Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough

Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough

Section 13-214.3(c) unambiguously applies to any action against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services regardless of whether the plaintiff is the attorney's client; Evanston’s claims arose from the attorneys’ professional acts in signing the Fund and Fight Agreement...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
2014 IL 114271
Parties
Appellee: Evanston Insurance Company; Appellant: George E. Riseborough; Appellant: Jacobson & Riseborough; Appellant: Reid Jacobson
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
United States
Judgment Date
31 March 2014
Case Number
114271
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Review of Appellate Court Decision on Dismissal Under 735 ILCS 5/2 619
Outcome
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed; plaintiff's second amended complaint dismissed with prejudice as time-barred by 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c).
Legal Topics
Statute of Repose Applicability, Attorney Liability, Performance of Professional Services, Relation Back, Accrual and Tolling
Source Language
english
Civil Procedure Statute of Repose Professional Liability Insurance Coverage Agency Law Statute of Repose Applicability Attorney Liability Performance of Professional Services +2 more

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Parties

Evanston Insurance Company

Appellee

George E. Riseborough

Appellant

Jacobson & Riseborough

Appellant

Reid Jacobson

Appellant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Review of Appellate Court Decision on Dismissal Under 735 ILCS 5/2 619

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) (six-year repose) applies to claims by nonclients against attorneys
  2. 2 Whether Evanston’s second amended complaint was time-barred by the six-year repose
  3. 3 Whether the original complaint pending or relation-back principles preserved Evanston’s claim

Ratio Decidendi

Section 13-214.3(c) unambiguously applies to any action against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services regardless of whether the plaintiff is the attorney's client; Evanston’s claims arose from the attorneys’ professional acts in signing the Fund and Fight Agreement and were filed after the six-year repose, so they are time-barred.

Court Disposition

Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed; plaintiff's second amended complaint dismissed with prejudice as time-barred by 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c).

Orders

  • Appellate court judgment reversed
  • Circuit court judgment affirmed