[2017] UGCA 149

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 237 OF 2015

## **LEADS INSURANCE LTD**

$\cdots$

**APPELLANT**

#### **VERSUS**

### 1. INSURANCE REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF UGANDA $10$ **RESPONDENTS** 2. KISUULE ASTACIO & SONS CO LTD $\cdots:$ BEFORE: HON. JUSTICE REMMY KASULE, JA HON. JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JA HON. JUSTICE CHEBORION BARISHAKI, JA

(Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Uganda [Civil Division] at 15 Kampala before Hon. Justice Stephen Musota, in Miscellaneous Cause No.171 of 2014 and Miscellaneous Application No.182 of 2015).

#### JUDGMENT

## **Background to the appeal:-**

The 2^nd respondent was a holder of a Burglary Policy No. LIL/ 01-P02 $20$ /00301/2012 for coffee held in a bonded warehouse, with the appellant. It was alleged that between 30^th November and 2^nd December, 2012, thieves broke into the 2^nd respondent's warehouse and stole coffee worth UGX 415, 852,118/=. The $2^{nd}$ respondent made a claim for compensation from the appellant but the latter declined to meet the claim on grounds that $25$ there were inconsistencies in theft details given by the 2^nd respondent.

o The Znd respondent then lodged a complaint with the 1st respondent against the appetlant for failure to settle the claim under the Burglary policy. On 4s November,20L4, the ls respondent made a decision that the appellant had no material ground for repudiating the insurance claim since there was substantial evidence to show that the coffee was stolen and the 2nd respondent had suffered loss as a result.

The appellant lodged an application for Judicial Review Miscellaneous Cause No. L7L of 2Ot4 in the High Couft on grounds that the lst respondent adjudicated upon the matter without jurisdiction, the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard; and that there was evidence of fraud which had not been properly evaluated by the ts respondent in reaching its decision. At the hearing of the application, counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary point of law that in accordance with Section 92B of the Insurance Act, upon being dissatisfied with the decision of the 1\* respondent, the appellant ought to have filed an appea! with the Insurance Appeals Tribunal and not by way of an application for Judicial Review to the High Court. The trial Judge upheld the preliminary objection and made a decision that the appellant ought to have first appealed to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal before moving to the High Court by way of Judicial Review. 15 20

²⁵ Subsequently, the appellant filed in the High Court an application Miscellaneous Application No, 182 of 2015 for review of the ruling in Miscellaneous Application No. L7L of 2014 on the ground that there was an error apparent on court record. This was on the basis that at the relevant time, the Insurance Appeals Tribunal was non-existent and had never been constituted. The trial Judge made a finding that the argument that the 2 30

O Insurance Appeals Tribunal was non-existent was untenable because the Insurance (Amendment) Act provided that the Tribunal operated on an adhoc basis and would only be constituted when need would arise from time to time.

Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court in both Miscellaneous Cause No. L7L of 2OI4 and Miscellaneous Application No. 182 of 2015, the appellant filed this appeal on the following grounds:- 10

- 7. The triat Judge erred in law and fact when he dismis\*d the appettanfs application for Judicial Reuiew on grounds that the appellant ought to have appealed to the fnsurance Appeals Tribunal. - 2. The trial Judge erred in law and fact when he refused to grant the appellant's application for reuiew which was premised on grounds that there was an erfior on tecord. - 3. The trial Judge erred in law and fact when he held that the appellant had fully participated in the prcceedings before the 7\* respondent, - 4. The trial Judge erred in law and fact when he refused to make a finding and hold that the appellanfs constitutional right to be heatd was violated by the respondenb. - 5. The trial Judge erred in law and fad when he failed to make a frnding that the claim and the award by the 7d respondent was illegal and fraudulent

I

# o 6. The triat Judge erred in law and fact when he failed to hold that the fnsurance Regulatory Authority did not have iurisdiction to adiudicate over the aforcmentioned matten

### Representation:-

At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant was represented by Mr. Yesse Mugenyi while Mr. Mamawi Bill represented the 1\$ respondent and Mr. Geoffrey Atwine, the 2nd respondent. 10

At the commencement of hearing, counsel for the 2nd respondent raised what in effect was a preliminary point of law in regard to grounds 3, 4, ⁵ and 6 of the appeal. We are accordingly dealing with it first. It was his 1s contention that while Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2OL4 was never heard on merit and was dismissed on a preliminary point of law, grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this appeal delve into the substance of the said application. Counsel submitted that regardless of the fact that the Court of Appeal as the first appellate court had the same powers and authority which could be 20 exercised by the trial Court, it could only make such orders that could have been made by the trial court.

