[2025] UGHC 162

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT LUVIERO HCT- 1 7-r'D-C A-OO22 -2022 (Arising from Taxation Cause no. 78 of 20221

# (All arising from Civil Suit no. 206 of 2O2Ol

#### 1. JUMA MUUIAWU

2. REBECCA NAI0,,AZZI APPELLANTS

# vs

SULAIMAN SSERWANGA::::::::::::::::::::::3:::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT

#### BEFORE HON. JUSTICE GODFREY HIMBAZA

#### RULING.

1. The Appellants brought this appeal by way of Chamber Summons under Section 33 of thc Judicaturc Act, Cap 13, Scction 62 lll of thc Judicature Act Cap 267, and Regulation 2 & 3 of the Advocates (Taxation of Costs) (Appeals and References) Regulations S. I 267-5. The appeal sought for orders that;

a) The costs taxed and allowed in Misc. Application no. 496 of 2O2O be revised/ reviewcd downwards.

b) Costs be provided for.

## 2. Background

3. The background to this appeal is that the respondent hled Civil Suit No.206 of 2O2O against the appellalts seeking for orders and declarations that he is a benehciary of thc cstate of the late Ester Nambooze Matovu and that hc is entitled to a share of the estate. The suit is pending judgement before this court. At the time they wcre servcd with summons to file a defcncc, the Appellants jointly instructcd Mcssr, Tropical Law Advocatcs to rcprcscnt them, and appointed the Law firm as their address of scrvicc for court

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process. The said lawyers then filed Misc. Application no. 496 of 2022 against the respondcnt sceking for an order of Security for costs and thc same was dismissed with costs for want of prosecution by Hon. Justice Dr. Joseph Murangira.

- 4. The respondent then filed a Bill ofcosts and an application for taxation vide Taxation cause no. 78 of 2022 to thc tune of 16,330,00O/=. According to the appellant, thc rcspondcnt cxtracted taxation hearing notices in respcct of the Bill of Costs on l9th of November 2021 buL neithcr the appcllant nor thcir advocates (Tropica.l law Advocates) were scrved with the notices. The rcspondent's Bill of Costs was subscqucntly taxed ex parte and allowed at 16'O1O'OOO/=. - 5. The appellants wcrc dissatisfied with thc award of the Deputy Registrar hence this appeal. - 6. In reply to thc chamber summons, the respondent who was sclfrepresented throughout the proceedings fi1ed an affidavit in reply opposing the appellants appeal on grounds that he was genuinely entitled to the costs awarded. - 7. The Appeal/ refcrcncc is based on thc following grounds; - a) The lcarned Rcgistrar allowcd Itcm 1 of thc respondents Bill of costs at Ugx 25O,OOO/ = a payment for services of hiring a special taxi to Makindyc to pick documcnts in rcspcct of the application without corresponding cvidencc from the service provider. - b) The learncd Rcgistrar allowcd itcm 2 ol thc Bill of Costs at Ugx ISrOOO,OOO/= as paymcnt for scrviccs of an advocatc and yct thc respondcnt was not rcpresented by an advocate in the application which is the subjcct of the Bill. - c) The Lcarncd Rcgistrar allowcd itcm 3 of the Bill at Ugx 6O,OOO/= as lccs for producing copics of writtcn submissions and photocopying arnexturcs by an advocatc and yct ncither party to thc application submitted written submissions and hence its dismissal lor want of prosecution.

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- d) The learned Registrar also allowed items 4 & 7 at Ugx 1OO'OOO & Ugx 2OO,OOO respectively as the respondent's transport costs to courl without amounts being proven by documentary evidence. - e) Thc learncd Registrar also allowed item 6 at Ugx 2OO,OOO as fees paid by the Rcspondcnt to the process scrver lor drafting an affidavit of service among others without any corrcsponding evidcncc to that cffcct from the alleged process scrvcr. - f) The Rcgistrar allowcd ltcm 9 undcr disburscmcnts at Ugx 15O'OOO which were higher than the ordinary fees payable for filing such documents. - 8. The appeal is supported by an affidavit in support where the grounds of appeal arc reitcrated. In rcply thc rcspondcnt who was self- rcprescntcd throughout the proccedings opposcd the appcllants appcal on grounds that he was genuinely entitled to thc costs awarded.

