[2024] UGHCCD 142

# **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (CIVIL DIVISION)**

#### **CIVIL SUIT NO. 449 OF 2017**

**SETH HENRY M. RUKUNDO :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: PLAINTIFF**

#### **VERSUS**

**1. BAGONZA TOM**

**2. NYANZI MUHAMMED**

**3. ICEA GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD :::::::::::::::::::::::::: DEFENDANTS**

### **BEFORE: HON. JUSTICE BONIFACE WAMALA JUDGMENT**

#### **Introduction**

[1] The plaintiff brought this suit against the defendants jointly and severally seeking special damages, general damages, exemplary damages, aggravated damages, interest and costs of the suit arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving motor vehicle registration No. UAU 691G. The motor vehicle was owned by the 1st defendant and was being driven by the 2nd defendant. The allegation by the plaintiff was that the accident occurred due to the carelessness, recklessness and negligence of the 2nd defendant leading to grievous harm and multiple bodily injuries onto the plaintiff.

[2] The brief facts according to the plaintiff are that on 30th May 2017 at New Taxi Park Kampala, the plaintiff was traveling in motor vehicle registration number UAU 691G from Kampala to Masindi along the Kampala – Gulu high way route. Upon reaching Bamusuta village in Nakasongola District, the 2nd defendant became a nuisance on the highway, recklessly drove exceeding the required speed limit and without having regard to the onboard passengers, went off his lawful side of the road, and overturned the motor vehicle. As a result, the plaintiff sustained multiple bodily injuries, thereby suffering grievous bodily harm. The plaintiff further averred that the motor vehicle was not in a good mechanical condition, worthy of being driven on the road. After the accident, the defendants ignored taking the injured plaintiff to medical centers for medical treatment or thereafter meeting the plaintiff to discuss his medical bills. The plaintiff also averred that owing to the accident, he sustained bodily injuries, suffered loss of earnings, incurred expenses on medical treatment; for which he claims compensation by way of special, general, exemplary and aggravated damages. The plaintiff attributes the loss and damage to the negligence of the 2nd defendant who was operating in the course of his duties as a driver/ employee of the 1st defendant, the owner of the motor vehicle in issue; and the latter is vicariously liable. The plaintiff also stated that the 3rd defendant had insured the subject motor vehicle for the relevant period of time and was liable to make good the loss and damage.

[3] The defendants filed two written statements of defense. The first was filed on 29th September 2017, jointly for all the three defendants. The second was filed on 10th October 2017 for the 1st and 2nd defendants. There was no explanation as to why two defences were filed. As such, for purpose of the 1st and 2nd defendants, I will take the latter statement of defence as the binding one; while for the 3rd defendant, I will rely on the only defence filed on their behalf. The gist of the defendants' case is that although the accident involving the subject motor vehicle took place on that day, the allegations of bodily injury sustained by the plaintiff were not true. It was also averred by the defendants that the accident was occasioned solely by reason of negligence and or recklessness on the part of the plaintiff who became a nuisance to other passengers and issued threats to the driver. The defendants denied any negligence or liability for injury, loss or damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.

#### **Representation and Hearing**

[4] At the hearing, the plaintiff represented himself while the 3rd defendant was represented by **Mr. Peter Kahindi** from M/s PACE Advocates. The 1st and 2nd defendants did not appear for the hearing and neither were they represented. In view of evidence of proof of service upon them, the Court allowed the hearing to proceed ex parte against the 1st and 2nd defendants. The plaintiff led evidence of two witnesses. The plaintiff's case was conducted in presence of the plaintiff and counsel for the 3rd defendant. However, upon closure of the plaintiff's case, when the case came up for hearing of the 3rd defendant's case, Counsel for the 3rd defendant neither appeared nor furnished an explanation for their absence. Hearing of the case was therefore closed under Order 17 rule 4 of the CPR and the plaintiff was allowed to file their final submissions in the matter.

