[2025] UGIC 47


# **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF UGANDA IN GULU LABOUR DISPUTE REFERENCE NO.08 OF 2023** *(Arising from Labour Dispute No. AMURU/NPU/012/2020)*

# **ORINGO JOHN CLAIMANT**

# **VERSUS**

**DEDE FARMING TRACTORS(U) LTD RESPONDENT**

**BEFORE:** The Hon. Mr. Justice Anthony Wabwire Musana

**THE PANELISTS:** Hon. Adrine Namara, Hon. Emmanuel Bigirimana & Hon. Can Amos Lapenga.

#### *Representation:*

*1. Mr. Joseph Etoma of the LegalAid Project ofthe Uganda Law Society for the Claimant.*

*2. The Respondent was represented by its Director, Mr. Mayende Stephen Dede.*

#### *Case summary*

*Employment Law- claim for unpaid wages- proof of salary arrears-definition of employer- This employment dispute was ^a claim for unpaid salary and damages. The Claimant, a Workshop Manager, asserted entitlement to significant salary arrears, alleging the Respondent ceased full payments after September 2020. The Respondent countered by arguing that the Claimant had absconded from duty and was an unreliable worker, while also raising a preliminary objection that it was a non-existent entity. The court ruled in favour ofthe Claimant for a portion of the claimed salary arrears and general damages, overruling the Respondent's objections regarding its legal existence and contract validity by applying a broader interpretation of 'employer'' within employment law.*

*Heard: Determined:*

*5th June 2025 7th July 2025*

## **AWARD**

# *Background facts*

- **[1]** By a contract dated the 12th of December 2019, the Respondent appointed the Claimant Workshop Manager at a basic salary of UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) per month. The Claimant contends that the Respondent last paid him half his salary in September 2020. He lodged a complaint of unpaid salary arrears with the District Labour Officer(DLO), Achirocan Fancy, at Amuru. The DLO attempted to carry out a mediation, and when this failed, the matter was referred to this Court. - **[2]** In his Memorandum of Claim (MOC) filed before this Court on 5th September 2024, the Claimant sought payment of UGX 39,000,000/= (shillings thirty-nine million Uganda Shillings), being salary arrears for nineteen and a half months. It was contended that he developed a misunderstanding with the Respondent's Human Resource Manager, because he had raised the issue of non-payment of salary. It was impleaded that the Respondent

promised to pay but failed to do so. In sum, the Respondent's actions were said to be unfair and unlawful and had caused the Claimant mental anguish, stress, and financial loss.

[3] In its memorandum in reply, the Respondent raised a preliminary point of law to the effect that the Claimant had sued a non-existent party. On the substantive claim, it was contended that the Claimant had absconded from duty in September 2020 and did not return to work. The Respondent then engaged other mechanics. It was also claimed that, because the Respondent had only three employees, it did not agree to make National Social Security Fund (NSSF) contributions on behalf of the Claimant. Paragraphs 4(a), (b) and (e) of the MOC were admitted. It was also contended that after October 2020, the Claimant would be paid for work done. It was also claimed that the non-payment of wages was justified after the Claimant breached the employment contract by absconding from work.

#### *The issues*

- On the 5th of June 2025, the following issues were framed for determination. [4] - (i) Whether the Claimant is entitled to payment of UGX 39,000,000/= (shillings thirty nine million) in salary arrears? and - (ii) What remedies are available to the parties? - [5] The documents in the Claimant's trial bundle, dated 30th May 2025, were admitted into evidence and marked Exhibits "CEX1" to "CEX5".

