**KASORO SABASITYANO ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: DEFENDANT**

# **BEFORE: HON. MR. JUSTICE VINCENT EMMY MUGABO JUDGMENT**

### **Introduction**

The plaintiffs filed this suit against the defendant seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, a declaration that they are the beneficiaries of the said estate, a declaration that the defendant fraudulently got registered as an administrator on the certificate of the title of the suit land, a declaration that the defendant has mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, an order for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his agents from further dealing with the suit land, an order for vacant possession, and costs of the suit.

### **Brief Facts**

The plaintiffs' claim against the defendant is that they are granddaughters of the late Revocat Kahimbara who died intestate in 1989 and left them and the defendant living on the suit land comprised in LRV 1859 Folio 4, Plot 3, Block 80 land at Burahya, Kabarole.

Following the death of their grandmother, the defendant, who is their brother, fraudulently applied for and obtained letters of administration of their grandmother's estate. The defendant then got registered as the administrator on the certificate of title for the suit land and forcibly evicted them from the land in 1998.

In his written statement of defence, the defendant denied all the plaintiffs' claims and stated that he is the owner of the suit land having acquired the same as a gift *inter vivos* from his grandmother, the late Revocat Kahimbara in the year 1980.

# **Representation and Hearing**

At the hearing, Mr. Kayonga Augustine represented the plaintiffs while Mr. Kwikiriza Herbert represented the defendant. To prove their case, the plaintiffs led evidence from 5 witnesses while the defendant led evidence from 3 witnesses. The hearing proceeded by way of witness statements. Both counsel filed written submissions which I have considered in this judgement.

### **Issues for Determination**

In their amended joint scheduling memorandum, counsel for the parties agreed on 6 issues, which I have slightly modified into 5 issues under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, for this court's determination:

1. Whether the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara or the defendant.

- 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the beneficiaries of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, and if so, whether they are entitled to a share in the suit land. - 3. Whether the defendant fraudulently obtained letters of administration of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. - 4. Whether the defendant mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. - 5. What remedies are available to the parties?

# **Burden and Standard of Proof**

In civil matters, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff who must adduce evidence to prove his or her case on the balance of probabilities to obtain the relief sought (*See: sections 101-103 of the Evidence Act Cap 43).* The court must be satisfied that the plaintiff has furnished evidence whose level of probity is such that a reasonable man might hold that the more probable conclusion is that for which the plaintiff contends (**See:** *Lancaster v. Blackwell Colliery Co. Ltd 1982 WC Rep 345* and *Sebuliba v. Cooperative Bank Ltd (1982) HCB130*).

### **Consideration by Court**

# **Issue 1: Whether the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara or the defendant.**

The 1st plaintiff who testified as PW1 told the court that the suit land comprised in LRV 1859 Folio 4 Block 80 Plot 3 land at Burahya in Kabarole belonged to her maternal grandmother, the late Revocat Kahimbara, who died intestate in 1989. A certificate of title of the suit land in the names of the defendant as an administrator of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara was led in evidence and admitted as Pexh 3.

PW1 testified that the plaintiffs together with their parents started living on the suit land in 1969, and when the late Revocat Kahimbara died, she left the plaintiffs herein, together with their father, living on the suit land until 1998 when the defendant forcibly evicted them from the suit land. It was PW1's testimony that when their late father died, in 1997, he was buried on the suit land.

PW1 also testified that in 2015, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in local council court which ordered the defendant to give them their share in the suit land, but the defendant gave them only 1 and ½ acres out of the 38 acres of the suit land.

The evidence of PW1 was corroborated by the 2nd defendant who testified as PW4.

For the defence, the defendant, who testified as DW1, told the court that he was given the suit land as a gift *inter vivos* by his grandmother, the late Revocat Kahimbara, in 1980 and immediately took possession of the same by building a house on it and has lived on the suit land since then. A gift deed dated 01/10/1980 was led in evidence and admitted as Dexh 1.

