[1991] UGSC 27

## IN. THE STURGE COUNT OF UGANDA

## AT MENGO

CCO-AP/;: WAMBUZI, C. J., ODE" , J .0 . , AND SEATON^. T J

## CIVIL A. PPEAL NO. 8 OF 1990

## BET 'EEN

ROBERT KAVUMA

*I*

## APPELLANT

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## AND

HOTEL INTERNATIONAL LTD RESPONDENT

1989) (Appeal' from the decision of the High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Tabaro,J) dated 29th May, 19'89)

### IN

**■I.**CIVIL **■■ li «i —** SUIT-NO. **^I II Mi ■■■ » "Hwy ■**701 **»—** OF**r-f** 1987 **• -•**

# JUDGEMENT OF ODER. J. F.0,

This case arose out of a dispute for ownership of land comprised, in Kyaddondo Block 244, Plot 2J61 (the -property), on which stand some residential houses. The appellant, Nora Nakiridde Namwandu Mpgalasi, deceased and now represented, by her son Robert Kavuma as her legal representantive, sued the respondent in the High Court for a declaration that she is the rightful owner of the property, for an order restraining the respondent from trespassing on the property, and for general damages and costs. The respondent is an incorporated company with limited liability.

The pla'-nt qlleged that the appellant bought the property from one Kasiitwa Mulindwa who had previously bought it from one Samwiri Kato Sebagereka. The transfer to Mplindwa was not made, but it was expected that it would be completed on return from exile of Sebagereka. .

Thereafter Mu line]we died be fere ell this was done. The plaint further alleged that the administrators of the to the latter with the intention of defrauding the appellant, and that the respondent became fraudulently registered as the owner thereof. estate of Mulindwa's estate colluded with Sebagereka and the respondent and fraudulently truns/erred the property Mplindwa would transfer the property to the appellant.

*?*

No particulars of the allged fraud were given in the pla-.nt.

The respondent filed a written statement of defence, . respondent was the registered, proprietor, having the property from the administrators of the estate of Mulindwa. denying the appellant's claims, and averred that the .

The temporary ⁹ agents or tenants from the property, and from carrying on any repairs, fencing or any development thereon. injunction restrained the respondent-, -its servants workmen or employees from evicting the appellant or her On 17/7/1987 the appellant obtained a temporary injunj.cticn granted by Kalanda Ag. J fas he then was).

On 28/4/1989, the respondent obtained an order, granted by Tnbaro,J., dishharging the temporary injunction of 17/7/198?.

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This appeal is against that order discharging the induction. Ten grounds of appeal are stated in the Memorandum.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgements prepared by Wambuzi C. J., and Seaton, J. S. C., I agree with them that grounds one, two and nine complaining, as they do, about Taharo J's refusal of an application for an adjournment by the appellant and about the record not reflecting what transpired before the learned Judge should fail. I also agree that ground wix which alleged an error of res judicata on the part of the learned Judge for purpotedly re-hearing the application should equally fail.

Most of the rest of the grounds of appeal, as I understand them, concern the powers and role of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under 0.37 r.4 of the C. F. F. which, I think, is the main point for consideration in this appeal. $0.37$ r.4 states as follows:-

> "Any order of an injunction may be discharged or varied, or set aside by the Court on application made the reto by any party dissatisfied with such order."

> > $.../4$

As it is stated, the powers of the Court under this rule appear to be very wide and unlimited. The rules of Court do not lay down any principles or guide-lines on which this discretionary function may be exercised. Nor, apparently, do previous decisions of this Court and its predecessors. However, without referring us to any authorities, Mr. Ntume Nyanzi, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the powers of the court under 0.37 r.4 are, and should be, subject to certain limitations which Tabaro J., in the instant case, exceeded. In counsel's view, all that the learned Judge had to do in the application before him was

Lo show that there had been the merit the court the One same jurisdiction in the Thirdly, according to counsel, an injunction should be set aside under the rule in question if there are new and important matters not iq existence at the time of th..; order granting the injunction.' Similar conditions should, apply as those which apply in a review under 0.42. same case. ^f'ecobdly the to set aside does not give power to re-hear the application and determine the merit of the injunction as would an appellate court. Judge should not sit in judgement of another Judge of the some irregularities, not in , but .in the procedure of gett ng the temporary injure bion.

