[2025] UGCommC 78

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADVOCATES ACT CAP 295 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR THE TAXATION OF AN ADVOCATE-CLIENT BILL OF COSTS MISC. APPLICATION NO. 0710 OF 2025 ARISING FROM HIGH COURT CIVIL SUIT 867 OF 2022

KARUNGI & PARTNERS ADVOCATES AND SOLICITORS………………………………………………….…APPLICANT

# VERSUS

# NADYA DIMITROVA MILEVA………………………….. RESPONDENT

## BEFORE: HON. LADY JUSTICE SUSAN ODONGO

# RULING

## Background:

The factual background to this application is set out in the evidence of the parties to wit, the applicant's application and affidavit in support, and the Respondent's affidavit in reply, briefly that:

The Respondent held a bank account with KCB Bank and on numerous dates, Uganda Shillings 121,025,185 was illegally and without the Respondent's consent withdrawn from her bank account using the E-Services of the Bank.


The Respondent commenced legal proceedings and instituted High Court Civil Suit no. 867 of 2022 against the Bank, for inter alia, breach of banker-customer relationship and for acting negligently in permitting the said transactions. The matter proceeded to mediation under Mediation Cause 85/23. Up until this point, the Respondent's Advocate was M/s Sebbowa & Co. Advocates.

On 21st May 2024, the Respondent issued instructions to the Applicant law firm to take over conduct of the suit as her Advocate by filing a Notice of Change of Advocate which effectively terminated the instructions with M/s Sebbowa & Co. Advocates.

The Applicant shared with the Respondent a draft Contract of Engagement and a Fee Note, reflecting the terms of the instruction given by the Respondent to the Applicant however this was never executed. The draft Contract of Engagement provided for the scope of the instructions to cover High Court Civil Suit no. 867 of 2022, and possible suit against Trigger Enterprises Ltd, a Company the Respondent had a dispute. The Fee Note provided legal fees for Civil suit at Ugx 7,000,000/= and for the possible suit Ugx 5,000,000/= and towards disbursements Ugx 3,000,000/=. The Respondent remitted a total of Ugx 9,000,000/= to the Applicant's bank account.

The Applicant having filed the Notice of Change of Advocate took over the conduct of the Mediation Cause in respect to Civil Suit no. 867 of 2022. The parties in Civil Suit no. 867 of 2022 agreed to resolve the matter amicably and negotiations ensued. When negotiations between the parties in the Civil Suit were nearly concluded, the Applicant sent to the Respondent a draft Consent Judgement to which the Respondent replied that she preferred the settlement figure to be reflected as a bulk Ugx 150,000,000/= and that the monies be remitted into the Respondent's named bank Account by 14th March 2025. To the contrary, a draft Consent Judgment drawn by the Applicant and presented for signature, provided that the amounts to be remitted by the Defendant is Ugx 120,000,000/= in full and final settlement of the plaintiff's claim in HCCS 867 of 2022 and Ugx 30,000,000/= towards legal costs. The said sums are to be paid to the Bank Account of the Plaintiff's lawyers, now Applicant, held with


Bank of Africa (U) Limited Account name; Karungi & Partners Advocates; Account Number 08333800012. The said amounts were to be remitted to the account before 20th March 2025. The Respondent opposed this Consent Judgment and declined to sign it stating that it is not reflective of their agreement.

Therefore, the settlement was not concluded by entering a Consent Judgement because the Applicant and Respondent have since been unable to agree on the terms as relates to:- the actual amount of Legal fees to be paid to the Applicant firm, and to whose Bank Account the remuneration for legal fees should be remitted.

The Applicant's concern is that if the Respondent receives both the principal amount and the legal fees she will not remit the latter to the Applicant considering that the Respondent's visa is expiring in May and the Respondent is set to leave the jurisdiction. It is the applicant's case that the Respondent did not pay the legal fees involved in handling the matter. It is on account of that the applicant prepared an itemised advocate-client bill of costs Ugx 44,856,622.2 on account of those legal services. The Applicant seeks for orders that the Advocate-client bill of costs be taxed; Payment of any monies to the Respondent arising from the Consent Judgment/Decree be paid to the Applicant; the Decree be stayed until the Applicant's Bill of costs is taxed and paid; Costs be awarded to the Applicant.

