

Serugo v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 85 of 2024) [2025] UGHCCRD 20 (14 May 2025)

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The prosecution's case states that Christine Zawedde, now over 92 years old, suffered a stroke in 2013, which rendered her incapable of managing her day-to-day affairs. She also became blind, making her reliant on others for assistance. The Appellant, her grandson, was among those who cared for her and had lived with her for 37 years.

The prosecution claims that in 2022, the Appellant took his grandmother to the Kampala City Authority Land Offices, where he induced her to sign transfer forms, transferring her land into his name. None of the family members were informed or involved in the transfer process. It was not until October 20, 2023, that Simon Sekivu, a son of Zawedde, visited his mother. He found her very sick. And as he was taking her to the hospital, the Appellant tried to stop him, while yelling that the son was stealing her to take her fingerprints and photographs so that he could transfer the land title into his name. It was only through the intervention of the Local Council members that the Appellant allowed Sekivu to take his mother to the hospital. The appellant's uncalled-for actions raised concerns about the safety of their mother's land. A search at the Land Office was done, which revealed that their mother had transferred her land in Kibuga Block 15 Plot 2420 at Kibuli to the Appellant's name in 2022.

The Appellant testified that his grandmother, presumably in consideration for his long-term care, gifted him the land in question through a deed in 2009. She had bought the land from Kalumba but did not transfer it into her name until 2011. In 2012, she allowed him to construct a permanent house on the land. In 2022, the Appellant transferred the land into his name.

The trial Magistrate convicted the Appellant. In her judgment, she found that:

a donation of registered land can only be completed upon signing transfer forms. It is not in contention that Zawedde Kulistina suffered a stroke in 2013 that made her non-functional. I also had the benefit of interacting with her, and the only words she is capable of saying in response to any question put to her are "do-do-do-do".

The transfer had badges of fraud, foremost, the documents submitted to the Land Office for transfer were partially signed. While the transfer form has a thumbprint, which was never verified by the prosecution, if it actually belonged to her, the application for consent transfer Land Form No.6 was never signed by Zawedde Kulisitina.

Having found as above, the Trial Magistrate fined the Appellant UGX 400,000. The Appellant was aggrieved by the judgment and filed the Appeal.

Grounds of Appeal

The grounds of Appeal are:

1. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when she entertained a civil suit in a criminal trial over a question of cadastral ownership by registration of land in Block 15 Plot 2024, Kibuli, Kampala district.

2. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when she failed to properly evaluate the evidence on the record and apply it to the law of the offence of obtaining registration by false pretences contrary to section 312 of the Penal Code Act.
3. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact when she convicted the appellant in the absence of the testimony of the victim Zawedde Kulistina named in the particulars of the charge sheet, occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
4. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when she came to the conclusion that Zawedde Kulistina was incapable of authorising any transfer into the names of Serugo Collins registered on certificate of title Block 15 Plot 2420.
5. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by relying on circumstantial evidence and assumptions in finding that Zawedde Kulistina did not authorise the transfer of land.
6. The learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact when she made a decision that the appellant's transfer of title was shrouded in fraud in the absence of testimony of the registrar of titles.
7. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused fraudulently transferred land into his name without evidence of fraud in the proceedings.

The grounds for appeal were repetitive and argumentative. Therefore, for this appeal, I have condensed them into two grounds. The revised grounds are –

1. The Trial Magistrate erred in both law and fact when she entertained a civil suit in a criminal trial over a question of cadastral ownership, involving the registration of land in Block 15, Plot 2024, Kibuli, Kampala District.
2. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate the evidence properly, and as such, wrongly convicted the Appellant.

Representation

The Appellant was represented by M/s A N Kigozi & Co Advocates. Ms. Joanita Tumwikirize, a Senior State Attorney in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, represented the Respondent.

Submission of the parties

Submissions of the Appellant

Ground I of Appeal

The Appellant submitted that ownership of land cannot be resolved in a criminal trial. He argued that the question of who owns Block 15 Plot 24 cannot be resolved through either a criminal prosecution or a civil trial. He referred me to the case of Kagorogoro vs. Rwesherekwa (1969) EA 426 to support his arguments. He stated that if the Magistrate had adhered to this legal principle, she should have dismissed the charges against him.