J

Mr. Lwanga, learned counsel for the respondent, replied that Tabaro J. rightly considered the conditions on which a temporary injunction should be granted and then found that learned Judge who granted the in jun'ction in question did not namely, tha prcbabi 1 ⁱ ty of success of the appellant's case and irreparable damage which might be suffered if\* a temporary injunct ion was refused. On the facts then available the appellant had failed to prove that he. had a priraa facie case with a probability of success, especially her claim to ownership^> Secondly, counsel submitted that 0. J7 r.4 is widely framed and' entitles a Judge to look at and ro-appraise all the grounds on which the temporary injunction was granted and to decide whether it is It applies where a temporary injurcticn is granted improperly. therefore, be exercised ^v alid. The power may, give much attention to two of them, as in an appeal.

Finally counsel disagreed that /rounds for setting aside aro the sarne as tho.se for review under 0.42.

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In the instant could have appealed as of right under 0,40 r.1 sub-r.(q) against the order gran ting the temporary injunction; or applied for under 0142 after the period for appeal, had passed or as it did, for setting aside or discharging the injunction. So, what it did was perfectly within its rights to dp so. It also appears to me that there was ' nothing to stop it from also applying for a review concurrently as long as no appeal had been majde, though such a step -would snack o£ abuse of court procedure. applied., a revrev^c as e, ^t ⁱⁱ ^a i? -^> ^p^o nd ^< / ^j ^t

Where, as in the instant case, a party applies to have I think that the Court's powers to grant such an application are nc ^l entirely unlimited. Consequently, ^I see some attraction to the idea that the exercise of the court's discretion wide powers unnecessarily. principles or guide-lines which should govern the application of that rule, with ut fett^rinA the court's under O..37 r.4 is, or should bo, subject to certain the temporary injunction discharged or set aside,

The starting point, in my view, are the rules forgranting ^a temporary io junction under O. J? r.1 and r.2^f As they are stated, these rules, just as r.4, do not contain any limitation to the court's powers to-grant a temporary ⁱn^j unc ^t ion. But over Che years the courts, not im.- legislature, have crystalised a set of principles amounting to conditions which must bo satisfied before

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a temporary injunction may be granted. I think that in considering whether to discharge or set aside a temporary injunction under 0.37 r.4, the court must test the circumstances which supported the granting of the injunction against such conditions. The case of Nsubuga and Another $v.$ Mutawe (1974) EA 487 seems to support this view. The circumstances must, in my view, be those that existed at the time when the application for granting the injunction was considered, and not one improved upon by fresh evidence from the defendant. 0.37 $r.1$ and $r.2$ read as follows:

$-1$

$\epsilon$

"Where in any suit, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise -

- $(a)$ that any property in dispute in a suit is in rangin of being washed, damaged, or alionated by any party to the suit.....or - $(b)$ that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to derivand his ordditors.

The court may by order grant a temporary injumction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying or preventing the washing, danaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until furth r orders

$2(1)$ in any cult for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any Kind, whether compensation is<br>claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgement, apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any injury of a like kind arising out of some contract or relating to the same property or right."

dftou been surai.tarided. as r.'olj ons ; The principles on which a temporary injunction may be granted under the above rules ar. now well settled and have

(a) The purpose of a temporary 4»jua«tion is to preserve the status quo until the dicpnto to bo investigated in the suit can be finally disposed of.

(b) The applicant must show a primfl. facie case with a probability of success, and

(c) irreparable injury which cannot be adequately atoned for by damages. Rave in exceptional circumstances a tempoary injunction will not be granted unless refusal might cause the applicant

\*

(d) balance of convenience. See : Noor Mohamed Jnmmohamed v. 8; East African Industries' v. Trufoods (1972) Ethicon Ltd If the court is in doubt it v. ill decide on the 420; Gic 1 la\* v. Cassiman ⁶ Browⁿ and Co. Led (1973) E. ^A . 358; Nsubug^a and Another v. Mutawo (supra) and American Pyramid Co. *v.* ■(1975) 1, ALL E.'R. 504. Kassamali Vir.ji Madhani (1953) 20 EACA,