It was his submission that grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the appeal ought to be struck out for the above reasons.

25 Counsel for the znd respondent also concurred with the submission of Counsel for the 1\* that the issues in grounds 3,4,5 and 6 of the appeal had not been resolved upon by the trial Court and as such the whole appeal ought to be dismissed.

o In reply, counsel for applicant relied on the decision of Beatrice Kobusingye ven us Fiona llyakana and George Nyakana, Suprcme Court Civit Appal No, OOg of 20(M, where it was held that the Judicature Act vests in the Couft of Appeal the power, authority and jurisdiction which the trial couft could have exercised in determining the case. Counsel submitted that this Court had the power to constitute itself into the High Court and exercise all the powers which were vested in the High Court. He contended that in the present case, the trial Judge declined to exercise jurisdiction whereby he would have exercised his powers and determined the cause conclusively. Therefore, this Court could exercise the said powers and jurisdiction to determine the said Cause No. L7L of 20L4 conclusively. 10 15

Counsel further submitted that Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 20t4 raised issues of fraud and the denial of the right to be heard on the part of the applicant. The trial court had declined to investigate those issues. In such a case, Section 11 of the Judicature Act allowed this coutt to investigate the said matters regardless of the fact that they were not addressed by the trial Couft.

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We have considered the above preliminary objection raised by counsel for the 2nd respondent and the submissions of all counsel in that regard.

From the perusal of the trial Couft ruling in Miscellaneous Cause No. L7L of 2OL4, the appellant's application for Judicial Review was dismissed on a preliminary point of law. The tria! Judge made a finding that the applicant ought to have first appealed to the Appeals Tribunal before moving to the High Court for review. It is clear that the trial Judge did not 25

address the substance of the matter as the application was dismissed on a preliminary point of law.

We have considered Section 11 of the Judicature Act which was relied upon by counsel for the appellant. The said Section states that:

"For purposes of hearing and determining an appeal, the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers, authority and jurisdiction vested under any written law in the court from the exercise of the original jurisdiction of which the appeal originally emanated'.

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From perusal of the record in Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2014, on the 13^th of April, 2015, when the cause came up for hearing, and before the parties could be heard on the substance of the application, counsel for $15$ the $1^st$ respondent raised the preliminary point of law as stated above. When counsel for the appellant was addressing Court on the point of law in reply, Court required counsel not to delve into the merits of the application but to only address Court on the preliminary point of law. On the $4^{\mbox{\scriptsize th}}$ of May, 2015, the trial Judge delivered the ruling in relation to the preliminary $20$ objection alone. His Lordship did not address the substance of the application.

It is not disputed that at the time of the ruling, the parties had only been heard on the preliminary point of law and not on the substance of the cause for Judicial Review. In the circumstances, we find that this case $25$ does not fall within the ambit of Section 11 of the Judicature Act, and as such, we cannot make findings on the substance of the cause for Judicial Review when the trial Judge never addressed himself to the same. We can only make findings in relation to the preliminary objection that was raised 6

$10$

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in the said cause, considering that the parties had not been heard on the subject matter of Judicial Review and the trial Court never made findings on the substance of the cause then. As rightly stated by counsel for the 2nd respondent, this Court can only make such orders that could have been made by the trial court. Therefore, Section 11 of the Judicature Act does not apply to the circumstances of this case and the decision of Beatrice Kobusingye vensus Fiona Nyakana & George llyakana Supreme Court Ciuil Appeal No, 5 of 2OO4, which was relied upon by counsel for the appellant is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

15 Accordingly, we find that grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the appeal were improperly raised before this Court. In that regard, the objection raised by counsel for the 2nd respondent is upheld and the said grounds are struck off the record. By reason of this decision, we see no need to deal with the matters that were submitted upon by all counsel relating to grounds3,4,5 and 6.

20 we shall address the remaining grounds 1 and z of the appeal concurrently.