Ground II of Appeal

Counsel raised a multiplicity of arguments against the judgment of the lower court. I will endeavor to answer the relevant ones in this appeal.

Counsel argued that the Appellant was wrongly convicted of obtaining registration by false pretences contrary to section 312 of the Penal Code Act because the prosecution never presented evidence to demonstrate that he induced anyone, including Land Registry Staff, to transfer the land into his name. Secondly, the prosecution did not identify anyone in the charge sheet whom the Appellant allegedly induced. Thirdly, Christine Zawedde, who is the alleged victim, never testified that the Appellant induced her to transfer land into his name. Fourthly, the prosecution did not present medical evidence to demonstrate that Christine Zawedde was too ill to transfer her land to the Appellant logically.

Moreover, Counsel criticised the Trial Magistrate for unjustly disregarding all the defence testimony indicating that Christine Zawedde transferred land to the Appellant. He claimed that in 2009, Zawedde conveyed the land to the Appellant through a Gift Deed. He also mentioned that Christine Zawedde had the mental capacity to transfer the land and sign the transfer forms.

Additionally, counsel criticised the Trial Magistrate for including fraud among the elements necessary to establish a charge of obtaining registration by false pretences. He argued that even if fraud were an element, there was no way the Trial Magistrate could have concluded that the Appellant committed fraud when, in her judgment, she stated that the transfer of the land had a thumbprint that was never verified by the prosecution as belonging to Christine Zawedde. In conclusion, counsel asked the court to allow the Appeal.

Submissions of the Respondent

Ground I

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant was correctly charged with the criminal offence of obtaining registration by false pretences under Section 292 of the Penal Code Act. She stated that this conclusion was based on the evidence gathered in the matter. Therefore, she invited me to dismiss this ground of appeal.

II

Ms. Tumwikirize argued that the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant committed the offence of Obtaining Registration by false pretences, in violation of Section 292 of the Penal Code Act. She contended that in a charge of obtaining registration by false pretences, the prosecution must establish the following elements:

1. Willful and fraudulent procurement of registration.
2. The accused committed the offence.

On the first ingredient, she submitted that the prosecution led evidence to show that the appellant is now the registered owner of the land. Concerning the Appellant's denials that he never induced the grandmother to transfer the land into his name, counsel submitted that there is no way the grandmother could have signed the transfer forms when she suffered a stroke in 2013, which incapacitated her. She was also blind. Counsel submitted that the prosecution presented evidence showing that Zawedde was too ill to make any logical decisions. She referred to the interaction between Zawedde and the Trial Magistrate, where she could only say “do-do, do”; meaning that she was incapable of comprehending matters before her. She also pointed to the medical evidence showing that she was very ill. She submitted that, given her unsatisfactory mental state, the Appellant, as her caretaker, must have taken advantage of her illness to induce her to transfer the land into his name.

Regarding the Appellant's claim that Christine Zawedde allowed him to build on the land because she had given it to him, counsel submitted that this was not true. She stated that the gift deed never transferred title but allowed the Appellant to construct on the land. She argued that if Christine Zawedde had intended to give the Appellant the land, she could not have transferred the land into her name in 2011. Furthermore, she contended that the alleged donation of the land to the Appellant was questionable since none of Christine Zawedde's children were present or aware when she conveyed the land to the Appellant.

She dismissed the evidence of DW3, who testified that Christine Zawedde gave the Appellant land when she said, ‘do, do, do,’ as it cannot be translated to mean giving the Appellant land. Besides, DW3, in cross-examination, had been unable to specify when the land was transferred to the Appellant, despite being present with Christine Zawedde and the Appellant.

She submitted that although Christine Zawedde was not called as a witness, the Trial Magistrate interacted with her in court and found her speech incomprehensible, as she could not understand what she was saying. She said that in lieu thereof, the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence to show that she was unwell, and that the Appellant had unlawfully caused the transfer of the land into his name. She cited the case of *Omuroni vs. Uganda* (2002) 2 EA 508, at page 534, and *Kobusheshe vs. Uganda*, Court of Appeal, Criminal Appeal Number 110 of 2008. These cases are to the effect that a court may convict in the absence of the victim if there is sufficient evidence to prove the offence.