In instant case, Kalanda Ag. J. appears to have adequately set out these principles and borne them in mind when considering the appellant's application for a temporary injunction. He had before him the following evidence supporting the annexures M and A2 to the plaint, dated -16/8/1975 and .5/7/1975 respectively. Ry those letters' Mi.'M.ndwa purported]y informed his tenants in the house the two letters, appellant's claim to the property. • First

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situated On the date when the second If the two that when Mi;li.'jd.wa sold the property to her, Samwiri Kato Sebagereka was still the registered proprietor thereof then, I think, they would appear to be important pieces of evidence supporting the appellant's claims. Then there is the respondent's letter of 2'-/l98r>, anneyure WT4 to the appellant's affidavit. The Ibttcr addressed to Kavuma, the son of the appellant, advised him that the respondents had. purchased the property, and sought assistance from him (Kavuma) to enable the respondent to take possession of the property as soon as possible. If the respondent did not have any knowledge of the appellant's interests in the property, it may be wondered why it wrote to Kavuma seeking his assistance. According to paragraph eight of the appellant's affidavit this was evidence of the respondent ' ^s knowledge that she was the owner of trie property. *^t* on the property to the effect that the property had been sold to bde the registered proprietor of the property. letters are seen in the light of the appellant's allegation ⁱ according to the certificate of title, which was annexed of these two others was written, Sanrriri Kato Sebagereka, they should pay rent to her. appellant. ana that from henceforth to the respondent's writton statement of defence, was still

'Thirdly, the respondent's title to the property was annoxuie to the plaint. the respondent's title on two grounds: challenged by the Chief Registrar of Title's letter of C/12/1985, "D" The- letter queried one was that consent

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forms '.vcrr nob approved and signed r.b share i.i ^I /T^k to be non-Africans, the prior written consent of the In answer to that challenge of the validity of the t ansfer of the property to the respondent, Richardson's affidavit in reply in paragraph eleven admitted that the letter of the Chief Registrar of Titles but went on to explain that an investigation by the Deputy Chief Registrar of Titles concerning share transfers etc. had satisfied the official, th ^t the transfer to the respondent was correct in every detail. One would have thought that the respondent's claims in this regaid as contained in this part of Richard's affidavit would have c on ^c ai ne d nore ^t han raore as ^f e ^j? tiens . For instance a letter from the Deputy Chief Registrar of Titles stating the official's satisfaction would have boon a more satisfactory manner of countering the appellant's case in this regard. silent on the Registrar's concern about the lack of the approval and signature of the Commissioner for Lands and Survey. . authorising the trans Per by the Com Ussioner of Minister for registration of the transfer of the property /should hs-ve b\*?an cbta.i ed under the Lavid Tr..nsfe.r Act (Cap 202). Ri ch a rds an ' s /iff i d a ⁱⁱt wa s that as some or »as correct Further, or the respondent appeared. Lands and Surveys; and the other was

support of her claim to director, Richardson, had.proposed to purchase the property from her, whom Richardson knew ar bee ovner of the property. Fourthly, the appellant attached letters NNI and N?J2 in the effect that the respondent'^s

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written. to the respondents by the numerous? knowledge that the appellant had purchased the property from its former proprietors. The respondent was given an offer to buy the property. The letter NM2 dated 13/12/1931 was wr.it ten by the respondent's era in reply to NNI. It said that the respondent was prepared to entertain the proposal provided that the appellant could produce her title to the property. These t-wo letters may not show much of a negc'ti.ticn having been goinp on between the- two parties appellant's claims that she had. bought the property from its proprietors when Samwiri Kato Sebagereka was still the registered proprietor and before Mulindwa was registered as proprietor. According to the certific.-te of title Sebagereka On the latter date Knsiitwa Aulindv.a was registered. as proprietor; and the administrators 'of his estate were registered as proprietors on 27/6/1983\* That letter also shows that the appellant was complaining against the . respondent for trespass on the property before the . . respondent became NFII dated 23/10/1983, &PP^o ¹¹ ant¹ ^s ¹awy^e ^rs, ..t the time, but they appear to bo significant to the a registered proprietor. was the registered proprietor between 1/4/1975 to 3/4/1985\* alleged that the respondents had occupied part or th.\* pi.up- ^j • • '-rich was tne property of the appellant and that the respondents had not heeded verbal warnings from the appellant despite the respondents¹

Second, both NNI and NN2 were exchanged between, the two

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/ parties long before the respondent was registered on 27/6/1985 as the registered proprietor.

