[2024] UGHCCRD 70

**THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA**

**(CRIMINAL DIVISION)**

**CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 003 OF 2024**

**(Arising from Criminal Case No. MAK/00/CR/CO/929/2022)**

**NDYAMUHAKI EUSTORIA NDUHIRA::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPLICANT**

**VERSUS**

**UGANDA::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPODENT**

**RULING BY JUSTICE GADENYA PAUL WOLIMBWA**

This Application was made under Section 48 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Section 17 (1) of the Judicature Act, which grants supervisory powers to the High Court over Magistrate Courts and Section 33 of the Judicature Act.

The Application was brought for orders that:

1. The ruling of His Worship Igga Adiru, Senior Magistrate Grade I, sitting at Makindye Magistrates Court, in Criminal Case Number MAK/00/CR/ CR/ CO/ 929/2022, delivered on November 31, 2023, should be revised and set aside. 2. That Criminal Case Number MAK. CR/CO/929/2022 be stayed pending the determination of Divorce cause No. 27/2022 3. Costs of the Application will be provided for.

Briefly, the grounds of the application are:

1. That the Applicant is charged with the case of forgery and uttering a false document which relates to proof of a customary marriage. 2. That the document in question and the whole issue of the customary marriage between the complainant and the accused? The Applicant is pending determination at the High Court Family Division vide Divorce Cause No. 27 of 2022. 3. Through her lawyer, the Applicant filed an oral application to stay the criminal proceedings before the Magistrate pending the determination of divorce cause no. 27 of 2022. 4. The Application was based on the fact that the issues before the criminal case were directly and majorly related to the Divorce case at the High Court. 5. That the complainant, in connivance with the lawyer watching brief, used the criminal case as a mere weapon to gain an unfair advantage in the Divorce Cause. 6. The ruling delivered on 31st November 2023 held that there was no need to stay in the criminal proceedings. 7. That this ruling is not only unfair but also improper. 8. It is in the interest of justice and fairness that the application be allowed, the ruling be revised, and the criminal proceedings stay pending the determination of Divorce Cause No. 27 of 2022.

The Application was supported by the Affidavit of Ndyamuhaki Eustoria Nduhira, the Applicant.

**Background to the Application**

On 14th February 2022, the Applicant petitioned the Family Division of the High Court to dissolve her marriage with John Baptist Gakyalo on several grounds, including adultery. The petition was filed vide Divorce Cause Number 27 of 2022. While the Divorce Petition was going on, John Baptist Gakyalo complained to the police that the Applicant had forged a marriage certificate and a letter from the Applicant’s father acknowledging receipt of the bride's price. The Director of Public Prosecution took an interest in the matter, and the Applicant was charged with forgery contrary to section … of the Penal Code Act and uttering a forged marriage certificate at the Family Division contrary to section …. Of the Penal Code Act. During the criminal trial, the Applicant orally moved the court under section 209 of the Magistrates Courts Act to stay the criminal case pending the determination of the Divorce Cause. The Applicant argued that both cases were premised on the validity of the customary marriage between the parties and that since the High Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage, the criminal case should be stayed pending the determination of the civil matter. The Applicant also argued that if the two cases are left to proceed concurrently, the courts may render conflicting decisions.

The DPP opposed the application because there was no direct or substantial connection between the criminal matter and the Divorce Cause. The DPP also argued that despite the two cases being premised on the same documents, the issues between the two cases were different. The Trial Magistrate dismissed the Application. He ruled that the matters between the two cases were different; the remedies sought by the two cases were different- the criminal matter was to punish, while the civil matter sought dissolution of the marriage. He also ruled that no universal principle provides for staying criminal proceedings in favour of civil matters. He also ruled that criminal cases take precedence over civil cases. Finally, he ruled that where an inquiry can be satisfactorily done by both the civil and criminal courts as I do in this instant case, there is no need to stay criminal proceedings. The decision of the Trial Magistrate aggrieved the Applicant, and, therefore, filed the Application for revision as introduced in the opening paragraphs.

**Submissions of the Applicant**

The Applicant submitted that the Trial Magistrate should have stayed the criminal matter pending the determination of the Divorce Petition because both cases are premised on the same documents and, therefore, are dealing with substantially the same subject matter.

