Juno Sourcing Ltd v Revenue and Customs (CUSTOMS DUTY AND VALUE ADDED TAX) [2025] UKFTT 1447 (TC) (01 December 2025)

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] UKFTT 1447 (TC) Case Number: TC09704 Appeal reference: TC/2022/02615 TC/2024/04274 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER Taylor House Heard On: 4 5 6 And 7 November 2025 B e f o r e : TRIBUNAL JUDGE TONY BEARE SONIA GABLE ____________________ Between: JUNO SOURCING LIMITED Appellant - and - THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS Respondents ____________________ Representation: For the Appellant: Ms Dilpreet K. Dhanoa, of counsel, instructed by Shoosmiths LLP For the Respondents: Ms Charlotte Brown, of counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs ____________________ HTML VERSION OF DECISION ____________________ Crown Copyright © CUSTOMS DUTY AND VALUE ADDED TAX – appeal against a post–clearance demand notice following an importation of goods where reliance was placed on provisions of EU law conferring a relief from customs duty and import value added tax on items of personal protective equipment imported by the National Health Service (the "NHS") (and other approved bodies) during the COVID-19 pandemic – whether the relief was available in respect of certain goods simply because, on the balance of probabilities, they were intended and expected to end up at the NHS – no, the relief was available only if, on the balance of probabilities, the relevant goods did end up there – whether, on the facts, that was the case – no – appeal dismissed – appeal against a refusal by the Respondents to accede to a claim for remission from customs duty and import value added tax in respect of certain of the goods on the basis that one or more of Articles 117 to 120 of the Union Customs Code (Council Regulation (EU) No 952/2013) applied – consideration of the scope of the remittance claim that had been made – concluding that, on the facts and taking into account the scope of the remittance claim, none of those Articles applied and therefore no remission was available – appeal dismissed DECISION Introduction This decision relates to the following two appeals by the Appellant: (1) an appeal against the issue by the Respondents on 28 September 2021 of a post-clearance demand notice (the "C18") in the amount of £1,373,884.73, comprising £490,523.81 of customs duty and £883,360.92 of import value added tax ("VAT"). The C18 related to 52 consignments of personal protective equipment, or "PPE", (the "Goods") – namely, face masks, face shields and aprons – which were imported into the UK between 14 April 2020 and 4 November 2020 and in relation to which the Appellant was the importer of record (the "IoR"). The C18 was issued on the grounds that the Respondents were not satisfied that the Goods satisfied all of the conditions for relief from customs duty and import VAT ("disaster relief") set out in Article 1 of Commission Decision (EU) 2020/491 (the "Commission Decision"). More specifically, the Appellant had not satisfied the Respondents that the Goods had been imported by or on behalf of a State organisation – including a State body, public body and other body governed by public law – in the UK or by or on behalf of an organisation in the UK approved by the Respondents (each, an "Approved Organisation"), as required by Article 1c of the Commission Decision; and (2) an appeal against the refusal by the Respondents on 22 May 2024 (the "Remission Decision") of a claim for the repayment or remission of customs duty and import VAT in the amount of £483,812.59. The claim which was the subject of the Remission Decision related to some of the Goods which were the subject of the C18 although, as will be seen below, precisely which of the Goods were included in the remission claim was a matter of considerable debate at the hearing. The grounds for the Remission Decision were that the Respondents did not consider that any of the Goods which were the subject of the remission claim satisfied the conditions for repayment or remission of customs duty and import VAT set out in Articles 117 to 120 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 952/2013 (the "Union Customs Code" or "UCC"). background The background to the dispute is as follows: (1) the Appellant is a logistics operator and agent involved in the sale of a variety of goods; (2) from time to time, the Appellant provides importation services to a US–incorporated company called Logistics Plus, Inc. ("Logistics"); (3) over the period between 14 April 2020 and 4 November 2020, Logistics sold the Goods, which were sourced in China, to a UK-incorporated company called AyMa IOT Limited ("AyMa"); (4) the Appellant was not itself part of the supply chain between Logistics and AyMa. Instead, its role in the transactions was to act as the IoR in respect of the Goods for Logistics; and (5) the customs duty and import VAT which are the subject of this decision arose out of those importations and it is common ground that, to the extent that the customs duty and import VAT properly arose and do not qualify for repayment or remission, the Appellant, as the IoR for Logistics, is liable for it. The 52 consignments of PPE which are the subject of the present dispute were not the only consignments of PPE in respect of which the Appellant acted as the IoR for Logistics over the relevant period. In addition to the Goods, there were a further 11 consignments of PPE in respect of which the Appellant acted as the IoR for Logistics in the relevant period but the Respondents have concluded that, unlike the Goods, the PPE in those 11 consignments did qualify for disaster relief. The PPE in those 11 consignments is therefore not part of the appeals in this case and, although they are mentioned at various points in this decision, we do not address in the decision the question of whether or not they qualified for disaster relief. the agreed facts This case is somewhat unusual in that there is no disagreement between the parties over almost all of the relevant facts. The agreed facts are as follows: The applications to the Respondents (1) in the course of acting in its role as the IoR for Logistics, at the start of the period within which the Goods were imported to the UK, the Appellant made six applications to the National Import Reliefs Unit of the Respondents ("NIRU") for disaster relief in respect of the importation of face masks and face shields. Five of those applications were successful and resulted in the issue of the requested duty relief certificate (a "NIRU Certificate") whilst the sixth application was rejected. The applications, together with the outcome in each case, are set out in the table below: No. App. date Items Quantity Value ($) Stated reason for importation Decision date Outcome NIRU Certificate no. 14–4–20 Face masks Face shields 100,000 30,000 170,000 22,350 Sale of goods to National Health Service ("NHS") 14–4–20 Approved 332–2020 14–4–20 Face masks 100,000 170,000 Sale of goods to NHS 14–4–20 Approved 333–2020 14–4–20 Face masks 840,000 70,000 2,116,800 113,610 Donation of goods to NHS, Italian, Spanish, French and German hospitals 14–4–20 Approved 360–2020 17–4–20 Face masks 155,200 391,104 Donation of goods to NHS going to Germany 20–4–20 Rejected N/A 20–4–20 Face masks 200,000 330,000 Donation of goods to NHS 20–4–20 Approved 404–2020 21–4–20 Face masks 155,200 391,104 Donation of goods to NHS Improvement 21–4–20 Approved 273–2020 (2) each application was made on a form which directed the applicant to refer to the notes on page 2 of the form and relevant guidance before completion. The notes included the following: ".… 2. A copy of your order and other supporting documents to support this application may be requested by Customs. 3. Any certificate issued by this office will grant relief from Customs duty and VAT. 4. The goods and their use may be subject to verification by Customs at any time after the import. 5. If the goods are sold on, duty may be due on the value of the goods at the time of the sale. 6. The goods must not be lent, hired out or transferred whether for payment or free of charge except with the prior consent of this office…." (3) the NIRU Certificates were in a similar, but not identical, form. In particular: (a) in the section of the certificate headed "Description and Quantity of Goods Covered by this Certificate", each of NIRU Certificates 332–2020, 333–2020 and 273–2020 referred to the Goods expressly described in the related application form, whereas each of NIRU Certificates 360–2020 and 404–2020 said simply that it applied to any goods falling under the COVID-19 Community Code List on the relevant Government website; and (b) the notes to NIRU Certificates 332–2020, 333–2020 and 273–2020 included the following: "… 3. The goods may be checked by Customs either at the time of import or a later date to ensure the conditions for relief have been met. Please note, for a valid claim to duty and VAT relief to be made, the end user of the goods must be one of the following: ... State organisations including State bodies, public bodies and other bodies governed by public law; ... other charitable or philanthropic organisations approved by the competent authorities. 4. Further Information on the relevant relief conditions can be found on GOV. UK via the following link - https://www.gov.uk/guidance/pay-no-import-duty-and-vat-on-medical-supplies-equipment-and-protective-garments-covid-19 . False information can lead to payment of duty and import VAT and even forfeiture of the goods. 5. The goods may not be lent, hired, sold or transferred without prior consent from NIRU. Further details are available via the link above", whereas the notes to NIRU Certificates 360–2020 and 404–2020 included the following: "… 3. The goods may be checked by Customs either at the time of import or a later date to ensure the conditions for relief have been met. Information on the relevant relief conditions can be found on GOV. UK via the following link – https://www.gov.uk/guidance/pay-no-import-duty-and-vat-on-medical-supplies-equipment-and-protective-garments-covid-19 . False information can lead to payment of duty and import VAT and even forfeiture of the goods. 4. The goods may not be lent, hired, sold or transferred without prior consent from NIRU. Further details are available via the link above"; (4) following the rejection of the application referred to at item 4 in the above table, Officer Michelle Drysdale of the Respondents sent an email to Ms Emma King (an employee of the Appellant) and Mr David Osborn (the sole shareholder and sole director of the Appellant) on 21 April 2020 to explain that NIRU's technical team had advised that only goods that were to be used in the UK could qualify for disaster relief. In his response later that day, Mr Osborne explained that the Goods referred to in that earlier application were now being sent directly to Germany and that an equivalent number and description of Goods were being sent instead to NHS Improvement. (These were the Goods referred to in item 6 in the above table); (5) each of the NIRU Certificates set out in the above table had an expiration date of 31 July 2020 when it was issued. However, on 24 July 2020, the Appellant contacted NIRU to ask that NIRU Certificate 404–2020 – item 5 in the above table – be extended to encompass a delivery which was expected to occur after that initial expiry date and, in response, that NIRU Certificate was extended on 26 July 2020 to be valid until 31 October 2020; The importation of the Goods (6) upon importation, the Goods were held initially in a warehouse owned by a company which was under common control with the Appellant called XPand Logistics Limited ("XPand"); (7) from that point, for the purposes of this decision, the Goods can most appropriately be divided into three categories as follows: (a) those of the Goods (the "Category 1 Goods") which were delivered to a person within the UK; (b) those of the Goods (the "Category 2 Goods") which were exported to a Member State of the European Union (the "EU"); and (c) those of the Goods (the "Category 3 Goods") which were either destroyed in the XPand warehouse or exported to Kazakhstan for the reasons described below; The Category 1 Goods (8) the Category 1 Goods arrived in the UK at some point between 14 April 2020 and 4 November 2020; (9) all but one consignment of the Category 1 Goods were delivered by the Appellant at the direction of Logistics and/or AyMa to AyMa's customer – a company called Deliver Net Limited ("Deliver Net"). Investigations made on behalf of the Appellant by its agents Oculus Financial Intelligence Limited ("Oculus") and Harod Associates Borders and Security Limited ("Harod") for the purposes of the present dispute have revealed that, from Deliver Net, the relevant Goods were delivered to a company called Aspect Limited and from there to a company called ARCO Limited ("ARCO"). However, the investigations referred to above did not reveal precisely what happened to the relevant Goods after they had been received by ARCO; (10) the remaining consignment of Category 1 Goods was delivered by the Appellant to the Northern General Hospital in Sheffield (the "Sheffield NHS"). What happened to those Goods thereafter was a matter of some dispute between the parties at the hearing and we deal with that further below; The Category 2 Goods (11) the Category 2 Goods arrived in the UK on 14 April 2020. Thereafter, the relevant Goods left the UK and went to an EU Member State although the date on which they did so was also a matter of some dispute between the parties at the hearing and we deal with that further below; The Category 3 Goods (12) the Category 3 Goods arrived in the UK at some point between 24 April 2020 and 4 November 2020. The reason why those Goods were not delivered to Deliver Net thereafter in the same way as the Category 1 Goods was that a commercial dispute arose between Logistics and AyMa which was ultimately resolved only by way of a decision of Mr David Edwards QC in the High Court on 11 March 2022 in favour of Logistics (Logistics Plus Inc v AyMa Iot Limited [2022] EWHC 876 (Comm)). We describe the nature of that commercial dispute further below; The dispute in the present proceedings (13) on 27 July 2020, Officer Paul Lappine of the Respondents wrote to the Appellant in order to establish that the conditions for disaster relief had been met in relation to recent importations made by the Appellant. Those importations included the 52 consignments of Goods which are the subject of this decision, together with the 11 consignments of PPE to which we have referred in paragraph 3 above; (14) on 10 September 2020 and 30 September 2020, Mr Osborn provided some initial documents and information to Officer Lappine and Officer Lappine's successor, Officer Liam Gregory; (15) on 21 October 2020, Officer Gregory sent an email to Mr Osborn explaining that part of the audit trail which the Respondents would need to see in relation to each of the 63 consignments before being satisfied that disaster relief was available was missing; (16) on 12 January 2021, Officer Gregory wrote to Mr Osborn with a summary of the case and explained that the incomplete audit trail meant that disaster relief did not apply to the 63 consignments of PPE; (17) on 26 March 2021, Officer Gregory issued a right to be heard letter to the Appellant in relation to the 63 consignments of PPE; (18) on 30 April 2021, Officer Gregory issued to the Appellant an initial post-clearance demand notice in respect of all 63 consignments of PPE; (19) on 10 June 2021, Mr Colin Kneller, of Harod, who had carried out investigations on behalf of the Appellant into the supply chains for the PPE which was the subject of the initial post-clearance demand notice, sent a