# 9. Legal Repreaentatlon.

10. The Appellant was rcprescntcd by Counscl Mohammed Ssebandcke from M/S Edward Occn Advocatcs whereas the rcspondcnt rcprcsentcd himsclf. The parties filed writtcn submissions which thc court has considered.

## 1O,1 Issue for determination by Court

Whether the costs tqxed and allouted by the learned Registrar should be revised/ set aside.

## 11. Submissions bv Counsel for the Aooellants

12. It was argucd by counscl for thc appcllant that thc circumstanccs undcr which court may intcrfcrc with an award of costs by a tzrxing officcr wcrc stated by Lady Justicc Olivc Kazaarwc Mukwaaya in thc casc of NABANJALA GORRETM NABUKALU HELLEN Taxation Appeal no. 4 of 2O18 at page 4 & 5 citing Bank of Uganda Vs Banco Arabe Espanol S. CCA No. 23 of 1999 as followsl

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"Save in exceptional circumstances, ajudge does not interfere with the assessment ofwhat the taxing officer considers to be a reasonable fee. This is because it is generally accepted that questions which are solely of quantum of costs are matters with which the taxing officer is particularly Iitted to deal with and in which he has more experience than the judge. Consequently, a judge will not alter a fee allowed by the taxing oflicer merely because in his opinion, he should have allowed a higher or lower amount,

Secondly, an exceptional case is where it is shown expressly or by inference that in assessing and in arriving at the quantum of the fee allowed, the taxing officer exercised or applied a wrong principle. In this regard. Application of a wrong principle is capable of being inferred from an award of an amount which is manifestly excessive or manifestly low.

Thirdly, even if it is shown that the taxing oflicer erred on principle, the judge should interfere only on being satisfied that the error substantially affected the decision on quantum and that upholding the amount allowed would cause injustice to one of the parties."

- 13. Counsel submitted that the taxing ofliccr applied wrong principles in arriving at thc manilcstly exccssivc costs awardcd to thc rcspondcnt which in equity and fairness warrants intervention by court. Counsel furthcr submitted that the costs awarded by the taxation officer were taxed and awarded ex parte since the appellants were not served with the taxation hearing noticc as cvidcnt from paragraph 9 ol the aflldavit in support. - 14. Counsel argued that thc appellants only got to know o[ the taxation aftcr a warrant of arrest was issued against thcm on thc 19th Scptembcr 2022 L<t recover the costs as stated in Paragraph 1 1 of the affidavit in support and hence thc dclay in lodging this taxation appeal. - 15. Counsel submittcd in respect of each particular item as follows;

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- 16. On Item I , he submitted that the Respondent is not entitled to the costs ofUgx 25O,OOO/= awarded as transport charges from Luwero to Makindyc High Court Family Division by the taxing officer since he did not specify the documents he was requircd to pick from court. Furthcrmorc, that thc rcspondcnt did not avail the taxing officer with a corrcsponding rcccipt from the Spccial Taxi cab driver hc hircd to transport him in ordcr to support the claim. - 17. On Item 2, he argued that costs of 15,OOO,OOO/= (Ftfteen Million Shillings) awardcd in this itcm should bc sct asidc for thc following rcasons; - i) The Respondent has ncver hircd the serviccs ofa practicing advocatc as he personally drafted and filed the afhdavit in rcply in respect of Misc. Application. No 496 of 2020 which was the subjcct of thc taxation. - ii) There wcre no writtcn submissions draftcd and filcd in Misc. Application r,o. 496 of 2O2O by either party to the application as thc same was dismissed for want of prosecution. Counsel submitted that evcn when an advocate is engaged in a case, thc fces for drafting written submissions arc shillings 300,000/= under the 6th Schedulc for the Advocates (Remuneration and taxation of Costs) Regulations particularly Rcgulation I O(4) - 18. On item 3 counsel submitted that no photocopies could have bcen madc from fictitious written submissions and hence an award of 6OO'OOO/= should be reversed or set asidc. - 19. On item 4, counsel concedcd to an award of IOO,OOO/= es transport costs incurred by the respondcnt in filing his aflldavit in rcply in Misc. Causc no. 496 ot 2027. - 20. On item 5 and 6 of the Bill of Costs, counscl argued that the taxing ofliccr erred in awarding thc costs of Ugx 2O,OOO /= and 2OO,O00/= sincc thc rcspondent did not tendcr cvidencc of making thc said paymcnt to thc process servcr. Counsel prayed that this award also be sct asidc.

