[2025] UGHC 299

### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA HOLDEN AT MBALE

# CIVIL SUIT NO. 47 OF 2021

### 1. MUKHAYE JUDITH

# 2. KHALAYI LYDIA ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

#### **VERSUS**

#### 1. KINYAJUI KIMAANI

# 2. MODERN COAST BULDERS & CONSTRUCTORS LTD (M. C. B. C. Ltd)

3. APA INSURANCE COMPANY ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

# **BEFORE: HON. JUSTICE LUBEGA FAROUQ JUDGMENT**

#### 1. Introduction

2. The widows of late Khabala Mukyeme Lawrence instituted this suit against the Defendants jointly under section 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 289 for damages for loss of support and dependency, compensation of Ugx: 350,000,000/=, general damages for loss of expectation of life of the deceased, special damages and general damages for negligence, interest and costs of the suit

#### 3. Background

- 4. The plaintiffs' claim is that, on the 25^th day of January, 2021 while the deceased (Khabala Makyeme Lawerence) and the 1^st Plaintiff were travelling on the motorcycle No. UBN 684G were knocked by the 1st Defendant who was a driver of motor vehicle No. KBS 804K/2D 9955 trailer scania white in colour at about 0:800/C along Tororo Road, Total Petrol Station, when he negligently failed to control the motor vehicle and collided with the motorcycle No. UBN 684G. As a result of the accident, the deceased was seriously injured and the 1^st plaintiff was also critically injured. - 5. Both the deceased and the 1^st Plaintiff were rushed to the hospital but unfortunately, after some treatment, Khabala eventually died due to severe

injuries caused by the accident. The 1^st Plaintiff was incapacitated after a serious treatment and can no longer work for her family.

- 6. This suit was instituted on $3^{rd}$ of December, 2021. However, the Defendant's being residents of Kenya, on 8^th of December, 2021, the Retired Judge Godfrey Namundi granted the Plaintiffs leave to serve summons upon the Defendants outside the jurisdiction of court as required by the law. The summons to file defence were then issued on 9^th of December, 2021. According to the affidavit of service deposed by Wanjala Andrew Mulati, a process server, he received the said summons on the same day and proceeded to Kenya –Mombasa on the 14^th of December, 2021. He arrived on 15^th of December, 2021 and on the same day at around 4:00pm, he proceeded to the offices of the 2^nd defendant at Majengo, Lumumba Road Mombasa and found a receptionist. He explained to him the purpose of his visit and tendered a copy of the summons to him. He accepted service by stamping and signing on the original summons. - 7. That he inquired about the whereabouts of the 1^st Defendant and he was informed that he had gone to work and he could be reached on his personal Kenyan telephone number 0714386681. He called him and in turn, he authorized the same to be served to their receptionist since the company was to hire a lawyer to represent them. - 8. I have reviewed the original summons and noted that the said summons were indeed received by Ramadhan and contains the 2^nd Defendant's stamp dated $15^{\text{th}}$ of December, 2021. - 9. He further averred that on the 16^th of December, 2021, he proceeded to the 3^rd defendant's offices situated in Nairobi and found a receptionist and requested him to receive and sign on the summons and the plaint but he declined to acknowledge them. - 10. After the said service, the 3^rd Defendant filed its written statement of defence on $6^{th}$ of January, 2022 but the 1^st and $2^{nd}$ Defendants adamantly

refused to file their written statements of defence despite effective service upon them.

- 11. Given the above circumstances, on 8^th of November, 2024, Counsel Masa Joseph prayed to be allowed to proceed under Order 14, Order 9 rules 5, 8, 10 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Rules and section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act for an interlocutory judgment to be entered against the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. The said application was granted as per the letter from Wakosese Advocates dated 7^th October, 2024. According to that letter, the Deputy Registrar granted the said application and endorsed his or her signature and stamp on 18^th of November, 2024. - 12. Thus, the trial of this matter proceeded exparte against the $1^{st}$ and $2^{nd}$ Defendants. - 13. At the trial, the Plaintiffs presented three witnesses in a bid to prove their case. The $3^rd$ Defendant did not adduce any witness. - 14. Legal representation - 15. Counsel Maasa Joseph and Counsel Wesire Yona represented the Plaintiffs. The 3^rd Defendant was not represented.