#### **Issues for Determination by the Court**

- [5] Five issues are up for determination by the Court, namely; - *(a) Whether the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the 2nd defendant's negligence?* - *(b) Whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence?* - *(c) Whether the 1st defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of the 2nd defendant?* - *(d) Whether the 3rd defendant is jointly liable with the 1st and 2nd defendants?* - *(e) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies claimed?*

#### **Burden and Standard of Proof**

[6] In civil proceedings, the burden of proof lies upon he who alleges. *Section 101 of the Evidence Act, Cap 6* provides that;

*"(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he or she asserts must prove that those facts exist.*

*(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person"*.

[7] Further, *Section 103 of the Evidence Act* provides that the *"burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person"*. Accordingly, the burden of proof in civil proceedings normally lies upon the plaintiff or claimant. The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. The law, however, goes further to classify between a legal burden and an evidential burden. When a plaintiff has led evidence establishing his/her claim, he/she is said to have executed the legal burden. The evidential burden thus shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's claims.

#### **The Evidence**

[8] The plaintiff led evidence of two witness. He testified as **PW1**. He stated that was he was 58 years old, resident of Kisoro District. On 30th May 2017, he was travelling from Kampala to Masindi in motor vehicle Reg. No. UAU 691G which was being driven by the 2nd defendant at a high speed. Upon arriving at Bumusuta Village in Nakasongola District, the motor vehicle overturned and violently fell heavily on the ground, trapping him inside the wreckage. He was later pulled out of the wreckage and taken to Kakooge Health Centre III from where he was referred to Mulago Hospital. PW1 stated that he became traumatized and suffered severe broken bones. He stated that the defendants jointly ignored to cater for him and was charged UGX 800,000/= to be transported to Mulago. As a result, he sustained loss of earnings, lost his laptop in the wreckage and was exposed to risk of death by the defendants not providing funds for his surgical operations, purchase of drugs and medication. In cross examination, PW1 stated that although he had no contract with the 3rd defendant, he joined them on the suit because he was advised to claim for medication from the 3rd defendant insurance company since it had given a certificate of insurance policy to the 1st defendant's car.

[9] **PW2** was **Dr. Jackson Kakembo**, aged 74 years, a general medical practitioner at Muyenga Dispensary, Kabalagala. He stated that he had served as Director Police medical services, with Dr. Barungi as his deputy for 35 years. PW2 had retired from the police force at the rank of Commissioner of Police. He has practiced medicine since 1975. He stated that the plaintiff was examined at Bombo Road clinic by Dr. Barungi whose handwriting he was well acquainted with. Upon examination, the plaintiff was found to have sustained a fracture of the right cervical, the left ulna bone and left radius bone. At the time of examination, the plaintiff had two scars, about 12cm each, which were about a month old. The examination was carried out on 6th July 2017 while the accident had occurred on 30th May 2017. The plaintiff had undergone surgery to fix the broken bones on left arm; and was under admission from 8th June 2017 to 26th June 2017. The medical report was admitted by the Court as a plaintiff's exhibit.

#### **Resolution of the Issues**

## **Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the 2nd defendant's negligence?**

#### **Submissions**

[10] The plaintiff submitted that the 2nd defendant who was the driver of the subject motor vehicle negligently, carelessly and recklessly drove the motor vehicle thereby hitting a concrete pavement. The plaintiff stated that the 2nd defendant did not make a proper look out for other objects on the road, ignored caution road warning signs and, despite the fact that there was no other vehicle coming from the opposite direction, he overturned and crashed the motor vehicle. He further stated that the driver neglected to slow down or brake in time to avoid the vehicle from veering off the road. As a result, the plaintiff was violently hit, sustaining grievous bodily harm and compound fractures. The plaintiff stated that the X-ray images produced by him confirm the fractures sustained by him. He stated that according to police Form 37, the weather was clear and the road surface was dry. He submitted that the 2nd defendant thus breached his duty of care towards passengers in the subject vehicle. The 2nd defendant driver was charged with a traffic offence to which he pleaded guilty.

