[2025] UGCA 114

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OFAPPEAL OF UGANDAAT KAMPALA CML APPLICATION No. 60 OF 2025 (ARISING FROM CIVILAPPEAL No. 72 OF 2025)

# I. UGANDA RETIREMENT BENEFITS REGU LATORY AUTHORITY (URBRA)

- 2. HON. BIGIRWAJULIUS JUNJURA - 3. MUTEBI DAVID RONNIE - 4. NINSIIMA RONAH RITA - 5. DR. MARY KANYIGINYATIZIKARA - 6. RITA NANSASI WASSWA APPLICANTS

Vs

#### MARTIN ANTHONY NSUBUGA RESPONDENT

# RULING OF CHRISTOPHER GASHIRABAKE JA. (SINGLE JUSTICE)

#### Introduction

t1] The applicants brought this application under Rules 2 and 6 ofthe Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions seeking:

- a) an order of stay of execution pending the hearing and determination of their appeal. - b) Costs of the application be providedfor

t2) The application is supported by affidavits deponed by the 2nd Applicant, the 6th Applicant and the Honourable Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, (herein after referred to as the Minister) who though not a party to this appeal was a party in the original cause at the High Court. The role of the Minister will become clear later in this ruling.

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t3] The 2"d Applicant's affidavit attached a consent form signed by 3'd - 5tt' Appticants authorizing the 2"d applicant to depone the affidavit on their behalf. The Respondent filed an affidavit in reply and an affidavit in sur rejoinder upon obtaining leave of court to respond to new matters brought to this court in the 2nd applicant, the 6'h applicant and Hon. Minister's affidavits in rejoinder.

#### Representations

I4l At the hearing, Mr. Ham Mugenyi represented the Applicants while Mr. Kabiito Karamagi and Mr. Martin Kakuru represented the Respondent. The parties filed written submissions which were adopted as their legal arguments.

#### Backgro u nd

t5] The l'' Applicant is a statutory authority established under Section 2 of the Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority (URBRA) Act. Section 4 of the Act stipulates the objective for which the l " Applicant was established to be:

'The supervision and regulation of the establishment, management and operation of retirement benefits schemes and protect the interest of members and beneficiaries of retirement benefits schemes in Uganda'

t6] Section 15 of the Act provides for the appointment of the Authority's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) by the Minister on the recommendations of the l " Applicant's Board, for a term of 5 years. However, Section l7 of the Act, provides that that appointed Chief Executive Officer is eligible for reappointment for a one more term of 5 years. The 1" Applicant's Board is established under Section 8 of the Act under which the Minister is required to appoint the following to constitute the Board:

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- a) the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry responsible for Finance or hts or her representative, - b) the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry responsible for Labour or his or her representative, - c) the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry responsible for Public Service or his or her representative; and - d) four (4) persons not being public officers, who knowledgeable or experienced in matters relating to the administration of retirement benefits schemes, banking, insurance, finance, law, accounting, economic or actuarial studies. - e) The ChiefExecutive Officer appointed under section ¹⁵

l7l The 2 - 5th Applicants were until recently the 4 members appointed by the Minister to serve on the Board along with the three public oflicials listed above.

t8l The Respondent was appointed by the Minister in exercise of this power under Sectionl5 and served as the Authority's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for an initial 5-year term that expired on l4'h May 2019. Before the expiry of this term, the Respondent applied to the l't Applicant's Board for recommendation to the Minister for his reappointment as Chief Executive Offrcer. On the 8'h May 2024,, the I't Applicant's Board sat and declined to recommend his reappointment. The Board also decided to advertise the vacancy of the position of CEO and further recommended the 6'h Applicant to the Minister for appointment as Acting CEO upon the expiry of the Respondent's term in office.

t9] Thereafter, the Respondent commenced Miscellaneous Cause No. 78 of 2024 at the High Court seeking a judicial review of the Board's aforesaid decisions alleging acts of illegality, bias, bad faith and other acts of procedural impropriery by the Board and 2nd - 5'h Applicants. On 14th May 2024, that day being the last

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day on his contract, the Respondent obtained an interim Order from the High Court that was meant to preserve the status quo. However, it would appear that the 6rh Applicant took office nonetheless on the strength of an issued appointment by the Minister.