### Grounds 1 and 2.

- 1. The trial Judge errd in law and fact when he dismissed the appellantb applicatrbn for Judiciat Reubw on grounds that the appellant ought to have appealed to the fnsurance Appeats Tribunal. - 2. The trial Judge ered in law and fact when he refusd to grant the appellantb applicatron for reuiew whrCh was based on the ground that there was an error on record.

### Appellanfs submissions:-

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding by the trial Judge that Judicial Review was not normally permitted where there was an alternative appellate provision in the law was ancient and redundant. It was his contention that the trial Judge ought to have taken into consideration the provisions of Articles 24 and 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda that allow Judicial Review. Further, that Judicial Review being ^a constitutional right, it could not be fettered by a right of appeal which is not vested by a constitutional provision. Counsel relied on the authority of Yudicial Review, Law, Procedure and Practice", 2nd Edition, pp 284'286, by Peter Kaluma, where the said learned author states that in deciding whether or not to grant relief, the existence of an alternative remedy is not of itself a bar to Judiciat Review.

Counsel further submitted that while the remedies of certiorari and prohibition were provided for under the Judicature Act, the same were not provided for under the Insurance Act. The Insurance Act did not, therefore, grant to the appellant the right to seek for the above remedies from the Appeals Tribunal. The law only empowers the appeltant to seek those remedies from the High Court.

25 It was counsel's further submission that if the triat Judge had taken into consideration the evidence of Sam Phiri, the Executive Officer of the appellant, he would have made a finding that the Appeals Tribunal was non-existent at the material time of lodging the application for Judicial Review by the applicant. Counset relied on Chaftis Uganda fnsurance Company Ltd Vercus fnsurance Regutatory Authority of gganda & Anor, High coutt Miscellaneous Apptiation lllo. 2 of 2oTJwhere it 8 30

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o5

o5 10 15 was held that Section 92 of the Insurance Act as amended, had not yet been made operational and that this was unfair to pafties who wished to appeal to the authority. Counsel was of the view that it was unfortunate for the respondents to submit to the Honourable trial Judge to the effect that the Appeals Tribunal was existent at the time when the decision was made and when the appellant lodged an application for Judicial Review before the High CouG whereas not. Further still, that the appellant had lodged an application for review of the ruling in Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2014, and brought to the attention of the trial Court that the Appeals Tribunal was not e><istent. In Counsel's view, the alleged non-existence of the Appeals Tribunal was an error apparent on the face of the record considering that the appellant could not have appealed to a non-existent entity. Counsel contended that, for the above reasons, the trial Judge ought to have allowed the application for review of the ruling in Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2OL4.

## 20 Respondent's submissions:-

In reply, counsel for the lst respondent submitted that where the law provided for a special procedure by way of appeal, the Court would not allow an applicant to challenge a decision by way of Judicial Review. Counsel relied on The Queen vensus Financiat Seruices Authority,

25 [2073] EWC/I Civ 671where it was hetd that it was necessary to guard against granting Judicial Review in cases where an alternative remedy existed and that the said remedy of Judiciat Review could not be applied for merely because it was more convenient and efficient to do so. Counsel contended that to allow a claim for Judicial Review where there was ^a 30 statutory procedure for contesting a certain decision would raise a risk of

- s undermining the will of parliament. He submitted that Section 92(A) of the Insurance Act established an Insurance Appeals Tribunal and that the same conducts business on an adhoc basis. Fufther, that the Tribunal was not permanent and would only be set up when need would arise from time to time. - 10 It was counsel's fufther submission that it was incumbent upon the appellant to prove that the remedy provided for under the law was not adequate and fufther give reasons why the alternative remedy was opted for in the circumstances. He invited the Court to consider the persuasive High Court case of Housing Finance Company of Uganda Ltd vercus - 1s The Commissioner General Uganda Revenue Authority, High Court Miscellaneous Application [Uo, 722 of 2OO5 to suppoft the above submission. It was his contention that the appellant ought to have specifically stated the reasons why he did not appeal to the Appeals Tribunal within his pleadings. - 20 The 2nd respondent's Counsel maintained his contention that the remedy of Judicial Review was not available to the appellant in Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2OL4. The appellant ought to have pursued an appeal or instituted a fresh suit in the High Court to seek appropriate remedies.