report on the supply chains to Officer Gregory; (20) on 23 September 2021, Mr Kneller wrote to Officer Matthew Hayes at the Respondents' National Duty Repayment Centre (the "NDRC"). In that letter, Mr Kneller: (a) enclosed a schedule of all 63 consignments of PPE which had been imported; (b) informed Officer Hayes that Officer Gregory was engaged in verifying the supply chains in a number of cases; and (c) said that he wished to seek a ruling from Officer Hayes in relation to 31 of the consignments, those being the consignments listed in lines 11, 14, 33 and 37 to 64 of the schedule. The schedule revealed that those consignments had been imported between 24 April 2020 and 4 November 2020. Mr Kneller went on to say that: (i) since it had been impossible to find an appropriate end–user for the PPE it was now proposed that the PPE be destroyed to put a stop to the escalating storage costs and he wished to obtain confirmation from the Respondents that they would be happy with that course of action; and (ii) his understanding was that, if the customs duty and import VAT had already been paid, then the Appellant would now be able to reclaim it by submitting the appropriate form and therefore he was seeking Officer Hayes' advice as to what he should do where customs duty and import VAT had not as yet been paid but might become payable in due course; (21) on the same day, Officer Gregory wrote to Mr Osborn to say that, following his review of the information provided by the Appellant, he had decided to reduce the initial post–clearance demand referred to in paragraph 5(18) above by accepting that the 11 consignments of PPE referred to in paragraph 3 above qualified for disaster relief and by recognising that some of the remaining consignments of Goods qualified for a zero rate of import VAT; (22) on 28 September 2021, Officer Gregory issued the C18 which is at issue in the present dispute; (23) on 6 October 2021, Mr Kneller wrote to the NDRC listing 31 consignments of Goods which he said had been imported under NIRU Certificate 404–2020 and explaining that the relevant Goods had still not been delivered because of a commercial dispute between the US supplier and the UK recipient. Mr Kneller asked if the Respondents would consent to the destruction of the Goods because of the storage costs involved and asked for the advice of the Respondents as to whether it would be appropriate to make a formal remission claim under form C285; (24) on 20 January 2022, following a request for a review in relation to the C18 by Harod on behalf of the Appellant on 19 November 2021, Officer Joe Higginson of the Respondents issued the review conclusion letter, which was to the effect that the C18 was upheld; (25) on 18 February 2022, the Appellant notified its appeal against the C18 to the First–tier Tribunal (the "FTT"); (26) on 11 January 2023, the parties participated in mediation but that was unsuccessful; (27) on 17 February 2023, the Respondents filed and served their statement of case in relation to the appeal against the C18. In the statement of case, the Respondents said that the appropriate course of action for the Appellant to take if it wished to claim remission of customs duty or import VAT on any of the Goods was to make a formal application for remission; (28) on 18 April 2023, Shoosmiths LLP ("Shoosmiths") wrote to the Respondents on behalf of the Appellant. In that letter, Shoosmiths said that: (a) as the Respondents were aware, the Appellant was seeking the remission of customs duty and import VAT for two categories of Goods, those being: (i) Goods which had been destroyed; and (ii) Goods which had been "re–exported to member states to assist with their efforts in dealing with the pandemic"; and (b) although the Appellant had previously requested remission by way of the letters from its agent, Harod, no response had been received from the Respondents. Shoosmiths went on to recite the history of the events which had occurred to date – including the error made by NIRU in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 – and submitted that the Appellant should be entitled to remission either on the grounds that the relevant Goods were defective or on the grounds of equity; (29) on 19 April 2023, Mr Kneller digitally filed a form C285 (the "C285") on–line with the Respondents, formally seeking the remission of customs duty and import VAT in respect of the 31 consignments of Goods to which his letters of 23 September 2021 and 6 October 2021 had referred. Mr Kneller attached to the C285 a copy of the letter to the Respondents from Shoosmiths of the previous day referred to in paragraph 5(28) above; (30) on 20 October 2023, Officer Ewa Greda of the Respondents wrote to Mr Kneller to ask for further information in relation to the remission claim made in the C285; (31) on 16 November 2023, Mr Kneller responded to Officer Greda's letter by setting out the history of the events which had occurred to date and the basis for the remission claim. In so doing, Mr Kneller duplicated in a number of paragraphs in his letter – paragraphs [1], [3] to [5], [7], [27] to [31] and [54] to [56] – paragraphs of Shoosmiths' letter referred to in paragraph 5(28) above; (32) on 29 December 2023, Officer Greda wrote to Mr Kneller raising queries arising out of Mr Kneller's letter referred to in paragraph 5(31) above; (33) on 26 January 2024, Mr Kneller provided further information to Officer Greda in response to Officer Greda's letter referred to in paragraph 5(32) above; (34) in an email of 3 April 2024, Officer Greda attached the right to be heard letter (dated 4 April 2024) in relation to the remission claim; (35) in an email of 2 May 2024, Mr Kneller attached a response (dated 3 May 2024) to the right to be heard letter; (36) on 22 May 2024, the Respondents issued the Remission Decision; (37) on 31 July 2024, the Appellant appealed against the Remission Decision; and (38) pursuant to a direction made by Judge Brown KC on 11 June 2024, the appeal against the C18 and the appeal against the Remission Decision were consolidated. the disputed facts Introduction At the hearing, we were provided with a considerable amount of written and witness evidence. The written evidence took the form of a substantial hearing bundle of 1,966 pages. The witness evidence was provided by: (1) Mr Osborn; (2) Mr Yuriy Ostapyak, the chief operations officer and director of global operations of Logistics; (3) Mr Bryden Thomson, formerly of Oculus, who had carried out investigations into the supply chains for the Goods on behalf of the Appellant; (4) Mr Kneller; (5) Officer Gregory; and (6) Officer Greda. A substantial part of the evidence simply confirmed the agreed facts which we have already outlined in paragraph 5 above. Accordingly, in this part of our decision, we will confine ourselves to describing the evidence which related to those of the relevant facts that were in dispute at the hearing. The disputed facts related to the following issues: (1) what happened to the single consignment of Category 1 Goods which was delivered to the NHS Sheffield (as opposed to Deliver Net); (2) whether, on the balance of probabilities, the remaining Category 1 Goods, which were delivered to Deliver Net, ended up at the NHS; (3) whether the remission claim made by the Appellant was limited to the Category 3 Goods or included both the Category 3 Goods and the Category 2 Goods; (4) the nature of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa that ultimately resulted in the High Court decision of 11 March 2022; (5) the time at which the Appellant first became aware that that commercial dispute had arisen; and (6) the date on which the Category 2 Goods left the UK following their importation. In the sections of this decision which follow, we will describe briefly, in relation to each of the above issues: (1) the evidence with which we were provided in relation to the issue; and (2) our finding of fact in relation the issue, together with the reasons for that finding. The Category 1 Goods delivered to the NHS Sheffield The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) an air freight arrival cartage advice with receipt, an air document pack for Customs and an invoice from XPand recording the arrival of Dasheng masks at Heathrow on 30 April 2020 (the "UK documentation") and noting that: (a) Logistics was the shipper; (b) the Appellant was the consignee; (c) the NHS Sheffield was the delivery address; and (d) the masks were in 23 boxes with an aggregate weight of 94 kilograms; (2) an air waybill issued by United Airlines and a US Customs form recording the arrival of PPE equipment at Chicago O'Hare on 22 May 2020 (the "US documentation") which recorded that: (a) Xpand was the shipper; (b) Logistics was the consignee; and (c) the PPE Equipment had an aggregate weight of 110 kilograms; (3) in the review request to the Respondents which was submitted by Mr Kneller on behalf of the Appellant on 19 November 2021 in relation to the C18, Mr Kneller said as follows: "On the 1st of May 2020, a delivery of PPE was made to Northern General Hospital Sheffield. The goods were received by the hospital. However, it was not up to the hospital's requirements. The supplier agreed to take back the PPE because the USA was the most appropriate place to receive the goods. The PPE was exported to the USA. We produce the export/import documents to evidence the transaction. It was not necessary to make any duty reclaims as there was zero duty/VAT on the goods. The file containing the documents is at Appendix C." Appendix C was the air waybill described in paragraph 12(2) above; The witness evidence Officer Gregory testified that, despite the absence of a detailed description of the PPE to which it related in the US documentation and the 16 kilograms difference between the weight recorded in the UK documentation and the weight recorded in the US documentation, he had accepted that the US documentation was evidence that the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to the NHS Sheffield had been sent back to the US because that was what Mr Kneller had written in the review request as set out in paragraph 12 above. Relevant finding of fact We acknowledge that there is a large discrepancy between the weight recorded in the UK documentation and the weight recorded in the US documentation. However, there are various reasons why that might have been the case, including human error or the possibility that the package sent to the US included other PPE as well as the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to the NHS Sheffield. In the light of that and the clear statement by Mr Kneller in his review request of 19 November 2021, we have concluded that the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to the NHS Sheffield were sent back to Logistics within a few weeks of their arrival at the NHS Sheffield. The Category 1 Goods delivered to Deliver Net The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) on 1 April 2020, the chief commercial officer of the Department of Health and Social Care (the "DHSC") wrote to health and care sector providers to say that, due to capacity constraints in the usual NHS supply chain network for obtaining PPE, the DHSC, the NHS and the Army had developed a supporting parallel supply chain; (2) on 10 April 2020, the DHSC published a PPE plan stating, inter alia, that: (a) priority drops of PPE were being made to Local Resilience Forums ("LRFs"), those being "local partnerships that bring together the NHS, councils and the police"; (b) between 25 February 2020 and the date of the plan, 761 million items of PPE had been distributed across the UK, of which 654 million had been delivered to the NHS, 21 million had been delivered to primary care providers in the community (such as GP surgeries, community pharmacies, dentists and hospices) and seven million had been delivered to registered care homes; and (c) starting in the week commencing 6 April 2020, the DHSC had authorised the release of 34 million items of PPE across 38 LRFs; and (3) on 24 May 2021, Mr Thomas Martin, the chairman of ARCO, gave evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in which he said that ARCO had supplied PPE directly to the NHS when the usual lines of communication with Government departments had broken down. The witness evidence Mr Kneller testified that not all of the PPE acquired by Deliver Net had ended up at Approved Organisations – in his opinion, the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered by the Appellant to Deliver Net "could have gone absolutely anywhere" because the supply chain was so chaotic and because not every supply chain in which Deliver Net participated had terminated in a delivery to an Approved Organisation. Mr Osborn agreed. He accepted that: (1) just because Deliver Net was an approved supplier to the NHS did not mean that all of the PPE acquired by Deliver Net would necessarily have ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation; (2) he had carried out no independent verification exercise at the point when the Goods were imported but had simply accepted at face value the confirmation from AyMa that the Goods were destined for the NHS; and (3) he had seen no evidence that the relevant Goods had ended up at the NHS. The views of Mr Kneller and Mr Osborn were echoed by Mr Thomson. Having initially suggested that the mere fact that Deliver Net was an approved supplier of PPE to the NHS meant that the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to Deliver Net were "highly likely" to have ended up at the NHS, he conceded that there was no way of knowing whether the Category 1 Goods had ended up there because the audit trail stopped at ARCO and he had no knowledge of what proportion of PPE acquired by Deliver Net or ARCO ended up at the NHS. Mr Thomson added (in paragraph [29] of his witness statement) that his investigations into what had happened to the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to Deliver Net suggested that the scale of PPE which was being moved, coupled with the chaotic nature of the PPE supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic, meant that PPE was unlikely to be segregated within the supply chains. This meant that the participants in each supply chain were not in a position to confirm where particular consignments of PPE ended up. Mr Ostapyak testified that AyMa had informed it that the NHS was cancelling contracts for the purchase of PPE because of issues with over-supply whilst Mr Osborn referred to the fact that AyMa had over–ordered and did not have enough customers for the PPE which it had ordered. In response to a question from the panel in relation to the quality of the evidence that he had seen in relation to whether the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to Deliver Net had ended up at the NHS, Officer Gregory said that, in his opinion, it was more likely than not that those Goods had done so – see the exchange between Officer Gregory and the panel at the end of Officer Gregory's evidence on Day 2 at pages 79 to 81 of the hearing transcript. Relevant finding of fact The evidence set out above is supportive of the following five propositions: (1) Deliver Net was an approved supplier of PPE to the NHS and some of the PPE which passed through Deliver Net ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation; (2) ARCO supplied some of its PPE to the NHS or another Approved Organisation; (3) not all of the items of PPE passing through Deliver Net or ARCO ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation; (4) a significant majority of the PPE which became available in the UK ended up at the NHS or LRFs but a meaningful proportion of that PPE did not; and (5) most crucially, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the specific items