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- 21. On item 7, counsel conceded to the fact that the respondent attended court for delivcry of the ruling in Misc. Application no. 496 ot 2O2l but praycd that an award of Ugx 2OO,OOO/= was too excessivc, hcncc hc praycd that thc respondcnt be awarded Ugx IOO,OOO/= - 22. On item 8 & 9, counscl submitted that the rcspondcnt could only rccovcr rcasonable disburscments of the filing charges for thc Bill of costs and transport costs. Counscl proposcs a sum of Ugx 15O,OOO/= instcad of a combincd total of Ugx 6OO,OOO/=

### 23. Submissions for the Respondent

Thc respondent in his submissions raised two objections to thc effcct that;

- i) The Taxation Appeal /rcference was filed out of timc, as the Bil[ was taxed and ccrtihcd on thc I I th day of April 2O2l and this application was lodgcd on court rccord on fllh October 2022, which is a period of onc ycar which automatically bars and disentitlcs the appcllants a right to filc thc taxation appcal without hrst sccking lcavc of court. - ii) That thc affidavit in support of thc Chamber Summons sworn by ^a onc Ntanda Umaru Counscl for thc appellants working with Edward Occn Advocatcs is invalid as far as the application is conccrncd sincc according to thc respondent, a party to thc suit is thc only onc u'ith authority to swcar an affidavit. Thc rcspondcnt rclicd on thc authority of TAREMWA K. THOMAS Vs AIIIORNEY GENERAL & 17 ORS MA 83 OF 2012 wherc Justicc Bashaija stated as follows; "It is trite law that where a party aweara an aflldavlt without authority of the party to the sult, the aflldavlt ls defective for want of authorlty". - 24. Th.e respondent further submitte d in referencc to thc taxed Bill o[ Costs that Regulation 13 (a) (i) of thc advocates (Rcmuneration and Taxation of Costs) Rcgulations 2018 entitlc him to tax his costs undcr the regulations.

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#### 25. Analysis of Court.

# 26. Dutv of a first aDpellate Court.

This Court takes note that it is the first appellate court and thcrcfore is under a duty to cvaluate the evidence on the Court rccord and come up with its own conclusion. See Klfamunte Henry Vs Uganda SC Crim. Appeal no. LOI L997,

- 27. It is clear from thc rccord, that the costs which arc the subjcct of this appeal / refcrence, wcre as a rcsult of dismissal of thc appcllant's application for want of prosecution. This was an intcrlocutory application sccking for security for costs but the appcllants never prosccuted itJ resulting into its dismissal with costs. - 28. Before I dclvc into the mcrits of thc appcal, I shall disposc off thc preliminary objections raiscd by thc rcspondcnt firs!

The respondent in his submissions raised two objections to the effcct that;

## af The appeal/reference was flled out of time.

The rcspondcnt raiscd a preliminary objcction that thc Bill ol Cost was taxed and ce rtihed on the 1 lth day of April 2O2l and this application was Iodged on court record on 8th ()ctober 2022, which is a period of one ycar which automatically bars and disentitles the appellants a right of a taxation appeal. In effcct, thc rcspondcnt argues that thc appeal was filcd out of timc.