### 16. Issues for determination

- 17. Counsel for the Plaintiffs framed the following issues- - (a) Whether the late Khabala Makyeme Lawrence and the 1^st Plaintiff were *knocked negligently?* - (b) If yes, whether the defendants are liable? - (c) What are the remedies available to the plaintiffs in the circumstance?

# 18. The burden and standard of proof.

19. The burden of proof in civil matters lies upon the person who asserts or alleges. Any person who wishes the court to believe the existence of any particular fact or desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he or she asserts, must prove that those facts exist. The standard of proof required is on the balance of probabilities. (See: sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act Cap 8 and Miller V. Minister of Pensions (1947)2 ALL ER 372)

## 20. Analysis of court

- 21. Issue No.1: Whether the late Khabala Makyeme Lawrence and the 1^st Plaintiff were knocked negligently. - 22. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the standard of care expected is that, a reasonable person proving breach of a duty is usually by adducing evidence of unreasonably conduct in light of foreseeable risks. He contended that the drivers are expected to keep their vehicles under control by avoiding reckless driving or overtaking in town areas like Mbale Total Petrol station which is an extremely busy area to avoid any negligent act which would obviously put other road users like Khabala, in danger. - 23. Section 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 289 provides that-

"If the death of any person is caused by any wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person, and the act, neglect or default would, if the death had not ensured, have entitled the person injured by it to maintain an action and recover damages in respect of it, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action in damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death was caused under such circumstances as to amount in law to a felony"

- 24. The Black's law Dictionary 11th Edition 2019 defines negligence to mean-"The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under the circumstances". - 25. In the case of Mugisha Felix and others V. Attorney General Civil Suit No. 237 of 2019, the judge stated that-

"Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person or property. Before the liability of a Defendant to pay damages for the tort of negligence can be established, it must be proved that- (a) The defendant owed to the injured man a duty to exercise due care; (b) The Defendant failed to exercise the due care and (c) The defendant's failure was the cause of the injury or damage suffered by that man".

- 26. I will therefore discuss the above conditions together to establish whether the 1^st defendant was negligent or not, and whether his failure to exercise due care caused any injury. - 27. Whether the 1^st defendant owed the 1^st Plaintiff and late Khabala Makyeme Lawrence (deceased) a duty of care and If so, whether the 1^st Defendant's *failure to exercise due care caused any injury?* - 28. In Donoghue V. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at page 580, Lord Atkinson held that-

"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who *are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably* to have them in contemplation as being so affected when $I$ am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in *question.*"

29. In Tart V. Chitty & Co. (1931) ALL ER 826 at page 829, the court stated that-

> "...it seems to me that when a man is driving a motor vehicle along the road he is bound to anticipate that there may be things and people or animals in the way at any moment, and he is bound to go not faster than will permit of his stopping or deflecting his course at any time to avoid anything he sees after he sees it".