# The Application:

This Application is brought by Notice of Motion under the provisions of Article 126 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as amended), Section 33 of the Judicature Act cap 16, Section 98 Civil Procedure Act Cap 282, Section 57, 58 & 60 of the Advocates Act Cap 295 and Order 52 rules 1, 2, 3 of Civil Procedure Rules SI 171-1 seeking orders that:

- 1. The Applicant's Advocate-client bill of costs be taxed; - 2. Payment of any monies to the Respondent arising from the Consent Judgment/Decree.


- 3. Decree be stayed until the Applicant's Bill of costs is taxed and paid. - 4. Costs.

The Application is supported by an affidavit deponed by Karungi Anne, the Managing Partner in the Applicant firm. It is stated by the Applicant that the Respondent is the plaintiff in High Court Civil Suit 867/22, Nadya Dimitrova Mileva Versus KCB Bank Ltd. That the Respondent instructed the Applicant to take over conduct of the case from the Respondent's former advocate M/s Sebbowa & Co. Advocates. The Applicant averred that she fully represented the Respondent leading to a Consent Agreement (Draft Consent Agreement Annexure "A"). That prior, it was agreed between the Applicant and the Respondent that both the principal sum and legal costs in respect of the Civil Suit would be deposited in the Applicant's Bank Account as lawyer of the Respondent. However, the Respondent has since become hostile, demanding that the monies be deposited in her personal account with the intent not to remit the Applicant firm's legal costs.

The Applicant contended that the Respondent is set to leave the jurisdiction in the month of May since her visa is expiring and once the Respondent receives all the money she may never return and the Applicant will suffer great loss and inconvenience. It is the applicant's case that although the law firm provided legal services to the Respondent, they were never remunerated yet the Respondent has refused to comply with the demand for payment of their fees.

# Affidavit in Reply

The Respondent opposed the application through an affidavit in reply deponed on 17th April 2025 by herself, Nadya Dimitrova Mileva. She contended that, upon the advice of her lawyers, the application by the Applicant is misconceived and improper before this Court for being in contravention of sections 63 and 64 of the Advocates Act Cap 295 and she will raise an Objection on a point of law to have it dismissed with costs.


The Respondent avers that whereas she was the plaintiff in HCCS 867/22 Nadya Dimitrova Mileva Versus KCB Bank Ltd, she is not indebted to the applicant as alleged. That in May 2024 when she issued instructions to the Applicant to take over conduct of her matter, the Respondent's former Advocates, M/s Sebbowa & Co. Advocates had filed all pleadings in the matter. That the Respondent and the Applicant agreed to a total remuneration to be paid to the Applicant in the sum of Ugx 10,000,000/= of which Ugx 7,000,000/= was to be applied to legal fees and Ugx 3,000,000 to disbursements. The Parties also discussed payment of Ugx 5,000,000/= to be applied to a possible suit against a company, M/s Trigger Enterpises Ltd with whom the Respondent had a dispute. The Respondent further avers that on 6th May 2024 the Applicant sent her an email wherein she attached a copy of the Contract of Engagement and Fee Note in line with the above understanding (annexures "A", "B", "C"). That on 14th May 2024 the Respondent made an initial payment of Ugx 5,000,000/= to the Applicant's official bank account held with Bank of Africa (U) Limited under Account name; Karungi & Partners Advocates; and Account Number 08333800012 (Annexure "D1" and "D2"). The receipt of the funds was acknowledged by the Applicant via email and WhatsApp (Annexure "E") who further proceeded to file Notice of Instructions in Court (Annexure "F"). The Respondent states that she subsequently made additional deposits to the Applicant in the amounts of Ugx 1,500,000/= on 27th September 2024, Ugx 5,00,000/= on 2nd December 2024, Ugx 1,000,000/= on 26th December 2024 and Ugx 1,000,000/= on 16th January 2025. (Annexures "G1", "G2", "G3" and "G4"). Th total amounts paid to the Applicant being Ugx 9,000,000/= in accordance with the engagement agreement and fee note.