[0] On 3l" January 2025, the High Court delivered judgment in favour of the Respondent and issued a writ of certiorari quashing and reversing the Board's decision declining to recommend to the Minister the renewal of the Respondent's appointment. Similarly, the Court quashed and reversed the decision appointing the 61h Applicant as acting Chief Executive Officer of the 1'r Appticant for the reason that the same had been in contravention of the court order.

[11] The Court also made a finding that the 2nd - 5rh Applicants lacked the statutory qualifications required under Section 8 of the Act to be appointed to the l" Applicant's Board. The Court therefbre issued a Prohibition Order stopping the Applicants from performing duties of the Board and further ordered the Minister to appoint persons with the requisite qualifications to the 1'r Applicant's Board.

[12) The Minister, by his own conduct of deponing affidavits in support of this application, appears reluctant to implement the Order of the High Court requiring him to replace the 2nd - 5th applicants with the persons possessed of the requisite qualifications. The result of this is that the l" Applicant's Board remains incomplete and improperly constituted.

### a) Submissions of Counsel for the Applicants

[13] Counsel fbr the Appticants submitted that this Court had wide discretion under Rule 6(2) of this Court's Rules to grant an order of stay ofexecution where a notice of appeal had been tlled under Rule72 of the Rules, on such terms as it

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deems fit. Counsel also referred this Court to Rule 2(2) of the Rules which give this court the discretion to make any such orders necessary to meet the ends of justice.

[4] Counsel relied on Hon. Theodore Ssekikubo & ors V. Attorney General & Anor , Constitutional Application No. 6 of 2013 to outline the following principles and guidelines that court must consider in an application fbr stay of execution;

- a) The applicanl must establish that his appeal has a likelihood of success, or a primafacie case of his right of appeal - b) It must also be established that the applicant will suffer irreparable damage or that the appeal will be rendered nugatory ifa stay is not granted. - c) If I and 2 above are not established, the court must consider where the balance of convenience lies. - d) The applicant must also establish that his appeal has been instituted without delay.

[5] Counsel argued that the applicants' appeal stood a likelihood of success as the original suit had been commenced to investigate the process leading to the Board's decision to decline the Respondent's reappointment, yet the trial Judge had delved entirely into matters of the 2"d -5'r' Applicant's qualifications. Counsel also contended that the trial Judge had not properly evaluated the evidence regarding the 2nd - 5tl' Applicants' qualifications upon which the Minister determined and found them adequately knowledgeable and experienced to perform the duties ofthe Board. Counsel argued that the trial Judge failed to consider the Minister's

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discretionary powers to appoint the 6tr' applicant as acting Chief Executive Officer after the expiry of the Respondent's contract.

[6] Counsel pointed this court to the governance vacuum that has been created by the High Court orders. Counsel contended that the absence of a fully constituted Board exposed the l'1 Applicant to the risk of financial [oss, vagaries of ineffective and inefficient management that could adversely affect public interest under the l't Applicant's management. Counsel therefore entreated this court to grant a stay and reinstate the 2"d - 5'r' Applicants to office arguing that the process of obtaining new members as directed by High Court was lengthy and laborious and stood to expose the 1" Applicant to risk of irreparable loss for an unnecessarily long period.

U7l Counsel for the Applicants also submitted that they stood to suffer irreparable damage to their personal reputations if they were not restored to their respective positions, and that their appeal would be rendered nugatory in the event that the same was decided in their favour. Lastly, the applicants argued that the balance of convenience tilts in their favour given that they have a running Board term that expires in 2027. The applicants also argue that the balance of convenience favours the grant to stay given the length and laborious process required for the constitution of a new Board.

### a) Counsel for the Respondent's Submissions

[8] Counsel for the Respondent opposed this Application arguing that the application was incurably defective because the orders sought are ambiguous because the application did not state the judgment, decree, ruling or order whose execution the applicant seeks to stay. Counsel pointed out that the supporting

amdavits do not attach a copy of the order or ruling whose orders were intended to be stayed. Counsel invited Court to examine this supposed defect in the manner that it would while establishing a cause of action in a plaint under Order 6 Rule 30 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In this regard Counsel relied on this Court decision in Kapeka Coffee Works Ltd Vs. NPART, Civil Appeal No. 53 of 2000.

[9] The Respondent's counsel also pointed this Court to the ambiguity in the applicants' motion and supporting affidavits that made it unclear where the applicant sought an interim or substantive order of stay of execution.