#### **Determination by the Court**

[11] Negligence as a tort has been defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. See: *Blyth v Birmingham Water Works (1856) II EX 78*. To establish the tort of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that there was a legal duty of care owed to him or her; that the duty of care was breached by the named defendant; and that damage or injury was suffered by the plaintiff. See: *Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) UKHL 100*.

[12] On the case before me, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff shows that the 2nd defendant negligently, recklessly and carelessly drove the subject motor vehicle by driving on the wrong side of the road, hitting a concrete pavement whereupon the vehicle veered off the road and overturned causing bodily injuries to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff did not include in the plaint a specific paragraph on the particulars of negligence, he set out in paragraph 21 of the plaint that the 2nd defendant recklessly drove the motor vehicle outside its lawful lane, ignored caution and road warning signs, which caused the vehicle to hit an off road pavement and overturned into a wreckage. These averments are verified in the plaintiff's testimony and corroborated by the contents of the police report. I am in position to believe that the said evidence represents a correct account of what transpired.

[13] It is clear to me that the 2nd defendant was under a duty of care towards passengers in the motor vehicle that included the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant was under duty to regulate the speed at which he was driving and to take a proper look out. He was expected to take precaution against foreseeable risks which he did not. By driving in the manner he did as shown by the evidence, the 2nd defendant breached this duty of care imposed upon him under the law, and thus occasioned injury upon the plaintiff. In *Kato Paul v Uganda Transport Corporation [1975] HCB119*, the court stated that once a possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, and no precautions are taken by the driver, then such a driver is negligent, notwithstanding that the other driver or road user was in breach of some traffic regulations or even negligent.

[14] In a case such as this where, in Uganda, the high way code mandates drivers to keep left, the 2nd defendant's act of hitting a road side pavement on the opposite side of the road and consequently overturning is sufficient proof of negligence on the part of the 2nd defendant. Such occurrence also imports in the application of the principle of res ipsor loquitor (facts speak for themselves) which the plaintiff also pleaded. Upon the evidence before the Court, therefore, the plaintiff has proved on a balance of probabilities that the accident occurred and the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the 2nd defendant's negligence. Issue one is answered in the affirmative.

#### **Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence?**

[15] It was claimed in the written statement of defence filed on behalf of the 1st and 2nd defendants that the accident was occasioned solely by reason of negligence and or recklessness on the part of the plaintiff who became a nuisance to other passengers and issued threats to the driver. This claim was, however, not particularized by the said defendants. Nevertheless, given that the Court has made a finding of negligence on the part of the 2nd defendant, the above averment imports a plea of contributory negligence.

[16] In regard to the principle of contributory negligence, the defendant has to show that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the causation of the accident. In the case of *Embu Public Road Services Ltd v Riimi [1968] EA 22,* the Court of Appeal held that where circumstances of the accident give rise to an inference of negligence, the defendant in order to escape liability has to show that there was another probable cause of the accident which does not connote negligence and that the explanation for the accident was consistent only with an absence of negligence on the part of the defendant. It follows, therefore, that if the explanation sought to be relied upon by the defendant is that the plaintiff was responsible for any negligent acts or omissions in the prevailing circumstances, the defendant had to expressly plead as such by way of a plea of contributory negligence.

[17] Looking at the rules of pleading, specifically Order 6 rules 1 & 3 and Order 8 rule 3 of the CPR, their combined effect is that a defendant, in the written statement of defence, ought to make a brief statement of material facts on which he or she relies and every denial of a material fact must be specific and not evasive. Where particulars are necessary, the same shall be stated in the pleading. In the present case, the 1st and 2nd defendants did not make a specific plea of contributory negligence, although they sought to explain away the occurrence by placing the responsibility upon the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the said defendants gave no particulars of negligence on the part of the plaintiff and led no evidence verifying the claim that the plaintiff "became a nuisance to other passengers and issued threats to the driver". This averment by the 1st and 2nd defendants therefore remained redundant. In the circumstances, having already found that the 2nd defendant is guilty of negligence upon the evidence and facts before the Court, and in absence of a proper claim for contributory negligence or evidence thereof, the second issue is answered in the negative.

