[1951] EACA 147

### COURT OF APPEAL FOR EASTERN AFRICA

Before Sir BARCLAY NIHILL, President, SIR G. GRAHAM PAUL, C. J. (Tanganyika), and LOCKHART-SMITH, J. of A.

### JAMES s/o YARAM, Appellant

$\mathbf{v}$ .

## REX. Respondent

# Criminal Appeal No. 258 of 1950

(From the decision of H. M. High Court of Tanganyika—Clifford Knight, J.) Sentence—Conviction three counts—Separate offences consecutive sentences.

The appellant was convicted on three counts of three separate burglaries in Tanganyika. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labour on each count and the sentences were made to run consecutively. The appellant had four previous convictions, the last in 1936.

Held (31-1-51).—The sentences were severe but the Court refused to interfere. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant absent, unrepresented.

### Summerfield, Crown Counsel (Tanganyika), for Crown.

JUDGMENT.—In this case the appellant was convicted on three counts of three separate burglaries at Mwanza in the Lake Province of Tanganyika. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labour on each count and the sentences were made to run consecutively. He appeals to this Court against sentence only.

The appellant has four previous convictions, but his last conviction is as long ago as 1936. It is evident, however, that the learned trial Judge passed this very severe sentence on the appellant, not because of his past criminal record, but as a deterrent sentence in view of the prevalence of crime of this kind in Mwanza at the period in which the appellant committed these offences. This the learned Judge was entitled to do and we cannot say that he acted upon any wrong principle in so doing. A sentence of 15 years in all is, undoubtdely, a most severe sentence for this type of offence, but each sentence of five years was given in respect of a perfectly distinct offence. It may be that had this Court been trying the appellant it might have imposed a less severe sentence but that by itself is not a ground for interference and this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by a trial Judge in the matter of sentence unless it is evident that the Judge has acted upon some wrong principle, or overlooked some material factor. In the present case the learned Judge has done neither. $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}$

$\mathcal{L}^{\alpha}(\mathcal{L})$

$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{L}$ $\langle \phi, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{U} \rangle \mapsto \langle \phi, \mathbf{y} \rangle$

$\{2,3,4,6,4,4,7,7,8\}$

$\epsilon_{\pm}$

$\mathfrak{m}^{\mathfrak{p}} \rightarrow \mathfrak{m}^{\mathfrak{p}} \rightarrow \mathfrak{m}^{\mathfrak{p}}$ $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2,\mathcal{A}_3,\mathcal{A}_4) = \frac{1}{2} \mathcal{F}_1$ $\delta \rightarrow \omega^+ \gamma \gamma \gamma^+ \gamma$

$\tau_{\mathcal{F}}(X)$

$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{B} \mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}} \mathcal{A}$

attachem ann agus

The appeal is dismissed.

t

147