[20] The Respondent argued in the alternative that the orders made in High Court Miscellaneous Cause No. 78 of 2024 took immediate effect. As such, they could not be entbrced by way of execution, and therefore, the remedy of stay of execution was unavailable to the applicants in this case. Counsel relied on Finasi/Roko Construction SPV Ltd & anor Versus Roko Construction ltd, Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 220 ol 2019 and Mugenyi and Co. Advocates v National Insurance Corporation, Court of Appeal Civil Appea! No. 13 of 1984.

[21 ] Counsel further submitted that the application offended Rule 42( I ) of the Rules of this Court as it was not first heard at the High Court. Counsel pointed out that the applicants had not fumished any reasons for the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Rule a2 (l). He further relied on the decisions in AIDS Health Foundation Vs. Dr Stephen Mirembe Kizito, CA No. 147 of 2014 and PK Sengendo Versus Busulwa Lawrence and anor, Court of Appeal Civil Application No.207 ot2Ol4 to have the application dismissed.

[22) As regards the substance of the application itself, Counsel argued the same had no merit because it did not satisfy the conditions set in Hon. Theodore

Ssekikubo & ors Versus AG & Anor(supra). Addressing the propriety of the Minister's appointment of the 6'h Applicant, Counsel argued that the impropriety of the appointment was not in the absence of the Minister's powers to make the appointment but in the fact that that appointment was backdated and made in violation of an interim order made by the Court on 14th May 2024 in the presence of the 6'h Applicant and counsel fbr the I't Applicant.

t23) Tuming to the disqualification of the 2nd - 5'h Applicants from the l" Applicant's Board, Counsel argued that their appeal stood little likelihood of success because the qualification presented by the 2nd and 3'd Appticant did not meet the requirements set out in S. 8 of the URBRA Act. As regards the 4'h and 5tl' Applicants, Counsel argued that their appeal was moot because they didn't fumish any qualifications to satisry the requirements of S.8 of the Act.

l24l On the issue of irreparable damage, Counsel argued that the mandate of the l" Applicant required that only persons that were properly qualified as provided under S.8 of the Act be appointed to the Authority's Board. In other words, maintaining persons without the requisite qualifications on the Board is an illegality that should not be sustained.

[25] In response to the fears of the govemance vacuum created by the High Court order, Counsel argued that this was created by the Minister who had refused/failed to comply with the order to appoint a Board with the proper qualifications that would then regularize the appointment of the CEO.

126l Counsel pointed this Court to the advice of the Attomey General to the Minister to replace the 2"d - 5'r' Applicants on the Board and the directives of the Cabinet that directed the reappointment of the Respondent to office. On this basis, counsel also submitted that the balance of convenience favours the Respondent

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given the Govemment had demonstrated commitment to implement the decrsron of the High Court.

l27l Lastly, Counsel argued that this application was an abuse of Court process out of which the applicants seek to legitimize their iltegal stay in office. The Respondent referred this court to the applicant's antecedents including their violation of court orders and what he termed as 'schemes of impropriety'.

#### b) Counsel for the Applicant's Submissions in Rejoinder

[28] Counsel for the applicant contended in rejoinder that the orders sought lacked any ambiguity stating affirmatively that that application and the supporting afidavits sought orders of a stay of execution pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal and costs for the application.

[29] Counsel conceded that the application did not comply with Rule 42(1) of this Court's rules but there were exceptional circumstances that allow for this Court to entertain this application. Counsel cited Falcon Estates Ltd vs Bismillah Trading Ltd, Misc. Application 104 of 2015 and Hajji Edhiruma Said vs Kabaale Florence, Civil Application 586 of 2014 where this Court has entertained similar applications in special and probably rare circumstances without the same having been heard at the High Court.

[30] Counsel then proceeded to elaborate the special circumstances and referred to the manner in which the High Court handled the applications for an interim order and the temporary injunction that were filed before it. The Applicants argued that the interim order was made without atTording them an opportunity to file an affidavit in reply. Further, counsel submitted that the parties did not file submissions in the matter.