The defendant further testified that he lived on the suit land for 10 years during the lifetime of the late Revocat Kahimbara, while the plaintiffs resided there merely as licensees. That he allowed the plaintiffs to live on the land because they are his siblings.

It was the testimony of DW1 that the late Revocat Kahimbara died testate and that a will was read at her funeral rite which confirmed that the suit land had been gifted to the defendant as a gift *inter vivos*.

In arguing ground one, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that plaintiffs' witnesses had corroborated the evidence that the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, who died intestate in 1989.

Counsel for the plaintiffs also argued that the fact that the defendant was registered on the suit land as "an administrator of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara" was *prima facie* evidence that the suit land is indeed part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. Counsel for the plaintiffs cited section 59 of the Registration of Titles Act which is to the effect that a certificate of title is a conclusive proof of ownership.

Counsel for the plaintiffs also argued that, according to Pexh 2, a petition for letters of administration regarding the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, the defendant had listed the suit land as part of the deceased's property. And that this further supports the claim that the suit land is indeed part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara

Counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that, in the circumstances, Dexh 1 was a forgery because the defendant could not have applied for letters of administration for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, let alone as the administrator of the suit land knowing that he had supposedly acquired the same land as a gift *inter vivos*.

Counsel for the plaintiffs also highlighted the inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony where, during cross-examination, the defendant told the court that he had signed Dexh 1 but later claimed he was not present when it was executed.

On the other hand, counsel for the defendant submitted that the defendant had led evidence that he acquired the suit land as a gift *inter vivos* on the strength of Dexh 1, the gift deed and that this evidence had been corroborated by both DW2 and DW3 who told the court that on the funeral of the late Revocat Kahimbara, a document was read by one Yowasi Katuramu stating that the suit land had been gifted to the defendant.

Counsel for the defendant argued that all the requirements for a gift *inter vivos* had been fulfilled. Counsel referred this court to the case of *Jolly Mukobe v. Willy Wambuwi HCCA NO. 55 of 2005* where the court held that for a gift *inter vivos* to be passed on to the donee, the donor must have the intent to give a gift, the donor must deliver the gift and the donee must accept the gift.

Counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant applied for letters of administration of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and got registered on the certificate of the title of the suit land as an administrator of the same out of a bonafide mistake having been advised by bank officials.

# **Court's Analysis of Issue 1**

It is undisputed that the suit land originally belonged to the late Revocat Kahimbara. What is in dispute is whether the late Revocat Kahimbara gifted the suit land to the defendant as a gift *inter vivos* before her death. Since the defendant has claimed to be the donee of the suit land, he bears the evidential burden of proving this to the court.

It is a trite law that for a gift *inter vivos* to take irrevocable roots, the donor must intend to give the gift, the donor must deliver the gift and the donee must accept the gift *(See: Sajjabi John v. Zaiwa Charles HCCA No.50 of 2012).*

A gift *inter vivos* of land may be established by the evidence of exclusive occupation and use thereof by the donee during the lifetime of the donor *(See: Oyet Bosco & Another v. Bwola Vincent Suing Through Attorney Too-Ocaya Francis HCCA No. 68 Of 2016)*. All that the plaintiff (the defendant in this case) needs to prove is the intent, delivery, and acceptance in establishing the validity of the gift *(see: Elizabeth Komuhendo v. Patrick Sabiti & 5 Others HCCA No. 27 of 2020).*

In the instant case, both PW1 and PW2 led evidence which was not challenged by the defendant that the defendant came to settle on the suit land in 1987 with permission of the parties' grandmother, the late Revocat Kahimbara and the defendant found the plaintiffs already living on the suit land.

Although the defendant relies on Dexh 1 to prove that he was gifted the suit land as a gift *inter vivos*, significant controversy surrounds this document, casting doubt on its authenticity.