According to the respondent, this appeal / refcrence by Chambcr Summons was filed in court on 8th October 2022 and yet the Bill of Costs had been taxed on 1 I th April 202 1. According to the rcspondent, it took the appellant over 1 year to file the appeal hcnce the objcction that it was filcd out of timc.

29. According to the Appellants, under Paragraph 8 of the Affidavit in support of the appcal / refercncc, it is statcd that counsel for the appellants was

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not served with taxation hearing notices as alleged and indeed, the mattcr proceeded ex parte, the Bill was taxed by the learncd Deputy Rcgistrar on 1lth April 2022 and allowed at 16,O1O,OO0/= in the absence of the appellant. That they were only made aware of the taxation when a warrant of a-rrest issued against thcm on 19rh Scptember 2022 was brought to their notice by court bailiffs.

- 30. In response, the respondent statcd in his affidavit in rcply undcr paragraph 4, that the appellant was dully served with taxation hearing notice as pcr the affidavit of service of Ddamulira Kassim. A look at the affidavit of service o[ the said Ddamulira Kassim attached to thc respondent's affidavit in rcply states under paragraph 2-4 as follows; - A) fhd on 23'd Jan 2O22, I receiued copies of the Taxalion Heanng Notices issued bg this honourable court to be serued on to the defendant. - B) Tlnt on 2Vt, Jan 2O22 I proceeded to Pilkington road Plot 1 utorkers house 6th Floor where'l'ropical Aduocates utho represent both defendants ore situate, I explained to the secretary on the reception desk the purpose of my uisit and aJler serued her u.tith copies of the Taxation hearing Notices uthich she took to counsel Musedde who is in personal conduct of the ciuil suif. - C) ffuat he accepled seruice but declined to sign end stamp on the Court Copu. lemphasis) - 31 . This court is not convinced that therc was sufficicnt proof of scrvice of thc taxation hearing notices upon thc appcllants. On a balancc of probabilitics, I seem to belicve the appcllants' counsel's submission that he and his clicnts did not know about thc taxation until thc appellants wcre notificd by court bailiffs about thc cxistencc of a warrant of arrest. Much as court is alive at thc timclincs within which to lllc this rcfcrcncc, it is also alivc t<r thc time when the appcllants becamc aware that thcrc had bccn a taxation of the Bill of costs in qucstion. Much as the appeal was filcd out of timc, the appellants did not gct aware of the taxation against them until the timc thcy were informcd by court bailiffs that therc was a warrant of arrcst. In

fr, ill'"' light of section 33 Judicature Act, Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 126 (2) (e) of the 1995 Constitution which provides that substantive justice shall be administered without undue regard to technicalities i hereby validate the appellants' appeal. The respondent's preliminary objection is accordingly overruled.

b) The second preliminary objection is to the effect that the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons sworn by a one Ntanda Umaru Counsel for the appellants working with Edward Ocen Advocates is invalid as far as the application is concerned since according to the respondent, a party to the suit is the only one with authority to swear an affidavit.

The respondent argued in his written submissions that Ntanda Umaru, the counsel who swore the affidavit in support of the chamber summons on behalf of the appellants did not have authority to swear the affidavit, hence his affidavit is invalid. That as long as he purported to swear the affidavit in support of the appeal/reference without a power of attorney from the appellants the affidavit was rendered incurably defective. He relied on the case of TAREMWA K. THOMAS VS ATTORNEY GENERAL & 2 ORS 17 M. A of 2012 where Justice Andrew Bashaija stated that

"..... *where a party swears an affidavit without the authority of the party to the suit, the affidavit is defective for want of authority".*

32. The issue of an advocate swearing an affidavit on behalf of a party was dealt with in the case of M/S SIMON TENDO KABENGE ADVOCATES VS M/S MINERAL ACCESS SYSTEMS (U) TD HCT-00-CC-MA-565-**2011.**Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire held as follows;

"An *advocate making an affidavit on behalf of a client in contentious matters*" is not the best practice...this is clearly a contentious matter that Nalwanga seeks to give evidence on. In paragraph 1 she states that she is fully conversant with the factual matters in the application and she depones the affidavit in such capacity. She however does not state that she is *authorised(emphasis) by her client M/S Mineral Access Systems Uganda Ltd*

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to do so within the meaning of 0.3 rule 1 of the CPR a situation that was faulted by Hon. Justice Madrama in the case of MUGOYA CONSTRUCTION vs CENTRAL ELECTRICALS INTERNATIONAL LTD M. A 699 of 2011."