5 | Page

- 30. In this case, PW1, PW2 and PW3 testified that on the 25^th day of January 2021, at around 8:00 hours the 1^st plaintiff with late Khabala Makyeme Lawrence while moving along Mbale Tororo Road on the Motor Cycle No. UDN 684G, were negligently knocked by the 1^st defendant while driving the 2^nd defendant's motor vehicle trailer No KBS 804K chassis number 3805847 near Total Petrol Station. Khabala Makyeme Lawrence was greatly injured and rushed to Mbale Regional Referral Hospital where he was pronounced dead. The 1^st plaintiff was also greatly injured and incapacitated by the defendant's negligent and careless act and admitted in Mbale Regional Referral Hospital. They tendered in court PEX.1, 2 and 3 to prove those facts. - 31. PEX.1 is a police form 37 containing abstract of particulars of an accident involving a motor vehicle Reg No. KBS 804K Scania white and others. In the said form, the accident reported on 25^th of January, 2021 at Mbale Police Station. It occurred near total petrol station along Tororo road. The persons who were injured therein is- Khabala Lawrence Makyeme aged 45 years, a rider of motorcycle UDN 684J Bajaj Boxer red in color and Mukhaye Judith (PW1). - 32. PEX.2 is the death certificate of Khabala Lawrence showing that he died on 27^th of January, 2021 from Mbale Referral Hospital due to motor accident. PEXH.3 is the inpatient discharge note indicating that the 1^st plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on the 16^th of February, 2021 with a left tabular fracture. - 33. The general principle derived from the above facts is that the driver of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure the safety of other road users. These other road users include pedestrians, motorcyclists, cyclists, and others. This duty requires taking all reasonable measures to prevent danger or accidents. It is not relevant whether the driver was in breach of traffic regulations or whether the other party was negligent. If a danger is reasonably apparent, failing to take precautions constitutes negligence.

- 34. It follows, therefore, that the driver of trailer Reg No. KBS 804K should have foreseen that the motorcyclist was approaching and should have slowed down, especially given that the area was a busy center requiring increased caution. The driver should have driven at a speed permitted by local traffic regulations, allowing him to stop promptly if necessary to let other road users pass in any eventuality. However, he failed to do so. - 35. Therefore, since Khabala Lawrence was riding a motorcycle carrying PW1, the first defendant owed them a duty of care, as they were using the same road. He had a duty not to do, or fail to do, any act that he could reasonably foresee would cause injury to them. Specifically, he owed a duty to avoid driving at a speed that could create danger, especially in a busy center and at a junction. - 69. I have further reviewed police book 24 which was tendered as PEX.1 and noted that no defect was detected on motor vehicle Reg. No. KBS 804K, the condition of the road was good and the remarks of the police officer were that the motor vehicle was in good mechanical conditions. This implies the driver of the said trailer was merely reckless. - 70. However, it should be noted that while the law imposes a duty on the defendant to demonstrate that there was probable cause on their part or that the accident resulted from circumstances beyond their control, the defendant in this case chose not to participate despite proper service being effected upon them. - 71. Consequently, it is the finding of this court that the 1^st defendant failed to exercise the required due care hence causing death of Khabala Lawrence as well as injuring PW1. - 72. Issue No.2: Whether the 1^st and 2nd defendants are liable? - 73. The Black's Law Dictionary, 9^th Edition at page 998, defines vicarious liability to mean-

"the liability that a supervisory party, such as an employee, based on the relationship between the two parties".

74. In Okupa V. Attorney General & 13 Ors. Misc. No.14 of 2005 [2018] **UGHCCD 10**, court defined vicarious liability as-

> "a legal doctrine where a person, himself blameless, is held liable for another person's acts. Court further went on to state that "the rule is often justified by reference to the latin maxim "quit facit per alium facit" *per se" meaning that he who acts through another acts himself".*

- 75. Counsel submitted that the driver was not denied to have been an authorized driver of the said motor vehicle who was in the course of his employment. For that reason, counsel submitted that his actions bind the employer since he was acting for the employer in the course of his employment. - 76. He contended that, the defence never denied any existence of the employee-employer relationship, and since he was driving the trailer for transport services, it definitely implies he was an employee in the course of his employment. - 77. Counsel further submitted that the $2^{nd}$ defendant tried to have the matter settled at police by sending representatives, which was a further confirmation that the employer of the $1^st$ defendant was accepting liability to have the matter settled. This is further confirmed by the affidavit deposed by Wanjala Andrew Mulati when he said that upon service, the $1^st$ defendant asked him to serve the $2^nd$ defendant's receptionist since the company was to hire a lawyer to represent them. - 78. I have also reviewed police book 24 which was tendered as PEX.1 and noted that the owner of motor vehicle Reg. No. KBS 804K was the 2^nd defendant. - 79. In light of the above, I am satisfied that the 1^st defendant was an employee of the $2^{nd}$ defendant. - 80. Be that as it may, the Plaintiffs pleaded that motor vehicle KBS 804K was insured with the 3^rd Defendant at the time of the accident. However, the said fact was denied by the 3^rd Defendant in its written statement of

8 | Page defence. The 2^nd Defendant who would further prove this fact opted not to participate in these proceedings.