The Applicant referred to the case of Kaddu Dunstan & Mukibi Samuel Vs Ug Criminal revision 04/2022, where the High Court granted a payer to stay the criminal matter because the two cases were dealing with the same subject matter of land.

The Applicant also submitted that the Respondent deliberately filed the criminal matter to frustrate the Divorce Petition. She submitted that the criminal case would give the Respondent an advantage in the Divorce Petition.

Thirdly, the Applicant submitted that they had discharged the burden of showing that the concurrent hearing of the cases would prejudice her case. She said that the marriage certificate, which is critical to the success of the Divorce Cause, is pending the determination of the High Court and that it would be prejudicial if the criminal case were not stayed. She relied on the case of Uwera Agnes Vs Cr. Revision Application No. 31/2022, where the High Court held that the Applicant has the burden of showing a real and not a mere national risk of injustice or prejudice from the continuation of both cases concurrently before the stay can be ordered.

Fourthly, the Applicant submitted that she had satisfied the requirements for a stay of the criminal case under section 209 of the Magistrates Courts Act. She submitted that the following conditions must exist for the court to grant a stay.

* Presence of 2 concurrent suits or proceedings, one of which is previously or filed earlier than the other before any court vested with jurisdiction. * The suits/proceedings should be between the same parties. * The subject matter of the suit or proceedings is directly or substantially the same.

There are two suits: Criminal and Divorce Cause.

Subject matters are directly the same. Both cases concern the customary marriage certificate, which the Applicant seeks to rely on in the Petition and the Respondent seeks to rely on in the criminal case.

* The suit is between the same parties.

The Divorce cause is between the Applicant and Respondent.

The criminal case is between DPP and Applicant. The Respondent is the complainant.

Fifthly, counsel submitted that while it is true that there is no universal principle for criminal proceedings to be stayed when a similar matter is pending before a civil case, the courts have recognised the inherent danger of conflicting judgments and have consequently stayed proceedings in the lower court until the decision of the High Courts is given.

Lastly, counsel submitted that if the Applicant is convicted and the Civil court finds that there is no forgery and that there was a valid customary marriage, the convict will suffer remand because of the functus officio rule. **See Swaliki Gguta Vs Uganda Cr. App 231/2016.**

**Submissions of the Respondent**

Ms. Apolot Joy Christine, a Senior State Attorney, opposed the Application. She submitted that the Applicant was charged with forgery and uttering a false document in Makindye Criminal case No. 929/2022 following a complainant against her and an investigation which resulted in the DPP sanctioning the charges.

Secondly, she submitted that the laws of general application in Uganda do not have a provision for staying criminal matters in favour of civil matters. See Sarah Kulata Vs Uganda SCCA 03/2018 – it cannot be a correct proposition of the law that where a civil suit is pending between 2 parties, no criminal proceedings may be instituted against one of the parties arising from the same facts. She referred to the case of Musumba Yahaya & Anor Vs Uganda Cr. Revision 4/19, where the Court held that the Magistrate Court Act does not make provision for staying criminal proceedings in preference of hearing a civil matter.

She submitted that in Uganda Vs Ssonko HC Rev. Application No.12 of 2019 - the court must satisfy three conditions as elaborated by the Applicant. The conditions are:

* There are two proceedings going on concurrently. * The parties in the civil suit (Divorce Petition) are different from the criminal case. * The subject matter in the Divorce Petition and Criminal case are different.

She submitted that the Applicant failed to establish that the parties were the same in the cases. While the parties were the same in the divorce case, the parties in the criminal case were the Applicant and the DPP. Furthermore, the two cases sought two different remedies.

Lastly, counsel submitted that the Applicant had not satisfied the court that she would suffer real prejudice if the court did not stay the criminal matter. She relied on the Jefferson Ltd case.

**Rejoinder of the Applicant:**

The Applicant, in rejoinder, reiterated that there are two concurrent suits/proceedings, one filed previously and the other latter in courts vested with jurisdiction, both proceeding concurrently and substantially dealing with the same matter or aptly are premised on the same documents. He submitted that whereas the remedies sought in the two cases differed, the Respondent used the criminal case as a weapon to gain an unfair advantage in the Divorce Petition. Additionally, he submitted that while the parties are different, the particulars of the offence, evidence of the complainant and State witnesses all relate to the originality or authenticity of the customary marriage certificate. They are the same. Lastly, counsel submitted that the Applicant stands to be prejudiced by continuing the criminal case as the Divorce Petition would be rendered nugatory. He submitted that there is a real possibility of witnesses being interfered with and that having the two cases concurrently would burden the Applicant.