of Category 1 Goods which were delivered by the Appellant to Deliver Net and which are the subject of the present dispute were delivered to the NHS or another Approved Organisation. We find all five of the above propositions to be facts for the purposes of this decision although we did not understand there to be any dispute between the parties in relation to any of them. Turning then to the crucial question of whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation, we should start by delving a little deeper into the finding of fact set out in paragraph 22(4) above. That proposition is based on the statistical evidence adduced at the hearing in relation to items of PPE which became available in the UK in general. However, it has limited value in the context of the issue which is presently being addressed because it is not linked to the specific items of PPE with which we are concerned. For example, it does not reveal: (1) how the relevant overall figures for deliveries of PPE in the UK were broken down between imported PPE and UK–manufactured PPE; and (2) what proportion of the items of PPE which were delivered specifically tor ARCO as a whole ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. In addition, the statistics include LRFs and it was common ground at the hearing that not all participants in the LRFs were Approved Organisations. We have also noted that: (1) the evidence of Mr Ostapyak suggests that there may have been an over-supply of PPE to the NHS with the result that the NHS was cancelling purchase contracts; (2) the evidence of Mr Osborn suggests that AyMa had over-ordered PPE with the result that it did not have sufficient purchasers of the PPE it had agreed to purchase; and (3) the evidence of Mr Thomson suggests that the chaotic nature of PPE distribution during the COVID-19 pandemic meant that no-one in a supply chain could know where particular items of PPE went. The points which we have mentioned in paragraphs 24 to 27 above mean that we simply have no idea whether any of the Category 1 Goods which the Appellant delivered to Deliver Net ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. It is one thing to say that a significant proportion of the available PPE in the UK was delivered to the NHS and LRFs. It is quite another thing for us to be able to conclude that this means that, on the balance of probabilities, the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. There is inevitably a meaningful possibility that all of the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net did not end up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation but instead ended up elsewhere. The position is simply unknowable. In the circumstances, we have concluded that the Appellant has not satisfied us that, on the balance of probabilities, any of the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. We should add that in, reaching this conclusion, we have placed no weight at all on the statement by Officer Gregory which we have recorded in paragraph 21 above. That is because, in our view, it was very obviously a mistake made by Officer Gregory as a result of confusion on his part as to the question which he was being asked by the panel at the end of his evidence. We say that for the following reasons: (1) first, Officer Gregory's position throughout the dispute has been that, in the absence of any evidence to the effect that the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net ended up at the NHS, there is no way of knowing whether that is where the relevant Goods ended up; (2) secondly, this position was apparent in paragraphs [20] and [21] of Officer Gregory's witness statement, in which he distinguished between the Category 1 Goods and the 11 consignments of PPE in respect of which he had upheld the claim for disaster relief as follows: "… [the Appellant] has been unable to evidence the goods in question from their initial import to their ultimate end use by an eligible end user; thus not qualifying for relief under the special procedure … Those goods that [the Appellant] could trace to their ultimate end use by an eligible end user did qualify for relief and therefore no Customs Duty or Import VAT was due on those goods"; and (3) thirdly, the exchange in question occurred during the part of his evidence when Officer Gregory was contrasting: (a) the evidence with which he had been provided in relation to the consignments of Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to Deliver Net and were in dispute; with (b) the evidence with which he had been provided in relation to the 11 consignments of PPE that he had previously accepted had ended up at the NHS, and he was making the point that his decision to uphold the claim for disaster relief in relation to the latter had not been based on the existence of "perfect" incontrovertible evidence to the effect that the latter had ended up at the NHS but instead simply on "satisfactory" evidence, suggesting that it was highly likely that the latter had ended up there. He was saying that, in contrast, no such evidence existed in relation to the former. It seems to us that, viewed in the above light, Officer Gregory's response to the question raised by the panel was based on the mistaken apprehension on his part that the panel was asking about the 11 consignments of PPE and not the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net. Whether the remission claim included the Category 2 Goods The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) in his letter to Officer Hayes of the NDRC of 23 September 2021, Mr Kneller attached a schedule setting out all 63 of the consignments of PPE which were at that time the subject of the dispute between the Appellant and Officer Gregory in relation to the availability of disaster relief and raised the subject of the remission of customs duty and import VAT in relation to 31 specified consignments as set out in numbered lines in that schedule, those being the ones described in lines 11, 14, 33 and 37 to 64 of the schedule. The earliest date of the 31 specified consignments was 24 April 2020; (2) in his letter to the NDRC of 6 October 2021, Mr Kneller began by listing the 31 consignments to which he had referred in his previous letter to Officer Hayes. The earliest date of the listed consignments was 24 April 2020 and the schedule specified that all of the Goods which were the subject of the letter had been imported under NIRU Certificate 404–2020. Under the heading "Application", Mr Kneller asked for the consent of the Respondents to the destruction of the Goods in question and asked for the advice of the Respondents in relation to the process for making a remission claim; (3) in their letter of 18 April 2023, Shoosmiths said that the Appellant was "seeking retrospective relief for two categories of goods which were: a. imported but subsequently destroyed; and b. imported but subsequently re-exported to member states to assist with their efforts in dealing with the pandemic". The letter went on to say that the Appellant had previously requested this relief through its agent, Harod, but that no response had been received from the Respondents. It then set out: (a) under the heading "Brief Factual Background", the background to the claim but, although that description referred to all 63 of the consignments of PPE, the only application to NIRU and the NIRU Certificate to which reference was made was the application relating to NIRU Certificate 360–2020 and NIRU Certificate 360–2020 itself; (b) under the heading "Goods which were imported but subsequently destroyed or exported": (i) the steps which had been carried out in relation to the Goods which had been destroyed in the Xpand warehouse or exported to Kazakhstan (at paragraphs [12] to [14] of the letter); (ii) the fact that no application for temporary importation relief had been made in relation to the Goods "re-exported to Europe" because of the issue of NIRU Certificate 360–2020 and the fact that the relevant Goods had immediately been "re-exported"(at paragraph [15] of the letter); and (iii) the fact that the Respondents had been invited to observe the destruction of the Goods as well as the "re-exporting" of the Goods but had not responded (at paragraph [16] of the letter); and (c) under the heading "Remission of Duty" a claim for remission under Articles 118 and 120 of the UCC in respect of the Goods that had been "destroyed and/or re–exported" (at paragraphs [17] to [20] of the letter); (4) the C285 which Mr Kneller filed on–line on 19 April 2023 stipulated that: (a) it related to 31 specified consignments of Goods, the first of which was said to have been imported on 20 April 2020. (At the hearing, Mr Kneller confirmed that this date was simply a typographical error because the date of the earliest importation on the list of consignments appended to the C285, which was the same list of consignments as that to which his letters of 23 September 2021and 6 October 2021 referred, was 24 April 2020); (b) the total amount of the claim was £483,812.59, which the list of consignments appended to the C285 made clear comprised £275,485.19 of customs duty and £208,327.40 of import VAT; (c) the basis of the claim was Article 120 of the UCC; (d) all of the Goods which were the subject of the claim had been imported under NIRU Certificate 404–2020; and (e) the basis for the claim was as set out in Shoosmiths' letter of the previous day, which was attached to the C285; (5) in her letter to Mr Kneller of 20 October 2023, Officer Greda noted that, whilst Shoosmiths' letter had referred to Article 118 of the UCC in addition to Article 120 of the UCC, the C285 had referred only to the latter; (6) in his letter of 16 November 2023 to Officer Greda, Mr Kneller duplicated much of the content of Shoosmiths' letter and went on to say at paragraphs [36] to [49] that remission should be available under Article 120 of the UCC because the Appellant had relied on the NIRU Certificates in deciding to import the Goods and "specifically for the goods exported to Europe, would have applied for at least one of the Customs Special Procedures (for example, Temporary Admission)" (see paragraph [41]); (7) in her letter to Mr Kneller of 29 December 2023, Officer Greda asked Mr Kneller for further information in relation to the exported Goods, noting, inter alia, that: (a) whilst the Respondents had issued NIRU Certificate 360–2020 in error, the Appellant had been aware from 20 April 2020 that exported Goods did not qualify for disaster relief; and (b) the earliest importation in the C285 was dated 24 April 2024; (8) in his letter to Officer Greda of 26 January 2024, Mr Kneller said: (a) at paragraph [7], that, but for the issue of NIRU Certificate 360–2020, the Appellant would not have imported the relevant Goods and therefore Article 119 of the UCC applied; (b) at paragraph [8], that a reference to Article 119 of the UCC was intended to have been included in the letter from Shoosmiths; (c) at paragraph [16], that Goods "which did not need to be destroyed were exported"; (d) at paragraph [17], that "[the] intention had never been to export these particular goods" and that, were it not for the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa, the Goods would have been delivered to the NHS as had always been expected; and (e) at paragraph [18], that Officer Greda's request for more information about the Goods which had been exported to Europe was irrelevant because the relevant Goods had all been imported on 14 April 2020 and had left the UK on 17 April 2020 – before the Respondents had informed the Appellant on 20 April 2020 that relief did not apply; (9) in the right to be heard letter in relation to the remission claim dated 4 April 2024, Officer Greda said that the Goods included in the remission claim were those imported between 24 April 2020 and 4 November 2020 and that "the goods imported to the UK and then exported to the EU and therefore affected by NIRUs error are not included in this claim". She then offered the Appellant the right to provide more evidence that could affect the decision; (10) in his response to the right to be heard letter in relation to the remission claim, Mr Kneller did not point out that the earliest transaction date of 24 April 2020 was incorrect or challenge Officer Greda's statement to the effect that the Category 2 Goods were not included in the remission claim but nevertheless alleged in paragraphs [8] to [11] that Article 119 of the UCC should apply because of the Respondents' error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020; (11) in the Remission Decision refusing the remission claim, Officer Greda said that, after reviewing the evidence, she could confirm that the entries included in the remission claim included only those Goods which had been imported for use by an end-user in the UK and did not include Goods which had been imported for the purpose of export to an EU Member State; and (12) in the amended grounds of appeal, the Appellant noted that the Remission Decision had addressed only Goods that had been destroyed and not Goods that had been "re-exported" despite the fact that the Shoosmiths' letter accompanying the C285 had addressed both (paragraph [35]) and submitted that the Respondents' error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 justified a remittance claim under Articles 119 and 120 of the UCC (paragraphs [84] to [91]). The witness evidence Mr Kneller confirmed that: (1) the remission claim related solely to the 31 consignments of Category 3 Goods set out on the C285 and did not include any Category 2 Goods; and (2) as noted in paragraph 31(4) above, the earliest date of importation of a consignment of Goods to which the remittance claim related was dated 24 April 2020; Relevant finding of fact Ms Dhanoa, on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that the Category 2 Goods should be treated as having been included in the remission claim because: (1) Shoosmith's letter of 18 April 2023 referred at certain points to the export of certain of the Goods to Europe and the error made by the Respondents in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020; and (2) that letter had been appended to the C285. We are unable to agree with this submission. In our view, there is overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that the remission claim related only to the 31 consignments of Category 3 Goods and did not include the Category 2 Goods. For instance: (1) the C285 submitted by Mr Kneller on behalf of the Appellant: (a) referred solely to the 31 consignments of Goods which were Category 3 Goods and did not include the consignments of Goods which were Category 2 Goods; (b) referred to the fact that all of the consignments which were the subject of the claim fell within NIRU Certificate 404–2020 and did not refer to NIRU Certificate 360–2020 (which was the one applicable to the Category 2 Goods); (c) specified that the earliest date of importation relevant to the remission claim was the date of the earliest importation of Category 3 Goods – expressed to be 20 April 2020 but acknowledged by Mr Kneller to be intended as 24 April 2020 but, in any event, well after 14 April 2020 when the Category 2 Goods were imported; (d) was for an aggregate amount of customs duty and import VAT which was the aggregate amount of customs duty and import VAT payable in respect of the 31 consignments of Category 3 Goods and did not take into account the customs duty and import VAT payable in respect of the Category 2 Goods; and (e) appended a schedule of importations which was confined to the 31 consignments of Category 3 Goods; (2) Mr Kneller's letters of 23 September 2023 and 6 October 2023 to the NDRC which preceded the submission of the C285 made it plain that he was asking the