### Appellant's rejoinder:-

25 In rejoinder, counsel for the appellant also relied on the persuasive High Couft authority The Chief Magistrate, Malindi Vercus Mohamed Ati Mohamed, High Court Judicial Reuiew 67 of 2OlI, where it was held that where there was a statutory remedy of appeal, an order of Judicial Review would be granted in exceptional circumstances. Further, that in Or determining whether exceptional circumstances were in existence, it was necessary for the Court to look at the suitability of the statutory appeal and, in the context of a particular case, whether the appeal was suitable. Counse! submitted that in the present case, the applicant had in its pleadings raised the question of want of jurisdiction of the 1\* respondent 10 in handling the complaint, and that this was a matter for Judicial Review.

l-

Counsel fufther submitted that in the present case, there was no Appeals Tribunal where the appellant could have lodged the appeal and that the remedies that were being sought by the appellant could only be granted by the High Court, through Judicia! Review and not by the Appeals Tribunal which was not in existence at that material time.

## Resolution of Couft

We have carefully considered the evidence on record, the submissions and authorities relied upon by learned counsel for all the parties.

From the record, the trial Judge dismissed Miscellaneous Cause No. L7l of 2OL4, for the reason that when and if dissatisfied by the ruting made by the 1\* respondent herein, the appellant ought to have invoked Section 92B of the Insurance Act and appealed to the Appeals Tribunal. It 20

was his finding that an applicant for Judicial Review must first exhaust whatever other rights he had by way of appeal before resorting to Judicial Review. 25

## Or Section 92B (1) of the Insurance Act provides as foltows:

'A persoO who is aggn?ved by a decision of the Authority, may within one month from the date the decisr'on is communiated by the Authority, appeal to the Tribunal against the drcision;'

- While it is not in dispute that the appellant could have appealed to the above stated Tribuna! provided for under the Insurance Act, the appellant contends that at the material time when the lst respondent made ^a decision, there was no Appeals Tribunal in place where the appellant could have lodged the said appeal. The above contention was the subject of Miscellaneous Application No. 182 of 2015, where the appellant applied for review of the ruling made by the trial Judge in Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2OL4. However, the trial Judge made a finding that the Insurance (Amendment) Act provided that the Appeals Tribuna! operated on an adhoc basis and it would be formed and constituted whenever need would arise from time to time. 10 15 - ²⁰ We have perused the letter dated 22nd May,20L5, which was addressed to the Chief Executive Officer of the appellant, from the 1\* respondent in regard to the Insurance Appeals Tribuna!. This was the basis for the appellant's application for review in Miscellaneous Application No. 182 of 2015. The said letter read as follows:

## ²⁵ "fnsura nce Appea ls Trib u na I

1. Your letter ref: uL /rRA / ABM - L - 00s/rs dated @ uay 20tS which was rueived on the 2fi May 2015 refers.

- o 2. Section 92 A and 9B (g) of the fnsurance Act (Cap 213) Laws of Uganda 2000 prouides for the establishment of the Insurance Appeals Tribunal; and for the making of Regulations for handling of appea ls, respedrVely, - 3. We are in the process of finalizing the sid Rqulatr'ons after which the Minister will be informed and will proced to appint Memberc of the Tribunal. - 4. I trust you will frnd the forqoing in order andwe shall inform the industry when the Tribunal is in place"

In view of the contents of the above letter, it is apparent that while the ls Insurance Act provided for a remedy of appeal to the Insurance Appeats Tribunal, the said Tribunal had not yet been established at the time when the appellant lodged an application for Judicial Review and the subsequent application for review in Miscellaneous Application No. 182 of 2015. As pointed out earlier by the appellant's Counsel, the Couft in Chartis 20 Uganda fnsurance Company Ltd Vercus Insurance Regulatory Authority of Uganda and Anor, High Court Miscellaneous Cause No. 25 of 2O72, also noted that the Tribunal had not yet been put in place and that Section 92 of the Insurance Act, as amended had not been made operational, which was unfair to the parties who wished to appeal zs against the decisions of the Authority,

While we agree with the finding of the trial Court that the Appeats Tribunal established under Section 92 (A) of the Insurance Act was intended to conduct business on an adhoc basis, in the present case, the Tribunal had never been constituted. From the above letter of 22nd of May 2015, the 30 members of the Tribunal had never been appointed and the Tribunal was

a not in existence at the time. We don't agree with the proposition by the trial Judge and Counsel for the 1\* respondent that a new Appeals Tribunal would have to be constituted each time there was an appeal. It would neither be practical nor expedient so to do. It is also not what Section 92 (A) of the Insurance Act says. If the Legislature wanted the Appeals 10 Tribunal to be set up and to operate on such adhoc terms as propounded by Counsel for the 1\* respondent.