Lastly, counsel submitted that the failure by the Registrar of Land to testify did not undermine the prosecution's case that the registration of the land into the Appellant's name was shrouded in fraud. The certificate of title was initially in Christine Zawedde's name. The land was transferred into the appellant's name without her signature, and besides, the thumbprint of Christine Zawedde was missing on some of the documents used in the transfer.

Appellant's submissions in rejoinder

Counsel maintained that the appeal should be dismissed because Christine Zawedde transferred the land to the Appellant when she was not ill. He asserted that the Appellant began construction in 2012, when Christine Zawedde was healthy, and she never objected. Furthermore, although the medical evidence in Exhibit PEX3 indicated that Christine Zawedde suffered a stroke in 2013, she was able to express herself and thus make decisions, including giving away her land. Additionally, he submitted that the prosecution never contested the Gift Deed in which Christine Zawedde transferred the land to the Appellant. Finally, he contended that the Trial Magistrate's finding that the Appellant fraudulently transferred the land into his name contradicts the principles of natural justice, as the Appellant was never charged with fraud and therefore did not have an opportunity to defend himself.

Duty of the First Appellate Court

As this is a first appeal, it is my duty to subject the evidence at trial to fresh and

exhaustive scrutiny and to reappraise all the evidence on record before reaching my own decision. This principle was emphatically stated by the Supreme Court in *Kifamunte vs Uganda SCCA 10 of 1997*. The Court observed that:

The first appellate court has a duty to review the evidence of the case and reconsider the material before the trial judge. The Appellate court must make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it.

However, in doing so, I will have regard to the fact that, unlike the trial court, I never had the benefit of observing the demeanour of the witnesses.

Consideration of the Appeal

Ground I: The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when she entertained a civil suit in a criminal trial over a question of cadastral ownership, involving the registration of land in Block 15, Plot 2024, Kibuli, Kampala District.

The singular complaint of the Appellant is that the complaint against him was a civil matter that should not have been subjected to a criminal trial. The Respondent submitted that the evidence adduced showed that the Appellant had committed the offence of obtaining registration by false pretences, contrary to Section 292 of the Penal Code Act and therefore, was rightfully charged before the lower court.

In Sarah Kulata Basangwa vs Uganda, SCCA 03 of 2018, the Supreme Court addressed a case where the Appellant contested being charged with a criminal matter arising from the same facts that had been the subject of a civil lawsuit. The court, in dismissing her objection, held that:

We are in agreement with the Court of Appeal that criminal proceedings may emanate from the same facts but it doesn't deter prosecutors to institute criminal proceedings because the facts are similar to that of civil case.

Although the facts in the Busangwa case differ slightly from those in the current case, the principle that a set of facts can give rise to both civil and criminal cases is relevant to this case. The decision of the Supreme Court addresses this ground of appeal because the facts in the Appellant's case can attract both civil and criminal sanctions. In any case, the purpose of criminal law is to punish unlawful conduct, as in this case, where the Appellant is charged with inducing the complainant to transfer their property using false pretences. On the other hand, civil law can be used to restore the transferred title to the complainant's name. Furthermore, the Appellant cannot claim double jeopardy because criminal law is distinct from civil law, as the two typically seek different remedies. Ground I has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Ground II: Whether the Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate the evidence properly and, as such, wrongly convicted the Appellant.

The major complaint of the Appellant is that the Trial Magistrate failed to evaluate the evidence on the record and wrongly convicted him of obtaining registration by false pretences contrary to section 292 of the Penal Code Act. The Respondent supported the trial magistrate's finding and requested that I confirm the conviction.

Section 292 of the Penal Code Act provides that:

Any person who willfully procures or attempts to procure for himself or herself or for any other person any registration, licence or certificate under any law by any false pretence commits a misdemeanour and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term of one year.

The ingredients of the offence of obtaining registration by false pretences are:

1. Intentional or deliberate procurement or attempt to obtain any registration, license, or certificate for oneself or another individual.
2. The use of false pretences to procure and induce registration.
3. The accused is responsible.