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As evidence in support of the attroportunt's claim of title to the property, Kalanda,J., had before him the respondent's certificate of title which I have already referred to. $= 4.1^\circ$ seen in the light of the appellant's evidence I have referred to and of her allemation of collusion and fraud on the part of the respondent, I think that 8.56 of the Registration of Titles Act may not afford the appellant such a water-tight protection of title as it appears to do. Admittedly, no evidence of frond was indicated by the appellant, but the sequence of events, beginning with the earliest av ilable evidence of her claim and the various registrations of proprietors as shown by the certificate of title, appear, in my view, to tally with her assertions. If the allegation of fraud was proved then she would be in a position to defeat the respondent's registered title by virtue of the provisions of securions 76 and 184 of the Registration of Titles Act (Cap 205).

The decision of Tabaro J. discharging the temporary injunction is found in the following passages of his order:

> "...... From the plendings of both sides, it is fairly clear that both parties claim ownership as purchasers of the property. There are buildings from which t nt accrues to the plaintiff/Lespendent. Plaintiff claims to have bought the properties from<br>the late vasitive Malindra. The late Mulindra<br>would have appeared to have died before the property's titles were transferred to the It is in issue thether in fact plaintiff. any sale did take place between the plaintiff

> > $.../12$

and the late Mulindwa. The appellant company (applicant) is currently the registered proprietor of the property in dispute. It claims to have ton hi the property from the administrators of the estate of the late Mulindwa who in turn allage to have acquired the title from Samwiri Kato Sebagereka. Fraud is imputed to both. the defendant company and the administrators of the late

Mulinawa's estate to defeat the plaintiff's interests. $\texttt{go}$ far there is nothing on record to suggest that such fraud was perpetrated. The report of a handwriting expert, Mr. Mujuzi, indicated in his opinion that the late Kasiitwa Mulindwa's signature has been forced on some of the documents by the plaintiff's side;

At the hearing of the application, counsel for the applicant outlined the well known principles which guide courts in consideration of such applications for temporary injunctions as;

that there must be a serious question to be tried $(1)$ in the suit and on the facts before the court there is a probability of applicant getting the relief asked for;

$(5)$ if the injunction is not granted there will be irreparable damage;

$(5)$ if the injunction is not granted the applicant will suffer more inconvenience than the respondent. These principles were considered by the court on granting the injunction in issue. They are well known and have always been applied. See for instance ........ So there is a wealth of authorities. I think I need only evaluate two factors which do not appear to have attracted much attention from the court as neither counsel appears to have emphasized them. These are balance of convenience and probability of success in the substantive action;

It is the case of the defendant that it intends to construct a 5 Star Hotel on the premises in question. There is no averment from the plaintiff that the defendant intends to demolish the buildings or structures being claimed by the plaintiff. Rent that is accruing to the plaintiff is capable of computation in terms of pecuniary damages. Can it be said that any damage which cannot be atomed for by damages will be occasioned if the injunction is lifted? It appears to me in the event of her being successful after final determination of the suit, he can adequately be componsated even if the nojunction were lifted; The defendant/applicant holds a certificate of title in respect of the property in question. As is well knowr a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of

title of ownership-section 56 of the Registration of Titles Act (Cap 205) (Laws of Ukanda). It can only

be impeached on the ground of fraud - section 76 RT+. A bonafide purchaser for value acquires good title. area .... it is one of the peradoxes of registered conveyancing that registration obtained by Fraud is void and yet copable of becoming a good room of title to a bonsfide purchaser for value. I have already remarked<br>that so far there is no ground to impute fraud to the defendant company. For this reason it is no longer possible to say that the respondent/plantiff has established probability that she will succeed in the substantive action.

In my view of the conclusions I have arrived at ab ve.<br>I am inclanded to find that a case is made out to justify the discharge of the injuction against the defendant. It is set asidd with costs to the applicant."