15 20 Be the above as it ffiay, it is trite law that Judicial Review essentially involves an assessment of the manner in which a decision was made. It can be granted in cases of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The fact that the Appeals Tribunal was not in existence at the time when the appellant lodged the application for Judicial Review does not fall in any of the above categories and cannot be regarded as procedural impropriety. In Chartis Uganda fnsurance Company Ltd Vercus fnsurance Regulatory Authority of Uganda and Anor (Supra), the Coutt stated that since the appeal window was not yet open, the applicant could seek other legal avenues rather than Judicial Review which was of limited application.

In view of the above, although the non-existence of the Appeals Tribunal could be one of the matters which Court could have considered in entertaining the appellant's application for Judicial Review, that was not an end in itself. The appellant had to first fulfi! the obligation of proving that the decision made by the 1\* respondent was illegal or irrational or was tainted with procedural impropriety and as such the same qualified to be challenged by way of Judicial Review.

t4

O It is also necessary for us to resotve whether or not the appellant succeeded in discharging that obligation. The trial Judge made a finding that the appellant ought to have taken the normal path of appeal to the Appeals Tribunal provided for under the Insurance Act. He stated as follows in his ruling:

,

- "When disstisfied by the ruling, the applicants herein ought to have invokd Sstion 928 and appealed the decision to the Appeals Tribunal. The applicant did not do this and decidd to frle this application without showing why it did not take the normal path providd for in the Insurance Act before resorting to Judicial Reuiew. 10 - 15 As rightly pointed out by Mr. Atwine it is the normal rule that in cases such as this the applicant for Judicial Review must frrst exhaust whatever other ngh9 he has by way of appeat before resorting to Judicial Reuiew. - 20 25 rn the instant ese the law gives the applicants the avenue of appeal and prescribes how it should be done and at what point the matter should enter the Judicial System through a Notice of Appeal to the High Court The remedy by way of Judicial Reuiew is not auaitabte where an alternative remedy exisB. Thts ts a preposition of great importance. ludicial Reuiew is collateral challenge; it is not an appeat. where Parliament has prouided by Statute appeat procdures, it wiil only fu very rarely that the court will allow the collateral process of Judicial Reuiew to be usd to attack an appatabte decrsion. See: Breston vs rRS 7985 voL2 following Land Reports pg J2z at page 33O per Lord Scarman.

⁵ Judiciat Review wiil not normally be permittd if there is alternative appellate Provision.

Mr. Mugenyi rightty argued that a decision of an Administrative Bdy can be chaltengd by Judiciat Reuiew. But to do this there must be not other remdies auailabte in law to address the grieuance unless 10 the appticant pteads that alternative remedies are inadquate"

We accept the finding of the trial Judge that where a Statute provides for ^a remedy like in the present case, the court could only allow the collateral remedy of Judicial Review in rare circumstances. We also find instructive the finding of court in Housing Finance company of llganda Ltd 1s Vercus The Commissioner General tlganda Revenue Authority, High Court Miscellaneous Application llo. 722 of 20O5, where it was stated as follows:

. Tn cases such as this application, I am percuadd to follow the uiew expressd by Sir Donaldsn MR in R v Secretary of State for Home zo Affairc ex parte Swatl that leave to proced by way of Judicrbl Reuiew may be withhet4 where parliament has prouided for an alternative remedy, unless the applicant is able to show some exceptional circumstances, or some other ground why it is inappropriate for the matter to be dealt with by way of reuiew by the zs Tax Appeals Tribunal and that the matter can, more appropriately, be dealt with by way of ludicial Review-..

> I must hasten to add that there are evceptions to the 'rule'at hand. If a matter in question or decision in issue is questioned on the basis of the same being ultra vires or procured by frau4 ill will, or some 16

o other circumstances that makes it imperative that Judicial Reuiew fu embarkd upn, leave may be grantd rqardlus of the existence of an alternative remdy.'!