Respondents about how to reclaim the customs duty and import VAT only in respect of the 31 importations of Category 3 Goods and not in respect of the Category 2 Goods; (3) Mr Kneller's letter of 26 January 2024 to Officer Greda made it apparent that he did not consider the Category 2 Goods to be part of the remission claim; (4) Mr Kneller did not respond to the right to be heard letter of 4 April 2024 by saying that the date of 24 April 2020 for the earliest importation relevant to the remission claim was incorrect; (5) the amended grounds of appeal did not include an allegation that the Respondents were wrong in their letter of 22 May 2024 refusing the remission claim to have treated the remission claim as relating solely to the Category 3 Goods; and (6) Mr Kneller's evidence at the hearing was to the effect that only the Category 3 Goods and not the Category 2 Goods were the subject of the remission claim. It seems to us that this issue has arisen now solely because, in their letter of 18 April 2023, Shoosmiths mistakenly: (1) referred in paragraph [2b] to the export of Goods to EU Member States instead of referring to the export to Kazakhstan; and (2) then focused in paragraphs [5] to [7] and [15] on the error made by the Respondents in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 for reasons which only Shoosmiths can explain. It should have been apparent to them from Mr Kneller's earlier letters of 23 September 2021 and 6 October 2021 that the Category 2 Goods were not part of the remission claim. We consider that the mere fact that Shoosmiths' letter containing that misunderstanding was appended to the C285, whilst confusing, did not have the effect of extending the remission claim to the Category 2 Goods because of: (1) the sheer volume of evidence in favour of the contrary view, as set out in paragraph 35 above; and (2) the fact that Shoosmiths were so obviously in error when they referred in their letter to the Goods that were exported to Europe and the issue of NIRU Certificate 360–2020. We would add that this conclusion does not mean that we are entirely ignoring the fact that the Shoosmiths' letter was appended to the C285. Despite the clear errors which it contained, the letter set out the general background to the making of the remission claim and, in particular, Mr Kneller's previous attempts to engage the Respondents on the subject matter of the remission claim. To that extent, the letter still served a useful purpose as an appendage to the C285 and it should be regarded as doing no more than that. The mistaken reference in Shoosmiths' letter to the Goods which were exported to Europe and to NIRU Certificate 360–2020 has caused unnecessary confusion in these proceedings, as demonstrated first in Mr Kneller's letter of 16 November 2023 (which was largely duplicative of Shoosmiths' letter) and then in Officer Greda's response to that letter of 29 December 2023. It has led to letters from Mr Kneller as the Appellant's adviser in which, even though apparently accepting that the Goods exported to Europe were not part of the remission claim, he has sought to rely on the Respondents' error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 to justify the remission claim. For example: (1) in Mr Kneller's letter to Officer Greda of 26 January 2024, whilst paragraphs [6] to [8] suggested that Mr Kneller was proceeding on the basis that the remission claim included the Goods which had been exported to Europe, paragraphs [16] to [18] reflected his understanding that those Goods were not so included and that the only Goods which were included in the remission claim were those intended for the NHS as the end–user; and (2) in Mr Kneller's response dated 3 May 2024 to the right to be heard letter, Mr Kneller did not point out that the earliest transaction date of 24 April 2020 in the right to be heard letter was incorrect or challenge Officer Greda's statement to the effect that the Goods exported to Europe were not included in the remission claim but nevertheless alleged in paragraphs [8] to [11] that Article 119 of the UCC should apply because of the Respondents' error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020. It seems to us that what has happened in this instance is that the Appellant and its advisers, having reached the conclusion that the error made by the Respondents in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 would be helpful in justifying the remission claim under Articles 119 and 120 of the UCC – even though that error related to only two consignments of Goods and was remedied within a few days of being made – have focused so intently on that error that they have entirely lost sight of the fact that: (1) the Category 2 Goods – which were the only Goods that were actually affected by that error – were never part of the remission claim in the first place; and (2) neither the C285 nor Shoosmiths' letter made any reference whatsoever to Article 119 of the UCC. That is not a mistake which the Respondents have made, with the possible exception of some initial confusion on the part of Officer Greda in her letter of 29 December 2023 caused by Shoosmiths' letter. After that date, the Respondents have – quite rightly in our opinion – consistently maintained the position that the Category 2 Goods were not included in the remission claim. For the above reasons, we find as a fact that the remission claim related only to the Category 3 Goods and did not include the Category 2 Goods. The nature of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) there was an exchange of emails between Logistics and AyMa in August 2020 in which AyMa alleged that certain of the Goods were defective; (2) there was an exchange of emails between Logistics and AyMa between 28 December 2020 and 8 January 2021 in which, in response to Logistics' request for payment, AyMa: (a) said that Deliver Net was alleging that some of the Goods on-supplied by AyMa to Deliver Net did not comply with the certificates relating to them – to which Logistics replied to the effect that the certificates were "100% legit"; and (b) accused Logistics of having entered into commercial arrangements directly with Deliver Net in breach of their agreement; (3) in his letter of 23 September 2021 to the NDRC, Mr Kneller said that the Goods whose importation was set out in lines 37 to 64 of the schedule attached to his letter were intended to be supplied to the NHS but had been "rejected by the end user as goods not being in accordance with the contract as they did not meet NHS requirements"; (4) in his letter of 6 October 2021 to the NDRC, Mr Kneller said that the Goods to which his application letter related "were destined for the UK Healthcare industry principally the NHS but were rejected by them as not being of a sufficient standard" and that that had led to ongoing litigation between Logistics and AyMa, which was the reason why the Goods were still in the XPand warehouse; (5) in the High Court decision of 11 March 2022, Logistics succeeded in its claim for payment against AyMa. No mention was made in the decision that any of the Goods to which the dispute related were defective and the decision noted that AyMa's defence and counterclaim had been struck out and that AyMa had served no evidence; (6) in their letter to the Respondents of 18 April 2023 which was appended to the C285, Shoosmiths: (a) in the section of the letter headed "Goods which were imported but subsequently destroyed or re–exported", referred to the ongoing litigation between Logistics and AyMa as the reason why the Goods to which the letter related were still in the XPand warehouse but made no mention of the nature of the dispute; and (b) in the section of the letter headed "Remission of Duty", at paragraph [17e.], said that the Goods "were not defective"; (7) in his letter to the Respondents of 26 January 2024, Mr Kneller said: (a) at paragraph [6], that it was plain from the detailed information set out in Shoosmiths' letter of 18 April 2023 "that some of the goods which were imported had been rejected on the basis that they did not comply with what was required (Article 118) and were no longer what was required under contract under the terms of which they had originally been contracted [sic]"; (b) at paragraphs [11a] and [22], that the Goods in the XPand warehouse were stored as a result of a commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa "which arose because AyMa contended that the goods were defective", that Logistics had been successful in the litigation which ensued and that, if the Respondents wished to understand the nature of the dispute in greater detail, they should read the High Court judgment; and (c) at paragraphs [13] and [16], that the reason why the Goods which had been stored in the XPand warehouse had not ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation was that, by the time that the litigation had concluded, there was a surfeit of PPE in the UK and that the majority of the Goods had passed their expiration date; and (8) in his response dated 3 May 2024 to the right to be heard letter in relation to the remission claim, Mr Kneller said, at paragraphs [6] and [7], that Officer Greda's statement to the effect that the Category 3 Goods were not defective and not in accordance with the contract was factually "simply incorrect" but then focused exclusively on the fact that the relevant Goods had passed their expiry date because of the commercial dispute as opposed to any inherent defect in the Goods when they were imported. The witness evidence Both Mr Ostapyak and Mr Thomson testified that there was nothing defective about any of the Goods and they were fit for use within the NHS. Mr Ostapyak referred to there being an over-supply within the NHS leading to the cancellation of purchase contracts by the NHS. Mr Thomson said that AyMa had raised defects in the Goods as one of its arguments in seeking to escape its contractual liability to Logistics but added that the real reason why AyMa had sought to escape its contractual liability to Logistics was that it had over-ordered PPE and did not have enough customers to buy from it the PPE which it had ordered. Relevant finding of fact In the light of the evidence set out above, we find that, whilst AyMa did raise as an argument in the course of the commercial dispute between it and Logistics the fact that certain of the Goods had not been fit for purpose or compliant with the contract, there is no evidence that that was actually the case. The evidence of both Mr Ostapyak and Mr Thomson was that there was nothing defective in any of the Goods and that their rejection by AyMa was founded solely on the fact that AyMa was unable to sell the Goods on. In addition, the decision in favour of Logistics in the High Court made no mention of any defect in any of the Goods. On the contrary, Logistics was wholly successful in its claim for payment. The time at which the Appellant first became aware of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) there was no dispute in existence as at 24 April 2020 when the first consignment of Category 3 Goods arrived in the UK because Logistics and AyMa were exchanging amicable emails in relation to delivery arrangements; (2) in section 5 of a report prepared by Mr Kneller on 10 June 2021 and provided to the Respondents, Mr Kneller referred to the rejection of the delivery of Goods made on 29 June 2020 as being the first delivery that was rejected by AyMa for being defective; and (3) an exchange of emails between Logistics and AyMa in early to mid-August 2020 reveals that the dispute had already started. The witness evidence Both Mr Osborn and Mr Ostapyak mentioned August 2020 as the time when they first became aware that a commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa had arisen. Mr Osborn also testified that, when the commercial dispute arose, he was aware of it from the outset because of his regular communications with Mr Ostapyak in relation to it and the mounting XPand warehousing costs. Relevant finding of fact It is difficult to be precise about exactly when the Appellant first became aware of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa given the length of time which has passed since the events in question and the incomplete documentary record. All we can say is that the earliest date on which it can be is early July 2020, just after the first rejection of a consignment of Goods by AyMa occurred. Given the evidence, we have concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant would first have become aware of the commercial dispute at some point in July or August 2020. The date on which the Category 2 Goods left the UK The evidence The written evidence The written evidence in the hearing bundle revealed the following: (1) a Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (or "CMR") recording the arrival in Rome on 21 April 2020 of goods with an aggregate weight of 2,520 kilograms which had been despatched on 18 April 2020; (2) a CMR recording the arrival in Madrid on or around 20 April 2020 of goods with an aggregate weight of 2520 kilograms which had been despatched on 17 April 2020; and (3) in his letter to Officer Greda of 26 January 2024, Mr Kneller said that the Category 2 Goods had left the UK on 17 April 2020. The witness evidence Mr Kneller testified that the Category 2 Goods had left the UK on 17 April 2020 whilst Mr Osborn testified that, whilst he was not sure about the precise date, the Category 2 Goods would have left the UK within a few days of their arrival in the UK and certainly before NIRU contacted him to let him know that NIRU Certificate 360–2020 had been issued in error. Officer Gregory said that the CMRs referred to in paragraph 51 above were certainly evidence that goods of some sort had moved from XPand in the UK to Italy or Spain but that, before he could be sure that the goods in question were the Category 2 Goods, he would want to marry up the description, weight and value of the goods, as set out in the relevant CMR, with the description, weight and value of the relevant Category 2 Goods, as described in the applicable importation documentation. The CMRs in this case lacked the required information and therefore he had no way of being sure that they related to the Category 2 Goods. Relevant finding of fact We acknowledge that there is insufficient information in the CMRs to treat them as conclusive evidence of the dates on which the Category 2 Goods destined for Italy and Spain left the UK. In addition, we were provided with no documentary evidence in relation to the Category 2 Goods that, according to the relevant application to NIRU of 14 April 2020 and the related NIRU Certificate (NIRU Certificate 360–2020), were destined for France or Germany. Having said that, we see no reason to doubt the evidence of Mr Kneller and Mr Osborn to the effect that the Category 2 Goods left the UK within a few days of their arrival here. After all, the evidence we heard from each of them was that the sole reason for moving the relevant Goods through the UK rather than directly to the relevant EU Member States was that Heathrow was functioning more efficiently than other European airports at that time. The Goods were destined for the relevant EU Member States and it stands to reason that they would have been moved on as soon as possible after their arrival. For that reason, we find as a fact that the Category 2 Goods left the UK on or around 17 April 2020 and certainly before 20 April 2020. Having said that, this finding of fact is of limited relevance to this decision. It would be relevant only in enabling the Appellant: (1) to show that it acted to its detriment in reliance on the misunderstanding shared by both parties between 14 April 2020 and 20 April 2020 to the effect that goods imported into the