Firstly, while both DW2 and DW3 stated that the document was read at the funeral rites of the late Revocat Kahimbara, the defendant told the court that he was given Dexh 1 on the day it was executed and kept it for nearly 10 years before her death. This raises the question: why would a document authored in 1980 and kept by the defendant for almost 10 years only be read for the first time at the late Revocat Kahimbara's funeral rites? Secondly, although the defendant testified that he witnessed Dexh 1, he contradicted himself during cross-examination by stating that he was not present when it was executed.

Additionally, a close examination of Pexh 3, the certificate of title for the suit land, reveals that the late Revocat Kahimbara was first registered as the owner of the suit land in July 1990, a year after her death. It is therefore possible that she died while the certificate of title was still being processed and, as a result, did not possess the certificate of title in 1980 to give to the defendant. Therefore, the defendant's claim that the late Revocat Kahimbara died after giving him the certificate of title to enable him to transfer the suit land into his name is unfounded.

As rightly argued by counsel for the plaintiffs, if the suit land had been donated to the defendant in 1980, there would have been no need for the defendant to petition for letters of administration for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and list the suit land as part of her estate, and subsequently be registered on the suit land as the administrator of her estate.

I find the foregoing inconsistencies and discrepancies to be grave and they go to the root of the defendant's claim that he acquired the suit land as a gift *inter vivos* from the late Revocat Kahimbara. There is no satisfactory explanation given by the defendant for such inconsistencies and contradictions. The defendant cannot seek refuge by simply stating that he applied to be registered on the suit land as an administrator of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara out of a bonafide mistake. He is simply untruthful.

The evidence on record, when considered as a whole, indicates that the late Revocat Kahimbara, the original owner of the suit land, did not transfer the land to the defendant as a gift *inter vivos*. She left the plaintiffs living on the suit land. And, just like the plaintiffs, the defendant was merely residing on the suit land with the permission of Revocat Kahimbara, a situation that continued even after her death.

Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, I find that the plaintiffs have proved that the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara.

# **Issue 2: Whether the plaintiffs are the beneficiaries of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, and if so, if they are entitled to a share in the suit land.**

Both PW1 and PW2 led evidence that they are the granddaughters of the Revocat Kahimbara and that the defendant is their brother. That the late Revocat Kahimbara had two children, their mother, and the late Christina Bonabaana who did not bear children. It was the testimony of PW1 and PW4 that the plaintiffs together with the defendant were the only surviving grandchildren of the late **Revocat Kahimbara.**

The defendant does not dispute the fact the plaintiffs, who are his sisters, are granddaughters of the late Revocat Kahimbara. But counsel for the defendant argued that even though the plaintiffs are beneficiaries of the late Revocat Kahimbara, they are not entitled to a share in the suit land because it had passed on to the defendant before the late Revocat Kahimbara's death.

On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the plaintiffs are lineal descendants of the late Revocat Kahimbara and are entitled to a share in the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the defendant was only holding the suit land in the trust of the beneficiaries who are entitled to a share.

### **Court's Analysis of Issue 2**

Section 2(ma) of the Succession Act Cap 268, as amended, defines a "lineal descendant" as a person who is descended in a direct line from the deceased and includes a child, a grandchild of the deceased and any person related to the deceased in a direct descending line up to six degrees downwards. In the instant case, the plaintiffs and the defendant are all beneficiaries of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara by virtue of being her lineal descendants.

The next question is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any shares in the suit land. A lineal descendant is entitled to a share in the estate of the deceased who died intestate under section 27 of the Succession Act.

Having established that the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and that Revocat Kahimbara had only two children—the plaintiffs' mother and another child named Christina Bonabaana, who did not have children—there is no basis to deny the plaintiffs a share in the suit land. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the suit land in accordance with the law

Resultantly, issue 2 is answered in the affirmative.

## **Issue 3: Whether the defendant fraudulently obtained letters of administration to the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara.**

Both PW1 and PW2 testified that the defendant applied for the letters of the administration for the estate of their grandmother, the late Revocat Kahimbara without their consent despite knowing that they are the beneficiaries to the suit land.

Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that besides the defendant applying for the letters of administration clandestinely, he equally concealed vital information in his petition for the letters of administration when he stated that he was the son of the late Revocat Kahimbara whereas not. Counsel argued that such concealment was an act of fraud. Counsel referred this court to the case of *Fredrick J. K. Zaabwe v. Orient Bank Ltd and 5 Others SCCA No. 04 of 2006* for the definition of fraud.

On the other hand, counsel for the defendant submitted that the defendant supplied the court with the correct information in his petition for the letters of administration for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and clearly stated that the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the estate.

Counsel for the defendant also argued that when the defendant got the suit land as a gift deed, he initially had plans of applying for a vesting order but was misadvised by his lawyers to apply for the letters of administration in order to transfer the suit property into his name.

Counsel for the defendant argued that the mistakes or omissions of counsel should not be visited on the litigant. Counsel referred this court to the case *of Attorney General v. AKPM Lutaaya SCCA No. 12 of 2007*.

Counsel for the defendant also argued that since the defendant had already been gifted the suit land, he did not commit any fraud in applying for letters of administration. Counsel referred this court to the case of *Kakumirizi Regina & 2 Others v. Namuyomba Rose & Another HCCS No. 007 of 2019*.

#### **Court's Analysis of Issue 3**

Quoting *Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, Page 660*, the Supreme Court in the case of *Frederick J. K. Zaabwe case (supra*) gave an elaborate definition of fraud. That case underscores the fact that fraud is intricate and encompasses various forms. So, to speak, fraud entails intentional distortion of truth to induce reliance, leading to harm or loss. It includes misrepresentation through words, actions, misleading statements, or concealed information. Fraud encompasses any deceptive means employed to gain an unfair advantage over another. It differs from negligence as it is always intentional.

In *Kampala Bottlers Ltd v. Damanico (U) Ltd SCCA No. 22/92,* Wambuzi C J (as he then was) held that *"fraud must be proved strictly, the burden being heavier than on a balance of probabilities generally applied in civil matters."*

However, in all cases, fraud is a conclusion of the law. This was emphasized by Oder, JSC (as he then was) in the case of *J. W. R. Kazzora v. M. L. S. Rukuba SCCA No 13 of 1992* quoting the case of *B. E. A. Timber Co. v. Inder Singh Gill (1959) E. A. 463 at 469* when he held thus:

> *"Fraud, however, is a conclusion of law. If the facts alleged in the pleading are such as to create fraud, it is not necessary to allege the fraudulent intent. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be set out, and then it*

### *should be stated that these acts were done fraudulently, but from the acts, fraudulent intent may be inferred."*

In the instant case, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant obtained the letters of administration of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, fraudulently, by; (i) making an application without obtaining their consent, (ii) stating, in his petition for the same, that he was a son of the late Revocat Kahimbara whereas not, and (iii) failure to state that the 2nd plaintiff is also a surviving grandchild and a beneficiary to the estate.

I have examined the said petition for the letters of administration dated 5th October 1998, which was admitted in evidence as Pexh 2. In the said application, the applicant stated that he is a son of the late Revocat Kahimbara and listed the 1st plaintiff and one Byaruhanga Peter as a daughter and son of the deceased, respectively.

With due respect to counsel for the defendant, I find the argument of counsel's mistake problematic and untenable for several reasons. First, there is inconsistency in the counsel's position. On one hand, he argues that the defendant was misadvised by the Bank officials to apply for letters of administration for the estate in question, while on the other hand, he attributes the action to a mistake of counsel. Second, the information contained in the petition for letters of administration is attributable to the defendant himself, not to his counsel at the time, if any, and the defendant deponed that the information was accurate to the best of his knowledge. Therefore, I find the authorities cited by counsel for the defendant regarding the mistake of counsel to be irrelevant to this case.

The evidence on record shows that the 1st plaintiff and the defendant are a granddaughter and a grandson of the deceased, respectively. The petition, however, does not mention the 2nd plaintiff who is also a granddaughter of the late Revocat Kahimbara.