# **Issue 3: Whether the 1st defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of the 2nd defendant?**

### **Submissions**

[18] The plaintiff cited the cases of *Paul Byekwaso v Attorney General CACA No.10 of 2002* and *Muwonge v Attorney General 1967 E. A 17* to the effect that a master is liable for acts committed by his servant in the course of his employment. The plaintiff submitted that it is not disputed that the 2nd defendant was a servant of the 1st defendant who was the owner of the motor vehicle and that the 2nd defendant was in the course of his employment. The plaintiff concluded that the 1st defendant, as the master, is vicariously liable for the negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the 2nd defendant that led to the accident and caused bodily injuries onto the plaintiff.

## **Determination by the Court**

[19] Having made a finding of negligence against the 2nd defendant, the next duty upon the plaintiff is to prove that the 1st defendant, as the employer or master of the 2nd defendant, is vicariously liable for the conduct of the 2nd defendant. The position of the law is that a master is vicariously liable for the tortious acts committed by his servant in the course of his employment. See: *Paul Byekwaso v Attorney General, CACA No. 10 of 2002* and *Bagenda Dyabe Tommy v Pioneer Easy Bus Limited, HCCS No. 36 of 2016*. An act may be done in the course of employment so as to make a principal or master liable even though it is done contrary to the orders of the master, and even if the servant or agent is acting deliberately, wantonly, negligently, or criminally, or for his own behalf; nevertheless, if what he did is merely a manner of carrying out what he was employed to carry out, then his master is liable. See: *Muwonge v Attorney General [1967] EA 17*; *AG v Hajji Adam Farajara [1977] HCB 29;* and *Uganda Commercial Bank v Kigozi [2002] EA 305 at 306*.

[20] In this case, it is not disputed that the 2nd defendant was employed as a driver of the 1st defendant and that the driver was acting in the course of his employment. The evidence before the Court, therefore, sufficiently proves that the 1st defendant is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the 2nd defendant. Issue 3 is answered in the affirmative.

# **Issue 4: Whether the 3rd defendant is jointly liable with the 1st and 2nd defendants?**

### **Submissions**

[21] The plaintiff cited Section 5(2) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Third Party Risks Act Cap 214 to the effect that the insured may be required to pay to the insurer any sums which the insurer may have become liable to pay under the policy and which have been applied to satisfaction of claims of a third party. The plaintiff stated that Regulation 3 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations S. I 214-1 states that an insurer shall settle all claims in respect of third party insurance within 60 days of notification but where valid disputes exists over a claim, within 60 days after the resolution of disputes. The plaintiff submitted that the 3rd defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff on account that it was the insurer for Motor Vehicle Reg. No. UAU 691G under the terms of the certificate of insurance policy No. 084-A2-100576- 14 that was valid from 19/12/2016 -18/12/2017.

### **Determination by the Court**

[22] Although it is not disputed that the subject motor vehicle was insured by the 3rd defendant, there is no satisfactory evidence that the policy was in respect of third party claims. The plaintiff did not establish privity of contract between him and the 3rd defendant. If the 3rd defendant was indeed liable to pay any compensation based on the policy, it was the 1st defendant (the insured) who had the right to enforce a claim for indemnity against the 3rd defendant (the insurer). Since the 1st defendant did not take that course, the plaintiff has no locus to enforce any claim against the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff's claims are bound to be satisfied by the 1st and 2nd defendants. Issue 4 is answered in the negative.