- 33. In the case of **Mugoya Construction (op cit)**, the learned judge also struck out an affidavit sworn by one of the Counsel to the respondent for failing to state that the advocate had authority to swear the affidavit on behalf of the respondent. - 34. Similarly, in the case of **UMEME LIMITED VS BUSINGE HILDA MAATE** TAXATION APPEAL NO 023 OF 2022 (ARISING FROM KASESE CIVIL **SUIT NO. 032 OF 2021),** Justice Vincent Emmy Mugabo stated, in respect of an advocate who swore an affidavit on behalf of the appellant in the suit as follows:

"Counsel does not in the first instance disclose that he was authorised *(emphasis) by the appellant to depose on its behalf or to do so within the* meaning of Order 3 rule 1 of the CPR... Regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations offers additional guidance in an instance *where counsel finds himself in a position of witness for client. The foregoing* is what was castigated by courts in **BANCO ARABE ESPANOL VS B. O. U** SCCA NO. 8/1998 and M/s SIMON TENDO KABENGE vs M/s MINERAL ACCESS SYSTEMS (U) LTD H. C. M. A No. 565/2011. In these authorities, such affidavits were found to be defective and were accordingly rejected... I *have no reason to depart from the same"*

- 35. In the instant case, Counsel Umaru Ntanda swore the affidavit in support of the chamber summons and in his paragraph 1 he states as follows; "That I am an Advocate of the High Court of Uganda and Subordinate courts" *thereto practicing with the firm of Edward Ocen Advocates dully instructed* by the Appellants in this matter and familiar with the facts of this case, I accordingly affirm this affidavit in that capacity". - 36. The above affidavit falls short of mentioning that the said advocate was authorised to swear the affidavit for and on behalf of the appellants. This is contrary to 0.3 Rule 2 of the CPR. I also have no reason to depart from

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the principle s laid down in the abovc cited authorities in respcct to this principle. To that cffcct, thc affidavit sworn by NTANDA UMARU is struck out. The prcliminary objcction is thcrclorc uphcld.

- 37. Howevcr, in thc casc of UMEME LTD VS BUSINGE HILDA MATTE (OP CIT) Justice Vincent Emmy Mugabo wcnt on to determine the mcrits of the appcal despite striking out thc affidavit in support of the Chambcr Summons. Likcwisc, I shall also go ahead with dctermining thc mcrits of this appeal; - 38. The principlcs of taxation of Bills of Costs have time and again bccn statcd by the courts, but werc outlined in notablc cascs such as NICHOLAS ROUSSOUS VS GULAMHUSSEIN HABIB VIRANI SCCA NO. 6 OF 1995, which principles were extracted from thc case of MAKU LA INTERNATIONAL LTD VS CARDINAL EMMANUEL NSUBUGA & ANOR (1982) HCB 11 as follows - i) The court will only intcrferc with an award of costs by the taxing ofhccr if such costs arc so low or so high that they may amount to an injusticc to one of the partics. - ii) Costs must not bc allowcd to rise to such a lcvcl so as to confinc access to the Courts only to thc rich. - iii) A successful litigant ought to bc fairly reimburscd for costs hc or shc has to incur.

It is against these principles that the court shall rcsolvc thc issuc " Whether the costs taxed and allowed bg the learned Reglstrar should be set aslde/revleued".