The defendant deliberately distorted the truth to induce court reliance on the false information in the grant of the said letters of administration by stating that he is a son of the late Revocat Kahimbara but also failing to mention that the 2nd defendant as one of the surviving grandchildren and a beneficiary to the late Revocat Kahimbara. This is an act of fraud following the authority in *Frederick J. K. Zaabwe's case (supra).*

Therefore issue 3 is answered in the affirmative.

## **Issue 4: Whether the defendant mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara**

PW1 told the court that the defendant sold part of the suit land to third parties including Nyakaana Richard and Smart Bwango. In arguing issue 4, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that at the *locus in quo* visit, the defendant admitted to having sold the suit land to the aforementioned people and had gone ahead to distribute part of the estate to his sons who also have built houses on the suit land.

On the other hand, counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant had been given the suit land as a gift *inter vivos* and therefore he had all the powers to deal with it as he deemed fit.

### **Court's Analysis of Issue 4**

It is trite law that the administrator holds properties under his or her administration as a trustee for the benefit of all the beneficiaries under the estate *(see: Moshe Mujogya & 3 Others v. Smart Bwango & 2 Others HCSC No. 37 of 2018).*

In the case of *Richard Babumba & 13 Others v. Ames Ssali Babumba (Administrator of the estate of the late Dr. Eria Muwanga Babumba) HCCS NO. 78 of 2012*, Hon Lady Justice Tuhaise citing the case of *Boardman & Another v. Phipps (1966) WLR 1009* held that:

> *"A person occupying a position of trust must not make a profit which he can acquire only by use of his fiduciary position or if he does, he must account for the profit so made."*

During the *locus in quo* visit, the defendant clarified to the court that he sold part of the suit land to Nyakaana Richard and Smart Bwango and also allocated other portions of the suit land to his sons. The court was able to observe the house of Nyakana Richard on part of the suit land and two other houses belonging to the sons of the defendant. The court observed the eucalyptus trees, on the suit land, belonging to Smart Bwango.

It is conceivable that the defendant was able to sell the suit land to Nyakaana Richard and Smart Bwango because he was registered on the suit land as an administrator of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara.

The defendant sold part of the suit land without the plaintiffs' consent. There is no evidence to suggest that accounted for the proceeds of the sale to the plaintiffs. Never mind that the defendant went ahead and distributed part of the estate to his sons, some of whom have houses on the suit land.

It is, therefore, this court's finding that the acts of the defendant to sell and distribute part of the suit land without the consent of the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries to the suit land, and his failure to account for the proceeds from the sale are acts of mismanagement of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. By doing so, the defendant breached his fiduciary duty as an administrator of the said estate.

Therefore issue 4 is found in affirmative.

## **Issue 5: What remedies are available to the parties?**

In their plaint, the plaintiffs sought several declarations and orders including; a declaration that the suit land belongs to the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, a declaration that the plaintiffs are the beneficiaries of the said estate, a declaration that the defendant fraudulently obtained letters of administration for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, a declaration that the defendant mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, an order that the letters of administration granted to the defendant for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara be revoked, a permanent injunction be issued restraining the defendant and his agents from any further dealings with the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara, an order that the defendant be deregistered from the certificate of title in respect to the suit land, an order for general damages, an order that the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara be collected and divided equally among the beneficiaries, and costs of the suit.

I have already made a finding that the suit land is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. A declaration to that effect is, therefore, hereby issued. Also, for the reasons stated under issue 2, it is hereby declared that the plaintiffs are beneficiaries of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and are entitled to share in the said estate in accordance with the law.

I already made a finding that the defendant fraudulently obtained letters of administration for the estate of the estate of late Revocat Kahimbara and went ahead to mismanage the same estate. Under section 234(1) of the Succession Act, as amended, the court may revoke or annul letters of administration for just cause. Under section 234(2) of the same Act, a just cause means;

- a) That the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; - b) That the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the court something material to the case; - c) That the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; - d) That the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; - e) That the person to whom the grant was made has willfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with Part XXXIV of this Act, or has exhibited under that Part an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect; or

f) That the person to whom the grant was made has mismanaged the estate.