UK for onward transport to approved bodies or organisations in EU Member States qualified for disaster relief; and (2) therefore to succeed in claiming that the Respondents are estopped from assessing customs duty and import VAT on the Category 2 Goods. Since we conclude in paragraphs 154 and 155 below that there is a general principle which precludes estoppel against the Crown, the fact that the parties' common misunderstanding persisted at the point when the Category 2 Goods left the UK is of no assistance to the Appellant in this case and we include it only because it was a matter in dispute between the parties at the hearing. discussion Now that we have set out the facts relevant to this decision, we turn to the legal issues which need to be decided in order to determine the two appeals. It is common ground that: (1) the FTT have the jurisdiction to hear both appeals pursuant to Section 16 of the Finance Act 1994 (which relates expressly to customs duty but is extended to apply to import VAT by Section 16 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (the "VATA")); and (2) the burden of proof in relation to both appeals is on the Appellant. It follows from paragraph 60(2) above that the Appellant needs to show that, on the balance of probabilities: (1) in relation to the appeal against the C18, it was entitled to disaster relief in relation to the Goods described in the C18; and (2) in relation to the appeal against the Remission Decision, it was entitled to the remission of customs duty and import VAT in relation to the Goods in respect of which the remission claim was made. the C18 The relevant law Introduction It was common ground that, even though the UK had left the EU shortly before the importations which are relevant to this decision occurred, the legislation which is relevant to both appeals, as set out in more detail in this section of the decision and in the equivalent section of the part of the decision in which we address the appeal against the Remission Decision, is legislation which applied to the EU Member States. The reason for this is that the relevant importations were made within the "implementation period" for the UK's withdrawal from the EU – see Section 1A(3) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and Part 4 of the "withdrawal agreement", as defined in Section 39 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. As such, the UK continued to be subject to the relevant legislation, which remained effective in the UK by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 (the "ECA") – in this case, more specifically, Sections 2 and 5 of the ECA. Relief from customs duty and import VAT Customs duty At the time relevant to this decision: (1) Articles 74 to 80 of Council Regulation (EC) 1186/2009 (the "Regulation") made provision for the European Commission, acting at the request of one or more EU Member States, to grant relief from customs duty in respect of certain specified importations made following a disaster; (2) Articles 74 to 80 of the Regulation provided as follows: "Article 74: 1. Subject to Articles 75 to 80, goods imported by State organisations or other charitable or philanthropic organisations approved by the competent authorities shall be admitted free of import duties where they are intended: (a) for distribution free of charge to victims of disasters affecting the territory of one or more Member States; or (b) to be made available free of charge to the victims of such disasters, while remaining the property of the organisations in question. … Article 76: Granting of the relief shall be subject to a decision by the Commission, acting at the request of the Member State or States concerned in accordance with an emergency procedure entailing the consultation of other Member States. This decision shall, where necessary, lay down the scope and the conditions of the relief. … Article 78: 1. The organisations benefiting from the relief may not lend, hire out or transfer, whether for consideration or free of charge, the goods referred to in Article 74(1) under conditions other than those laid down in that Article without prior notification thereof to the competent authorities. 2. Should goods be lent, hired out or transferred to an organisation itself entitled to benefit from relief pursuant to Article 74, the relief shall continue to be granted, provided the latter uses the goods for purposes which confer the right to such relief. In other cases, loan, hiring out or transfer shall be subject to prior payment of import duties at the rate applying on the date of the loan, hiring out or transfer, on the basis of the type of goods and the customs value ascertained or accepted on that date by the competent authorities. … Article 80: 1. Organisations referred to in Article 74 which cease to fulfil the conditions giving entitlement to relief, or which are proposing to use the goods admitted duty-free for purposes other than those provided for by that Article, shall so inform the competent authorities. 2. In the case of goods remaining in the possession of organisations which cease to fulfil the conditions giving entitlement to relief, when these are transferred to an organisation itself entitled to benefit from relief pursuant to Article 74 or, if appropriate, to an organisation entitled to benefit from relief pursuant to Article 61(1)(a), relief shall continue to be granted, provided the organisation uses the goods in question for purposes which confer the right to such relief. In other cases, the goods shall be liable to the relevant import duties at the rate applying on the date on which those conditions cease to be fulfilled, on the basis of the type of goods and the customs value ascertained or accepted on that date by the competent authorities. 3. Goods used by the organisation benefiting from the relief for purposes other than those provided for in Article 74 shall be liable to the relevant import duties at the rate applying on the date on which they are put to another use, on the basis of the type of goods and the customs value ascertained or accepted on that date by the competent authorities …"; and (3) Article 123 of the Regulation went on to provide that: "Where relief from import duties is granted conditional upon goods being put to a particular use by the recipient, only the competent authorities of the Member State in whose territory the said goods are to be put to such a use may grant this relief." Import VAT At the time relevant to this decision, Articles 51 to 57 of Council Directive 2009/132/EC (the "Directive") contained provisions which conferred an equivalent relief from import VAT to those conferred by Articles 74 to 80 of the Regulation in the context of customs duty. Disaster relief On 3 April 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, under the powers set out in Articles 74 to 80 of the Regulation and Articles 51 to 57 of the Directive, the European Commission, by way of issuing the Commission Decision, introduced a relief from customs duty and import VAT on PPE and medical equipment imported into the UK and all 27 EU Member States. Article 1 of the Commission Decision specified as follows: "Goods shall be admitted free of import duties within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 and exempted of value added tax (VAT) on the imports within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2009/132/EC, where the following conditions are fulfilled: a. The goods are intended for the following uses: i. distribution free of charge by the bodies and organisations referred to in point (c) to the persons affected by or at risk from COVID-19 or involved in combating the COVID-19 outbreak; ii. being made available free of charge to the persons affected by or at risk from COVID-19 or involved in combating the COVID-19 outbreak while remaining the property of the bodies and organisations referred to in point (c); b. The goods satisfy the requirements laid down in Articles 75, 78, 79 and 80 of Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 and Articles 52, 55, 56 and 57 of Directive 2009/132/EC; c. The goods are imported for release for free circulation by or on behalf of State organisations including State bodies, public bodies and other bodies governed by public law or by or on behalf of organisations approved by the competent authorities in the Member States. […]" Article 3 of the Commission Decision provided that Article 1 would apply to importations made from 30 January 2020 to 31 July 2020 but the period of relief was extended to 31 October 2020 by Commission Decision 2020/1101 and then to 31 December 2020 by Commission Decision 2020/1573. At the time relevant to this decision: (1) the Appellant's liability for customs duty on the importation of goods was a function of Title III of the UCC; (2) Article 79(1) of the UCC, within Title III of the UCC, provided that a customs debt arose where, inter alia, there was a failure to comply with "(c) a condition governing …the granting, by virtue of the end-use of the goods, of duty exemption or a reduced rate of import duty"; and (3) Article 79 of the UCC relevantly went on as follows: "2. The time at which the customs debt is incurred shall be either of the following: … (b) the moment when a customs declaration is accepted for the placing of goods under a customs procedure where it is established subsequently that a condition governing the placing of the goods under that procedure or the granting of a duty exemption or a reduced rate of import duty by virtue of the end-use of the goods was not in fact fulfilled. … 4. In cases referred to under point (c) of paragraph 1, the debtor shall be the person who is required to comply with the conditions governing the placing of the goods under a customs procedure or the customs declaration of the goods placed under that customs procedure or the granting of a duty exemption or reduced rate of import duty by virtue of the end-use of the goods ….". The parties' positions in relation to the C18 As regards the C18, it was common ground at the hearing that: (1) if any of the Goods failed to satisfy one or more of the conditions in Article 1 of the Commission Decision, then it was the Appellant as the IoR which was liable for the ensuing customs duty and import VAT in respect of those Goods, pursuant to Article 79(4) of the UCC; (2) the NHS was an Approved Organisation for the purposes of Article 1c of the Commission Decision; and (3) all of the Goods were intended for distribution by the NHS free of charge to the persons affected by or at risk from COVID-19 or involved in combating COVID-19 and/or made available free of charge to such persons while remaining the property of the NHS, so that the importation of the Goods satisfied Article 1a of the Commission Decision. The dispute between the parties centred on whether the conditions in both Article 1b and Article 1c of the Commission Decision were satisfied in relation to each consignment of Goods. Ms Dhanoa submitted that both conditions were satisfied – at least so far as the Category 1 Goods and the Category 3 Goods were concerned – whereas Ms Brown, on behalf of the Respondents, submitted that none of the Goods satisfied both conditions. Having said that, Ms Brown accepted that those consignments of Goods which entered the UK between 1 May 2020 and 31 October 2020 qualified for the temporary zero rate of VAT accorded to supplies of PPE by Article 4 of The Value Added Tax (Zero Rate for Personal Protective Equipment) (Coronavirus) Order 2020, which added an additional Group 20 to Schedule 8 of the VATA, as that temporary zero rate was extended by Article 3 of The Value Added Tax (Zero Rate for Personal Protective Equipment) (Extension) (Coronavirus) Order 2020. The aggregate amounts set out in the C18 reflected the position outlined by Ms Brown. The Appellant's submissions Introduction – Application for new ground of appeal In relation to the satisfaction of the conditions in Article 1 of the Commission Decision, Ms Dhanoa for the most part: (1) confined her submissions at the hearing to the Category 1 Goods and the Category 3 Goods; and (2) accepted that the Category 2 Goods did not qualify for disaster relief because they had not been delivered to the NHS or another Approved Organisation but had instead been exported to a body or organisation in an EU Member State. This position was in line with the Appellant's admission, in paragraph [55] of its amended grounds of appeal, to the effect that: "The clear position with respect to relief is: i) goods must be imported for supply (directly or indirectly) to an approved body or organisation; ii) such a body or organisation must be based in the UK …" Ms Dhanoa adopted that position in her opening submissions at the hearing and then throughout the hearing until the afternoon of the penultimate day of the hearing. At that point, she sought to raise a new ground of appeal in relation to the Category 2 Goods, to the effect that: (1) disaster relief applied not only to goods which were delivered to the NHS or other Approved Organisations but also to goods which were delivered to bodies or organisations that had been approved by the competent authorities in other EU Member States; and (2) since the Category 2 Goods had been exported to hospitals in Italy, Spain, France and Germany and those hospitals had been approved by the competent authorities in the EU Member State in which they were located, the relief should apply. The Respondents objected to the application (and we upheld their objection) on the grounds which follow. First, the application had been made at a very late stage in the proceedings. The Appellant could have made the application at any stage in the lengthy period leading up to the hearing or, at the very least, in making its opening submissions and before the cross-examination of the witnesses. Instead, it had chosen to do so just before the end of the hearing and after all the witness evidence had been heard. For example, it was too late for the Respondents to cross-examine the witnesses in relation to which body or organisation had used the Category 2 Goods or whether that body or organisation had been approved in its EU Member State. In our view, therefore, allowing the application would give rise to considerable prejudice to the Respondents. Secondly, the proposed new ground of appeal was directly contrary to the position which the Appellant had consistently maintained throughout the dispute so far – to the effect that the importation of the Category 2 Goods did not qualify for disaster relief and that NIRU had made an error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 despite the fact that the Goods in question were to be exported to EU Member States. Indeed, as we have already outlined in paragraphs 31 to 41 above, both Shoosmiths' letter of 18 April 2023 and Mr Kneller's letters of 16 November 2023 and 26 January 2024 in relation to the remission claim sought to rely on NIRU's error in granting that certificate as a basis for making the remission claim. Thirdly, the Appellant had provided no reason for the lateness of the application. It appeared to us to arise from the fact that, immediately prior to making the application, the Appellant's advisers had become aware that it was not making much headway in persuading us that the remission claim included the Category 2 Goods and they were therefore belatedly seeking to challenge the right of the Respondents to include the Category 2 Goods within the C18. Finally, we did not think that the additional ground was likely to be successful. Article 123 of the Regulation made it clear that, where relief was conditional on goods' being put to a particular use by a recipient, only the competent authorities of the EU Member State in whose territory the goods were to be put to that