However, as rightly observed by the Appellant, proof of fraud is not an element of the offence.

I will evaluate the evidence based on the elements of the offense, which I believe will address all the multiple grounds raised by the Appellant.

Intentional or deliberate procurement or attempt to obtain any registration, license, or certificate for oneself or another individual.

The prosecution's case in the lower court was that the Appellant registered himself as the proprietor of the land comprised in Kibuga Block 15, Plot 2420, at Kibuli, which had previously belonged to Christine Zawedde in 2022.

The Appellant admitted that he transferred this land into his name after his grandmother gave it to him, initially in a gift deed dated 2009, then verbally, and ultimately when she signed transfer forms, conveying her interest in the land to him. The Appellant testified that he took Christine Zawedde to the Land Office, where she transferred the land into his name. A certificate of title was presented in court, confirming that the land was transferred from Christine Zawedde in Kibuga Block 15, Plot 2420, at Kibuli, to the Appellant.

From the testimony of the prosecution and defence, there is no doubt that the Appellant deliberately and willfully caused Christine Zawedde to transfer land located in Kibuga Block 15, Plot 2420, at Kibuli into his name. A certificate of title was presented to confirm the transfer. This resolves the first ingredient in the Respondent's favour.

Use of false pretences to procure and induce the registration

The prosecution's case was that the appellant transferred Christine Zawedde's land into his name using false pretences. The prosecution called three witnesses to prove the allegations. Simon Sekivu (PW1) and Lubowa Joseph (PW2), both sons of Christine Zawedde, testified that the appellant is their nephew who was looking after their mother, who was unwell. They stated that their mother, who had suffered a stroke and was blind, was so unwell that she was not in the proper mental condition to give her land to the appellant. They concluded that the appellant must have taken advantage of her illness to cause her to transfer the land into his name. Furthermore, they testified that their mother could not have given the appellant land without informing or notifying other family members. The prosecution also presented medical records from various hospitals detailing Zawedde's illness in court.

Sgt. Mukwaya David James(PW3), a police officer and the investigating officer, testified that the Appellant was registered on the land title using transfer forms dated 30th June 2022. The land was transferred into the Appellant's name on 22nd July 2022, using transfer forms thumb-printed by Christine Zawedde and a Gift Deed, which she signed in favour of the Appellant to transfer the land. PW3 presented certified copies of the documents the Appellant used to transfer the land into his name. In his investigation, PW3 noted that the family in this case was divided, with some children supporting the Gift Deed while others held contrary views. Christine Zawedde, who is at the centre of this matter, was not called as a witness after the Trial Magistrate interviewed her and found her too incoherent to understand.

On the other hand, the defence's case was that Christine Zawedde gave the Appellant the land in a gift deed dated 2009 and later on signed transfer forms which enabled him to register himself. The Appellant testified that his grandmother gave him this land in 2009. After this, she signed transfer forms for him, culminating in the transfer of the land into his name. He also testified that his grandmother had allowed him to build a storeyed house on the land in 2012, which the

prosecution witnesses acknowledged was on the land. Musa Ssali, DW2, testified that he was present when the grandmother wrote an agreement giving the land to the Appellant. Nambalirwe Betty, DW3, a granddaughter of Zawedde, testified that she was present when her grandmother gave the Appellant the land in 2018. She said that her grandmother said, 'do, do, do,' to signal that she had given the Appellant the land in question.

Before going into the merits of whether the Appellant used false pretences to procure registration of the land into his name, it is essential to address the legality of the Gift Deed, which is at the centre of this appeal.

Christine Zawedde executed a gift deed in 2009, in favour of the Appellant. A translation of the deed was received in evidence as Exhibit PEX6. The deed states -

I, Zawedde Kulistina, a resident of Kibuli Market B, Zone, hereby make this agreement without being coerced. I hereby permit my grandchild, Sengo (Serugo) Colline, to construct a house on my land, which is located at Kibuli, in Lubuga Zone. No one should distract him, be it my children, any other person, or my relative.