In the instant case, the defendant obtained the letters of administration fraudulently by making false allegations that he was a son of the late Revocat Kahimbara whereas not and did not state that the 2nd plaintiff is a beneficiary to the estate. Equally, it is the finding of this court that the defendant has mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara by selling and distributing part of it to third parties and not accounting for the proceeds to the beneficiaries.

In light of the foregoing, the letters of administration granted to the defendant for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara are hereby revoked. Consequently, an order is issued directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to deregister the defendant from the certificate of title of the suit land comprised in LRV 1859, Folio 4, Plot 3, Block 80, land at Burahya, Kabarole.

On the prayer of general damages, it is trite law that general damages are the direct probable consequences of the act complained of. Such consequences may be loss of use, loss of profit, physical inconvenience, mental distress, pain and suffering *(J. K Patel v. Spear Motors Ltd SCCA No. 04 of 1991).*

General damages are awarded at the discretion of the court and the court is guided mainly inter alia by the value of the subject matter, the economic inconvenience that a party may have been put through and the nature and extent of the breach.

In the case of *Katakanya & Others v. Raphael Bikongoro HCCA No. 12 of 2010*, the court held that *"General damages need not be*

## *specifically pleased, particularised or proved" because the law presumes them to be the direct natural or probable consequences of the act or omission complained of."*

In the instant case, the plaintiffs led evidence that the defendant forcibly evicted them from the suit land in 1998. Since then, they have been trying to get their fair share in the suit land by engaging local authorities but were frustrated by the actions of the defendant. No doubt, the plaintiffs have been greatly inconvenienced by the actions of the defendant. Therefore, in the exercise of the discretion of this court, each of the plaintiffs is awarded general damages of UGX. 5,000,000/= against the defendant.

Regarding costs of this suit, it is trite law that costs follow the event, and a successful party is entitled to costs **(see: section 27(2) of the Civil Procedure Act***)***.**

In the case of *Kivumbi Paul v. Namugenyi Zulah Civil Revision No. 10 of 2014*, Hon Lady Justice Elizabeth Musoke (as she then was) citing *Kiska Ltd Vs De Angelias [1969] EA 6*, noted that *"a successful party can only be deprived of his costs when it is shown that his conduct either prior to or during the course of the suit has led to litigation, which, but for his own conduct might have been averted."*

In the instant case, PW3 testified that he requested the defendant to allocate the plaintiffs their fair share in the suit land, but the defendant ignored these requests. It is abundantly clear that the dispute came to this court due to the defendant's insistence and failure to honour the plaintiffs' bonafide requests. Consequently, the defendant shall bear the costs of this suit.

Consequently, Judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiffs in the following terms:

- a) A declaration that the suit land comprised in LRV 1859 Folio 4 Block 80 Plot 3 land at Burahya, Kabarole is part of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. - b) A declaration that the plaintiffs are beneficiaries of the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara and are entitled to share in the said estate in accordance with the law. - c) A declaration that the defendant mismanaged the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. - d) The letters of administration granted to the defendant for the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara are hereby revoked. - e) The Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby ordered to deregister the defendant from the certificate of title of the land comprised in LRV 1859 Folio 4 Block 80 Plot 3 land at Burahya, Kabarole. - f) The defendant shall make good the loss he occasioned to the estate of the late Revocat Kahimbara. - g) The defendant is hereby ordered to pay each of the plaintiffs UGX. 5,000,000/= in general damages. - h) A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the defendant or anyone claiming under him from further selling or distributing the suit land without the consent of the plaintiffs. - i) Costs of the suit shall be borne by the defendant.

It is so ordered.

Dated at Fort Portal this 29th day of August 2024.

**Vincent Emmy Mugabo Judge**