**Consideration of the Application**

The purpose of revision is to correct errors and irregularities in the records of the lower court. Revision is a cost-effective measure through which the High Court corrects errors and irregularities of the lower courts, saving litigants time and expenses involved in prosecuting appeals. This is why revisions can be commenced by letters or the High Court calling for the inspection of the lower records to ensure compliance with the law. Lastly, revision is a tort of quality assurance and enforcement of judicial standards and legal supervision of the lower courts by the High Court. Be that as it may, the power of revision must be exercised sparingly and only in deserving cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice through unnecessary interventions by the High Court in the work of the lower courts.

**Is the matter amenable to Revision?** Section 50 (5) of the CPC provides that:

Any person aggrieved by any finding, sentence or order made or imposed by a magistrate’s court may petition the High Court to exercise its powers of revision under this section. Still, no such petition shall be entertained where the petitioner could have appealed against the finding, sentence or order and has not appealed.

The above section allows any person aggrieved by a finding, sentence or order made by a Magistrates Court to petition the High Court to revise the matter complained of. However, this section has a petitioner who had a right to appeal but chose not to appeal or exercise his right from petitioning for revision.

In this case, the complainant (Applicant) made an oral application under Section 209 of the Magistrates Court Act to stop the criminal proceedings in Makindye Criminal Case No. 929 of 2022 to allow the High Court to hear Divorce Cause No.27 of 2022, which had been filed earlier than the criminal case arguing that the matters in the two cases arise from a marriage Certificate and should therefore first be prosecuted in the Divorce Cause to avoid conflicting judgments. The Trial Magistrate dismissed the application. He said there was no universal principle allowing for the stay of criminal matters in favour of civil cases, that the two cases were not the same, that the two cases were seeking different remedies, and that the two cases could be heard concurrently. The Trial Magistrate made a definite order. Although this order is not appealable, it is amenable to revision under Section 50 (5) of CPC.

The key issue in this revision is whether the Trial Magistrate erred in law when he refused to stay in criminal proceedings before him in favour of the Divorce Cause in the High Court. It is the case for the Applicant that the criminal case and Divorce Cause are all founded on the legality of the Marriage certificate, which the Applicant relies on to show that she is legally married to the Respondent. On the other hand, the Respondent contends that the Marriage Certificate is forged, and he has, through the DPP, filed a criminal case against the Applicant, accusing her of forgery and uttering a false document.

The Applicant contends she will be prejudiced if the criminal case is not stayed, and the Divorce Cause will be rendered nugatory. She also argued that the Respondent uses the criminal case to gain an unfair advantage in the Divorce Cause. It is the case for the Applicant that there will be a miscarriage of justice if the stay is not granted.

The Respondent’s case is that there is no law providing for staying criminal cases in favour of the civil matters, that the criminal case and Divorce Cause are different, that the parties are not the same, and lastly that the applicant has not shown that she will be prejudiced if the criminal case is not stayed.

However, before I delve into the merits of the case, it is important to consider the legality of the application to stay the criminal case before the Trial Magistrate. The Applicant moved the Trial Magistrate to stay the criminal case under Section 209 of the Magistrates Courts Act. This section has since been renumbered to Section 208. The section provides as follows:

*No magistrates' court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or proceeding in which the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties or between parties under whom they, or any of them, claim, litigating under the same title, where that suit or proceeding is pending in the same or any other court having original or appellate jurisdiction in Uganda to grant the relief claimed.*

Several issues regarding the application of Section 208 of the Magistrates Courts Act should be noted. The section is found in part XX of the Act, under the subheading Civil Jurisdiction of Magistrates' Courts and provisions relating to exercising that jurisdiction. The significance of placing Section 208 under part XX of the Act is that it pertains to magistrates when they exercise civil jurisdiction.

The Marginal Note to section 208 says stay of a suit. Although the marginal note is not part of the Act, it is a good guide to the legislature's intention to pass a specific legislation. The legislature must have intended to give Magistrates power to stay particular suits in section 208.