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[31] The Applicants also submitted that they contested the legality of this Order in the substantive application for a temporary injunction, but the High Court did not deliver a ruling in the matter. Specificatty, counsel submitted that the order should not have been issued given that the Respondent's contract had expired. Counsel also referred this court to the urgency of the situation in the 1't Applicant's govemance given that the Minister is now functioning as the Board and CEO.

l32l Finally, Counsel for the Applicants entreated court to exercise its discretion in pursuit of equity and laimess with regard to the ground in support of the application. Counsel cited Kisembo Emmanuel and Ors vs Tibezinda Moses & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 250 of 2O16 in which this Court declined to strike out an appeal on a preliminary objection so as to adjudicate the matter on its merits. The applicants then reiterated their grounds for the application and relied on this Court's decision in Lubega Moses Vs Nassimbwa Sylvia, Civil Appeal No. 122 of 2024 in addition to Hon. Theodore Ssekikubo (supra).

## c) Counse! for the Respondent's suhmissions in sur rejoinder

[33] In their rejoinder to the Applicant's submissions above, Counsel for the Respondent argued that the applicants' special circumstances for not filing this application in the High Court were not specifically pleaded. Counsel contended that the applicants had only introduced the subject in their submission in rejoinder which amounted to adducing evidence at the Bar.

[34] Addressing the facts alleged to be the special circumstances, counsel submitted that the interim order was issued to maintain a status quo given that the Respondent's contract had not expired but was due to do so that day. Counsel reiterated that the 6th Applicant and her counsel who also represented the l"

10 C.1dd'A Applicant were in court the day that the Order was issued and did not contest the respondent's submissions on the status quo that was to be protected.

t35] Counsel also referred this court to the averments made by the Minister in his affidavit in rejoinder that was filed after the Respondent had filed his submissions and this is reason for which this court granted leave to file submission in sur rejoinder. The averments made by the Minister stated that the Respondent was not fit to be the l'r Respondent's CEO because an investigation had established that he had caused financial loss to the organization. Counsel stated that the subject of financial loss ought not to be a matter of this appeal because the issue was never brought to the attention of the trial court, and the matter was not a basis for the Board's refusal to recommend the renewal of his contract.

#### Analysis

[36] It is not contested that Rules 2(2) and 6(2) (b) give this Court wide discretion to stay execution pending appeal. Both parties have relied on Hon. Theodore Ssekikubo & Ors Versus AG & Anor (supra) which I have reviewed and find helpful in the resolution of this matter. The issue for me is whether the Applicants have satisfied the conditions for the grant stay ofexecution as stated in the above authority. Before I address the substance of these conditions, I find it pertinent to address what I consider three preliminary issues raised by the Respondent.

### a) Preliminary Objections

# i. Ambiguity of the Orders being sought

[37] I have considered the submission made by both counsel and find that the application and its supporting affidavits do indeed offer significant confusion about

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what the application seeks to achieve. While the orders in the Motion refer to a prayer for a substantive stay of execution, ground 6 on the other hand refers to a prayer for a grant of an interim stay of execution. In addition, ground 2 refers to a filing of another substantive application for a stay of execution.

[38] Furthermore, paragraph l4 ofthe 2'd Applicant's aflldavit is clearly deponed in support of an application for an interim order stay of execution/order of an injunction. I also agree that the motion does not disclose sufficient information about the High Court Orders sought to be stayed. It certainly would have brought helpful ctarity if the applicants had attached an order or ruling to their supporting aflldavits.

[39] This court therefore finds merit in counsel for the Respondent's submissions that the import of these averments and statements is confusing as a respondent would not know whether to responded to an interim or substantive application.

[40] While I find merit in the counsel's submissions, I have weighed the consequences of a dismissal of the application at this stage and opt to exercise the rarity of my discretion after considering the public interest in the 1'1 Applicant's business that are now at stake. This objection is therefore overruled.

#### ll. Application ought to have been made at the High Court

[4 ^I] ^Ihave considered Rule 42( I ) of this Court's Rules and there appears to be no contest about the fact that the applicants are in its breach. The issue to consider is whether the applicants have fumished special circumstances for this Court to exercise its discretion and entertain the apptication. I note that nothing in the Applicants' submissions and affidavits in support make any justification to the contravention of Rule 42 of this court's Rules. I would therefore agree that the

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justification fumished in this regard is a knee jerk reaction to the Respondent's submissions highlighting the deficiency in the applicant's case.

l42l Having said that , the justification itself is hardly comforting given that it rotates around the interim order that the Applicants claim to have been issued in error or irregularly, yet the High Court found the Applicants to have acted in its breach. I have considered the Applicant's justifications for the first instance filing in this Court as well as the objections of the Respondent and determined in another rarity of this Court's discretion that the interests of the public are better served by determining the matter on the merits of this case. Accordingly, this objection is also ovemrled.