Witnesses

Kalumba Geoffrey

Musa Ssali

Mariam

Does this gift deed meet the legal requirements? A gift deed is a legal instrument that transfers ownership of property from one person(donor) to another (donee) without exchange of money or valuable consideration. In **Matovu and Others v. Igga & Others [2024] UGHC990**, the court said that a Gift Deed must meet the following criteria:

1. The donor must have the intention to give the gift;
2. The donor must intend to give the gift.
3. The donor must transfer the gift by executing a legally appropriate instrument based on the nature of land ownership; and
4. The donee must accept the gift.

The Gift Deed in the subject case does not fall within the legal parameters of a Deed because Kulistina Zawedde, the donor, never transferred the land to the Appellant. Instead, the deed granted the appellant a license to build on the land. Therefore, the Appellant cannot use this Deed to assert legal proprietary rights in the land. For the purposes of this trial, the gift deed will be treated as a license to construct on the land.

Whether the Appellant induced Zawedde by false pretences to transfer land to him

Having resolved the legal status of the deed, the key question for the court to answer is whether the Appellant induced Christine Zawedde by false pretences to transfer the land into his name. Section 282 of the Penal Code Act defines false pretence as :

Any representation made by words, writing or conduct, of a matter of fact, either past or present, which representation is false in fact, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true, is a false pretence.

False pretence implies behaviour that is intended to deceive or mislead others into parting with something of value to their detriment. The maker of the statement or action must know that it is inaccurate or untruthful, and they must intend for the complainant to act on the statement or action to their disadvantage.

In this case, the prosecution argued that the Appellant took advantage of his grandmother, who had suffered a stroke and subsequently lost her mental faculties and sight, to mislead her into transferring the land into his name. The prosecution presented medical evidence detailing Christine Zawedde's illness. The records indicated that Zawedde was **inter alia** suffering from hypertension, or high blood pressure. She also had an ailment that rendered her blind. On 23rd January 2024, Dr. Mwebaze Raymond, one of the medical personnel attending to Zawedde, stated in the medical reports that although she had suffered a stroke, she still maintained some degree of understanding. On the other hand, the Appellant maintained that his grandmother had voluntarily given him the land and, therefore, had lawfully transferred it to his name.

The prosecution bore the legal burden of proving that the Appellant obtained registration through false pretences or, in other words, that he induced Zawedde to transfer the land through deceptive means. Although the prosecution endeavoured to convince the court that the Appellant took advantage of his mother's illness to register the land in his name, its case fell short in the following ways.

Firstly, although the prosecution's case was that the Appellant took advantage of an ailing Christine Zawedde to induce her to transfer her land into the Appellant's name, it failed to present material evidence demonstrating the extent of her ailment. Understandably, the prosecution was unable to call Zawedde to testify due to her illness at the time of her court appearance. However, this was not fatal, as other witnesses could have been called to provide evidence in her place. See: **Kobusheshe vs. Uganda, Court of Appeal, Criminal Appeal Number 110 of 2008.**

I am aware that the prosecution presented medical records to verify Zawedde's illness through PW1 and PW2 (her sons). However, the medical reports were not properly introduced into the record in accordance with the law. The medical personnel who examined Zawedde and wrote the notes should have been called as witnesses to testify and explain their findings and assessment of the patient. Their explanation would have allowed the defence to cross-examine the medical personnel and possibly bring additional or alternative testimony to challenge the prosecution's

case. The prosecution would have re-examined them to clarify matters, and the court would have had the chance to ask relevant questions and determine whether the Appellant induced and or misled Zawedde into signing off the land into the Appellant's names.

Alternatively, the prosecution should have called some of the medical personnel who had treated Zawedde over the last decade or any other competent medical experts to illustrate the extent to which the ailment had affected her and to help the court understand the impact of this ailment on her ability to make crucial decisions, such as giving away her property. Medical evidence would have been beneficial for the court in determining the effect of the stroke on the elderly woman and explaining the speed of her deterioration. It would also clarify the capacity of her mental faculties to engage and make decisions.

Secondly, the prosecution failed to call vital witnesses from the Land Registry to demonstrate how the Appellant was registered as the proprietor of the subject land. I appreciate that PW3 obtained certified copies of the land file relating to the land transfer. However, his evidence fell short of detailing the processes through which Christine Zawedde transferred her land to the Appellant. I am sure the Land Registry has an in-built mechanism.