Furthermore, Section 208 of the Magistrates Courts Act refers to a suit or proceeding. The phrase "suit or proceeding" belongs to the civil family, not criminal law. Therefore, a purposeful interpretation of Section 208 of the Magistrates Courts Act suggests that it only applies where a magistrate is sitting and exercising civil jurisdiction. This is why the lawmakers deliberately placed this provision under the Civil Jurisdiction of Magistrates. It was put there to prevent duplication, save court time, and enhance the efficiency of the judicial process by simultaneously avoiding the double handling of similar cases in two courts. Staying one suit would enable the parties and the court to decide whether to hear the second case or consider it res judicata under Section 209 of the Magistrates Courts Act.

Based on this interpretation, the applicant's application to the Trial Magistrate to stay the criminal case under Section 208 of the Magistrates Courts Act was improper, as the magistrate was exercising criminal rather than civil jurisdiction. The magistrates' Order dismissing the Application to stay the adjudication of the criminal case is not irregular.

Be that as it may, while there is no specific law providing for stay of criminal cases, the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Uganda **vs. Kamoga Muhammadi**, Criminal Appeal Number 646 of 2023, observed that:

*Criminal proceedings emanating from the same facts as civil proceedings, cannot be stayed because of the latter unless there are serious grounds that may affect a party’s right to a fair hearing as provided in the Constitution. In this matter we do not see the grounds.*

The Applicant must satisfy the court that she has exceptional or serious grounds to justify staying of the Criminal case. Although the Court of Appeal did not define what serious grounds mean under this limb, it gave some indication from which the court can expound on the principle. First the Applicant must show that the continued hearing of the case sought to be stayed will infringe on their right to a fair trial. Secondly, they must show that concurrent hearing of the cases will prejudice them. There are also English authorities that dealt with stay of cases that are persuasive. In **Jefferson Limited vs. Bhetcha 1979 WLR 898**, the court observed that deciding whether to stay civil proceedings in favour of criminal proceedings is a matter of discretion to be exercised by reference to the competing considerations. It added that it was not a matter of a rule. The Court said one factor to be considered in deciding to stay or deny the stay was whether there was a real danger of causing injustice in the criminal proceedings, for example, if publicity might influence potential jurors in the criminal proceedings or if disclosure of the defence might enable prosecution witnesses to prepare a fabrication of evidence or might lead to interference with witnesses.

In **PCP Capital Partners and other Barclays Bank PLC [2017] EWHC 2897 (Comm),** the defendant applicants succeeded in their application for the stay of civil proceedings in the Commercial Court until the parallel criminal trial brought by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in the Crown Court concluded.

In the civil proceedings, the defendant requested the Commercial Court first allow the Crown Court trial. A co-defendant in those Crown Court proceedings also applied for a stay. The SFO supported the applications, but the claimants in the civil proceedings opposed them.

The two sets of proceedings arose from the same underlying facts, namely Barclays's capital raisings during the financial crisis of 2008. Part of the hearing had to be held in private due to the highly confidential and sensitive nature of certain matters that overlapped between the civil and criminal proceedings.

The Commercial Court trial was due to commence in January 2018 and last an estimated eight weeks. The Crown Court trial was due to commence in January 2019 and last an estimated 12 to 16 weeks. The Commercial Court had decided to list the civil trial first before the SFO made a charging decision (which occurred in June 2017).

The Defendant submitted that the test of whether to stay proceedings should be considered in three stages as follows:

1. The court must be satisfied there is a sufficient overlap between the issues raised in the civil and criminal proceedings (*Re DPR Futures* [1989] 1 WLR 778). 2. Where such an overlap does exist, the court must consider whether there is a real risk of serious prejudice which may lead to injustice in relation to the criminal and/or civil proceedings (*R v Panel on Takeover and Mergers, ex p Fayed* [1992] BCC 524). Proceedings should not be stayed if safeguards can be imposed which provide sufficient protection against the risk of injustice (*Re DPR Futures*). 3. The court has to balance justice as between the parties (*Jefferson*).

It was held that the court first needed to satisfy itself that there is a sufficient overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings regarding the issues to be determined (Re DPR Futures [1989] 1 WLR 778). The Judge found that there was a “very significant” overlap between the two sets of proceedings, noting that:

“Both trials will traverse in detail events and statements at a time of great consequence for all institutions and individuals involved. Both trials will examine the reasons for and the purpose of statements and actions, where made or undertaken. Both trials will examine responsibilities for what was or was not said or done, and levels of information and states of mind.”