The Respondent avers that the Mediation Cause was concluded by a proposed settlement of Ugx 150,000,000/= which was to be paid to the Respondent's bank account held with EcoBank (annexure "H"). However, when the parties appeared before the mediator for finalizing the settlement, the Applicant presented a consent judgment/decree which was not satisfactory to the Respondent. The Consent


Judgment presented by the Applicant had the total settlement fee broken down into Ugx 120,000,000/= as the principal and Ugx 30,000,000/= as Legal costs, and the amount was to be paid to the Applicant's bank account (Annexure "I"). The Respondent avers that she objected to the said draft and neither the Respondent nor the Defendant KCB Bank appended signatures to the draft. The Respondent then issued a formal termination of instructions to the Applicant (Annexure "J" and "K") and granted instructions to another counsel, M/s Meritas Advocates.

The Respondent asserts that she has no intention of concluding the settlement upon the terms set out by the Applicant considering the Respondent has incurred additional legal costs in instructing new counsel. According to the Respondent the proposed settlement fee of Ugx 150,000,000/= was not intended to cover a principle sum and legal fees but rather refund the sum of Ugx 121,025,185/= the subject of the main suit. The Respondent states that the Applicant's instructions were terminated prior to the commencement of trial and as such the Respondent prays that the court directs the Applicant to render a proper account of the legal fees paid to her and refund the unexpended portion of instruction fees.

The Respondent admits that she intends to travel outside Uganda but denies that she seeks to evade payment of legal fees.

The Respondent disputes the claim that the applicant is entitled to the Ugx 30,000,000/= or any monies in excess of what had been discussed at the issuance of instructions. The claim therefore presents a demand for double remuneration.

# Rejoinder

The Applicant filed a rejoinder stating that in as much as the previous lawyer had carried out some of the work in the Civil Suit, the Applicant firm just as well, upon obtaining instructions from the Respondent, undertook extensive work. This included preparing the trial bundle, making appearances in Court, drafting correspondences to the Defendant Bank, attending meetings with the Bank and with the mediators. (Trial

bundle annexure "A", Correspondences Annexure "AA2" to "AA23"). The Applicant further asserted that Annexure "B" to the Affidavit in Reply is not a signed contract and therefore of no evidentiary value. The Applicant firm sent a fee note reflecting professional fees for the 2 matters where the firm was instructed as experts and indeed work was done on the two files. The Applicant sought to distinguish professional fees from costs awarded to an Advocate after the successful conclusion of a matter stating that professional fees is the consideration for the lawyer as a professional agreeing to take on one's matter as an expert whereas costs are the total summation of all expenses incurred by the lawyer in bringing the matter to its conclusive end.

The Applicant contended that the Respondent has not proved that she has a running visa or any property within court's jurisdiction in the names of the Respondent that can be sold to recover the Applicant's costs. Therefore, her application is proper before the Court.

## Representation and Hearing:

At the hearing of this application, the Applicant was represented by Ms. Anne Karungi, while the Respondent was represented by Mr. Sam Natamba.

This matter came up for hearing alongside another application for leave to tax an Advocate-Client bill, Miscellaneous Application 1847 of 2024 Francis Sebbowa Kabali Vs Nadya Dimitrova Mileva. At the hearing, it was agreed that this Application adopts the issues in the other application (Miscellaneous Application 1847 of 2024). The issues were:

a) Whether the Applicant acted under the instructions of the Respondent.

b) Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to tax the advocate-client bill of costs.

However, issue 1 is not in contention in this application. It will not meet the objective of "bringing down the evidence, the arguments and decision to a particular question


so that there may be no doubt as to what the dispute is" *(Miscellaneous Civil Revision 0003 of 2017 Mundua Richard Vs. Central Nile Transporters Association*). Additional issues have arisen from the evidence set out. Therefore, in accordance with Order 15 rule 5 this Court is empowered, before passing a decree, to amend the issues or frame additional issues on such terms as it thinks fit, and all such amendments or additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties shall be so framed. The court may also at any time before passing a decree strike out any issues that appear to it to be wrongly framed.