use could grant the relief and Article 123 of the Regulation had effect also in relation to import VAT (pursuant to Section 16(1)(b) of the VATA). Although the language used in Article 123 of the Regulation was dealing with the use of goods, as opposed to the residence of the body or organisation importing the goods – so that it was relevant to the condition in Article 1a of the Commission Decision and not Article 1c of the Commission Decision – its effect was that only the competent authorities in the EU Member State in which goods were to be used could grant relief from customs duty and import VAT when goods entered the EU. In consequence, where goods such as the Category 2 Goods were to be put to use in an EU Member State and not the UK, only the competent authorities of the relevant EU Member State could grant relief from customs duty and import VAT. It was not a matter for the Respondents. It followed that the Appellant was right to have accepted before applying to raise its additional ground of appeal that disaster relief was not available for Goods which were destined for hospitals in the EU Member States and that the additional ground of appeal had no prospect of success. For the above reasons, although we recognised that we had a discretion to allow the new ground of appeal, we considered that admitting it would not be consistent with our obligation to deal with cases "fairly and justly", as required by Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the "Tribunal Rules"). We therefore held that the additional ground of appeal should not be admitted and we have not addressed that argument further in this decision. Submission in relation to both the Category 1 Goods and the Category 3 Goods So far as concerned the Category 1 Goods and the Category 3 Goods, Ms Dhanoa submitted that the ability to satisfy Article 1c of the Commission Decision did not depend on the Appellant's showing that, on the balance of probabilities, the Goods in question had actually ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. Instead, it was merely necessary for the Appellant to show that, on the balance of probabilities, at the time of the importation, it had intended and expected the Goods to end up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. She explained her position as follows: (1) the main goal of the UCC was to speed up trade and reduce administrative burdens on trade and therefore both the UCC and the conditions in the Commission Decision, the Regulation and the Directive needed to be construed with that in mind; (2) Article 1c of the Commission Decision provided that the relevant importation could be made both "by" or "on behalf of" an Approved Organisation such as the NHS. It therefore envisaged both a direct importation and an indirect importation through an intermediary; (3) it followed that, on a purposive reading of the UCC and the Commission Decision, all that mattered was that, when each relevant importation in this case occurred, the Goods in question were intended and expected to go to an Approved Organisation. It was not necessary for the Goods actually to end up at an Approved Organisation because that was merely an "evidential condition". It was not a "substantive condition" relevant to the availability of the relief; (4) thus, whilst she accepted that the Respondents had the right to check in any particular case that the Goods had reached the destination recorded in the related NIRU Certificate – as was made clear by the notes to the application form for the NIRU Certificates and the NIRU Certificates themselves – any failure to satisfy the Respondents that the Goods had actually reached that destination as a matter of evidence could not affect the availability of the relief. Article 79(1)(c) of the UCC applied only to breaches of substantive conditions and it did not bite simply because there had been an evidential failure; and (5) any other approach to the legislation would involve converting what was intended to be a trader-supportive scheme in the context of an international emergency into a backward-looking paper chase. In short, in this case, the importation of the Category 1 Goods and the Category 3 Goods qualified for disaster relief because, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant's intention and expectation, at the time of importation, was that the Goods in question were going to end up at the NHS. Submission in relation to the Category 1 Goods only Ms Dhanoa said that, in the alternative, in relation to the Category 1 Goods, if, contrary to her first submission, the relief was dependent on the Appellant's showing, on the balance of probabilities, that the Goods in question had actually ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation, the Appellant had discharged that burden on the facts in this case. As regards the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to Deliver Net, the evidence demonstrated that it was more likely than not that they had been delivered to the NHS after passing through the supply chain and therefore we should conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, they had done so. As regards the Category 1 Goods which had been delivered to the NHS Sheffield, the documentary evidence demonstrated that those Goods had actually been delivered to the NHS Sheffield and that was the end of the matter. Those goods had clearly ended up at the NHS and therefore, even if her primary submission based on intention and expectation was incorrect, those Goods clearly qualified for disaster relief. Conclusion Introduction We have not summarised the submissions of Ms Brown in relation to the C18 because we agree with them in their entirety and they are reflected in this section of this decision. Analysis Ms Dhanoa's primary submission – intention and expectation sufficient We must confess to being somewhat perplexed by Ms Dhanoa's primary submission to the effect that mere intention or expectation on the part of the Appellant that the Goods would end up at the NHS was sufficient for disaster relief to be available. We agree that intention alone is sufficient when it comes to satisfying the condition for relief set out in Article 1a of the Commission Decision – which relates to the intended use of the Goods in question – but the language in Article 1c of the Commission Decision appears to us to impose a higher standard in relation to the Goods in question by requiring them to have been imported "by or on behalf of" an Approved Organisation. The Goods in this case were clearly not imported "by" the NHS or another Approved Organisation because they were destined in the first instance for AyMa. They can therefore satisfy this condition only if they were imported "on behalf of" the NHS or another Approved Organisation. In our view, that phrase required the Goods in question actually to end up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. If and to the extent that the Goods did not actually end up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation, they were not "imported for release for free circulation by or on behalf of [the NHS or another Approved Organisation]" within the meaning of Article 1c of the Commission Decision and therefore the relief was not available. It follows that we consider that the mere fact that it was the Appellant's intention or expectation that the Goods would end up at the NHS is not enough to satisfy the condition in Article 1c of the Commission Decision. In short, we do not understand the distinction which Ms Dhanoa sought to draw in making this submission between the "substantive conditions" of the legislation – breach of which would prevent the relief from applying pursuant to Article 79(1)(c) of the UCC – and the "evidential condition" of ascertaining where the Goods ended up after the operation of the supply chain. The latter was plainly inherent in the former in that it went to the question of whether the former were satisfied. Consequently, we do not agree with Ms Dhanoa's primary submission, as summarised in paragraphs 85 to 87 above. We should add that the fact that disaster relief was dependent on the eventual receipt of the Goods by an Approved Organisation was precisely the reason why: (1) the notes in both the application form for each NIRU Certificate and each NIRU Certificate itself made it clear that the certificate was conditional on the Respondents' right to check the Goods either at the point of import or subsequently to see if the conditions for relief had been satisfied; (2) the notes to NIRU Certificates 332–2020, 333–2020 and 273–2020 made it clear that "the end-user" had to be an Approved Organisation; and (3) the notes to each NIRU Certificate stipulated that the consent of NIRU was required for any subsequent loan, hire, sale or transfer of the Goods. Of course, those notes did not have the force of law themselves and it is perfectly possible that their inclusion might have been based on a misunderstanding of the law by the Respondents but, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 92 to 95 above, we do not think this was the case. On that subject, we should add that, in the course of these proceedings, the Appellant consistently described the issue of the C18 as the Respondents' "resiling" from the approvals given in the NIRU Certificates. We consider that, leaving aside NIRU Certificate 360–2020, which was issued in error and which the Respondents corrected within days of its being issued – albeit too late for the Category 2 Goods which had by then left the UK – the actions of the Respondents in denying disaster relief for Goods which they were not satisfied had ended up at an Approved Organisation or otherwise complied with the conditions for relief were entirely consistent with the notes to both the NIRU application forms and the NIRU Certificates. If the Appellant was under the mistaken impression that the issue of the NIRU Certificates meant that it had no ongoing obligations in relation to compliance with the conditions for disaster relief, then it had only itself to blame. The Category 2 Goods and the Category 3 Goods Given our conclusion that mere intention or expectation was not enough and that disaster relief was dependent on the relevant Goods' ending up at an Approved Organisation, it necessarily follows that disaster relief cannot have been available in relation to the Category 2 Goods or the Category 3 Goods because it is common ground that none of those Goods ended up at an Approved Organisation. The Category 1 Goods That then leaves the Category 1 Goods, all but one consignment of which were delivered to Deliver Net and the remaining consignment of which was delivered to the NHS Sheffield but which we have found in paragraphs 12 to 14 above to have been sent back to the US. The Category 1 Goods delivered to Deliver Net As regards the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to Deliver Net, we have already set out in paragraphs 15 to 30 above our finding of fact to the effect that the Appellant has not established on the balance of probabilities that those Goods ended up at the NHS or another Approved Organisation. Consequently: (1) the Appellant has not satisfied us that those Goods were imported "by or on behalf of" an Approved Organisation; (2) this means that they did not meet the condition in Article 1c of the Commission Decision; and (3) therefore, disaster relief is not available in relation to them. The Category 1 Goods delivered to the NHS Sheffield As for the Category 1 Goods which were delivered to the NHS Sheffield, the starting point is to note that the Commission Decision was enacted pursuant to the Regulation and the Directive – see Articles 74 and 76 of the Regulation and Articles 51 and 53 of the Directive – and that satisfaction of the condition in Article 1b of the Commission Decision required compliance with Articles 75, 78, 79 and 80 of the Regulation and Articles 52, 55, 56 and 57 of the Directive. It follows that: (1) relief under Article 1 of the Commission Decision was conditional on, inter alia, compliance with the provisions of Article 78 of the Regulation and Article 55 of the Directive; (2) therefore, even though the NHS Sheffield was an Approved Organisation, and the relevant Category 1 Goods were delivered to it – so that those Goods were imported "on behalf of" an Approved Organisation and satisfied the condition in Article 1c of the Commission Decision – the subsequent transfer of those Goods by the NHS Sheffield to the US triggered a liability on the part of the NHS Sheffield, in advance of the transfer, both: (a) to notify the Respondents of the transfer; and (b) to pay the customs duty and import VAT attributable to those Goods see Article 78 of the Regulation and Article 55 of the Directive; and (3) the fact that neither of those things occurred means that, so far as those Goods were concerned, there was a breach of the relevant Articles, with the result that the condition set out in Article 1b of the Commission Decision has not been satisfied in relation to those Goods and disaster relief is not available in relation to them. Conclusion For the reasons set out above, we consider that disaster relief was not available in relation to any of the Goods, the C18 was validly issued and the appeal against the C18 fails. the remission decision The legislation relevant to the Remission Decision At the time relevant to this decision, Section 3 of the UCC dealt with the repayment and remission of customs duty and provided as follows: "Article 116 General provisions 1. Subject to the conditions laid down in this Section, amounts of import or export duty shall be repaid or remitted on any of the following grounds: (a) …; (b) defective goods or goods not complying with the terms of the contract; (c) error by the competent authorities; (d) equity. … Article 118 Defective goods or goods not complying with the terms of the contract 1. An amount of import duty shall be repaid or remitted if the notification of the customs debt relates to goods which have been rejected by the importer because, at the time of release, they were defective or did not comply with the terms of the contract on the basis of which they were imported. Defective goods shall be deemed to include goods damaged before their release. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, repayment or remission shall be granted provided the goods have not been used, except for such initial use as may have been necessary to establish that they were defective or did not comply with the terms of the contract and provided they are taken out of the customs territory of the Union. 3. Repayment or remission shall not be granted where: (a) the goods, before being released for free circulation, were placed under a special procedure for testing, unless it is established that the fact that the goods were defective or did not comply with the terms of the contract could not normally have been detected in the course of such tests; (b) the defective nature of the goods was taken into consideration in drawing up the terms of the contract, in particular the price, before the goods were placed under a customs procedure involving the incurrence of a customs debt; or (c) the goods are sold by the applicant after it has been ascertained that they are defective or do not comply with the terms of the contract. 4. Instead of being taken out of the customs territory of the Union, and upon application by the person concerned, the customs authorities shall authorise that the goods be placed under the inward processing procedure, including for destruction, or the external transit, the customs warehousing or the free zone procedure. Article 119 Error by the competent authorities 1. In cases other than those referred to in … Articles … 118 and 120, an amount of import or export duty shall be repaid or remitted where, as a result of an error on the part of the competent authorities, the amount corresponding to the customs debt initially notified was lower than the amount payable, provided the following conditions are met: (a) the debtor could not reasonably have detected that error; and (b) the debtor was acting in good faith …. Article 120 Equity 1. In cases other than those referred to in … Articles … 118 and 119 an amount of import or export duty shall be repaid or remitted in the interest of equity where a customs debt is incurred under special circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the debtor. 2. The special circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 shall be deemed to exist where it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the debtor is in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business, and that, in the absence of such circumstances, he or she would not have suffered disadvantage by the collection of the amount of import or export duty." The parties' positions in relation to the Remission Decision At the hearing: (1) Ms Brown submitted that: (a) the remission claim related solely to the Category 3 Goods; and (b) none of Articles 117 to 120 of the UCC was applicable to any of those Goods; and (2) Ms Dhanoa submitted that: (a) properly construed, the remission claim extended to the Category 2 Goods as well as the Category 3 Goods (as to which, see paragraphs 31 to 41 above); and (b) Articles 118 and 119 of the UCC applied to the Category 2 Goods and Article 120 of the UCC applied to both the Category 2 Goods and the Category 3 Goods, with the result that the Appellant's appeal against the Remission Decision should be upheld and it should be entitled to the remission of the customs duty and import VAT in relation to both categories of Goods. Introduction There are three preliminary points which we should make before starting our discussion in relation to the Remission Decision and they are as follows: (1) first, the finding of fact we have made in paragraphs 31 to 41 above means that our consideration of the Remission Decision is necessarily confined to the Category 3 Goods and does not include either of the other two categories of Goods; (2) secondly, and related to that, we do not address Article 119 of the UCC in the discussion that follows because that Article applies only where the competent authorities have made an error in assessing the amount of customs duty or import VAT and it therefore has potential relevance in the present context only in relation to the Category 2 Goods. It is common ground that no such error was made in relation to either of the other two categories of Goods. We would add that: (a) in any event, neither the C285 submitted by Mr Kneller on behalf of the Appellant nor the Shoosmiths' letter of the previous day which was appended to the C285 made any reference to Article 119 of the UCC. It was therefore not in any sense one of the grounds included in the remittance claim and it was raised only in correspondence subsequent to the remittance claim by Mr Kneller on behalf of the Appellant and then in the grounds of appeal; and (b) having said that, the failure to mention Article 119 of the UCC in the remittance claim is somewhat academic because Article 121(2) of the UCC required the Respondents to consider the application of Article 119 of the UCC once they declined to grant remission on the grounds stated in the remission claim and the Respondents confirmed at the hearing that they had done that; and (3) finally, we should note that Article 121(1) of the UCC imposes a time limit of one year from the date of notification of the customs debt for the making of a claim under Article 118 of the UCC although that time limit can be extended where the applicant provides evidence that it was prevented from submitting the remission claim as a result of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure. In this case, the Appellant was notified of the customs debt on 30 April 2021. It follows that, if Mr Kneller's letters to the NDRC of 23 September 2021 and 6 October 2021 can properly be construed as the making of the remission claim, the Appellant falls within the time limit whereas, if the remission claim cannot be seen as having been made until the submission of the C285 on 19 April 2023, it was not. We have some reservations about concluding that Mr Kneller's letters in 2021 can properly be construed as the making of the remission claim – they are, in our opinion, no more than an application for permission to destroy the Goods in the XPand warehouse, coupled with a request for advice from the NDRC on how to claim the remittance – but we do not have to address that question (or the question of whether, if they did not amount to the making of the remission claim, the condition for extending the time limit has been satisfied) because the Respondents confirmed at the hearing that they were not taking any point in relation to the time limit. The Appellant's submissions Ms Dhanoa submitted that the Appellant should be entitled to remission of the customs duty and import VAT on the Category 3 Goods: (1) under Article 118 of the UCC – either: (a) because the relevant Goods had been rejected by AyMa on the basis that, at the time of release, they were defective or did not comply with the terms of the contract between it and Logistics and therefore the language in Article 118(1) of the UCC was satisfied regardless of whether the Goods were actually defective or actually non-compliant with the terms of the contract at the time of release; or (b) because, as a result of the dispute between AyMa and Logistics, the relevant Goods reached their expiry date and became defective or non-compliant with the terms of the contract before they could be delivered; and (2) under Article 120 of the UCC – because one or more of: (a) the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) the commercial dispute between AyMa and Logistics; or (c) the conduct of the Respondents, amounted to special circumstances as described in Article 120(2) of the UCC in which there had been no deception or obvious negligence on the part of the Appellant. In support of her submission that the Appellant should be entitled to remission under Article 120 of the UCC, Ms Dhanoa referred us to the decision of the FTT in Ocean Choice International v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2023] UKFTT 289 (TC) (" Ocean Choice "). In Ocean Choice , the FTT concluded at paragraphs [178] to [203] that shortcomings in the conduct of the Respondents which had contributed to the customs duty that became payable amounted to special circumstances justifying a successful claim under Article 120 of the UCC. Conclusion Introduction We have not summarised the submissions made by Ms Brown in relation to the Remission Decision because, with the exception of certain points mentioned in paragraphs 121 to 147 below on which we do not agree with Ms Brown – which points do not form part of the ratio of this decision – we agree with them in their entirety and they are reflected in this section of this decision. Analysis Introduction It was common ground at the hearing that the only provisions of the UCC which were potentially relevant to the Category 3 Goods were: (1) Article 118 of the UCC – defective goods; and (2) Article 120 of the UCC – equity. The starting point in considering this issue must be the observation that, since remission is the exception rather than the rule, the remission provisions need to be construed strictly – see Canadian Solar EMEA GmbH v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2024] UKFTT 85 (TC) at paragraph [149], referring to the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU in Heuschen Schrouff Oriental Foods Trading BV v Commission C–38/07 at paragraph [60]. Article 118 of the UCC Turning first to Article 118 of the UCC and applying the above principle, it can be seen that there are only two possible ways of construing that Article in the present context. The first, which is the one favoured by Ms Dhanoa, is to say that the relevant Article applies where the goods in question were rejected because, at the time of release, they were alleged to be defective or to be non-compliant with the terms of the contract (even if it subsequently transpired that that was not the case) and the second is to say that the relevant Article applies where the goods in question were rejected because, at the time of release, they were actually defective or actually non-compliant with the terms of the contract. We can see nothing in the language of the Article to encourage the former approach, particularly given the requirement referred to in paragraph 113 above to apply a strict construction to the remission provisions. In our view, the more natural reading of the language in Article 118 of the UCC is the second one, particularly given: (1) the reference in the final sentence of Article 118(1) of the UCC to the inclusion within the phrase "Defective goods" of goods damaged before release; (2) the reference in Articles 118(2), 118(3)(a) and 118(3)(c) of the UCC to "establishing", "detecting" or "ascertaining" that the goods were defective or non–compliant with the terms of the contract; and (3) the reference in Article 118(3)(b) of the UCC to the "defective nature" of the goods. It follows that we consider that Article 118 of the UCC is not in point where the relevant goods are rejected because, at the time of release, they are alleged to be defective or non-compliant with the terms of the contract but it is subsequently established that neither of those was actually the case. Instead, the goods need, at the time of release, to have actually been defective or non-compliant with the terms of the contract. It follows from this conclusion that, in the light of the facts which we have found in paragraphs 42 to 46 above, the Appellant is not entitled to succeed in its remission claim under Article 118 of the UCC. At the time that the Category 3 Goods were released, they were not actually defective and were not actually non-compliant with the terms of the contract, as the evidence of Messrs. Ostapyak and Thomson and the subsequent High Court decision in favour of Logistics made clear. The fact that, during the period in which the Category 3 Goods were delayed in the XPand warehouse as a result of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa, some of the Category 3 Goods ceased to be fit for purpose because they passed their expiry date is not relevant in this context for two reasons, as follows: (1) first, Article 118 of the UCC applies where the defect in the relevant goods or the failure of the relevant goods to comply with the contract is present at the time of release and, in this case, the time of release occurred well before the relevant Category 3 Goods passed their expiry date; and (2) secondly, it is apparent from the language used in Article 118 of the UCC that the defect in the relevant goods or the failure of the relevant goods to comply with the contract needs to have been the cause of the rejection of the relevant goods by the importer. It is not the other way around. In this case, the Category 3 Goods passed their expiry date and became defective or non-compliant with the terms of the contract because AyMa rejected them. AyMa did not reject them because they had passed their expiry date and became defective or non–compliant with the terms of the contract. There is one further point which we would make in passing, although it was not raised in argument by either party. Article 118 of the UCC applies only where goods are rejected by the "importer". In this case, it seems to us that there are only three possible "importers" – Logistics, which actually imported the Category 3 Goods, the Appellant, as the IoR which made the customs declaration on behalf of Logistics and which was liable to pay the customs duty and import VAT – see Article 79(4) of the UCC – or the Approved Organisation by whom, or on whose behalf, the Category 3 Goods were imported. Whichever one of those it was, it was not AyMa. As such, any rejection by AyMa of the Category 3 Goods on the grounds of defect or non–compliance with the terms of the contract would not fall within the Article in any event and, on that basis alone, Article 118 of the UCC would not apply to the Category 3 Goods. Article 120 of the UCC Introduction Turning then to the application of Article 120 of the UCC, that Article applies "where a customs debt is incurred under special circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the debtor". It may be seen from this that the Article applies only if two conditions are satisfied as follows: (1) first, the customs debt needs to have been incurred "under special circumstances". In our view, the phrase "under special circumstances" means that there needs to have been a causative link between the special circumstances in question and the customs debt. That conclusion is supported by the language used in Article 120(2) of the UCC, which defines "special circumstances" by reference to an exceptional situation of the debtor which is the causa sine qua non of the customs debt in question (see paragraphs 123 to 129 below); and (2) secondly, those special circumstances must not be those "in which" deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to debtor. In our view, the phrase "in which" means that the deception or obvious negligence in question must be in some way inherent in the special circumstances by reference to which the first limb of the test has been satisfied. Contrary to the submission made by Ms Brown on this point, we do not think that it is sufficient for there to have been deception or obvious negligence which was in some way associated with the customs debt but which was wholly discrete from the special circumstances that have given rise to the customs debt. If there was no need for the deception or obvious negligence to be inherent in the special circumstances, then Article 120(1) of the UCC would have said "…under special circumstances and in relation to which …" as opposed to "… under special circumstances in which …" . Special circumstances Starting with the first of those requirements, Article 120(2) of the UCC provides that the special circumstances referred to in Article 120(1) of the UCC "shall be deemed to exist where it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the debtor is in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business, and that, in the absence of such circumstances, he or she would not have suffered disadvantage by the collection of the amount of import or export duty." In this case, we think that there are two possible bases for submitting that the customs duty and import VAT in respect of the Category 3 Goods arose in "special circumstances" as defined above. They are that: (1) the Goods were imported during the COVID–19 pandemic; and (2) the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa meant that AyMa refused to allow the delivery of the Goods (either to AyMa itself or to a person below AyMa in the supply chain such as Deliver Net), with the result that the Goods were trapped in the XPand warehouse and ultimately had to be destroyed or exported to Kazakhstan. We consider that the first of those circumstances affected all operators who were in the same business as the Appellant whilst the second, although involving a specific commercial dispute between Logistic and AyMa which did not itself affect other operators who were in the same business as the Appellant, amounted to no more than a particular example of the commercial risks run by all importers of goods. In other words, all importers face the prospect that their goods might be incapable of delivery as a result of