39. It is evidcnt that thc rcspondcnt was unrcprescntcd. Undcr ltcm l, Counsel for the appcllants argued that the respondcnt is not entitled to Ugx 25O,OOO I = awardcd as transport chargcs from Luwcro to Makindyc High Court Family Division by thc taxing mastcr sincc hc did not spccify thc documcnts he was rcquircd to pick from court. Furthcr, hc argucd that thc respondent did not avail the taxing officcr with a corresponding rcccipt from

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the Spccial Hirc Taxi cab drivcr hc hircd to transport him in ordcr to support the claim.

- 40. In response to this, the respondent attached a letter from a one Ssemakula Abdu purportedly a special hire driver attached as annexture Y. The lctter addrcssed to thc Dcputy Registrar Makindye Court dated 8rh Aprll 2022 claims that the rcspondcnt paid 250,000/= to thc taxi drivcr every time he drove him to the court. One wonders why thc letter was written in April 2022 long, after thc Bill of Costs had becn taxcd by court. Thc letter appears to me to be an aftcr thought by the respondent to try to justify the award of Shs 25O,OOO/= by the Rcgistrar. More so, thc rcspondcnt did not mcntion which documents he had gone to pick. It is evident on rccord that after the casc was dismissed for want of prosccution, the rcspondcnt went to court to filc his Bill of Costs. Hc should thcrcforc have been given transport refund for traveling to court to file the Bill of Costs. It is also not convincing enough that the rcspondcnt uses Special Hirc Taxi s whcnevcr hc is travcling to Kampala whcn thcrc is a chcapcr alternative of a 'Matatu'Taxi. For that rcason, an award of Shs 25O,OOO/= is hereby set asidc and replaced with a fec of Shs IOO,OOO/= which includes transport and meals for the respondent for travcling to the Court. - 41. Under Item 2 of thc Bill of Costs, Counsel for the appellant argued that Shs 15,OOO,OOO/= awardcd to thc respondent for hiring a practicing advocate to draft his plcadings and othcr court documcnts should bc sct aside because thc respondcnt reprcsentcd himsclf. - 42. Tlne respondcnt in reply attached a letter lrom M/S AYEBAZIBWE MAKOROGO & CO Advocates dated Sth April 2022 addressed to thc Deputy Registrar and marked Anncxturc "X", claiming that the rcspondcnt had so far paid lcgal fccs to thc firm to thc tunc of Ug shs 3O,OOO. OOO/= (Thtrty Millton Shtllings Onlyf . The letter claims that thc rcspondent was at thc stage of taxing his Bill of Costs and had becn taskcd to present prool of the instruction fees. The advocates were not confident enough to issue the rcspondcnt with an official receipt. With due rcspcct, the letter was

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written on 5^th April 2022 long after the Bill of Costs had been taxed by court. This reasoning is not convincing enough. More so, the record shows that the respondent drew and filed the court documents himself. There is no notice of instructions filed on court record. More so, this was an interlocutory application that was dismissed for want of prosecution. I find that the Registrar did not use her discretion judiciously when she awarded an exorbitant fee of $15,000,000/$ = as fees for advocates who were not known by court.

43. In the case of KAMAU ENG. INTERNATIONAL JANSEN LTD & ANOTHER VS RUSHOKORA VICTOR REVISION CAUSE NO. 29 OF 2020 Justice Ssekaana Musa held as follows;

"*Litigants are not entitled to make profit in litigation but rather they are only entitled to their disbursements expended during the trial and they should not share in the professional remuneration of advocates"*

44. The Justice went ahead and quoted a text in **COMMISSIONER OF LANDS**

**VS OGINGA ODINGA (1972) EA 125** where the court held as follows;

"A successful party who is awarded costs is not entitled to make profit out of *employment of an advocate. He can recover fees paid, reasonable expenses* paid or payable to his witnesses and reasonable charges and fees paid or *payable to his advocate.... the principal is that a litigant may instruct legal counsel at any point in the proceedings. However, only an advocate who has* instructions and has successfully prosecuted a matter can claim Costs... The *advocates' involvement must be overt on record(emphasis) and where there* has been a change of advocates, a notice to that effect be filed."