From this passage of his Order I gain the impression that the learned Judge's criticism of the Judge who granted the t- porary injunction was not that the latter did not consider all the relevant principles. But rather that he granted it when two conditions were not fully satisfied. These were the balance of convenience and the probability of success. With regard to the former, he (Tabaro, J.) appears to have mixed it up so much with the requirement for irreparable damage that I find myself unable to say that it formed a significant part of the basis of his decision. I think that his main reason for setting aside the injunction was that the appellant did not establish his case with a probability of I think that the learned Judge erred in reaching success. that decison for the following reasons:

Firstly, with respect, I think that he went beyond what was required of him under 0.37 r.4, which was to examine whether the conditions for a temporary imjunction were present hefore Malanda Ag. J. He brought evidence which was not available at the time when the application was considered.

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That; evidence the temp\*. . ry injunction .int e-tuc\*?d into the The conclusion he, . reached would have been inevitable in the circumstances.' The two letters alleged to have been written by ktypindwa having been such an important part of the was the purported .report of a handwriting expert dated 17/10/198? writb.n afl^r had all ody been ginnled. appear to have materially influenced the learned Judge's proceedings by a supplementary affidavit of P.i chardscn dated 3/J/1989. credibility of the appellant's case. appellant's case, the purported proof that they were forged

Secondly, it is my opinion that the learned Judge did not give sufficient weight to the evidence I have scrub! ntion th-t she purchased the property from Mulindwa and that she was the victim of a and pcrpertrated allegedly, by the respondent and the administrators of the estate of Mui indwa. I think tlvt had he done so, he would have found that the case before him was distinguishable from that of Nsubuga (supra) with regard to the evidence that was available in support of the application for an injunction. In that case, the Court of Appeal for East Africa allowed an appeal agaknst a confirmation of a temporary tnj^yp.tion on the ground, inter alia, that l:J-.e plaintiff had not \* . established his case in support of the application for an injunction with a probability of success.. nised above, which tend to support the appellant's conte-

which he occupied in the second appellant's premises. In that case, the respondent bad not paid rent for a shop

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with the ^T^h ^c ^r*• s*p^o nd ^e ⁿ ^t ^f ¹ ¹ : ^d a suit in the II: h Court for By an injusetion restraining the appellants from int :.rtering v. ith. of the goods. tempora ry 1njuret ion. The order for a temporary injunction was upheld but with a variation which required the respondent to deposit the amount of the rent due in Court, until the determination of the suit. the respondent's occupation of Lite shop and the seizing / The appe1 J.ants by no tice of mo tion app lied to the High Court to the High Court to The second appellant, a limited liability company, distrained for rent through the first appellant, and locked up th" shop r^o ^s pon^d ^en r.'^s go^o ^a £ ¹ ^p *-* ^j ^&lt; • ^o -j »?# a temporary injunction bo restrain the appellants from detaining the goods and for damages for trespass, wrongful eviction and detinue. ex parte chamber summons, the respondent ol»taincd a temporary set aside r/no

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At the hearing of the application for setting aside, the respondent gave his rea\* on for not having paid the rent in Cons covently the so, he decided to withdraw the payment of rent until the position was clarified/ the Decree stated that: The point to be decided, therefore, was whether the second appellant was the owner of or had. a premises were no longer vested in it by operation of law, and Gvneu by departed non-citizen Asians. claim in the premises in question so as to bo entitled to rent, under a Decree (No.5 of 1973)\* Section I (1) of an affidavit in reply as beifog that the second appellant was

.-./16^v .

"Notwithstanding any provisis in any last sublease or tunnory through every property belonging to a Departed inion caell wast in tion Saw file in for a $ent$ , $\mathcal{H}(\mathfrak{g},\mathfrak{g})$ $16.6 - 9.116$ . right, chigations a restate a the two were proviously versul in the departed stan."

$16$

Section 2 provided that every person who has allocated . by Government, any dwell ng house or business premises and a was vested in the Government under Dection 1 of the Decree should pay the relevant rent to the Minister. In terms of Decree No. 17 of 1972 and Decree No. 27 of 1992, a "departed vas of / India, Bangladeah, Fakistan, U. K. and non-citizen As anⁿ Northern Ireland and who was of Asian origin, extraction or whose descent and $\angle$ permit or certificate of residence was anulled by Decree $R_0$ . 17 of 1972 and who had left Uganda.