Further, the Claimants had submitted that the Judge should analyse the overlap at a more granular level (specifically, in terms of an overlap not just in issues but also in witnesses). Knowles J disagreed and commented that in his judgment on this particular application: “it is the wood rather than the trees that matters more, together with the importance of giving margin for the reality of the eventual compass of evidence”.

As to whether there was a real risk of jury contamination or witness contamination, the judge observed that these two distinct, albeit related, risks formed the basis of the applications to stay the civil proceedings.

The Judge also acknowledged that the Commercial Court trial (and resulting judgment) would likely attract heavy reporting, given the connection between this case and the financial crisis, the serious allegations made, and the high value of the sums claimed. Knowles J noted that there was a “real risk” that the jury’s already complex task would be made more difficult still by publicity surrounding an earlier Commercial Court trial, the outcome of that trial as contained in a judgment, and that the current application allowed consideration of how to manage that risk before it arose. Knowles J also took account of witness contamination issues arising: a civil trial that takes place before a criminal trial risk adding materially to the accounts that the defendants and witnesses have given or may give.

In **Akcine Bendrove Bankas Snoras (in bankruptcy) vs Vladimir Antonov Raimondas Baranauskas [2013] EWHC 131 (Comm),** Mrs Justice Gloster DBE summarised the relevant principles applicable to staying civil proceedings as follows:

*i) The court has a discretion to stay civil proceedings until related criminal proceedings have been determined, but it "is a power which has to be exercised with great care and only where there is a real risk of serious prejudice which may lead to injustice"; see R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Fayed [1992] BCC 524, per Neill LJ at p.531E-F; cited with approval in A-G of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai & Ors*[*[2006] EWCA Civ 390*](https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/390.html)*.*

*ii) The discretion has to be exercised by reference to the competing considerations between the parties; the court has to balance justice as between the two parties; a claimant has a right to have its civil claim decided; the burden lies on a defendant to show why that right should be delayed; see Panton v Financial Institutions Services Limited*[*[2003] UKPC 8*](https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2003/8.html)*(PC) at [11].*

*iii) A defendant must point to a real, and not merely notional, risk of injustice. As the Privy Council stated in Panton (supra):*

*"A stay would not be granted simply to serve the tactical advantages that the defendants might want to retain in criminal proceedings. The accused's right to silence in criminal proceedings was a factor to be considered, but that right did not extend to give a defendant as a matter of right the same protection in contemporaneous civil proceedings. What had to be shown was the causing of unjust prejudice by the continuance of the civil proceedings".*

*iv) The fact that a defendant has a right to remain silent in criminal proceedings, and would, by serving a defence in civil proceedings, be giving advance notice of his defence, carries little weight in the context of an application for a stay of civil proceedings. There is no right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in relation to putting in a defence, as compared with the right in civil proceedings to invoke the privilege where a defendant is being interrogated, being compelled to produce documents or cross-examined; see per Waller LJ in V v C*[*[2002] CP Rep 8*](https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1509.html)*, at paragraphs 37 and 38. In a civil trial there is no immunity against adverse comment or adverse inference from a failure to provide answers for the trial or to give evidence at the trial; a defendant does not have to put in a defence or give evidence at a civil trial but, if he does not, the court can draw an inference because in a civil trial it is not his "right" not to do so; that is important in the summary judgment context, because, if the claimant can establish his claim (for example on a summary judgment application) without interrogatories or disclosure, then a privilege against self-incrimination is not in fact relevant; see ibid at paragraph 37.*

*v) Moreover, today, even in criminal proceedings, at least in England and Wales, a defendant is expected to adumbrate a positive defence at an early stage. Thus, the disclosure of a defence in civil proceedings is unlikely to disadvantage a defendant in criminal proceedings; see ibid at paragraph 38.*

*vii) It is not enough, as Briggs J observed in FSA v Anderson*[*[2010] EWHC 308 (Ch)*](https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/308.html)*at [19], that both the civil and criminal proceedings arise from the same facts, or that the defence of the civil proceedings may involve the defendant taking procedural steps such as exchanging witness statements and providing disclosure of documents which might not be imposed upon them in the criminal proceedings.*