- 81. Therefore, the 1^st defendant having committed the tortious acts within the course of employment, the 2^nd defendant is vicariously liable for his acts as it is clearly elucidated in Okupa V. Attorney General & 13 Ors (Supra). - 82. Issue No.3: What are the remedies available to the plaintiffs in the circumstance? - 83. Section 6(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 289 provides that-

"In every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided among the parties in such shares as the court shall find and direct."

84. In Uganda Electricity Board V. GW Musoke SCCA No. 30 of 1993 Odoki C. J., at p.5 stated that-

> "It seems to me that the purpose of the Act was to provide a new cause of action which would enable dependent of the deceased to claim compensation for the loss suffered as a result of his death. It is true that section 8 of the Act does not use the word "dependents", but "members of the family". In my view, however, the intention was to provide for members of the family who were dependents of the deceased and therefore who had suffered pecuniary loss as a result of his death. In each case the question to ask is what pecuniary loss the member of the family has suffered. He would claim to have suffered pecuniary loss if he had lost dependency on the deceased. Damages were not generally awarded as solitium for the *bereavement of the family."*

85. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs prayed for damages for loss of support and dependency, compensation of Ugx: $350,000,000/$ = for loss of expectation of life of the deceased, special damages, general damages for negligence, interests on the above and costs of the suit.

## 86. General damages for loss of dependency

87. The principles governing assessment of damages for loss of dependency are well settled by the courts in our jurisdiction.

(a) The court starts by considering the last earning of the deceased. The court then assesses the portion of the earning which was regularly being spent on the dependents. Where evidence on this is not clear or available, the court may assess the last earning by taking the sum which the deceased spouse paid over to the surviving spouse and other dependents per month, less what the deceased spent on himself/herself. The net balance, on the annual basis constitute the net contribution of the deceased to the dependents.

(b) The court then determines the appropriate multiplier that is, the number of years during which the dependency would have continued if the deceased had lived beyond the date of death and continued to earn. The multiplier is calculated basing on the age at which the deceased died and what his or her working life expectancy would have been had he or she not met his or her death. Allowance has to be made for the uncertainties of life such as sicknesses, wars and accidents by reducing the number of years before arriving at the actual figure which is taken as the multiplier.

(c) The total lost dependency or benefit is obtained by multiplying the annual lost benefit by the multiplier. The court then considers whether there are any deductions to be made out of the sum. For instance, if the surviving spouse intends to remarry, a deduction can be made to reflect that fact.

(d) The lost dependency is then apportioned among the dependents. If the deceased was a husband, the widow is entitled to a more substantial share of the damages in recognition of the fact that her dependency upon her husband's support would ordinarily continue longer than that of the


children. If the wife was the breadwinner in the family and she is the one who met her death, the surviving dependent husband would be treated in a similar manner. It is also a recognized principle that in apportioning the damages, court would award the younger children relatively larger portions in recognition of the fact that their dependency, upon the deceased, would have lasted longer than that of older children. (See: Jane Gaffa versus Francis X. S. Hatega [1981] HCB 55 and Agnes Mujaju versus Makerere University and another HCCS No. 548 of 2001).