#### I . High Court Orders incapable of being stayed.

[43] According to the ruling and the extracted order attached to the Respondent's affidavit in reply, the High Court made the following orders that I find necessary to reproduce below.

a) An Order of Certiorari doth issue quashing;

- i. The decision of the 2'd Respondent s Board made on 8'h May ²⁰²⁴ declining to recommend to the I't Respondent the renewal of the Applicantb appointment as Chief Executive Oficer of the 2'd Respondent. - The decision of the 2'd Respondent's Board made on 8'h May 2024 to externally advertise the vacancy of the position of Chief Executive Oficer of the 2'd Respondent v)ithout evaluating the Applicant ^s expression of interest in his reappointment in accordance with the

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Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority Act and the 2nd Respondent s Human Resource Manual.

- ut. The decision o.f the 2'd Respondent s Board made on 8th May 2024 recommending to the l't Respondent the appointment of the 7th Respondent as Acting Chief Executive Oficer of the 2'd Respondent. - b) By these Certiorari Orders hereby given above, the status quo ante i.e. the siluation that existed before the above quashed orders, is hereby restored. - c) An Order of Prohibition doth issue against: - The 3'd, 4'h, 5'h and 6h Respondents from performing any duties as members of the 2nd Respondent h Board with immediate effect. Accordingly, the I't Respondent should appoint persons with the requisite qualifications set out under Section 8 of the Uganda Retirement Benefits and Regulatory Authority Act. l. - ll The 7'h Respondent from continuing to execute the duties of the Chief Lrecutive Oficer of the 2nd Respondent. - d) The decision ofthe I't Respondent to disregard the Order ofCourt stopping the removal of the Applicant from ofice of Chief Executiye Oficer of the 2'd Respondent was contemptuous. Accordingly, the I't Respondent is hereby cautioned. - e) The Applicant is awarded costs of the Application

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l44l As the applicants seek an order of stay of execution pending the determination of their appeal, the issue for this court to consider is whether the above orders can be enfbrced by way ofexecution. In Finasi/Roko Construction SPV Ltd & anor Versus Roko Construction ltd (supra),Court ruled that orders for stay of execution can only be issued where the judgment or decree was capable of execution in the manner provided for under the Civit Procedure Act.

[45] Execution itself is a court process that requires the application of a warrant or an order of enforcement in the manner provided by law. Indeed, as submitted by counsel for the Respondent, the Civil Procedure Act stipulates specific modes of execution and these include delivery of property specifically decreed, attachment and sale, or sale without attachment of any property, attachment of debts, arrest and detention in prison of any person, and appointing a receiver.

146l That being the case, I do not see how any of the orders made above can be enforced by way of execution as envisaged under the law. As Counsel for the Applicants appears to concede that, save the order for costs, all other orders took immediate effect without any requirement for further intervention of Court by way of execution proceedings. The Court in Finasi/Roko (supra), defined such orders as absolute orders that can only be set aside or suspended.

[47) It therefore appears that this application must fail on this account. I will now proceed to consider the substance of the application and determine whether I can exercise any discretion in the matter given the public interest nature of the l't Applicant's affairs.

### b) Substantive Consideration

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[48] It is not in issue that the applicants have filed a notice ofappeal in this Court. It also does not appear in issue that the notice was filed without delay. To that end, two of the five conditions set out in Hon. Theodore Ssekikubo (supra) are duly satisfied. What then remains to be considered are the following;

# Whether applicants' intended appeal has any likelihood of success.

l49l The issue that appears pivotal to this appeal is the application of the Ministers powers to appoint Board members that meet the qualifications stipulated under S. 8 (l) (d) of the URBRA Act. It is apparent to me that the 2nd - 5th Applicants strongly contend that they meet those qualifications. However, the court having undertaken a hearing ofthe matter found that that they do not.

t50l This Court notes though that only the 2nd and 3'd Applicants furnished evidence of their academic qualifications and experience as Ex Parliamentarians to prove that they have the required qualifications and experience to serve of the Board. At this stage, it is not for this Court to predetermine the merits of the case. This coun's role is to determine the likelihood of success.