*viii) As Mr. Zacaroli submitted, a defendant thus has a choice between remaining silent in the civil proceedings or risk giving an indication of his defence which may be used by the prosecuting authorities. The harshness of such a choice did not provide a good ground for staying civil proceedings in V v C (supra) or in Jefferson Limited v Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898.*

*ix) In the event that the court were to be satisfied that there would be a real risk of serious prejudice leading to injustice if the civil proceedings continue, then the proceedings should nevertheless not be stayed if safeguards can be imposed in respect of the civil proceedings which provide sufficient protection against the risk of injustice: see, e.g. Re DPR Futures [1989] 1 WLR 778, per Millett J at 790G; A-G for Zambia v Meer Care & Desai & Ors (supra) at paragraphs 30-33.*

From the above English cases that are persuasive in this Country, before a court can stay whether a criminal or civil case in favour of the other, the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The court has the discretion to stay the proceedings. 2. The discretion must be exercised by referring to the competing considerations between the two parties. A claimant has a right to decide his claim; the defendant must show why that right should be delayed. 3. There must be an overlap between civil and criminal proceedings regarding issues to be determined. 4. The overlap must be to the issues and not witnesses. As Knowles J said, ' it is the wood rather than the trees that matter more, together with the importance of giving margin for the reality of the eventual campus of evidence’. 5. There must be a risk of jury or witness contamination. 6. There must be a real risk of prejudice, which may lead to injustice. 7. The continuance of civil proceedings must pose a real risk of injustice—unjust prejudice. However, even if the court finds that there is actual prejudice, the proceedings should not be stayed if safeguards can be imposed to protect against the risk of injustice.

The safeguards include-

1. Order restricting reporting 2. Orders that the civil trial will sit in the private. 3. Order embargoing the civil judgment until the conclusion of the criminal judgment.

Although the above principles were mainly concerned with civil cases, they apply to criminal cases because they all concern procedural rights, including the right to a fair trial.

Applying the above principles and the exceptional clause in Kamoggas’s case to the instant case, it is my finding that:

1. There are indeed two cases – a Divorce Cause and a Criminal Trial. 2. The two cases are premised on the same documents – the marriage certificate and the letter confirming receipt of the bride's price. 3. To this extent, the two cases overlap each other regarding whether the applicant and respondent have a valid marriage. 4. In both cases, the courts will rely on the two documents to determine whether there was a forgery and whether the marriage between the parties is valid. In the Divorce case, the Applicant will depend on the documents to prove a valid and subsisting marriage between her and the Respondent. The DPP will argue that the documents are forgeries in the criminal trial. Both documents are likely to be taken by the court as exhibits. 5. However, the cases may or may not involve the same witnesses. Each party will likely call different witnesses to support their respective cases, ruling out the chances of witness contamination. 6. Depending on the schedules of the respective courts, the applicant will have to attend the criminal trial and the divorce petition. 7. The parties in both cases are different. In the criminal case, the DPP is the complainant, although she may rely on the Respondent to testify as a potential witness. In the Divorce Cause, the Applicant and Respondent are the parties. 8. From the facts laid out, while the two courts might come out with different conclusions on whether the marriage certificate and letter confirming receipt of the bride price, this is not unexpected as the standard of proof in the civil matter is lower in the civil case than the criminal case. 9. There is a remote chance of witness contamination, as each party will likely call different witnesses. Both cases seek different remedies. 10. The applicant's claim that continuing the criminal case will render the Divorce Cause nugatory is without merit. The criminal trial will allow the Applicant to disprove the DPP's claim that the marriage certificate and letter acknowledging receipt of the bride's price are not forgeries. 11. Lastly, the DPP has a constitutional imperative to fight crime on behalf of the public. The institution can only be limited in deserving circumstances, which unfortunately do not exist.

In conclusion, I have not found exceptional reasons to stay in the criminal trial in favour of the divorce cause. I have also not found that the Applicant will be prejudiced and suffer injustice if the two cases are heard concurrently. Both cases will continue to be heard simultaneously.

**Decision**

The Application for revision is dismissed for lack of merit because the Applicant has not established that exceptional circumstances justify a stay of the criminal case and that she will be prejudiced if the cases are heard concurrently.


Gadenya Paul Wolimbwa

**JUDGE**

9th December 2024

I request the Assistant Registrar to deliver this decision on 9th December 2024.


Gadenya Paul Wolimbwa

**JUDGE**

9th December 2024