Therefore, in the present crse, the appellant had the obligation of proving exceptiona! circumstances considering that the law provided for a remedy of appeal, which it had not taken. From the perusal of the appellant's pleadings in the application for Judicial Review, the appellant contended that the 1\* respondent adjudicated upon a matter in which it did not have jurisdiction and that the appellant was not afforded an oppoftunity to be heard. In our view, the above, constitute valid circumstances for which the Court could enteftain the appellant's application for Judicial Review. 10 15

However, the appellant also sought for the Couft to investigate issues that were substantive in nature and which challenged the factual findings of the 1st respondent in handling the complaint before it. Ground 4 of the appellant's Notice of Motion stated that: "the appticant is being condemned to pay a colossl loss in rcspect of a claim that was untenable and unsubstantiated.osuch an issue is outside the purpose of Judicial Review.

Our view is that based on the fact that the appellant had raised issues of lack of a legal mandate to adjudicate upon the subject matter, the appellant being not afforded an oppoftunity to be heard in the cause and that contrary to the Rules of natural Justice, the appellant was not afforded a fair hearing; these constituted appropriate circumstances justiffing the approach taken by the appellant of going to the court for a sotution by way of Judicial Review even though the law also availed to him the right of

L7

o5 appeal. These circumstances became even of more impoftance when it transpired that there was no Appeals Tribunal yet constituted to enteftain the appeal.

In the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial Judge erred when he dismissed the appellant's application for Judicial Review on grounds that the appellant ought to have appealed to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal, which was not in existence.

Accordingly, grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal are answered in the affirmative

We wish to note that after the appeal had been argued in open court, on 1s the 29s day of March, 20L7, the Registrar Court of Appeal wrote to the appellant respondents and their counsel asking them to address the Court on a peftinent issue before the Court could deliver judgment in the main appeal. The issue was whether Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2OLl was lodged in this coutt in time and whether or not the same was proper in 20 law. This came about after, while arguing the appeat, there was nothing on record and none of Counsel pointed it out to Court that there had been any extension of time within which the appeal was lodged. Consequently the parties filed written submissions in answer to the above issue.

25 We considered the submissions of Counsel and found that the appeilant sought and was granted extension of time within which to appeal vide Miscellaneous Application No. 316 of 2015. In Godfrey Magezi and Brian Mbabazi versus sudhir Rupaleria supreme couft civil Application No. 1O of 2OO2, it was held that when the time for lodging ^a document is extended, the document is duly lodged if lodged within the

time as so extended. This is whether the actual lodging is before or after the grant by Court of the order of extension. The court further agreed with earlier decisions that the legal effect of extension of time is to validate the documents filed out of time. Therefore, w€ are now satisfied that Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2015 was properly lodged in this Court and the same ¹⁰ was therefore valid in law.

't

In conclusion, basing on our earlier findings above, we allow this appeal. We set aside the proceedings and the Ruling of the High Court dated 4th May, 2015 in Miscellaneous Cause Insurance Limited versus Insurance Regulatory Authority and 1s Kisule Asitacio & Sons Limited, and also by necessary implication the proceedings and Ruling in High Court Miscellaneous Application No. of Leads Insurance Limited vensus Insurance L7L of 2OL4; Leads Regulatory Authority and Another.

20 We order that the said Miscellaneous Cause No. 171 of 2OL4 be heard de novo and determined by a different Judge of the High Court on issues as to whether or not:-

- 1) there was lack of lega! mandate by the 1\* respondent to adjudicate about the subject matter, - 2) the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard in the cause, - 3) the Rules of natural Justice were not obserued resulting in the appellant not being afforded a fair hearing, and/or

4) there was any matter having relevancy to $1$ , $2$ and $3$ above as the trial Court may deem appropriate.

As to costs, considering that we have ordered that **Miscellaneous Cause** No. 171 of 2014 be heard and determined afresh by the High Court, we find it fair that each party should bear its own costs of this appeal.

We accordingly so order. $10$

Dated at Kampala this .................................... Milleur Hon. Mr. Justice Remmy Kasule $15$

**JUSTICE OF APPEAL**

Hon. Lady. Justice Elizabeth Musoke $20$

## **JUSTICE OF APPEAL**


Hon. Mr. Justice Cheborion Barishaki

**JUSTICE OF APPEAL** $25$