The respondent did not adduce any avidence as to who or what the shareholders of the second appellant were. Ho. register of sheres was produced and no official from the Registrar of Companies department was called. To, it was not possible to say whether some or all of the sharoholders were "departed Asions" or if the property in question was abandoned. It might well be ft t some shareholders were Africans or Europeans or Asians who had not departed. In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal thought that the respondent's bare allegation that the second appellant was "ewned by departed non-citizen Asians" might well be unfounded and could not be acted upon. The onus was on the respondent to establish that the second appellant was exhed by "departed Asians". The turnerary injuction had been upheld on an assumption unsupported by evidence. It could not therefore, be 1:ft to mand.

$\cdots / 12$

Tn the instant case, unlike in IJsubuga, evidence of the nature ¹ have referred to was avail.'.bl support of the The evidence came froni annexures to the plaint and to the appellant' ^a affidavit filed in support of her application, and frum the certificate I do net think that such (underlining is mine)\* This, in my view, includes annexures to the pleadings. ^I n "where in any suit, it is proved by a ^j ^&gt; f?11a nt's ca sc« affidavit or otherwise" of title annexed to the respondent's W. S. D. i evidence needs to come from affidavits only, for 0.37 r. I states

The second point for consideration is wh.'thor the court's powers the same or different from those of review, under 0\*4-2 or those of an appellate court. As ^J have already mentioned, a temporary injunction may appeal against it under 0.40 r. I -r.(q) or apply.' to have it reviewed under 0.42 where either apply to have it discharged or sot aside under 0.37 r ^&lt; 4- or no appeal has been preferred. under 0\*37 r<4 are person dissatisfied with an order for a

With regard to review, such a relief is on prescribed conditions• These are discovery of new and important evidence which was not within the knowledge ..of\* the person seeking a review or could not bo produced by him at the time when the order account of some mistake or error apparent or the face of the record or for any other sufficient cause. Given that apart from the wide permission of other sufficient cause to review are tied to specific conditions, I do not accept Mr. Mtumoiiyanzi¹ ^s submission that the court powers under 0.37 appears to be unlimited, should be governed by the same conditions as those prescribed undci' O,42» r.4. which available only "any was made or on " the powers

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*r?* **-**

$\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ do so would, I think tend to limit the powers too narrowly.

With regard to appellate powers the issue appears to me to be this: whether an application under 0.37 $r.4$ should be equated with an appeal under 0.40 r, 1 sub $-r(q)$ . Should the grounds and the principles on which it may be considered and decided be the same as in an appeal? Tn my opinion, the answer to such a question should be in the negative, because I do not think that although the powers of the court for setting aside and on appeal appear to overlap, it would have been the intention of the legislature that a decision of one Judge under 0.37 $r.1.$ and r.? of the C. P. F. should be appealed before another Judge of the same court.

It appears that an application under 0.37 r.4 may be h and by either the same Judge who granted the bomponary injumption being sought to be discharged or by another Judge. Nor. do I think, that the legislature would have intended under 0.37 $r_{\ast}h$ should be just another procedure that the procedure/for an appeal when the right of appeal was provided for under 0.40 r.1 sub-r-(q). In the circumstances, I would concur with the views of Seaton, J. S. C., based, as they are, on Mine research of the practice in other jurisdictions, to the effect that if an injunction has been granted on insufficient grounds, concealment of material facts or it was founded on a decision which was wrong in law, the aggrieved party should appell against the order. An oppellate court would be the appropriate forum to decide whether the indee granting the injunction

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erred in law or on facts or was misled by the plaintiff. I slow concernation with meant on $J$ . The on his formulation of the guidelines which should govern the application of 0.37 $r.4$ .

. In the instant case I think that the application was mode and decided as would have been done on an appeal. In the circumstances, and for the reacons I have referred to earlier in this judgement, I also think that the learned Judge appears to have acted beyond his powers under 0.37 $\pi$ .

In the result, I would also allow this appeal with costs both here and in the court below. Such costs to be costs in the cause.

DATED at Mengo this .??th.... Jay of .?pril... 1991

Sgd:.................

$P.910.$ ODER

JUSTICE OF THE SUP TWE COURT

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE OFIGINAL.

$\overline{1}$

B. F. B. BABIGUMIRA PEGISTRAP CUPRTEE COURT

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