t51l That being said, this court finds that at the very least the 2nd and 3"r Applicants appear to have an arguable case. However, this court cannot quite say the same with certainty for the 4th and 5th Applicants after their having failed to fumish evidence of their qualifications during trial. Accordingly, the 4th and 5th applicants have failed to satisfo this condition.

l52l This Court also notes that the 6th applicant who holds the substantive position of Board Secretary and Chief Legal Manager, has appealed the decision nullifying her appointment as Ag. CEO, the High Court having found that the same was in violation of its interim order. The Court order attached to the Respondent's

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affidavit bears witness that a one Ms. Doris Kahuura appeared in the hearing as Counsel for the l " and 6'h Applicants on the day the order was issued. Accordingly, the 6'h Appticant also fails this condition.

[53] Finally, this Court finds little, if any, that the substance of the 2nd - 6th applicants' appeals have to do with the 1" Applicant itself given that their main contest appears to be about the supposed enforcements of their individual rights. The Learned Aftomey General rendered an opinion dated l0'r'February 2025 addressed to the Minister and the 6'h Applicant, in her official capacity as the l " Applicant's Chief Legal Manager/ Board Secretary, advising against an appeal. The Leamed Attomey General instead advised the Minister and the 6th Applicant to comply with the Court Order and regularize the appointment of a CEO. The Attomey General is the Principal legal adviser of the Govemment per Article I l9 (3) of the Constitution 1995 as amended. Therefore, this condition is also unsatisfied as against the 1'' Applicant.

## ii. Irreparabledamage.

[54] Both parties have expressed concem for the leadership vacuum at the l'' Applicant and urged court to consider the same in determining the issue of irreparable damage. The issue for this court is whether this court can issue an order that preserves the applicants in office despite the High Coun Orders that find them unqualified and unfit for the positions they seek to hold on. I find this unsafe to do so given the important public mandate of the l" Applicant. I find it most puzzling that a govemment Minister has chosen to defend them, in total disregard of the Attomey General's advice.

[55] I am fortified in this finding by the uncontested advice of the Hon. Attomey General to the Minister to appoint new members to the Board and unlock the l'1

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Applicant from this impasse. Evidently the Aftomey General does not share the Minister's concems on the elaborate process of appointing a new Board.

t56l I am further fortified in my finding by the Cabinet directive (annexture F to the Respondent's affidavit in reply) issued to the Minister' This directive was forwarded to the Minister by the Head of Public Service and Secretary to Cabinet by a lefter dated 5'r' November 2024. The directive expressly directed for the retention of the Respondent in office and further invited the Minister to meet the President over the retention of the 2"d Applicant as Chairperson of the Board in view of intelligence reports received about him.

{SZl As I am satisfied that the executive arm of government is working on ^a solution that will solve this leadership problem, I find that granting an order of stay/injunction in the matter witl derail Government's resolution process and spur even more confusion. Therefore, if the Minister's concerns for the public are legitimate, he should work closely with the Attomey General as the Principal legal adviser and his colleagues in cabinet to expeditiously comply with their directives.

t58] I have considered the potential irreparable damage that the 2nd, 3'd and 6th Applicants' reputation could suffer if this application is not granted. But I find the interests ofsavers and pensioners that the l" Applicant protects, the public interests lar outweigh this consideration.

#### iii. Balance of Convenience.

t59l This court has also taken into consideration the opinion of the Attorney General and noted the advice given to the Minister to implement the Orders of the High Court.

t60] The balance of convenience is to allow for this process to continue to retum normalcy at the l't Applicant and protect the interest of savers, pensioners and the

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national economy. Therefore, the Minister ought to respect the constitutional function of the Leamed Attomey General and respect his legal opinion on this matter. Similarly, he ought to respect the decisions of Cabinet and take measures to comply with them.

[61] In the result, I find no reason to interfere with the Orders of the High Court at this stage. The status quo ante the Board decision made on 8'h May 2024 shall continue to prevail at the I't Applicant as was ordered by the High Court.

[62] Accordingly, this application is dismissed .

[63] The parties shall bear their costs in this application.

Dated, signed and delivered this ?-alt^ day of ...2025.

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Christopher Gashira6ake JUSTICE OFAPPEAL.