#### *The Evidence*

- [6] The Claimant testified that the Respondent last paid him half his salary in September 2020 to cater for his December 2019 salary. He stated that he had been paid ^a total of UGX 9,000,000/= (nine million shillings) via mobile money and was seeking his arrears of UGX 39,000,000 (thirty-nine million shillings). In cross-examination, he said the Respondent did not maintain its machines properly and that when he left in December 2021, the Respondent's tractors were working well. - [71 The Respondent called four witnesses. Godfrey Sanya(RWI) testified in his capacity as the Respondent's financial controller between 2016 and 2023. He said the Respondent had three employees. He confirmed that the Claimant oversaw mechanical services and worked irregularly for the Respondent until August 2020, after which he disappeared in September 2020. He stated that he paid the Claimant cash in March and July 2020, but he was unsure if the Claimant had returned the toolbox when he left in August 2020. He informed us that the Claimant worked on a piece rate basis for the years 2021 and 2022. Under crossexamination, he said the Claimant did not sign any acknowledgement for the cash payment. He said he was ordered to pay the Claimant, but did not know what the payment was for. In re-examination, he said he did not record the payments to the Claimant but recalled payments of UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) each. - [8] Atim Nancy(RW2) testified next. She stated that she joined the Respondent in March 2020 and used to see the Claimant at Bana Trading Centre, where the Respondent was,'engaged

in cultivation. The Claimant would come and go. She stated that she witnessed RW1 pay the Claimant UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) in cash in August 2020 as the salary for July 2020. She said that she did not see him at the site for the entire month of September 2020, but that he visited once in early October 2020 and stayed for a few days in early 2021. She stated that she also witnessed an instance where the Claimant agreed to work on a tractor for UGX 1,600,000/= (shillings one million six hundred thousand) and the Respondent's Director paid him UGX 900,000/= (shillings nine hundred thousand). He was called in occasionally and did not work full-time from September 2020 to June 2021. Under cross-examination, she said she witnessed the claimant being paid UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) in cash in July 2020. She said she would only see him when tractors broke down. The Claimant would come in, work on the tractors, and then leave. The Respondent's Director would pay him. She said there was no documentation. She also informed us that she was unaware the Claimant was an employee until she was summoned to provide a witness statement in this matter. She thought he was a casual mechanic. She stated that the Claimant had conflicts with the Respondent's Director because the Claimant was not doing much work.

- [9] Wandera Erukana (RW3) told us that he worked for the Respondent as a Machine Operator from 2015 until 2023. He confirmed that the Claimant was a mechanic and workshop manager from early January 2020 until August 2020. After that, he would be called to do specific work, and that is how the Claimant ceased to be an employee. He recalled a tractor breaking down in South Sudan, which the Claimant was called to repair and was paid UGX 1,500,000/= (shillings one million five hundred thousand). He said the Respondent had only three workers. He also stated that he saw RW1 pay the Claimant UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) in cash. Under cross-examination, he said that no documents were signed for any payments. He was not reexamined. - [10] The Respondent's final witness was Mayende Stephen Dede(RW4). He also doubled as the Respondent's representative for the purposes of these proceedings. He told us that the Claimant worked for eight months from January to August 2020. He stated that he paid the December 2019 salary in two instalments: the first on 28th December 2019 via telephone to 0777534889 and the balance in cash. He said that when the Claimant failed to return to work in September 2020, the Respondent engaged another mechanic. He informed us that NSSF contributions were not part of the contract and that the Claimant failed to fulfil his duties by absconding from work. He informed us that in September 2020, he requested the Claimant to return to work and deposited UGX 1,000,000/= (shillings one million) on the 26lh of September 2020; however, the Claimant did not return to work. After September 2020, the Claimant was invited to work only when the tractors broke down. He said he could not attend to the Labour Officer because of the COVID-19 lockdown. He told us that the non-payment was justifiable because the Claimant was an incompetent employee who had caused serious loss to the Respondent. - [11] Under cross-examination, RW4 stated that he had paid the Claimant promptly for the period from January to December 2019. When the Claimant started seeking work outside the workplace, they developed a misunderstanding. In April 2020, RW4 informed us that he had sent the Claimant a warning. He said he gave the Claimant until July 2020 to change. He stated that he did not terminate the Claimant's contract, but rather that the . Claimant absconded. He said that according to the agreement, if the Claimant did not come/to work for 7-10 days, it meant he was out for ^a month. He told us that the ClaimanHef^perf lan^ntl^

LDR08/2023ORINGOJOHNVDEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTD Award Anfl/nyWalnvireMusstfi ./july2025.

in September 2020. He stated that payments were made both in cash and via mobile money, but the Claimant did not acknowledge receipt. He told us that he did not have a payroll and stated in CEX3 that he had paid the Claimant UGX 1,015,988.16/= (shillings one million fifteen thousand nine hundred eighty eight thousand sixteen) after the Claimant had worked for only 14 days between December 2020 and January 2021. He informed us that the Claimants' work outside of the policy contravened the policy. He told us that after the Claimant left, the business collapsed.

#### *Claimant's submissions*

[12] In his written submissions, Mr. Etoma submitted that the Claimant had produced a contract of employment (CEX1) and testified that for the period from 12lh December 2019 to 31st December 2021, he had received only UGX 8,750,000/ (shillings eight million seven hundred fifty thousand). It was submitted that RW1 admitted paying UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) in cash, RW2 had seen RW1 pay the Claimant, and RW4 had admitted to making ^a payment of UGX 400,000/= (shillings four hundred thousand) as an advance. Therefore, the Respondent had spent a total of UGX 9,150,000/= (shillings nine million one hundred fifty thousand). Counsel contended that all the Respondent's witnesses had testified that the Claimant had worked for only eight months and was not terminated. Furthermore, no disciplinary action had been taken against him for taking work outside his employment. Counsel relied on Section 2 of the Employment Act Cap. 226(EA) for a definition of a contract of service, Section 39 EA on the duty to provide work and Section 40 EA, which includes the duty to pay wages for work done. Counsel submitted that Section 61(1) and (2) EA empowers an employer to impose a disciplinary penalty on an employee for failure to perform duties. It was argued that the Respondent had failed to discharge the duty placed upon it to prove on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant was working outside his duties or that he was paid his full salary. We were invited to find for the Claimant in the sum of UGX 38,850,000/= (shillings thirty eight million eight hundred fifty thousand) in salary arrears.

## *Respondents Submissions*

- [13] The Respondent took the view that there were two other issues beyond those framed at the scheduling conference. In Mr. Mayende's view, these were whether the claim is a nullity *ab initio* for being brought against a non-existent party and whether there is a valid and enforceable contract. - [14] On the question of a non-existent party, Mr. Mayende relied on *Fort Hall Bakery Supply Company versus Frederick Muigai Wangoe [1959] ¹ EA 474, Mulangira Simbwa v The Board of Trustees Miracle Centre andAnor¹* and *Kilembe Mines v Uganda Gold Mines HCMA 312 of2012* for the proposition that this claim could not be sustained against ^a non-existent party. Our attention was also drawn to *Makula International v. Cardinal Nsubuga (1982) UGSC 2.* - [15] Regarding the validity of the employment contract, it was suggested that DEDE FARMING TRACTORS (U) LTD is not a legal entity but rather an unregistered association that has since collapsed. We were referred to Section 9(1) of the Contracts Act and the case of *Makula.*

**III**

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- [16] On the first issue, it was submitted that the Claimant had not proven his claim on the balance of probabilities. It was suggested that the Respondent's evidence was that the Claimant had absconded from work after eight months, and he was paid. According to Mr. Mayende, this evidence was unchallenged and uncontroverted, and, on the authority of *Stephen Mabosi v URA,* it should be accepted as true. It was also suggested that the Claimant was untruthful and gave conflicting evidence about his payment. Mr. Mayende cited Sections 58 and 59 of the Evidence Act in support of proof of facts. It was argued that the Claimant absconded. - [17] On reliance on Sections 39 and 40EA, the Respondent submitted that the Claimant had absconded from work and was duly paid for all his work. It was submitted that because the Respondent had fewer than five employees, it did not make provision for Social Security Fund Contributions. Therefore, the Claimant was not entitled to any arrears; he had not complained of non-payment during his employment, and any award to him would be unjust enrichment.

#### *Rejoinder*

- [18] Mr. Etoma took the view that by raising his own issues, Mr. Mayende, submitting on behalf of the Respondent, abused the Court process. Counsel contended that the defence of corporate personality was not available to the Respondent because RW4 conceded to signing a contract of employment with the Claimant(CEXI). - [19] Counsel also argued that the Claimant had not absconded from duty, and if he had, he would not have been retained after the expiry of his contract of employment. It was contended that there was no proof of payment adduced by the Respondent except for UGX 400,000/= (shillings four hundred thousand) in REX1. It was suggested that the Respondent was trying to avoid payment of wages and did not take any action over the alleged abscondment. We were asked to grant the claim of UGX 39,000,000/= (shillings thirty-nine million) in salary arrears and UGX 5,000,000/= (shillings five million) in general damages.

## *Decision ofthe Court*

## *Claim against a non-existent party.*

- [20] Mr. Mayende argues that the Respondent is non-existent. Mr. Etoma submits that this was an unpleaded issue. That is not correct. At paragraph 2 of the answer to the claim, the nonregistration of the Respondent with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau is impleaded, and it is indicated that the Respondent would raise ^a preliminary objection to that effect. In keeping with ^a plethora of authorities on this point2, this Court would be enjoined to dispose of the objection as a point of law. - [21] Under ordinary civil, commercial and contract law, a suit or claim against a non-existent party is untenable. It collapses. That is the essence of the dictum of Lord Templeton in *Fort Hall* and of the other cases cited by Mr. Mayende. Conversely, in employment law, as correctly submitted by Mr. Etoma, the confines are not as strict. The position in employment

LDR08/2023ORINGOJOHNVDEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTDAwardAnilZnyWahwirvMuA^I

² See Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co Ltd vs. West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA ⁶⁹⁶ x"" "x ^L

and labour law, as pointed out by this Court in Wabwire v Pachedo Foundation, 3 is that the doctrine of corporate separability is of limited application. The definition of employer under Section 2EA is broad. It reads as follows:

"employer" means any person or group of persons, including a company or corporation, a public, regional or local authority, a governing body of an unincorporated association, a partnership, parastatal organisation or other institution or organisation whatsoever, for whom an employee works or has worked, or normally worked or sought to work, under a contract of service, and includes the heirs, successors, assignees and, transferors of any person or group of persons for whom an employee works, has worked, or normally works"

A purposive interpretation of the provision suggests that it grants a broad scope to the meaning of 'employer'. The ordinary words employed by the legislature in that provision include a person or group of persons and a governing body of an unincorporated association. The definition uses the words "for whom and employee works, has worked, or *normally works.*" The statutory intention of this provision is to protect the worker; therefore, it does not avail a respondent of the defence of corporate personality. It is for these reasons that in *Wabwire*, we surmised that the dicta of *Salomon v Salomon*⁴ would have limited applicability in employment disputes. It would not be available to the agent, manager, and directors of the company to say, 'We are not the company and therefore not the **employers.**' We also cited *Byanju v Board of Governors St. Augustine College Wakiso*⁵ and Laban Awando Kanyo v Susan Larsen t/a Utamaduni Craft Centre ⁶ where the then Industrial Court of Kenya⁷ held the doctrine of legal separateness to be of limited utility in employment and labour relations. Similarly, in *Daniel Mutisya Masesi V Romy Madan & Another*⁸ it was observed that the doctrine of corporate separateness is not inviolable in labour law to enable the weaker party to apportion liability against the employer, as expansively defined. This approach would be consistent with the dictum of Bamugemereire, JSC, in Eseza Byakika v National Social Security Fund.⁹ In her dissenting judgment, Her Lordship thought that the Industrial Court was established to address disputes arising from employment relationships, to ensure that the rights of workers are protected and that industrial relations remain fair and balanced.

$[22]$ In our view, the dicta above focus on the employment relationship, rather than the legal or contractual relationship. As Mr. Mayende cited *Mabosi*, that case also emphasizes the principle of substance over form. In the case of the employment relationship, the Court would be concerned with the relational substance between an employer and an employee, rather than the legal form, which pertains to whether the employer exists as a legal entity. This explains the limited applicability of defences of corporate personality of legal

⁹ [2025] UGSC 11

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^&lt;sup>3</sup> [2025] UGIC 42

^{4 [1897]} AC 22

^&lt;sup>5</sup> [2017] UGIC 20

^&lt;sup>6</sup> [2013] KEELRC 128 (KLR)

^&lt;sup>7</sup> It was renamed the Employment and Labour Relations Court of Kenya following the establishment under Article 162 of the Kenya Constitution.

^&lt;sup>8</sup> [2013] KEELRC 450 (KLR) separateness in employment disputes. It is not that *Salmon* is not good law. It is only that its application in labour disputes is limited. The spirit of the law reflects the constitutional precept of leaning towards substantive justice without undue regard to technicalities, as enshrined in Article 126(2)(e) of the 1995 Constitution. In other words, employment law favours a flexible and non-formalistic, and not rigid, approach to labour justice.

- **[23]** In the case before us, an appointment letter (CEX1) in the name of DEDE FARMING TRACTORS UGANDA LIMITED was admitted in evidence and marked CEX1. The Respondent does not contest this contract. Mr. Mayende Stephen Dede signed it in the capacity of Human Resource Manager of the Respondent. RW1, RW2, RW3, and RW4 all testified to the existence of ^a contract between the Respondent, as named in the title of the contract and the pleadings before this Court. The witness's evidence also coalesced around the Claimant providing mechanical services to the Respondent, for which he was paid. RW4 testified to the expiry of the contract and the Claimant's absconding from employment. That evidence is irreconcilable with the absence of an employment relationship. A contract can only expire if it exists. Similarly, an employee can only abscond if an employment relationship subsists. It follows that there is an admitted employment relationship between the Claimant and an entity called DEDE FARMING TRACTORS UGANDA LIMITED, whether registered or otherwise. - [24] Applying the dicta of the cases cited above to the present case, we think the defence of ^a non-existent entity would not be available to the Respondent, and we therefore overrule the objection.

# *Validity ofcontract of employment*

- **[25]** Here, Mr. Mayende submitted that there was a lack of capacity to contract because DEDE FARMING TRACTORS (U) LTD is not a legal entity. Given our analysis and conclusions in paragraphs [21] to [24], it is unnecessary to consider this point any further. Except that Mr. Mayende suggests that the tenets of free consent of the parties with capacity to contract for lawful consideration are not present. And for this, Mr. Mayende cited *Makula.* - [26] This Court has held that the application of ordinary contract law rules to the employment contract is not automatic. In *Kyobutungi v NIC General Insurance Company Limited'⁰* we cited *Kenya Shoe & Leather Workers Union v Falcon Tanners Ltd¹¹* where Rika J. observes that contractual principles, such as freedom of contract, privity of contract, and capacity to contract, do not have the same influence on labour contracts as they do on other forms of contract. To illustrate what Rika J means, at the start of an employment relationship, the employee does not exercise the same degree of freedom to enter into the employment contract. The employer drafts the contract and often sets the terms of employment, remuneration, and all other conditions without the employee's input. The prospective employee is invited to execute the contract. Therefore, there is no negotiation between two equal parties. In this way, it is not possible to say that there was actual freedom of contract or free consent. The employee is eager to commence work. In *Obed Mpwerirwe v Hima Cement Ltd¹²* Dr. Justice D. Karekona Singiza explains the relationship between the owners - ¹⁰ [20241 UGIC 48 - ¹¹ [20131 KEELRC 558 (KLR) - ¹² H. C. C. S No. 0311 of 2012

LDR0S/2023ORINGOJOHN VDEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTD Award. AnlWwy WahwireMj **T**

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of capital (employers) and the owners of labour (employees) as conflictual. The former is focused on profit maximisation, while the latter emphasizes reasonable pay and a good, safe working environment. Thus, in *Akiror v International Food Policy Research Institute'³* we concluded that the Industrial Court serves as an arbiter in balancing the scales of labour justice, thereby addressing the unequal bargaining relationship between employers and employees.

**[27]** Therefore, and for the same reasons as expressed in paragraph [23] above, we do not accept the proposition that the present contract was illegal. The objection is overruled.

#### *Issue One: Salary Arrears*

- [28] In the cases of *Ahwera v Adaan Property Solutions Limited14and Rwambale v Garfield Institute of Technology15,* this Court observed that ^a claim for salary is to be proven in ^a manner similar to that of special damages in an ordinary civil suit. This means that the Labour Court will be interested in a contract, payslip, or bank statements as proof of salary. - [29] Section 2EA defines wages as a means remuneration or earnings, however designated or calculated, capable of being expressed in terms of money and fixed by mutual agreement or by national laws or regulations, which are payable under an oral or written contract of service for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered but excluding any contributions made or to be made by the employer in respect of his or her employee's insurance, medical care, welfare, education, training, invalidity, retirement, pension, post service gratuity or severance allowance; This definition is derived from the International Labour Organisation Convention, **Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95).** - [30] Under Section 49(1) EA, every employee is entitled to an itemised pay statement with each payment. The pay statement must be in writing, in a language the employee understands, and it must set out the deductions and their purposes, as well as the net wages payable for the pay period. An employee has the right to all information relating to their salaries. - [31] **In** the absence of a payslip, under Section 49(3) of the EA, a Labour Officer has the power to issue a pay statement or amend an existing pay statement. Section 49(5)EA provides as follows:

*"Any written statement issued by a labour officer in place or in amendment of the employee's pay statement shall, for all purposes, be regarded as if it had been duly issued by the employer in accordance with subsection (1)."*

[32] A labour officer's written statement supersedes the employer's pay statement. This means that as ^a point of first contact or intervention or first instance, when a complaint of unpaid salary is made to a labour officer, the labour officer can investigate the complaint under

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Section 12(1 )EA while invoking the power to inspect a workplace under Section 10(1 )(a) EA and require the production of any books including a payroll. The purposes of these powers are to ensure compliance with the labour laws in force and aid in dispute resolution.

- **[33]** Further, under Section 58(1 )(e), an employee is entitled to written particulars of employment including the ages to which the employee is entitled to receive, how the wages are calculated, the intervals at which they will be paid, and the deductions or other conditions to which the wages are subject. - **[34]** Therefore, from ^a review of the cases and legislation, proof of salary or wages proceeds by way of: - A contract of employment. - A letter of appointment - Itemised pay statements or Pay slips. - Bank Statements - Mobile money accounts - Or other documents that prove payment of salary and - If there are no documents proving salary payments, then ^a written statement of ^a labour officer under Section 49(3) and (5) EA. - **[35]** In the present case, under Clause ¹ of CEX1, the contract of employment, the Claimant was entitled to a basic salary of UGX 2,000,000/=(Two Million Uganda Shillings) per month. We were not presented with a single itemised pay statement or payslip. We were also not provided with written particulars. After the complaint of non-payment of salary arrears was reported to the Labour Officer at Amuru, no inspection was conducted, and no written statement was issued. - **[36]** What is before us is that the Claimant's contract of employment indicates that he was entitled to UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) per month. It was not disputed that he commenced work in December 2019. He claimed salary arrears for the period from May to December 2020 and from January to December 2021. It was also evidenced by RW1, RW2, RW3, and RW4 that, after August 2020, the Claimant worked intermittently and was paid piecemeal or per tractor repaired. We think that, based on the evidence available, it is impossible to say that the Claimant worked from 12th December 2019 until December 2021. The Respondent's narrative that he worked until August 2020 is much more believable. RW1, RW2, and RW3, who were employees of the Respondent, were consistent in stating that after August 2020, the Claimant appeared as needed for work. That might explain Mr. Mayende's stance that the Claimant absconded. Therefore, for the period from December 2019 to August 2020, the Claimant would be entitled to UGX 16,000,000/= (shillings sixteen million), representing eight months of service. In paragraph 7 of his witness statement, the Claimant admitted to having received UGX 9,000,000/=(shillings nine million). By REX1, the Respondent made a payment of UGX 400,000/= (shillings four hundred thousand) to the Claimant via mobile money to the telephone number +256 777 534 889. This means that the Claimant received UGX 9,400,000/=(shillings four hundred thousand). The Claimant did not demonstrate that he worked consistently for the Respondent during the period frorn

LDR0S/2023 OR1NGOJOHN V DEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTDAward AntonyWaliwin-Mysata

September 2020 to December 2021, RW4 stated that he paid the Respondent for each piece of work he completed during that period. Tested under cross-examination, he maintained that the Claimant left in August 2020. The law states that only an employee who has performed work is entitled to wages.¹⁶

$[37]$ Therefore, if the Claimant were entitled to UGX 16,000,000/=(shillings sixteen million) over an ascertainable work period of eight months and he was paid UGX 9,400,000/=(shillings nine million four hundred thousand), it means he would be entitled to UGX 6,600,000/=(shillings six million six hundred thousand) in salary arrears, which we now award him. Additionally, RW4 admitted to having paid the Claimant UGX 1,000,000/= (shillings one million) for September 2020. That would leave unpaid the sum of UGX 1.000.000/= (shillings one million). Therefore, we hereby award the Claimant the sum of UGX 7,600,000/=(shillings seven million six hundred thousand) as unpaid salary arrears for the period from December 2019 to September 2020. Issue one is answered in the affirmative.

### **Issue Two: Remedies**

#### **General Damages**

- Mr. Etoma cited Article 126(2)(c) of the 1995 Constitution in support of the proposition for $[38]$ adequate compensation and Uganda Post Limited v Mukadisi,¹⁷ for the principal considerations for an award of general damages. Counsel asked for UGX 5,000,000/= (shillings five million) in general damages because the Claimant's salary had been withheld for 5 years. - General damages are those that the Court presume to be a direct natural or probable [39] consequence of the wrong complained of¹⁸. In *Mukadisi*, the Supreme Court held that an employee would be entitled to a claim for general damages as an independent award for unlawful termination. The relevant considerations in determining general damages are that general damages are not tied to specific financial losses. The court assesses general damages and is not restricted to the salary or pecuniary benefit stipulated in the employment contract. They are awarded to compensate the employee for non-economic harm and distress caused by the wrongful dismissal. These damages include compensation for emotional distress, mental anguish, damage to reputation, and any other non-monetary harm suffered as a result of the dismissal. - In Wabwire, we observed that the Claimant has been deprived of his salary for about four $[40]$ years, and we also cited Alaba v Bank of Uganda 19, where we held that, having been deprived of her accrued benefits for well over nineteen years, the Claimant would be entitled to general damages. In this case, the Claimant has been deprived of part of his salary, and we are inclined to award him general damages. - On quantum of general damages, in cases relating to salary arrears, this Court has taken $[41]$ the approach of computing general damages against the period of service. In Alaba, the

7" July 2025 LDR08/2023 ORINGO JOHN V DEDE FARMING TRACTORS(U)LTD Award. And ny Waltwire M

^&lt;sup>16</sup> See <u>Akankwasa v Muhavura Extractions Limited [2023] UGIC 43 (27 October 2023)</u>

^&lt;sup>17</sup> [2023] UGSC 58. We cited this decision in Sserunjogi v Safeboda (Labour Dispute Reference 47 of 2022) [2024] UGIC 36 (16 August 2024)

^&lt;sup>18</sup> Per Lord McNaughten in *Stroms v Hutchinson* [1905] A. C 515

^&lt;sup>19</sup> f20251 UGIC 33

Claimant was awarded the equivalent of one month's salary for each year of service. In *Wabwire,* the Claimant had served his employer for approximately four years, and we granted him two months' salary as general damages. In the present case, given that the Claimant had worked for the Respondent for approximately nine months, we think that an award of UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million), equivalent to one month's salary, would suffice as general damages, which we so award. We are fortified in taking this approach by the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Standard Chartered Bank v Makoko²⁰* which holds that general damages should not exceed the employee's fixed income or double their earnings.

*Costs*

- **[42]** Mr. Etoma sought costs of the claim. Our principle on costs is that, in employment disputes, the exception applies in cases where the losing party has been found to have committed misconduct.²¹ In the present case, we are persuaded to award the Claimant costs. The Respondent did not pay salary arrears. In *Makoko,* the Court of Appeal maintained the Respondent's costs at the Industrial Court because she was justified in filing her action. For these reasons, and following our dicta in *Wabwire,* building on *Kiggundu Yunus v Felister (U) Ltd²²* the Claimant is justified in filing this action and shall have costs of the claim. - **[431** In the final analysis, the claim succeeds in the following terms: - (i) It is hereby declared that the Claimant is entitled to salary arrears of UGX 7,600,000/= (shillings seven million six hundred thousand) to be paid to him by the Respondent. - (•>) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the sum of UGX 2,000,000/= (shillings two million) in general damages. - (iii) The Claimant shall have the costs of the claim.

It is so ordered.

**Signed, dated, and delivered by email circulation at Kampala this 7th day of July 2025**

Anthony Wabwiraa **Judge, Industrial** lusana, **iourt**

*²⁰* [2025] UGCA 115 (25 April 2025)

- ²¹ See Kalule v Deustche Gesellschaft Fuer Internationale Zuzammenarbeit (GIZ) GMBH [20231 UGIC 89 - ²² LDR NO. 5 of 2023 Industrial Court 4\* June 2023.

7MJu!y2rt25 LDR08/2023ORINGOJOHNVDEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTDAward. AnftZny WahwnrMj

Page **12** of **12**

V

#### **The Panelists Agree**

1. Hon. Adrine Namara,

2. Hon. Emmanuel Bigirimana &

3. Hon. Can Amos Lapenga

## **Electronic delivery of the Ruling**

ft?

Under the Judicature (Electronic Filing, Service, and Virtual Proceedings) Rules, 2024,*(the Rules)* whose objective under Rule 3(a) is to promote simplicity, fairness, and efficiency in court administration by reducing unjustifiable expenses and delays, especially now that the present litigants reside outside of Kampala, and under Rule 3(d) of the Rules which provides for the exchange of electronic versions of rulings, and upon agreement of Mr. Joseph Etoma *Esq* for the Claimant and Mr. Mayende Stephen Dede for the Respondent, this award is delivered by circulation to the parties by email as follows:

(i) [josephetoma@gmail.com](mailto:josephetoma@gmail.com) for the Claimant and;

(ii) [stephenmayende8@qmail.com](mailto:stephenmayende8@qmail.com) for the Respondent.

The timestamp of delivery of this award is to be taken as the 7th day of July 2025 at 10:30 a.m.

/ Anthony Wabwire Musana, **Judge of the Industrial Court of Uganda.**

LDR08/2023ORINGOJOHN ^V DEDE FARMINGTRACTORS(U)LTD Award. AnllpnyWnhwin'Mj ⁷ *July* ²⁰²⁵