[1946] EACA 70
The court held that the omission to specify 'eggs of poultry kept by natives' in the charge did not render the charge defective, as the context and circumstances made it clear that the charges referred to the controlled produce. There was no reasonable doubt that the accused understood the nature of the offence....
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1946] EACA 70
- Parties
- Respondent: Rex; Appellant: Macharia s/o Kabachia; Appellant: Karigu s/o Ngunu; Appellant: Wangondu s/o Gichara; Appellant: Muchoki s/o Kangethe; Appellant: Nganga Kangethe; Appellant: Gachu s/o Gachera; Appellant: Njoroge Thita; Appellant: Joeile s/o Karakia; Appellant: Hoseah s/o Kamiro; Appellant: Jusia s/o Kamau
- Court
- East African Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- Uganda
- Case Number
- 'Criminal Appeals Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 230,231, 232, 241, 242 and 243 of 1945 Consolidated
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Final Appellate Judgment
- Outcome
- appeals dismissed
- Judges
- De Lestang, Ag. J, Sheridan CJ
- Legal Topics
- Native Produce Offences, Licensing Requirements, Charge Defects, Sentencing, Failure of Justice
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Rex
Respondent
Macharia s/o Kabachia
Appellant
Karigu s/o Ngunu
Appellant
Wangondu s/o Gichara
Appellant
Muchoki s/o Kangethe
Appellant
Nganga Kangethe
Appellant
Gachu s/o Gachera
Appellant
Njoroge Thita
Appellant
Joeile s/o Karakia
Appellant
Hoseah s/o Kamiro
Appellant
Jusia s/o Kamau
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Final Appellate Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the omission to specify 'eggs of poultry kept by natives' in the charge rendered the charge defective.
- 2 Whether the sentences imposed were excessive and occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that the omission to specify 'eggs of poultry kept by natives' in the charge did not render the charge defective, as the context and circumstances made it clear that the charges referred to the controlled produce. There was no reasonable doubt that the accused understood the nature of the offence. Furthermore, while the sentences were severe, they were not excessive or unreasonable in the circumstances, and the trial magistrate was in a better position to assess the appropriate penalty. No miscarriage of justice was occasioned, and there was no basis for appellate interference.
Court Disposition
appeals dismissed
Orders
- All appeals against conviction and sentence are dismissed.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
20 paragraphs
## APPELLATE CRIMINAL
## Before SIR JOSEPH SHERIDAN, C. J., and DE LESTANG, Ag. J.
## REX, Respondent ν.
## -MACHARIA S/O KABACHIA, KARIGU S/O NGUNU, WANGONDU S/O GICHARA, MUCHOKI S/O KANGETHE, NGANGA KANGETHE, GACHU S/O GACHERA, NJOROGE THITA, JOEILE S/O KARAKIA, HOSEAH S/O KAMIRO, JUSIA S/O KAMAU
Criminal Appeals Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 241, 242 and 243 of 1945 Consolidated
Criminal law-Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935, S. 4 (b)-Charge of "Purchasing eggs in a declared area without a valid licence"-Omission to state origin of eggs in charge—That "eggs" meant eggs of poultry kept by natives was obvious from all the circumstances-No failure of justice occasioned thereby—Sentence.
By the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935, it is an offence to purchase in a declared area eggs being the produce of poultry kept by natives. The accused were charged with "Purchasing eggs in a declared area without a valid licence *contra* S. 4 (b) of the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935, and Government Notice No. 426/1945". They pleaded guilty and were convicted and sentenced to fines varying between Sh. 100 and Sh. 400.
They appealed.
**Held** (22-3-46)—(1) That reading the charges with a little bit of common sense there can be<br>no reasonable doubt that the word "eggs" in them were intended to mean and were<br>understood by the several accuseds to mean "eggs the charges were not defective.
(2) That although the sentences were severe they were not excessive in the circumstances. $\cdot$
Appeals dismissed.
Nene for Appellants.
Todd, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
JUDGMENT.—The same points arising for decision in consolidated appeals 226–228, 241–243 and in consolidated appeals 229–232 this judgment applies to both sets of appeals.
The appellants were convicted by the First Class Magistrate, Fort Hall, of purchasing various quantities of eggs in a declared area, to wit Fort Hall, without a valid licence *contra* section 4 (b) Ordinance 28/35 and G<sub>1</sub>N. $426/45$ and sentenced to fines varying between Sh. 100 and Sh. 400.
The first ground of appeal is that the charges do not disclose any offence because they refer to eggs generally and not, as they ought to, to eggs being the produce of poultry kept by natives. Admittedly the only eggs the purchase of which is controlled by licence are those of poultry kept by natives and it would have been more accurate if the charges had described them as such. However, the charges must be read with a little bit of common sense, and considering that the purchases occurred in a district which is almost exclusively native and
that the section of the Ordinance quoted in the charges makes it quite clear that they relate to "native eggs" we think that there can be no reasonable doubt that the word "eggs" in the charges were intended to mean and were understood by the several appellants to mean "eggs of poultry kept by natives". There is no suggestion that they could be eggs of a different origin and it is only fair to learned Advocate to record that this point was not pursued, and rightly so in our view.
The next point in the appeals is the question of sentences which it is contended are excessive. We realise that the sentences are severe, but whether they are so severe as to be unreasonable or such as to occasion a miscarriage of justice-in which event only would we be justified in interfering-is a different matter.
Having considered all the circumstances of the cases we think that the learned Magistrate who tried the cases, being on the spot and having probably a great deal more information than we have on the matter, was in a much better position than we are to determine the appropriate penalty in each case. We feel that in the circumstances any interference with the sentences imposed would be purely arbitrary and wrong.
We dismiss all the appeals both against conviction and sentence.