- 88. In this case, PW1 testified that the late Khabala Lawrence left her and the 2^nd Plaintiff as widows who are now responsible for a total of 16 dependents, including their children. - 89. PW1 and PW2 further testified that at the time of late Khabala's death, he was 45 years and had not yet reached the retirement age. Having served for 15 years in active service, his anticipated retirement benefits were estimated at Ugx: $115,039,440$ /= which represents the financial loss incurred as a direct result of his untimely death caused by the negligence of the $1^{st}$ Defendant acting on behalf of the $2^{nd}$ defendant. - 90. PW1 and PW3 also testified that the deceased served as the Deputy head teacher and was earning a monthly salary of Ugx: 639,108. This was confirmed by PEX.12. - 91. Counsel submitted that the sudden passing of Khabala Makyeme Lawrence had a profound impact on them, as he was the sole bread winner of the family. - 92. From the above evidence, it is clear that the deceased was earning Ugx: 639,108/=. Ordinarily, all that amount could not be spent on the dependents alone. The witnesses did not disclose to this court how much the deceased was spending on the dependents. Therefore, following the number of dependents which is 16 in total, this court has estimated the said expenditure on the dependents to be Ugx: $300,000/$ = per month.

- 93. The deceased was aged 45 years old, which means he still had 15 years of active service. In the circumstance, the Plaintiffs are awarded Ugx: 54, $000,000/$ = for loss of dependency. - 94. General damages for loss of expectation of life - 95. It is trite that damages awarded for loss of expectation of life are determined on the basis of loss of prospective happiness and bereavement. (See: Uganda Electricity Board versus GW Musoke SCCA No. 30 of 1993) - 96. Counsel submitted that the deceased was at his productive age and healthy individual with a reasonable expectation of living a full life. He argued that the untimely death deprived his family of the joy of life and future opportunities. - 97. Considering the size of the deceased's family which has over 16 dependents who were all depending on him, I have awarded Ugx: $50,000,000/$ = as damages for loss of life expectation. - 98. General damages for pain and suffering. - 99. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs further seek general damages for the pain and suffering endured by the deceased before his demise. He argued that the deceased suffered excruciating pain and distress before succumbing to the injuries. He invited this court to take into account the severity of the injuries, the duration of suffering and the circumstances leading to the death when assessing the quantum of damages. - 100. From the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the accident occurred on 25th of January, 2021 and late Khabala Lawrence died on 27^th of January, 2021 as per PEX.2. In light of that time duration, it is no doubt that the injuries were severe and the deceased must have suffered a lot of pain. - 101. In the circumstance, Ugx: $10,000,000/$ = is awarded as general damages for pain and suffering. - 102. Special damages - 103. In Uganda Telecom Ltd V. Tanzanite Corporation, [2005] 2 EA 341, Oder, JSC at page 341 held that-

$\boldsymbol{\beta}$

"Special damage is the damage in fact caused by wrong. It is trite law that this form of damages cannot be recovered unless it has been specifically claimed and proved or unless the best available particulars or details have before trial have been communicated to the *party against whom it is claimed."*

- 104. My understanding of the above holding is that special damages are actual expenses incurred and the same must be specifically proved. - 105. In this case, the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 indicates that due to the 1^st defendant's negligence, life was lost and the other survived with injuries and a permanent fractured leg. The Plaintiffs tendered in court PEX.2 (death certificate), PEX.3 (inpatient discharge note) PEX.4 (receipt from beauty events management for tents, chairs, catering and public address), PEX.5 (Post-mortem receipt), PEX.6 (Platinum funeral home being cost for casket, transport and others), PEX.7 (platinum funeral homes), PEX.8 (Nile rock medical logistics MRF CT Scan performed on PW1), PEX.9 (Orthopedic receipt) and PEX.10 (Orthopedic receipt on HIP Replacement) to prove special damages. - 106. All the above exhibits indicate the expenses which were incurred by the 1^st Plaintiff in treatment and the funeral expenses of the deceased. - 107. Counsel for the Plaintiffs prayed for Ugx: $27,624,500/$ as special damages for both hospital bills for PW1, funeral expenses and transport costs related to burial expenses. - 108. In the view of the exhibits tendered in court, I have found Ugx 27, $000,000/$ = to be sufficient award for special damages. - 109. General damages - 110. Counsel submitted that PW1 seeks general damages for the injuries sustained due to the negligent actions of the 1^st defendant acting on behalf of the 2^nd defendant. He contended that PW1 was knocked by the 1^st defendant while in the course of his duties, causing severe injuries, permanent disfigurement and loss of employment.