### **Issue 5: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies claimed?**

[23] The plaintiff sought for special, general, exemplary and aggravated damages, interest and costs of the suit. As special damages, the plaintiff prayed for a sum of UGX 200,000/= per day from 30th May 2017 up the time of his discharge from hospital. The law on special damages is that they must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved in evidence. See: *Uganda Telecom Ltd v Tanzanite Corporation [2005] 2 EA 331 at P.341*. Although proof of such damages does not always have to come by way of documentary evidence, in order to prove special damages by oral evidence, the oral evidence adduced by the party has to be cogent. See: *Gapco (U) Ltd v A. S Transporters Ltd [2009] 1 HCB*. In *John Eletu v Uganda Air Lines Corporation [1984] HCB 44*, the court reiterated the position that production of receipts or documentary evidence is not the only way or method of proof of special damages; cogent oral evidence may suffice.

[24] Furthermore, under the law, lost income or earnings have to be pleaded and proved as special damages. In *Robert Cuossens v Attorney General, (SCCA No. 8 of 1999) 2000 UGSC 2 (2 March 2000)*, Oder JSC had this to say;

*"In cases of pecuniary loss … it is easy enough to apply [the rule that the court should award the injured party such a sum of money as will put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the injuries]*

*in the case of earnings which have actually been lost, or expenses which have actually been incurred up to the date of the trial. The exact or approximate amount can be proved and, if proved, will be awarded as special damages. In this category falls income or earning lost between the time of injury and the time of trial. But in the case of future financial loss whether it is future loss of earnings or expenses to be incurred in the future, assessment is not easy. This prospective loss cannot be claimed as special damages because it has not been sustained at the date of the trial. It is therefore, awarded as part of the general damages. The plaintiff no doubt would be entitled in theory to the exact amount of his prospective loss if it could be proved to its present value at the date of the trial. But in practice since future loss cannot usually be proved, the court has to make a broad estimate taking into account all the proved facts and the probabilities of the particular case"*. Also See: *British Transport Commission v Gourley (1956) AC 185 at p. 212*; *(1955) 3 A11 ER 796 at p. 808* to which the Court relied.

[25] In the present case, the plaintiff stated that he is an advocate, commissioner for oaths and notary public. He made a claim of loss of daily income of UGX 200,000/= and sought the said amount from the date of the accident up to the date of discharge. According to his evidence, the plaintiff was admitted in Mulago hospital on 30th May 2017 and discharged on 26th June 2017; a period of 27 days. However, the plaintiff led no evidence showing how he arrived at the sum of UGX 200,000/= as his daily earning as an advocate. In absence of any evidence in that regard, the plaintiff has fallen short of proving the claim for loss of earnings on this part of his claim.

[26] Still, under the claim for special damages, the plaintiff sought compensation for his lost laptop at UGX 2,000,000/=, clothes at UGX 1,500,000/= and UGX 800,000/= as costs of transportation from Kakoge health centre to Mulago hospital. The claim for loss of a computer laptop appears established and was not controverted. I allow the sum of UGX 2,000,000/= claimed in that regard. I have not found any evidence to justify the claim of UGX 1,500,000/= for clothes. I find this claim unverified and I reject the same as a special damage. I have believed the plaintiff's evidence regarding the sum of UGX 800,000/= being transport costs from the Kakoge health centre to Mulago hospital. I allow this part of the plaintiff's claim. In this regard, therefore, I allow the claim of **UGX 2,800,000/=** as proved by the plaintiff as special damages.

[27] The plaintiff made a further claim in the form of special damages being a sum of UGX 1,767,500/= on account of medical treatment, purchase of drugs and related expenses. The plaintiff adduced evidence of receipts to that effect. This evidence remained uncontroverted and I have found it believable and capable of establishing that claim on a balance of probabilities. I accordingly award the said sum of **UGX 1,767,500/=** to the plaintiff as special damages. In all, therefore, the total sum proved by the plaintiff under the claim for special damages is **UGX 4,567,500/=**.