When this matter came up for hearing, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection stating that this Application contravenes Sections 63 and 64 of the Advocates Act, Cap 295, on the basis that it was instituted without compliance with the statutory requirement of delivering the bill to the Client one month prior to commencement of proceedings. Premised on this, the Respondent seeks to have the application dismissed with costs. This requires framing an additional issue to accommodate the Objection of the Respondent.

#### Issues for determination

In light of the above, the issues for determination are:

- 1. Whether the Application contravenes the law and should be struck out? - 2. Whether a valid and enforceable agreement can be inferred between the Respondent and the Applicant law firm despite the absence of a signed written agreement. - 3. Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to tax the advocate-client bill of costs. - 4. Whether the Applicant is liable to account for the monies received. - 5. Whether a stay of payment of any monies arising from the alleged consent judgement in Mediation Cause No. 83 should be granted


I have carefully reviewed the materials on record, the submissions of the parties and the laws and authorities cited.

### Issue 1

## Whether the Application contravenes the law and should be struck out.

It is contended by the Respondent that the Application contravenes Sections 63 and 64 of the Advocates Act, Cap 295, on the basis that it was instituted without compliance to the statutory requirement of delivering the bill to the Client one month prior to commencement of proceedings.

Section 63 of the Advocates Act considers the procedures and requirements for advocates seeking to recover legal fees from clients. In this section, the law ensures that clients are adequately informed about the costs and provides mechanisms for dispute resolution before legal action is taken. The provision sets a mandatory waiting period of one month after delivering a bill of costs to the client, before legal action can be taken by an advocate to recover fees. This period allows the client time to review the charges and, if necessary, request a taxation of the bill. There are exceptions to the waiting period such that if there is probable cause to believe that the client is about to leave Uganda, declare bankruptcy, or take actions that might hinder payment, the court may permit the advocate to commence legal proceedings before the one-month period elapses.

Justice Mubiru in *Peter Jogo Tabu & Co. Advocates v Waco Fred HCMA No. 30 of 2009,* articulated the justification for the one month period and stated;

*"It would appear therefore that in the thirty days given to a client are to enable the client, among other reasons, to sieve out which items in the bill of costs presented to him or her were incurred with his or her express or implied approval, or not. For contentious business, the bill of costs will furnish a detailed statement of all the legal costs to the client. It will contain; a summary of the legal services provided; the amount of fees payable in respect thereof and details of the nature and*

 *quantum of all charges and disbursements incurred by the advocate in fulfillment of the instructions given by the client. This information enables the client determine the basis on which legal costs were charged and within the thirty day period, negotiate a costs settlement with the advocate, or obtain independent advise thereon. Failure of this, the client may then seek the bill to be taxed by a Taxing Officer whereupon such a Taxing Officer must consider: whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal costs relate, whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner and the fairness and the reasonableness of the amount of costs charged".*

The exception to abiding to the thirty day period is where there is reasonable cause by the advocate to believe that the party chargeable *"is about to leave Uganda, or to become a bankrupt, or to compound with his or her creditors, or to do any other act which would tend to prevent or delay the advocate obtaining payment, the court may, notwithstanding that one month has not expired from the delivery of the bill, order that the advocate be at liberty to commence a suit to recover his or her costs and may order those costs to be taxed".* (section 63(1) Advocates Act).

The question in the instant application is whether the Applicant had "probable cause" not to accord the Respondent the opportunity of the one month period, and if not, whether the application should therefore fail.

*"Probable Cause"* is based on objective considerations. It is a legal factual standard signifying sufficient evidence or grounds to support a belief, enough that an ordinary person, using common sense and judgment, would likely arrive at the same conclusion based on the same information. The phrase *"probable cause"* in section 63 (1) of the Advocates Act is used in respect to an act which would tend to prevent or delay the advocate obtaining payment. The decisions of Courts in several jurisdictions have set parameters for the phrase. Byamugisha J in the case of *Dr. Willy Kaberuka V Attorney General Civil Suit No. 160 of 1993 [1994}] II KALR 64*, guided that probable cause is primarily to be judged on the basis of an objective test.