- 111. Counsel argued that the medical evidence tendered during the trial clearly demonstrates that the injuries inflicted on PW1 resulted in lasting scars and deformities, affecting both her physical appearances and her psychological wellbeing. The trauma and emotional distress caused by the disfigurement cannot be understated. He asserted that the permanent condition will continue to affect her self-esteem and quality of life, and as such, she is entitled to compensation for the pain and suffering endured as a result. - 112. Counsel further submitted that PW1 was 27 years and working with Jewa Logistics earning Ugx: $800,000/$ = per month. This means she was remaining with 33 years in active service equivalent to Ugx: 316,800, $000/-$ . He contended that the loss of employment further compounded her financial distress, as she can no longer generate an income to support herself and her dependents since her performance and physical capacities were severely diminished due to the injury which led to her termination from work. - 113. Counsel also submitted that PW1 suffered both physical and psychological pain as a result of the injuries caused by the defendant's negligence. - 114. He cited the case of Kifamunte V. Uganda [2002] 1 EA 197, where court held that- "damages for personal injuries are awarded to compensate the victim for both physical and emotional suffering. The court emphasized that when determining the quantum of damages, the extent of the injury, pain and suffering and the effect on the victim's future, including loss of income and quality of life, should all be considered". - 115. According to the police report PEX.1, PEX.2 the discharge note, PEX. 8, PEX.11, PEX.10 and PEX.9, it is apparent that the 1^st Plaintiff suffered severe injuries. PW1 further tendered in court PEX.13 which was her appointment letter for the position of store manager with Jewa Logistics Company Ltd. According to that exhibit, she was earning Ugx: $800,000/$ = per month.

$\bigoplus$

- 116. PW1 testified that as a result of the accident, she is permanently disabled. Her leg was fixed with metallic implants and she can no longer work. - 117. Therefore, considering the pain, trauma and injuries which include permanent disfigurement that PW1 suffered as a result of the accident, she is awarded Ugx: $50,000,000/$ = as general damages.

118. Interests

119. Section 26 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 282 provides that-

"Where the decree is for the payment of money, the court may in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to *be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the* date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit."

120. In Mohanlal Kakubhai Radia V. Warid Telecom Ltd HCCS No. 234 of **2011**, it was noted that-

> "Court should take into account the ever rising inflation and drastic depreciation of the currency. A plaintiff is entitled to such rate of interest as would not neglect the prevailing economic value of money, but at the same time one which would insulate him or her against any further economic vagaries and the inflation and depreciation of the currency in the event that the money awarded is not promptly paid *when it falls due.*"

- 121. In light of the above, the interest of 8% is awarded in event of failure to pay in time. - 122. The position of the law is that costs follow the events. The plaintiffs having proved the case to the required standard as discussed above, cost of this suit are awarded to them. (See: section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 282.).

- 123. Having carefully analyzed the evidence herein, the following orders are hereby made- - (a) The $2^{nd}$ Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs Ugx: 54,000,000/= (Fifty four million shillings) for loss of dependency. - (b) The $2^{nd}$ Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs Ugx: 50,000,000/= (Fifty million shillings) for loss of life - (c) The $2^{nd}$ Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs Ugx: 10,000,000/= (Ten million shillings) for pain and suffering. - (d) The $2^{nd}$ Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs Ugx: 27,000,000/= (Twenty seven million shillings) for special damages. - (e) The 2^nd Defendant shall pay the 1^st Plaintiff Ugx: 50,000,000/= (Fifty million shillings) for general damages. - (f) The $2^{nd}$ Defendant shall pay the above amounts at 8% interest from the date of this judgment to payment in full. - (g) Costs of this suit are awarded to the Plaintiffs.

I so order.

**LUBEGA FAROUO** Ag. JUDGE

Judgment delivered via the emails of the Advocates of the parties on 19^th *day of May, 2025*