45. In the instant appeal, the purported advocates **M/S AYEBAZIBWE** -**MAKOROGO's** involvement in the matter was not overt. The Deputy Registrar therefore exercised jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity or injustice, when she awarded $15,000,000/$ = (Fifteen Million Shs only) as advocates fees when they were not shown on record as representing the respondent. The said award of $15,000,000/$ = (Fifteen Million Shs only) is therefore set aside and replaced with a fee of

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3,OOO,OOO/= (Threc Million Shillings Only) to cater for the reasonable expenses incurred by the respondent including disbursements in the course of the proceedings. This has been informed by the fact that the Bill of costs was in respcct of a dismisscd intcrlocutory. Court has noted that thc suit was dismisscd lor want of prosecution, and at a stagc whcn thc respondcnt had incurred minimal expcnses.

- 46. On item 3 counsel submitted that no photocopies could have been madc from fictitious writtcn submissions and hcnce an award of 60,OO0/= should be reversed or sct asidc. I note from the rccord that thc application was dismissed for want of prosccution of the application. No writtcn submissions were directed by the. Judge to be filed, indecd a look at thc taxed Bill of Costs shows that the Deputy Registrar taxed off the amount. - 47. On item 4, counsel conceded to an award of IOO,OOO/= aa transport costs incurrcd by thc rcspondent in filing his alfidavit in reply in Misc. Cause no. 496 ot 2027. - 48. On itcm 5 and 6 of thc Bill of Costs, counscl argucd that thc taxing olficcr errcd in awarding thc costs of Ugx IOO,OOO/= and 2OO,OOOI= since the respondent did not tcndcr cvidcncc of making the said paymcnt to thc process servcr. Counsel prayed that this award also bc set aside. I notc that there is an affidavit of scrvicc on court rccord indicating that thc proccss servcr servcd counscl for thc appcllants. Unscr itcm 5 i maintain thc fcc of ShsIOO,OOO/= as fecs for thc proccss scrvcr to scrvc thc rcply to thc chamber summons upon the appcllants. However, under item 6, I rcducc thc fces for thc process scrver to Shs IOO,OOO/ = - 49. On itcm 7, counscl conccdcd to thc fact that thc rcspondcnt attcndcd court for dclivery of thc ruling in Misc. Application no. 496 of 2O2l but praycd that an award of Ugx 2OO,OOO/= was too cxccssivc, hcncc hc praycd that the respondent be awarded Ugx 1OO,OOO/=. Indeed, I agree with the appellants that a fcc of Ughs 2OO,OOO | = for thc rcspondent's attcndancc to court is excessive. I hereby reducc it to Shs lOO,OOO/=

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- 50. On item 8, counsel submitted that the respondent could only recover rcasonable disburscmcnts of thc filing chargcs for thc Bill of costs and transport costs. Counsel proposes a sum of Ugx 15O,OOO/=. I hercby maintain the figure of Shs 3OO,OOO/= and I have no reason to intcrfcrc with thc award. - 51. In conclusion, thc appeal / rcfcrcnce partially succecds. - 52. I hercby make thc following orders; - a) Undcr Item 1 of the respondents Bill of costs an award of a fcc of Ugx 25O,OOO/= is hereby reduced to Shs IOO,OOO/= - b) Undcr iLem 2, thc award of Shs l5,OOO,OOO/= is hcrcby sct asidc and replaccd with an award of Shs 3,OOO,OOO/= - c) Undcr item 5 the award of Shs IOO,OOO/= is maintaincd. - d) Under itcm 6 thc award of Shs 2OO,OOOI= is reduccd to Shs IOO,OOO/= - e) Under itcm 7 thc award of Shs 2OO,OOO l= is rcduccd to Shs IOO,OOO/= - f) Under item 8 the award of Shs 3OO,OOO/= is maintaincd - g) Each party shall bcar its own costs.

GO FREY /''-z i\r/ ! |

AG. JU 8TH APRIL 2025