Suppose the Land Registry staff were difficult to reach. In that case, the prosecution should have summoned Nyanzi, the Advocate who witnessed the transaction and, more specifically, swore that he was present and saw Christine Zawedde affix her thumbprint on the transfer forms. Nyanzi's testimony would have shed more light on the circumstances under which Zawedde signed the transfers. He would have explained whether she signed the forms voluntarily and fully understood what she was doing, or whether it was a case of fraud.

Thirdly, the prosecution paid little attention to the license Christine Zawedde granted the Appellant to build on the land. The Appellant began construction in 2012, when Zawedde had not yet suffered a stroke. She was present, and neither she nor her children objected to the Appellant constructing a storeyed building on the land. The prosecution needed to address this to eliminate any doubts regarding Zawedde's intentions, as the Appellant had been looking after her for a long time. Might Zawedde have changed her mind to give the Appellant the land in consideration for his services?

Fourthly, the investigation and prosecution in this case were carried out properly. The investigators failed to interview key witnesses. The prosecutor did not adhere to established procedures to ensure the chain of evidence and its integrity. Evidence, specifically medical reports and those from the Land Registry, was merely placed on the bench without consideration for causation or the chain of evidence, resulting in a questionable admission of exhibits. In the future, cases of this kind should perhaps be handled by staff in the Serious Fraud department of CID to achieve better results.

Turning to the defence testimony, I found it so contradictory and inconsistent that it would require significant purging to be of value.

The Appellant stated that his grandmother donated land to him in 2009. He said she first gave him the land verbally and then in writing. He added that Madina, a lawyer, helped his (grand) mother sign the transfer forms. In cross-examination, he stated that his grandmother's children witnessed her giving him the land, but none signed. He said he was given the land in 2012. He did not transfer it until 2022. He mentioned that he only notified his father, Mutesasira, about the land donation. He did not recall whether he signed the transfer forms in the Land Office. Musa Ssali DW 2 states that he witnessed Christine Zawedde giving the Appellant the land in 2009 through a written agreement. He signed the agreement. Nambalirwa Betty (DW 3), a granddaughter of Christine Zawedde, testified that in 2018, her grandmother gave titles to Collins. She said "Do, do do" to mean that she had given the title to Collins.

The testimony of the defence witnesses is incoherent. While the Appellant claims that he was given the land in 2012, Nambalirwa states that the Appellant received the title to the land in 2018. Secondly, the Appellant asserts that he did not transfer the land in 2012, as he had received it. This contradicts Nambalirwa's testimony, which states that the Appellant was given the title to the land in 2018.

Thirdly, although the Appellant claimed that Madina, a lawyer, assisted his grandmother in signing the transfer forms, the exhibited transfer forms do not bear Christine Zawedde's signature. They have her thumbprint, and Madina is not mentioned anywhere. Kiyimba Hassan, an advocate, is stated to have witnessed Christine Zawedde affix her thumbprint to the transfer forms. See the Certificate of Attestation dated 30th June 2022.

Fourthly, while the Appellant stated that Zawedde's children were present when she gave him the land, the other defence witnesses assert otherwise. Fifthly, the Madina listed as a witness in the Gift Deed is not a lawyer. Lastly, while the Appellant did not mention that the grandmother had given him the titles in 2018, Nambalirwa stated that the grandmother indicated this by saying "do, do, do" to signify that she had given him the land.

In the final analysis, the evidence presented by the prosecution fell short of establishing that the Appellant had induced Zawedde to transfer her land into his. In a result, the Appellant was wrongly convicted by the Trial Magistrate. Ground II succeeds.

Decision

The Appeal substantially succeeds except ground I, which was dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant are set aside. In case the Appellant has paid the fine of UGX 400,000 imposed on him, I direct that it be refunded to him after the period for appealing against this decision has elapsed. It is so ordered.

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Gadenya Paul Wolimbwa

JUDGE

14th May 2025

I request the Registrar of the Criminal Division to deliver this decision on 19th May 2025.

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Gadenya Paul Wolimbwa

JUDGE

14th May 2025

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