a commercial dispute between the parties. We therefore consider that neither of the circumstances set out above involved the Appellant's being in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators in the same business. Consequently, the Appellant has not satisfied the first limb of the test in Article 120(1) of the UCC. As we have observed in paragraph 109(2)(c) above, at the hearing, Ms Dhanoa said that there was a third reason for concluding that the first limb of the test in Article 120(1) of the UCC was satisfied, which was the conduct of the Respondents. In making that submission, Ms Dhanoa relied on the FTT decision in Ocean Choice at paragraphs [178] to [203]. We agree with Ms Dhanoa that, in this case, the conduct of the Respondents in dealing with the Appellant's claim for remission has not been entirely beyond reproach. There were substantial delays in responding to Mr Kneller's request as to how to make the remission claim, as we have outlined above. However, a crucial distinction between the facts in this case and those in Ocean Choice is that, in this case, any shortcomings in the Respondents' conduct occurred at the stage when the customs duty and import VAT in respect of the relevant Goods had already arisen. The delays on the part of the Respondents in replying to Mr Kneller's letters played no causative role in those liabilities. For that reason, we cannot see how the conduct of the Respondents in dealing with the remission claim can be said to amount to special circumstances for the purposes of Article 120(1) of the UCC. For completeness, and in case there is any doubt about this, we should say that we recognise that, in addition to its less-than-perfect handling of the remission claim, the Respondents made an error in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020, which they have frankly acknowledged. However, that error, which they corrected within a matter of days, applied only to the Category 2 Goods, which we have held not to be included in the remission claim. It follows that that error is not relevant in considering the application of Article 120 of the UCC to the customs duty and import VAT which became payable in respect of the Category 3 Goods. Absence of deception or obvious negligence The above conclusion means that, strictly speaking, it is unnecessary for us to address the second limb of the test which the Appellant needs to satisfy before its remittance claim can succeed under Article 120 of the UCC. However, since there was some discussion at the hearing in relation to how that limb of the test should properly be applied in this case, we would say as follows. On the basis of our construction of the second limb of the test as outlined in paragraph 122(2) above, assuming that, contrary to the conclusion we have reached in paragraphs 123 to 129 above, either the COVID-19 pandemic or the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa amounted to special circumstances, we would need to consider whether any deception or obvious negligence on the part of the Appellant was inherent in those special circumstances. In that regard, Ms Brown accepted that there had not at any stage in the process been any deception on the part of the Appellant. However, she went on to suggest that there had been obvious negligence on the part of the Appellant in: (1) holding the Category 3 Goods in the XPand warehouse without telling the Respondents that the Goods had ceased to fulfil the conditions for disaster relief as required by Article 80 of the Regulation and Article 57 of the Directive; and/or (2) continuing, while the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa was ongoing, to import the Category 3 Goods to the UK. Article 80 of the Regulation and Article 57 of the Directive As regards the first of those submissions, we can see how, if the Appellant had an obligation to notify the Respondents under Article 80 of the Regulation and Article 57 of the Directive that the conditions for disaster relief had ceased to be satisfied in relation to the Category 3 Goods and failed to fulfil that obligation, that failure might amount to "obvious negligence". However, in this case, we are not persuaded that: (1) the Appellant did have any such obligation; or (2) if it did, that failure was inherent in the special circumstances which gave rise to the customs duty and import VAT in respect of the Category 3 Goods – which we believe to be a pre-requisite before the exclusion for obvious negligence can apply. In order to explain why we say that, we need to start by examining the architecture of the legislation and, in particular, the interaction between, on the one hand, Article 1 of the Commission Decision and, on the other hand, Articles 78 to 80 of the Regulation and Articles 55 to 57 of the Directive. Our interpretation of that interaction is as follows. Article 1 of the Commission Decision provides that disaster relief is available when goods are imported to the UK and each of the three conditions set out in Article 1 of the Commission Decision is satisfied. The provisions of the Regulation and the Directive specified above then deal with potential changes in circumstances affecting goods which have been admitted free of customs duty and import VAT after importation by an Approved Organisation has occurred. They apply where: (1) the goods are then lent, hired out or transferred by the Approved Organisation in question under conditions other than those laid down in Article 74 of the Regulation/Article of the Directive – see Article 78 of the Regulation and Article 55 of the Directive; (2) the goods cease to be used by the Approved Organisation in question in accordance with the original intention of being made available free of charge to the victims of the relevant disaster and are then lent, hired out or transferred by the Approved Organisation in question – see Article 79 of the Regulation and Article 56 of the Directive; and (3) the Approved Organisation in question ceases to fulfil the conditions which entitle the goods to be admitted free of customs duty and import VAT or proposes to use the relevant goods for purposes other than those provided for by Article 74 of the Regulation/Article of the Directive – see Article 80 of the Regulation and Article 57 of the Directive. Each Article provides that, where it applies: (1) the Approved Organisation in question has an obligation to inform the Respondents that the circumstances described in the Article either are about to arise or have arisen; and (2) unless the goods in question are lent, hired out or transferred to another Approved Organisation which uses the goods for purposes qualifying for disaster relief, the customs duty or import VAT must be paid either before or after the circumstances described in the Article have arisen. It may be seen that each of the Articles described above: (1) applies only after the goods which have qualified for disaster relief have reached the Approved Organisation in question; (2) deals with changes in circumstances arising after that time; and (3) imposes obligations on the Approved Organisation in question. In particular, Article 80 of the Regulation and Article 57 of the Directive apply where an Approved Organisation, which has initially satisfied the conditions for entitlement to relief, subsequently ceases to do so. There is no other way to interpret the use of the word "cease" – as opposed to "do not" – in those Articles. If we now turn to the Category 3 Goods in this case, it is apparent that those Goods were never delivered to an Approved Organisation and therefore never satisfied the conditions for relief in the first place. As we have outlined in our discussion in relation to the C18, the reason why customs duty and import VAT have arisen in relation to the Category 3 Goods is not that there has been a breach of any of Articles 78 to 80 of the Regulation or Articles 55 to 57 of the Directive in relation to those Goods but rather that the failure of the Goods to reach an Approved Organisation means that the Goods were not imported "by or on behalf of" an Approved Organisation and therefore did not satisfy the condition set out in Article 1c of the Commission Decision. It follows from this conclusion that no notification obligation ever arose under Article 80 of the Regulation or Article 57 of the Directive or, for that matter, any of the other Articles listed in paragraph 138 above in relation to the Category 3 Goods. We would add that, were any such obligation to have arisen, it would have been an obligation owed by the Approved Organisation in question – in this case, the NHS – and not the Appellant. (The Appellant is not an organisation referred to in Article 74 of the Regulation or Article 51 of the Directive as it is not itself an Approved Organisation). In addition, even if, contrary to the above conclusion, the Appellant had been subject to a notification obligation in respect of the Category 3 Goods, its failure to notify would not have been inherent in the special circumstances which caused the customs duty or import VAT to arise. Instead, those special circumstances – which we are assuming for present purposes to be the COVID-19 pandemic or the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa – would have caused the customs duty or import VAT to arise without regard to any notification obligation. We therefore consider that, if the customs duty or import VAT did arise under special circumstances, then any failure on the part of the Appellant to inform the Respondents that the Category 3 Goods remained in the XPand warehouse did not amount to obvious negligence inherent in those special circumstances. Continuing imports The starting point in Ms Brown's second submission was that the Appellant was already aware of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa as at 24 April 2020 when the first consignment of Category 3 Goods entered the UK and remained so aware throughout the period in which the Category 3 Goods were imported. Thus, she said, the Appellant should have arranged for the Goods to be placed in a temporary customs warehouse when they arrived in the UK, pending resolution of the commercial dispute, because it would then have been able to destroy or export the Goods without removing them from the temporary customs warehouse. This would have enabled the Appellant to avoid the customs duty or import VAT in the event that it proved impossible to deliver the Goods to AyMa or someone else on the basis that the end user would be an Approved Organisation. We have already found as a fact that, contrary to Ms Brown's submission, the Appellant was not aware of the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa as at 24 April 2020 but became aware of that commercial dispute only at some later date – which we have found to be at some point in July or August 2020 – see paragraphs 47 to 50 above. We can therefore see no basis for concluding that there was obvious negligence on the part of the Appellant in relation to the importation of the consignments of Category 3 Goods which arrived at the XPand warehouse prior to that date. However, as regards the consignments of Category 3 Goods which arrived on or after that date, we agree with Ms Brown's submission. It seems to us that, once the Appellant had become aware of the commercial dispute, it could have chosen to place the relevant consignments of Category 3 Goods in a temporary customs warehouse pending resolution of the commercial dispute and thereby avoided the customs duty or import VAT in the event that it proved impossible to deliver them to AyMa or someone else on the basis that the end user would be an Approved Organisation. Conclusion in relation to the absence of deception or obvious negligence In the light of the above, we have concluded that, had the commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa been sufficient to qualify as special circumstances, the Appellant would have been entitled to remission under Article 120 of the UCC only in respect of those Category 3 Goods which arrived at the XPand warehouse prior to the date when the Appellant became aware of the dispute. Conclusion In the light of our conclusions in relation to the potential application of Articles 118 and 120 of the UCC set out in paragraphs 112 to 149 above, the Appellant's appeal against the Remission Decision fails. conclusion The consequence of the conclusions we have drawn above is that the Appellant's appeals against both the C18 and the Remission Decision are dismissed. In saying that, we must express some sympathy for the Appellant in this case. The Appellant: (1) was party to the importations to which this decision relates at a time when, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the urgent need for PPE within the UK, there was a considerable degree of chaos and uncertainty in the supply chains; (2) took considerable steps – including the hiring of Oculus and Harod – retrospectively to establish that the Category 1 Goods which it had imported had ended up at the NHS (although it could, and should, have taken those steps at the time when the Goods were imported); (3) was wrongly led to believe by NIRU's issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 that it could import the Category 2 Goods even though those Goods were destined to be exported to EU Member States and became aware of the error only after the Goods had already left the UK; and (4) was caught up in a commercial dispute between Logistics and AyMa that was not of its own making and therefore found that the Category 3 Goods were stuck in the XPand warehouse and could not be delivered. In particular, the Appellant might justifiably feel aggrieved that the Category 2 Goods, which were imported and then exported on the basis of the wrongly-issued NIRU Certificate 360–2020, have given rise to customs duty and import VAT. Had we concluded that the Category 2 Goods were included in the remission claim, we would have been inclined to uphold the claim in respect of those Goods on the basis of Article 120 of the UCC. However, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 31 to 41 above, we do not see how, on any fair construction of the remission claim, the Category 2 Goods can be said to have been so included. Given the above conclusion, we considered whether the actions of the Respondents in issuing NIRU Certificate 360–2020 might be such as to enable the Appellant successfully to argue that the Respondents should be estopped from claiming customs duty and import VAT in respect of the Category 2 Goods and we therefore asked the parties for their submissions on that question at the hearing. After hearing those submissions, we have concluded that the Appellant could not succeed in any such claim because the authorities reveal the existence of a long–established settled principle that the Crown cannot be estopped from applying the law and collecting tax which is properly due in accordance with the law – see Julian Frost v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2010] UKFTT 344 (TC) at paragraph [15], citing Williams v Grundy's Trustees 18 TC 271, and MWL International Limited and Maywal Limited v The Commissioners for His Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2024] UKFTT 402 (TC) at paragraphs [126] to [134]. We have therefore not considered whether, in this case, had it been possible to apply estoppel to the Respondents, the estoppel conditions would have been fulfilled and we express no view on whether those conditions would have been fulfilled on the facts in this case. Right to apply for permission to appeal This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Rules. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release Date: 01 st DECEMBER 2025 BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII