[1994] UGSC 47

### AT MENGO

(CORAM: WAMBUZI, C. J., ODOKI, J. S. C., PLATT, J. S. C.)

# CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21/93

#### **BETWEEN**

REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF KAMPALA INSTITUTE

<pre>::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT</pre>

### AND

DEPARTED ASIANS PROPERTY CUSTODIAN BOARD

<pre>::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

$...12$

(Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Mr. Justice G. M. Okello)<br>dated 10th May 1993 in Civil Suit No. 610 of 1992)

# JUDGMENT OF WAMBUZI, C. J.

The appellants are the registered trustees of the Kampala Institute which was a members' club originally for the Goan community in Uganda but which later became multi-racial. In 1972 membership of the club was largely Asian and most of the members and trustees left the country as a result of the expulsion of the Asians by the Military Regime of the day.

The club had land in Kampala held on a lease in the name of the appellants on which stood the club house and recreation grounds. After the expulsion of the Asians, the government took over the property under the management of the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board, the respondent in this appeal. The club house was used as a mess for Senior Prisons Officers.

In 1983 the appellants applied for re-possession of the property under the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 but their application was rejected on the ground that the lease under which the appellants held the property had expired and the property had reverted to Kampala City Council, the controlling authority.

The appellants brought a suit in the High Court against the respondent seeking declaratory orders that,

- 1. The Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 applied to the property; - 2. The appellants were entitled to a certificate of repossession; and - 3. A permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the suit land.

The learned judge in the court below held that the Expropriated Properties Act of 1982 did not apply to the case and that the appellants were not entitled to the reliefs sought. The appellants brought this appeal on 9 grounds.

The first ground is that the learned judge erred in law in finding that the Expropriated Properties Act did not apply to the suit property. This appears to be the main ground and all the other grounds are different aspects of this ground as will appear later in this judgment.

From the pleadings the case in the court below was as follows. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the plaint stated,

> "6. In 1972, the Military Government expelled the Asian community from Uganda en masse forcing most of the Institute's members including members of the board of trustees, to flee the country. The Government of Uganda subsequently took over the plaintiff's property by force, the defendant assuming the management thereof and up to this day, the plaintiff's club house is being used as the prisons officers' mess.

On the passing of the Expropriated $% \left\vert \mathcal{A}\right\vert$ 7. Properties Act in 1982, the plaintiffs applied to the defendant for the return of their properties on 12th May 1983.

8. After a prolonged verification process that took about nine years, the defendant re-routed the plaintiff's application to the defendant 'New Desk', $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ set up especially for dealing with the properties of Uganda citizens, where the defendant proceeded to summarily reject the plaintiffs' application on the grounds that their lease had expired and the land had reverted to the <pre>controlling authority ..............."</pre>

In its written statement of defence the respondent replied as follows in paragraphs 3 and 6,

- "3. Paragraph 2 is admitted only in so far as the defendant is entrusted by law with management of Departed Asians' properties but denies the rest of the allegations contained therein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 6. In answer to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the plaint, the defendant will contend that it only had valid management powers over the suit property before the lease thereon expired and thereafter lost or relinguished management and/or control over this property to the controlling authority concerned and therefore rejecting the application was proper and justified since the defendant had no legal authority or powers to deal with the suit property."

Four issues were framed and in my view the main issue was the second issue framed as follows.

> "Whether the suit property was acquired by the Military Regime so as to bring it under the provisions of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982."

On this issue the learned trial judge held,

"Section $1(1)$ (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act appears to be wide. It appears to cover properties in whatever

manner appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime. This provision was considered in Gandesha's case above. The interpretation given of the extent of that section in that case was that it covered only properties which were lawfully acquired by the Military Regime. I agree with that interpretation. For a property to be covered under section $l(1)$ (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act, it must have been appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime either under section 4 of Decree $27/73$ or acquired under Decree 11/75 or by the Custodian Board under section 12(2) of Decree 29/73.

In the instant case, the Act of $4/12/72$ when the armed prisons officers took over the suit land could not fall under any of the provisions mentioned above. It was therefore an illegal act. The ownership of the property was not established to be Asian. That illegal act had no legal consequence. The property of the plaintiff was not lawfully acquired and the Expropriated Properties Act 1982 was not applicable to it."

As far as I can gather from the judgment in Gabriel Juma Lutaya vs Gandesha and Kampala Estates Limited Civil Suit 860 of 1982, the plaintiff Lutaya claimed to be a lawful tenant by allocation of expropriated property who was entitled to quiet enjoyment of the property until the property was returned to the owner or otherwise disposed of under the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982. He claimed various reliefs against the two defendants, an individual and a company.

. The learned Chief Justice who tried the case framed three issues as none were framed by the parties. I set down only the first two issues as the third is not material to this appeal. The two were,

> "1. Who owns the shares of the 2nd defendant and therefore plot 2/2B Kampala Road wherein the disputed businesses are situate?

2. Was the property of the 2nd defendant, more particularly plot 2/2B Kampala Road taken over during the Military Regime? .....................'

As regards issue one the learned Chief Justice found that the first defendant, Gandesha, and his wife owned the second defendant, the company, Kampala Estates Limited, which in turn owned the suit property.

As to the second issue the learned Chief Justice gave a brief history of the Decrees passed during the military regime and found as a fact that the property of the first defendant was not vested in the Custodian Board because he was a Ugandan whose property could not have been taken over under the legislation and that the property of his wife could not be taken over either, because it was not proved that she was of Asian origin, extraction or descent. As the two, husband and wife, owned the second defendant, the property of the second defendant was not taken over.

These were the findings necessary for this decision in that case. However, the learned Chief Justice went on to say in his judgment,

> "The third point relates to the interpretation of the phrase 'in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime' occuring in $S.1(1)(c)$ of the much celebrated Expropriated Properties Act (No. 9 of 1982). It was submitted, rather seriously to my surprise, for the plaintiff that the expression means any. kind of taking over property during the Military Regime. I would have thought it an elementary point of law that every act authorised by the law pre-supposes the legal and lawful way of doing that thing, so that even if the qualifying adjective<br>'lawful' or 'legal' is omitted it is to<br>be read in the action proposed. I find no difficulty in holding that in the<br>instant phrase the word 'lawful' or 'legal' must be understood to be implied so that the fuller restatement of the phrase would read: 'in any other lawful or legal way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime.'

To think otherwise would be in my view tantamount to authorising and unleashing all manner of illegal taking of property. Surely the law cannot authorise what it seeks to prevent."

$\overline{0}$

The learned Chief Justice went on to conclude,

"It is therefore my view that any one who wishes to bring any kind of appropriation or taking over of property during the Military Regime as falling under section $1(1)$ (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 must show that the appropriation or the taking over of that property was, in the first place, lawful."

In paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the memorandum of appeal in the case before us, the appellant complains in effect that the learned trial judge,

- (a) erred in law in finding that the Expropriated Properties Act applied only to the properties previously taken over under the Assets of the Departed Asians Decree; - $(b)$ misconstrued the appellants' counsel's argument on the Expropriated Properties Act; - misdirected himself in law when he found that properties $(c)$ to which the Expropriated Properties Act applied had to be Asian owned; - $(d)$ erred in law by limiting the application of section $l(1)$ (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act; and - failed to take into account the purpose and intention of $(e)$ the Legislature in enacting the Expropriated Properties Act.

I think there is merit in all these complaints. After dealing with the submission of counsel for the respondent on the interpretation of section 1 of the Expropriated Properties Act in the lower court the learned trial judge commented as follows,

"He (Mr. Byenkya) argued that section $1(2)$ of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 did not limit the application of the Act so long as the property was taken over by the Military Government in whatever manner. That the incident of $\frac{4}{12/72}$ fell squarely within the meaning of section $1(1)$ (c) of Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 which covers any form of $:$ , appropriation ......................

$\overline{7}$

From the above arguments of both counsel, it is fairly clear to me, that both counsel agreed that properties or businesses to which Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 applied were those which had first been vested in the Government under the Assets of Departed Asians Decree 27/73 and later under the same Decree re-vested in the Custodian Board for management. I share that view."

Clearly the agreement is far from what Mr. Byenkya is recorded as having said and it was, with respect, a misdirection on the part of the learned trial judge on learned counsel's submission.

Be that as it may section $l(1)$ of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 provides as follows,

$(c)$

"||) Any property or business which was,

vested in the Government and $\binom{n}{2}$ transferred to the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board under the Assets of the Departed Asians Decree, 1973,

acquired by the Government under $(b)$ the Properties and Business (Acquisition) Decree, 1975,

> in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime save property which had been affected by the provisions of the repealed National Trust Decree, 1971, shall from the commencement of this Act, remain vested in the Government and be managed by the Ministry of Finance."

> > $\ldots$ /8

On the interpretation of this provision learned counsel for the appellant referred to the long title of the Act which indicates the intention of the Legislature. It reads,

"An Act to provide for the transfer of properties and businesses acquired or otherwise expropriated during the military regime to the Ministry of Finance, to provide for the return to former owners or disposal of the same by Government and to provide for other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

Learned counsel also referred to section 17 of the Act, the definition section, particularly to the following definitions,

" 'Former Owner' means and includes, any person who was either the registered owner or proprietor of any real or movable property in Uganda or was a shareholder in a business or enterprise registered in Uganda and who was either expelled or forced to flee from Uganda during the period of the Military Regime or was in any other way dispossessed of such property or business; and anybody who is the legal heir or successor of such person",

" 'Military Regime' means the Government in power during the period from 25th January, 1971 to 3rd June, 1979."

Learned counsel argued that the intention of the Legislature as indicated in all these provisions was to correct what had gone wrong, that is, the acquisition or taking over of properties or businesses or even dispossession of any person who was either expelled or forced to flee Uganda between January 25th, 1971 and 3rd June, 1979. Learned counsel went on to say that the Act categorises the properties in paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) of section $1(1)$ . He submitted that the appellant's case came within the provisions of pragraph $(c)$ which as worded covers property appropriated or taken over in whatever manner. .

In the Gandesha case, which was followed by the learned trial $\ensuremath{\mathsf{judge}}\xspace$ , the learned Chief Justice considered in detail the properties which were vested or were acquired under the Assets of Departed Asians Decree, 1973, the Properties and Businesses (Acquisition)

Decree, 1975 and other Decrees passed by the military regime. I think that the learned Chief Justice properly directed himself on the law that the plaintiff in the case before him who claimed that e defendant's property had been taken over and vested in the Custodian Board, a fact which was denied by the defendant, had to show under what law the property had been taken over as alleged. The intention of the relevant legislation in the period indicated, 25th January, 1971 to 3rd June, 1979, was to take over certain property. The taking over had to be legal or lawful or within the law.

On the other hand the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 was not intended to take over any property but to return property taken over which was described in section 1 of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982. In my view and with respect the learned Chief Justice in the Gandesha case misdirected himself on the law. The issue before him was not whether the suit property should be returned under the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 but whether it was appropriated under the legislation passed by the military regime which the learned Chief Justice so carefully analysed. Interpretation of section $l(1)$ of the Expropriated Properties Act was, in my view, not necessary to the Gandesha decision and clearly wrong principles were applied.

On the meaning of section $1(1)$ of the Act the trial judge in the case before us although he followed the Gandesha case, observed,

> "Section 1(1) (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act appears to be wide. It appears to cover properties in whatever manner appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime."

For the respondent it was argued by Mr. Maloba that paragraph (c) of section 1(1) must be construed ejusdem generis paragraphs (a) and (b). He submitted that the phrase "in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime" pre-supposes appropriation or

$.../10$

taking over by law as in paragraphs $(a)$ and $(b)$ . He further argued that the expression "remains vested in the Government" in the section means that such property must have been vested in the Government in the first place in order to remain vested.

I am not persuaded by any of these arguments. First of all paragraph (a) of section $l(1)$ of the Act refers to property vested in the Government and transferred to the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board. It was therefore not vested in the Government immediately before the commencement of the Act. Paragraph (b) of the section refers to property acquired by the Government under the Properties and Businesses (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 which may or may not have been vested in the Government. Paragraph (c) refers to property in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime which could not have been vested in the Military Regime which was no more but must have been vested somewhere. Under section $1(1)$ all these properties in (a), (b) and (c), "shall, from the commoncement of this Act" wherever they were vested immediately before such commencement "remain vested in the Government and be managed by the Ministry of Finance." I am unable to read into these provisions ary suggestion that the properties to remain vested as provided must have been vested in .. the Government.

Secondly I do not think the ejusdem generis rule applies in this case. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section $1(1)$ are quite distinct and speak for themselves. The wording in paragraph (c) is quite clear and given their gramatical construction, the words, "in any way appropriated or taken over" must mean whether by law as in paragraph (a) or (b) or not and in the context of the various provisions referred to, property the former owners of which

$.../11$

$10$ may have been merely dispossessed may come under this paragraph. Having regard to the evil intended to be cured by the Legislature which is deprivation of former owners of their properties appropriated or taken over or of which they were dispossessed by the Military Regime, any other interpretation would defeat the purpose of this legislation. In the instant case, the evidence indicates quite clearly that the suit property was forciably taken over and used and to date may still be used by the Government. It In abound to suggest that because the taking over was illegal, the property in effect cannot be returned and the Government should continue using it.

In my judgment the suit property in the case before us comes within the provisions of section $1(1)$ (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 and it follows that section $1(2)$ (b) of the Act applies to continue in force the expired lease until the property is dealt with under the Act. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and Decree of the High Court and substitute therefor judgment in favour of the appellants and a declaration that the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 applies to the suit land.

It was not shown that the respondent has the power or legal capacity to grant a re-possession certificate. Accordingly I would decline to give a declaration regarding entitlement to a repossession certificate which may be against the interests of persons or authorities who are not a party to these proceedings.

I would give the appellants costs here and in the court below. As both Odok1 and Platt JJSC agree with the proposed orders, it is so ordered.

Delivered at Mengo, this $\begin{array}{c} \n\mathcal{V} \\ \mathcal{V}\n\end{array}$ day of $\begin{array}{c} \n\mathcal{V}\n\end{array}$ 1994


$\overline{11}$

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

AT MENGO

( COMAN. WAMBUZI C. J., ODOKI, J. S. C. & PLATT, J. S. C. )

CIVIL APPEAL NO 21 OF 1993

BETWEEN

REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF KAMPALA INSTITUTE......... APPELLANTS

$A$ $N$ $D$

DEPARTED ASIANS PROPERTY CUSTODIAN BOARD......... RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Uganda (Okello J) dated 10th May, 1993

in

Civil Suit NO 610 OF 1992)

## JUDGMENT OF ODOKI JSC:

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the and full Jsc, judgments prepared by Mambuzi CJ, and I agree that this appeal must succeed.

There is no doubt that the main issue in this appeal is whether the learned judge was correct in holding that the Expropriated Properties Act 1982 did not apply to the suit property, originally owned by the appellants, and taken over by the military regime and managed by the respondent. The learned bidge held that the Act did not apply to the suit property because the appropriation or taking over by the Prisons Department was unlawful and therefore could not come within the provisions of Section 1 (1) (c) of the Act. Section 1 (1) of the Act provides,

$.../2$ ...

- " (1) Any property or business which was, - (a) vested in the Government and transferred to the Departed Asidns Property Custodian Board under the Assets of Departed Asians Decree 1973, - (b) acquired by the Government under<br>the Properties and Business. (Acquisition) Decree 1975, - (c) in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime save property which had<br>been affected by the provisions<br>of the repealed National Trust Decree this 1971,

shall, from the commencement of this Act, remain vested in the Government and be managed by the Ministry of Finance"

In coming to his decision the learned judge said,

"Section 1 (1) (c) of the Expropriated<br>Properties Act appears to be wide. It appears to cover properties in whatever manner appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime. This provision was considered in Gandesha's case above. The interpretation given<br>of the extent of the section in that case was that it covered only case was that it covered only<br>properties which were acquired by the<br>Military Regime. I agree with that<br>interpretation. For a property to be<br>covered under Section 1 (1) (c) of<br>the Expropriated Properties Act, it<br>must have of the Decree 29/73.

In the instant case, the act of $1/12/72$ when the armed prisons officers took over the suit land could not fall under any of the provisions mentioned It was therefore an illogal act. above. The ownership of the property was not established to be Asian. That illegal act had not legal consequences. The<br>property of the plaintiff was not<br>lawfully acquired and the Expropriated<br>Properties Act 1982 was not applicable to it".

It is clear from his judgment that the learned Judge heavily relied on the decision of the High Court in Gabriel Milliam Juma Lutaaya V. H. G. Gandesha & Another, Civil Suit

No.860 of 1982 where Manika C. J. hold that anyone who withes to bring any kind of appropriation or taking over of projecty during the Military Regime as falling under $\ldots. / 3 \ldots.$

Section 1 (1) (c) of the Expropriated Frogerties Act 1982 must show that the appropriation or taking over of that property was, in the first place, lawful. This interpretation has far reaching implications and must be seriously The learned Chief Justice reasoned, reconsidered.

"The third point relates to the interpretation "The third point relates to the interpretation<br>of the phrase "in any other way appropriated or<br>taken over the the Military Regime" occurring in<br> $S_1$ (1) (c) of the much celebrated Expropriated<br>Properties Act (Act NO. 9 o the plaintiff that the expression means any kind<br>of taking over property during the Military<br>Regime. I would have thought it an elementary<br>point of law that every act authorised by the<br>law presupposes the legal and lawful of the phrase would read: "in any other lawful or legal way approperiated or taken over by<br>the Military Regime" To think otherwise would be, in my view tantamount to authorising and<br>unleasing all manner of illegal taking of property. Surely the law cannot authorise what it seeks to prevent"

Mr. Byenkya learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the above interpretation of the phrase "in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime" was arronoous. He contended that the learned Chief Justice was wrong to read the word "lawful" or "legal" into the Section relying on the authorities of Thomson V. Gould (1910) AC 409 and Vikaers V. Evans (1910) AC 444. He argued that as it can be seen from the preamble (long title) of the Act, the purpose of the statute was remedial and it must therefore be interpreted liberally. Ile cated Dapueto V. James Willie.<br> $\alpha$ Wyllie & Co. (1874) L. R. 5 PC 492, Attorney General V. Prince Irnest Augustus of Mannover (1967) AC 436 and Gokaldas Lagandas Tanna V. Rosemary Muyanja Civil Appeal NO 12/92, in support of his argument. $\ldots \ldots / l_1 \ldots$

Finally counsel submitted, that the mischief rule of interpretation supported his contention.

On the other hand Mr. Muloba learned counsel for the Respondent supported the interpretation of Masika C. J. He submitted that paragraph (c) must be read ejusdem generis with paragraphs (a) and (b) with the result that the appropriation or taking over must be made by law. He also contended that the property must have vested in the Military Government before it can remain vested in the Government.

With respect, I think the rule of ejusdem generis was inapplicable in this case. According to this rule. when a series of particular words in a statute is followed by general words, the general words are confined by being read as the same scope of genus as (ejusdem generis with) the particular words. In the present case there were no particular words which were followed by general words either in the sub-section $(1)$ as a whole or in the particular paragraph (c). On the contrary paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) were separate and independent of each other and must be construed on their own in order to give them their full effect. The learned Chief Justice in effect read into the Section words which the legislature, in its wisdon had not included in the Act. No authority was quoted to support such interpretation. In Thomson V. Goold & Co, (1910) AC 409, The House of Lords said, at p. 420.,

"It is a wrong, thing to read into an Act of<br>Parliament words which are not there and<br>in the absence of clear necessity it is<br>a wrong thing to do"

$\cdots \cdots / 5 \cdots \cdots$

This principle eiterated in <u>Vickers Sons & Maxim Ltd V</u> Evans $(110)$ $144$ where the same court said at P.445,

> the apppellants contention involves reading words into this clause. The clause does not<br>contain them, and we are not entitled to read<br>words into an Act itself"

The only reason the learned Chief Justice gave was that the legislature could not have intended to authorise illegal taking of property. With respect this reason was misconceived because the purpose of the Act was not to authorize any taking of property but to provide for the return of the property taken over by the Military Regime in whatever manner.

In my opinion the learned Chief Justice did not seriously consider the purpose of the Act, and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. As it can be seen from the long title to the Act, the purpose of the Act was "to provide for the transfer of properties and business acquired or otherwise exprepriated during the military regime to the Ministry of Finance (and) to provide for the return to former owners or disposal of the same by Government" In other words the intention was to transfer the properties which had been taken over to the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of returning them to former owners. The mischief which the Act intended to reckify was the Oppropriation of property by the military regime and the remedy was to return the property to former owners. Former owner is defined under section 17 of the Act to include any person who was a registered proprietor of real property and was either expelled or forced to flee from Uganda during the period of the Military Regime or was in any way disposed dispossed of such property.

$16.$

The appellants come under this definition.

The Expropriated Properties Act is therefore a remedial Act. I agree that such a statute must be construed liberally and not restrictively. To do otherwise would be to perpetuate the mischief intended to be redressed and not provide a remedy to the injustice which was occasioned by the Military regime to former owners. It would be wrong and unjust to return property which the military regime took over lawfully and refuse to return property which was illegally taken over. This court cannot approve of an interpretation which would result in such an injustice and which runscontrary to the plain meaning of the words and the purpose of the Act.

In my judgment, Masika C. J. erred in law in holding that for any property to fall under Section 1 (1) (c) of the Act, that property must be lawfully appropriated or taken over. I hold that the words "in any other way appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime" in Section 1 (1) (c) must be given their ordinary meaning and liberation interpretation to mean any appropriation or taking over by the military regime other than as specified in paragraph (a) and (b) of the same sub-section, whether the taking over was lawful or not.

The learned judge in the present case erred in following the erroneous interpretation in the Gandesha Case (Supra), and by so doing he came to a wrong decision. I do agree with Wambuzi CJ, that the interpretation of Masika CJ on Section 1 (1) (c) of the Act was not necessary for his decision in that case, and therefore it was an obiter dictum.

It was common ground that on 14 December, 1972, the Prison Department of the Ministry of Inernal Affairs forcefully took over the suit propery and converted it into

$...7...$

a Mess for Senior Prisons Officers, and is still occupying it up to the present time. Francis Joseph Almeida (PM1) the former General Secretary of the appellants club, and Joe Falnaldis (PM2) a member of the club who witnessed the take over testified to this effect, on behalf of the appellants. There was no evidence from the respondent to challenge their evidence. On the contrary, in its written statement of defence, the respondent admitted that

> "it had valid management powers over the<br>suit properties before the lease expired<br>and thereafter lost or reliquished<br>management and/or control over this management and/or controlling authority<br>property to the controlling authority<br>concerned and threfore rejecting the<br>application was proper and justified<br>since the Defendant had no legal<br>authority or powers to deal with the suit property"

On the evidence before the trial court, it was established that the suit property was appropriated or taken over by the military regime. Therefore although the leaseof the suit property expired in 1981 it was deemed to have continued by virtue of section 1 (2) (b) until such property had been dealt with in accordance with the Act, and the respondent had powers under section 1 $(4)$ to manage such property until the Minister appointed any other body to manage the property or until disposed of.

In conclusion, I hold that the appellants property was appropriated or taken over by the Military Regime and that it falls within the provisions of Section $\mathbb{I}^{\mathbb{Z}}$ (1) (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act 1982.

$\cdots \cdots \cdots / 8 \cdots \cdots$

I would therefore allow this appeal and concur in the orders proposed by Wambuzi $\text{CJ}_\bullet$

Dated at Mengo this....................................

A comi

B. J. ODOKI JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT