[1948] EACA 70
The court found that the conviction of the first appellant was not supported by sufficient evidence, as mere presence with a co-accused after the offence, without proof of possession or involvement, is not enough to infer participation in the crime. The conviction was quashed and the appellant ordered to be...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1948] EACA 70
- Parties
- Respondent: REX; Appellant: Elijah s/o Ndmaywa; Appellant: Kiarie s/o Magothe
- Court
- East African Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- Uganda
- Case Number
- Criminal Appeals Nos. 207 and 246 of 1948 Consolidated
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Judgment
- Outcome
- First appellant's conviction quashed and released; second appellant's appeal dismissed.
- Judges
- De Lestang J, Nihill P
- Legal Topics
- Burglary, Theft, Evidence Recording, Joint Participation, Conviction Standard
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
REX
Respondent
Elijah s/o Ndmaywa
Appellant
Kiarie s/o Magothe
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the conviction of each appellant for burglary and theft.
- 2 Whether mere presence with a co-accused after the offence is enough to infer participation in the crime.
- 3 Whether the use of the plural "they" in recording evidence by the Magistrate affected the fairness of the conviction.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the conviction of the first appellant was not supported by sufficient evidence, as mere presence with a co-accused after the offence, without proof of possession or involvement, is not enough to infer participation in the crime. The conviction was quashed and the appellant ordered to be released. For the second appellant, the court held that there was adequate evidence of participation, including being found with stolen property and actively showing the police the location of hidden goods. The use of the plural "they" in recording evidence was noted as unsatisfactory, but the court was satisfied that the Magistrate's finding was justified based on the totality of the...
Court Disposition
First appellant's conviction quashed and released; second appellant's appeal dismissed.
Orders
- Conviction of Elijah s/o Ndmaywa quashed and he is to be set at liberty forthwith.
- Appeal of Kiarie s/o Magothe dismissed.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
19 paragraphs
## APPELLATE CRIMINAL
## Before SIR BARCLAY NIHILL, C. J., and DE LESTANG, J.
REX, Respondent (Original Prosecutor)
(1) ELIJAH s/o NDMAYWA AND (2) KIARIE s/o MAGOTHE,
Appellants (Original Accused Nos. (2) and (1) respectively)
Criminal Appeals Nos. 207 and 246 of 1948 Consolidated
'Criminal Law-Practice-Recording evidence-Use of the word "they".
(This case is reported on account of the observations of their Lordships upon the use of the plural in the recording of evidence by a Magistrate.—*Editor.*)
Held (30-6-48).—That a Magistrate should always be on his guard, in recording evidence which concerns more than one person, to refrain from using the word "they" without<br>making sure from the witness giving such evidence that it applies equally to the acts<br>or words of each person to whom the witness is referr
Appellants present, unrepresented.
Todd, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
JUDGMENT.-In these two Appeals which we have consolidated the appellants appeal against their conviction on a charge of burglary and theft. Before trial before the Magistrate the third person named John Muthoka who was charged with them pleaded guilty to the offence.
As regards the first appellant, who was the second accused before the Magistrate, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence is not sufficient to justify the conviction. The case against him depends solely on the fact that on two occasions he was present with John when some of the stolen property was sold by John to a shoemaker and a dhobi. None of the stolen property was proved to have ever been in the possession of this appellant and in the absence of any such evidence we think the inference drawn by the learned Magistrate, because he was in the company of an admitted thief subsequent to the burglary he was therefore a participant in it, is altogether too far-fetched to be sustainable. In the case of this appellant, therefore, we quash the conviction entered against him and order him to be set at liberty forthwith.
As regards the second appellant who was the first accused in the Court below, we have come to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence before the Magistrate from which he could infer participation in the burglary. He was first of all found wearing a hat which was identified as part of the property stolen, and subsequently in company with John he pointed out a place on the estate where the bulk of the stolen property was hidden. The appellant before us has submitted that it was really John and not he that pointed this place out to the police, and that he was only a bystander because the police had made him accompany the party.
On this point it certainly is unsatisfactory that the Magistrate has recorded the evidence of the African Police Inspector so far as it concerned this incident in the plural. A Magistrate should always be on his guard in recording evidence which concerns more than one person to refrain from using the word "they" without making sure from the witness giving such evidence that it applies equally to the acts or words of each person to whom the witness is referring.
In this case, however, it is apparent from the judgment that the learned Magistrate was satisfied that both this appellant and the man John had together shown the police the place in the bush where the stolen boxes were hidden. We are not, therefore, disposed to reject the Magistrate's finding on this point, and from it it follows that he could find that this appellant was guilty with John of the offences charged.
$\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{1-\epsilon})$
$\mathcal{L}^{\pm}_{\pm}$
The appeal of the second appellant is accordingly dismissed.