Some courts have found that knowledge provided by an informant gives the police probable cause to arrest and search a suspect *(James Draper Vs United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959)).*

The Applicant contends in Paragraph 8 of her affidavit in support that the Respondent is set to leave Uganda in the month of May since her visa is expiring and once the Respondent receives all the money she may never return and the Applicant will suffer great loss and inconvenience. For her part, the Respondent avers in paragraph 11 of the Affidavit in Reply that whereas she intends to travel outside Uganda, she does not seek to evade payment of legal fees. She advances that Civil Suit No. 867 of 2022 is yet to commence and that will require her presence in Uganda. The Respondent further stated that she has been resident in Uganda for the past nine (9) years, she is a shareholder in two local companies carrying out business in Uganda and she also possesses a subsisting paid tenancy valid up to February, 2026. (Paragraph 12 of Affidavit in Reply).

To this, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent does not own any assets sufficient for recompense of her legal fees should the Respondent leave Uganda.

From the above, there is corroborative evidence that the Respondent intends to leave Uganda. This, as stated in the provision, is an act which would tend to delay the advocate obtaining payment.

I find that the Applicant had "probable cause" not to accord the Respondent the opportunity of the one month period. I answer the issue in the negative and hold that the Application does not contravene the law and is hereby not struck out.

#### Issue 2

Whether a valid and enforceable agreement can be inferred between the Respondent and the Applicant law firm despite the absence of a signed written agreement.


Section 51 (1) of the Advocates Act provides that fee agreements must; (a) be in writing; (b) be signed by the person to be bound by it; and (c) contain a certificate signed by a notary public (other than a notary public who is a party to the agreement) to the effect that the person bound by the agreement had explained to him or her, the nature of the agreement and appeared to understand the agreement. A copy of the certificate has to be sent to the Secretary of the Law Council by prepaid registered post. If any of these requirements have not been satisfied, non-compliant agreements are not enforceable (see section 51 (2) of the Act).

It is trite that the relationship of advocate and client is a contractual one, governed by principles of contract law emanating from an express or implied, retainer or employment. A contract may be oral or written or partly oral and partly written or may be implied from the conduct of the parties (section 9(2) Contracts Act Cap. 284).

Justice Mubiru in *Matovu & Matovu Advocates Vs. Damani Jyotibala & 2 Others, (Miscellaneous Application No. 0029 of 2021)*, stated that the Advocate-Client relationship *"being contractual, its general contours are governed by the same rules that govern the creation of a contract and so it must be proved like any other contract. The easiest method of proving an advocate client relationship is a written retainer agreement or engagement letter describing the existence and scope of the advocate's representation of the client. However, neither a written contract nor an express appointment and acceptance is essential to the formation of the relationship. The relationship may be established by mutual agreement manifested in express words or conduct. Courts can and do use other evidence to establish the existence of the advocateclient relationship, including the parties' behaviour, correspondence between the advocate and the client, invoices for services rendered, proof of payment made to the advocate, and other relevant facts or information. There has to be some form of agreement: whether oral or in writing, or inferred by the conduct of the parties".*

Justice Mubiru in expounding on how implied retainer arise, cited *Dean v. Allin & Watts [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 249)* by which it was explained that an implied retainer *"[can] only*


*arise where on an objective consideration of all the circumstances, an intention to enter into such a contractual relationship ought fairly and properly to be imputed to the parties".*

According to the Court in Miscellaneous Application No. 0029 of 2021, the word "impute," here implies the acknowledgement of an intention to enter into a contractual relationship, rather than the fact of the existence of such an intention. Imputation involves concluding what the parties would have intended, whereas inferences involve concluding what they did intend.

From the application before this Court, the Respondent states in the Affidavit in Reply that in May 2024 when she issued instructions to the Applicant to take over conduct of her matter, they agreed to a total remuneration to be paid to the Applicant in the sum of Ugx 10,000,000/= of which Ugx 7,000,000/= was to be applied to legal fees and Ugx 3,000,000 to disbursements. The Parties also discussed payment of Ugx 5,000,000/= to be applied to a possible suit against a company, M/s Trigger Enterpises Ltd with whom the Respondent had a dispute. The Respondent further avers that on 6 th May 2024 the Applicant sent her an email wherein she attached a copy of the Contract of Engagement and Fee Note in line with the above understanding (annexures "A", "B", "C"). That on 14th May 2024 the Respondent made an initial payment of Ugx 5,000,000/= to the Applicant's official bank account held with Bank of Africa (U) Limited under Account name; Karungi & Partners Advocates; and Account Number 08333800012 (Annexure "D1" and "D2"). The receipt of the funds was acknowledged by the Applicant via email and WhatsApp (Annexure "E") who further proceeded to file Notice of Instructions in Court (Annexure "F"). The Respondent states that she subsequently made additional deposits to the Applicant in the amounts of Ugx 1,500,000/= on 27th September 2024, Ugx 5,00,000/= on 2nd December 2024, Ugx 1,000,000/= on 26th December 2024 and Ugx 1,000,000/= on 16th January 2025 (Annexures "G1", "G2", "G3" and "G4"). The total amounts paid to the Applicant being Ugx 9,000,000/=.


The Applicant did not dispute that there had been such an arrangement with the Respondent. It was the Applicant's evidence that upon obtaining instructions from the Respondent, the Firm undertook extensive work which included preparing the trial bundle, making appearances in Court, drafting correspondences to the Defendant Bank, attending meetings with the Bank and with the mediators. (Trial bundle annexure "A", Correspondences Annexure "AA2" to "AA23"). An admission that the Applicant law firm took action following the discussion and consensus on the scope and legal fees.

I am convinced by the evidence provided that the Applicant's subsequent actions, (filing court documents, attending meetings with the Bank and appearance in mediation proceedings), were all prompted by the May 2024 discussions held with the Respondent as relates to both the scope of the assignment and the legal fees. The Applicant subsequently prepared a Fee note reflecting the agreement of the parties. The fact that the contract of engagement was not executed does not eliminate the glaring intention by the parties to be held to some obligation. The circumstances signify an intention to enter into legally binding obligations and this Court, hereby, imputes an agreement.

I, therefore, answer this issue in the affirmative.

## Issue 3

# Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to tax the advocate-client bill of costs.

According to Section 63 of the Advocates Act, Cap 295, where the circumstances require it, the Court may order that the advocate be at liberty to commence a suit to recover his or her costs and may order those costs to be taxed, notwithstanding that one month has not expired from the delivery of the bill and the bill has not been delivered in accordance with the requirements set out under the section.


Advocates deserve compensation that appropriately matches their professional efforts. Even if released from instructions, the reasonable worth of an Advocate's services before being released must still be paid.

I have already found that there was an implied agreement/retainer created between the parties by their conduct. The scope of the assignment as envisaged by the parties was High Court Civil Suit no. 867 of 2022, and a possible suit against Trigger Enterprises Ltd, a Company the Respondent had a dispute. The Fee Note provided legal fees for the Civil suit at Ugx 7,000,000/= and the possible suit Ugx 5,000,000/= and towards disbursements Ugx 3,000,000/=. The Respondent remitted a total of Ugx 9,000,000/= to the Applicant's bank account. The Applicant prepared an itemised advocate-client bill of costs Ugx 44,856,622.2 dated 1st April 2025.

Apparently, the Civil Suit has not yet been heard. The Applicant's evidence is that she filed trial bundles in the Civil Suit. Notably, Mediation Cause No. 85/23 arising from the Civil Suit, which had been commenced by the Respondent's previous counsel, proceeded into negotiations and a near settlement during the time the Applicant had conduct of the Mediation. In my view, the legal services rendered under the Civil Suit are catered for under the implied retainer which fixed the Applicant's remuneration at Ugx 15,000,000 for the two matters, and whereby the Respondent remitted Uganda Shillings 9,000,000/= to the Applicant. The Applicant is, therefore, not entitled to present this bill for taxation.

On the other hand, the services rendered under the Mediation Cause were not in the contemplation of the Applicant and the Respondent when they discussed the scope of instruction and the fees. The mediation is a separate assignment not duplicative of that in the civil suit. Therefore, the services rendered in the mediation having been reasonably incurred, should be remunerated.


I therefore grant the Applicant leave to tax the advocate-client bill of costs in respect to the Mediation Cause as from the date of Notice of Change of Advocate to the date of termination of the Applicant's services.

#### Issue 4

# Whether Applicant should render an account for monies received from the Respondent?

According to the Advocates (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Regulation, S. I. 123 of 1982, an advocate is guided on the reasonable fees to charge for their professional services. This is to ensure that the advocate does not overreach the client or under pay himself or herself. As a regulatory legal instrument tailored to the Legal profession, S. I. 123 of 1982 caters to the delicate nature of the Advocate-client relationship without watering down the dignity and right of an Advocate who has applied their intellectual resource to instructions given.

The Court in *Byenkya Kihika & Co. Advocates Vs Fang Min, (Miscellaneous Cause 52 of 2022) [2022] UGCommC 154 (3 November 2022))*, while explaining the oversight role of Courts over Advocates stated that when an advocate obtains instructions from a client, the advocate is not acting merely as a private person but is acting as an officer of the Court. Any Fee agreements are accordingly subject to judicial oversight and intervention. The Court cited the case of re *Levinson, 197 App. Div. 46, 188 N. Y. Supp. 730* to expound on this position. The case states;

*"While advocates at law are privileged to make contracts with their clients for remuneration for services, yet the court is vested with a supervisory control over its officers, and is authorised to investigate dealings between those officers and their clients, to see that the conduct of its officers is fair, honest, and straightforward, and that their clients are neither deceived nor defrauded in their relations with their advocates, and, while the court does not summarily or by disciplinary proceedings investigate ordinary business contracts*


*made by advocates, yet when the basis of the contract is the professional relation of advocate and client its jurisdiction is plenary and ample."*

Cognizant of the oversight authority of this court in respect to the Advocate, I am also alive to the Advocates (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Regulation which has set a scale recognizing that an Advocate's professional expertise requires remuneration. Such remuneration once agreed to does not mandate an accounting unless it involves fraud, charges for unnecessary tasks, or deliberate failure to perform services for which a fee is charged. The reasonableness of an advocate's fee is judged at the time the client agrees to it-not in hindsight *(Miscellaneous Cause 52 of 2022) [2022] UGCommC 154 (3 November 2022)).*

From the Facts, according to the implied retainer between the Applicant and Respondent, the instruction fees for the Civil suit no. 867 of 2022 was Ugx 7,000,000/= and the possible suit Ugx 5,000,000/= and towards disbursements Ugx 3,000,000/=. The Respondent remitted a total of Ugx 9,000,000/= to the Applicant's bank account. The active suit being Civil suit no. 867 of 2022, it can be rightly presumed that the legal fees were paid for in full leaving a balance of Ugx 2,000,000/= to be applied to disbursements. The Applicant has stated in her affidavit in support and in rejoinder the services she undertook in respect to the Civil suit. The direction the Civil Suit has taken is beyond the control of the Applicant. I find that the fees paid were reasonable.

I do not, therefore, find reason to order the Applicant to render an account for monies received from the Respondent.

Issue 5

Whether a stay of payment of any monies arising from the settlement should be granted.


A settlement is often finalized by obtaining a consent judgment. This involves the parties agreeing to specific terms of the settlement and then having a court record that agreement as a judgment. Once a consent judgment is entered, it becomes a final and legally binding order. This judgment and subsequent decree are the property of the holder. An unpaid advocate cannot hold a client at ransom or deprive a client from a settlement due to pending legal fees. The advocate has several courses of action, one of which includes filing an advocate client bill of costs.

It is alleged by the Applicant that the respondent is at flight risk and thus prays that in the interest of Justice this Court should stay payment of any monies arising from the settlement until the bill of costs is taxed and paid.

This prayer is not granted.

Accordingly, the Application is granted with the following orders:

- 1. Leave is hereby granted for the taxation of the Applicant's Advocate- Client bill of costs as relates to services rendered in respect of Mediation Cause No. 85/23 Nadya Dimitrova Mileva Versus KCB Bank Ltd from 21st May 2024 the date of the notice of change of advocate to 1 st April 2025 when Applicant was discharged from the services. - 2. Each party bears its own costs of this application.

Dated, signed and delivered electronically this 29 th day of April 2025.


Susan Odongo

## JUDGE