[28] Regarding the claim for general damages, the law is that the damages are a direct natural or probable consequence of the act complained of and are awarded at the discretion of the court. The purpose of the damages is to restore the aggrieved person to the position they would have been in had the breach or wrong not occurred. See: *Hadley v Baxendale (1894) 9 Exch 341; Kibimba Rice Ltd v Umar Salim, SC Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1992*; and *Robert Cuossens v Attorney General (SCCA No. 8 of 1999) 2000 UGSC 2 (2 March 2000)*. In the assessment of general damages, the court should be guided by the value of the subject matter, the economic inconvenience that the plaintiff may have been put through and the nature and extent of the injury suffered. See: *Uganda Commercial Bank v Kigozi [2002] 1 EA 305*. Under the law, general damages are implied in every breach of contract and every infringement of a given right. In a personal injuries claim, general damages will include anticipated future loss as well as damages for pain and suffering, inconvenience and loss of amenity.

[29] In the present case, the plaintiff has shown in evidence that he suffered grievous bodily harm and multiple bodily injuries. He had to undergo surgery to correct his bones. He stated that he suffered depression, nightmares, hallucinations and memory lapses. He was hospitalized for a considerable period of time. There is no doubt that he underwent pain and suffering. He also faced loss that has not been capable of quantification. Considering the above facts and circumstances, I am convinced that that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation in the form of general damages. I find a sum of **UGX 30,000,000/=** as an appropriate in the circumstances and I award the same to the plaintiff as general damages.

[30] The plaintiff also claimed for punitive/ exemplary damages and for aggravated damages. While exemplary damages are punitive in nature, aggravated damages consist of an extra compensation to a wronged individual on account of arrogant or malicious conduct of the defendant. According to Lord Devlin in the land mark case of *Rookes v Barnard [1946] ALLER 367 at 410, 411* there are only three categories of cases in which exemplary damages are awarded namely;

a) Where there has been oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government;

b) Where the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; or

c) Where some law for the time being in force authorizes the award of exemplary damages.

[31] On the other hand, aggravated damages are awarded by the court in form of extra compensation to a plaintiff for injury to his feelings and dignity caused by the manner in which the defendant acted. In *Obongo v Kisumu Municipal Council [1971] EA 91*, at page *96*, *SPRY, V. P* made the following statement regarding aggravated damages;

*"It is well established that when damages are at large and a court is making a general award, it may take into account factors such as malice or arrogance on the part of the defendant and the injury suffered by the plaintiff, as, for example, by causing him humiliation or distress. Damages enhanced on account of such aggravation are regarded as still being essentially compensatory in nature.''* Also see: *Fredrick J. K. Zaabwe v Orient Bank & Others, SCCA No.4 of 2006*.

[32] On the case before me, I have not seen any evidence of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants. Neither have I seen any evidence of arrogant or malicious conduct on their part. The claim by the plaintiff is that the defendants neglected to urgently take him for medical attention or to meet his bills. In my view, this aspect has been well taken care of by the award of general damages. It does not qualify as wanton conduct that is characterized by impunity, arbitrariness, arrogance or malice as to occasion an award of either exemplary or aggravated damages. This claim is therefore not made out by the plaintiff and I make no award in that regard.

[33] On interest, the discretion of the court regarding award of interest is provided for under Section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act. The plaintiff claimed for interest on the sum awarded although he did not specify any rate of interest. In the circumstances, however, I award interest on the special and general damages at the rate of 10% p.a. from the date of judgement till payment in full.

[34] Regarding costs of the suit, under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, costs follow the event unless the court upon good cause determines otherwise. Given the findings above, the plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the suit and the same are awarded to him as against the 1st and 2nd defendants. The suit against the 3rd defendant is dismissed with no order as to costs.

[35] In the result, judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly and severally for payment of;

a) UGX 4,567,500/= as special damages.

b) UGX 30,000,000/= being general damages.

c) Interest on (a) & (b) above at the rate of 10% p.a. from the date of judgment till payment in full.

d) The taxed costs of the suit.

It is so ordered.

# *Dated, signed and delivered by email this 28th day of August, 2024.*

**Boniface Wamala JUDGE**