Kusensela v Mvula (Appeal 32 of 2011) [2014] ZMSC 3 (19 January 2014)

J1 (60) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA SCZ JUDGMENT NO. 3 OF HOLDEN AT NDOLA (Civil Jurisdiction) APPEAL NO 32/2011 BETWEEN CHILUFYA KUSENSELA APPELLANT AND ASTRIDAH MVULA (MARRIED WOMAN) RESPONDENT Coram: Mumba, Ag. DCJ, Chibomba and Wanki, JJS. On 5th June, 2012 and on 20th January, 2014. For the Appellant: For the Respondent: Mr. M. Chitabo of Chitabo Chiinga and Associates (Standing in for Messrs. Patrick Kasonde and Co.). Mr. N. Simwanza of Messrs Kitwe Chambers. J U D G M E N T Chibomba, JS, Delivered the Judgment of the Court. Cases referred to: 1. 2. 3. 4. Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Ltd, SCZ Judgment No. 25 of 2006. Lyons Brooke Bond (Zambia) Ltd vs Zambia Tanzania Road Service Ltd (1972) ZR 317. Bank of Zambia vs Caroline Anderson and Another (1993/94) ZR 47. Administrator of the late Amos Sinya and ZSIC Ltd vs William A. Manda (1990/92) ZR 3. 5. Mary Musambo Kunda vs Attorney General (1993/94) ZR 1. 6. Smart Banda vs Wales Siame (1988/89) ZR 81. J2 7. Duncan Sichula and Another vs Catherine Mulenga Chewe (2000) ZR 56. Nkhata and 4 Others vs The Attorney General (1966) ZR 124. Ruston vs National Coal Board (1952) 1. Q. B 495. 8. 9. 10. Continental Restaurant and Casino Limited vs Arida Mercy Chulu (2000) ZR 128. 11. Rose vs Willey (1951) CA 221. 12. The Mediana (1900) A. C. 113. Statute referred to: (61) 1. The Judgments Act, Chapter 81 of the Laws of Zambia. This is an Appeal against the decision of the Deputy Registrar at assessment whereunder, the learned Deputy Registrar awarded damages in the sum of K62,503,000.00 (K62,503.00) as special damages and damages for personal injuries suffered by the Respondent as a result of a road traffic accident caused by the Appellant’s careless driving. It is not in dispute that the Respondent was severely injured as a result of the road traffic accident and that she has suffered permanent disability of 30 per cent. As stated above, the learned Deputy Registrar awarded a total sum of K62,503,000.00 (K62,503.00) as damages for personal injuries and special damages. The learned Deputy Registrar also awarded interest at 12% per annum from the date of the accident until final payment. J3 Dissatisfied with the above awards, the Appellant has appealed to this Court advancing three Grounds of Appeal as follows: - (62) “1. 2. 3. The Court below misapprehended the Law in regard to Assessment of damages when he wrongly awarded damages amounting to K62,503,000.00 without assessing the said amount and specifically proving it using established legal principles. The Court below misapprehended the evidence adduced before him and as a result went on to make awards without considering the evidence before him and without specifically proving each of the items with the evidence before Court. The Court wrongly awarded the interest from the date of the accident to the date of payment contrary to the provisions of the Judgments Act.” The learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Chitabo, relied on the Appellant’s Heads of Argument. Grounds 1 and 2 were argued together. In support of the two Grounds of Appeal, it was contended that the learned Deputy Registrar fell into error when he overlooked the established legal principles of assessing damages. And that he was obliged to follow the decisions of this Court on classifying damages in categories and then J4 analyze each and every category. Citing our decision in Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Limited1, it was argued that in assessing a claim for damages for personal injuries, the awards should be classified under the following heads:- “(i) Pain and suffering; Loss of amenities; (ii) (iii) Permanent disability; and (iv) Loss of future prospective earnings.” (63) Therefore, that by failing to analyze each and every aspect of the award and by failing to relate the 30 per cent disability to the actual awards made, the learned Deputy Registrar erred. It was further argued that the Deputy Registrar stated that:- “As regards the present case I notice the Plaintiff generally pleaded for permanent injuries and consequential loss, there is no special claim for pain and suffering and loss of amenities.” It was submitted that this finding is contradictory in that despite making such a finding of fact, the Deputy Registrar went on to award damages for pain and suffering and for loss of amenities. That it is however, trite law that all parties are J5 guided by their pleadings and that even Judgments should and must be confined to the claims that the parties pleaded. Hence, the Deputy Registrar ought not to have relied on new claims sneaked in through an assessment. Further, that it was not correct for the Deputy Registrar to proceed to award damages that were not specifically pleaded and without giving reasons for awarding un-pleaded claims. The case of Lyons Brooke Bond (Zambia) Ltd vs Zambia Tanzania Road Services Ltd 2 was cited in which it (64) was, inter alia, held that: - “(vii) (viii) The function of pleadings is to assist the Court by defining the bounds of the action, which cannot be extended without the leave of the Court and without amending of the pleadings. A party must, in any pleading subsequent to a statement of claim, plead specifically and distinctly any matter which raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading. Every defence must plead specifically and separately matters which are to be relied upon, otherwise no evidence of such matters can be given at the trial.” It was further submitted that the award for pain and suffering and loss of amenities should therefore, be quashed as J6 the same were not specifically pleaded. Further, that the learned Deputy Registrar also stated in his Ruling that: - “The approach adopted by Mr. Kasonde as regards damages in respect of pain and suffering and his reference to the case of Reuben Nkomanga as regards the tariff of K50,000 per week is regular. But the period taken into account of six months is underestimated because it is only limited to the time the Plaintiff was in Ndola Central Hospital. Although the period of admission to the Zambia-Italian Hospital was not ascertained, I am inclined to believe that also must generally be taken into account.” It was pointed out that the fallacy by the learned Deputy Registrar is that he then proceeded to award damages for a period which he clearly said was not ascertained. That as such, (65) he fell into error at law and fact as there was absolutely no basis for awarding the sum of K3,000,000.00 (K3,000) especially after accepting the tariff of K50,000.00 (K50) per week. Therefore, that the learned Deputy Registrar totally misdirected himself when he delved into issues of whether or not the proposed sum of K1,440,000.00 (K1,440) was adequate when the issue at hand was simply to be determined based on the period of admission multiplied by the weekly rate which the Deputy Registrar himself put at K50,000.00 (K50) per week. It was pointed out that this approach was in fact upheld in Bank J7 of Zambia vs Caroline Anderson and Another3 in which this Court observed that: - “The pain and suffering was awardable from the date of the accident and the period the victim was hospitalized, up to the time of her discharge and the award was on a weekly basis.” Therefore, it was argued the Deputy Registrar fell into error by failing to ascertain the period of pain and suffering and the weekly rate, as he instead, proceeded to make an award without any basis. That as such, the award of K3,000,000.00 (K3,000) for pain and suffering which was not pleaded should be quashed and replaced with the sum of K1,400,000.00 (K1,400), that is if this Court is of the view that the same was actually implied in the (66) Respondent’s testimony when she told the Court below that she was in hospital for six weeks only, otherwise, there should be no award at all. The case of Administrator of the Late Amos Sinya and Another vs William Manda4 and the case of Mary Musambo Kunda vs Attorney General 4 were cited as authority for the proposition that the correct approach is to J8 apportion weekly tariff and then multiply that by the period of admission only. On the sum of K55,000,000.00 (K55,000) awarded for permanent disability, it was argued that the learned Deputy Registrar did not give any reasons for this award. On the case of Smart Banda vs Wales Siame6 relied upon by the Deputy Registrar in justifying this award, it was argued that the earlier case was cited out of context as the Court in that case did not address the issue of permanent disability as it dealt with the aspect of pain and suffering. That in that case, this Court put pain and suffering at K200 per week and stated as follows: - “The Respondent suffered injuries to his right leg as a result of a road traffic accident. He was admitted to the hospital for a remedial operation on the leg. He returned to the hospital later for final treatment. He endured pain and suffering for twenty weeks. There was no permanent injury. The Judge awarded K8,000.00 for pain and suffering. The Appellant appealed on the ground that the sum was inordinately high. It was held under (67) item (ii) that the appropriate award for pain and suffering at the time of trial should be K200 per week.” In terms of the English authorities cited, it was submitted inter alia, that the learned Deputy Registrar did not need to go that far as the Appellant had cited Zambian authorities that J9 could have provided guidance. The case of Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms Limited1 was cited in which we stated that:- “In the bank of Zambia vs Caroline Anderson case, we took into account among other things the cosmetic disadvantages caused by scars including the pronouncedly ugly limp due to the shortening of the leg and resulting detriment to her married life and awarded the Respondent a global sum of K4,500,000 as general damages for pain and suffering and for loss of amenities.” And that: - “We note that the Appellant was not in any gainful employment and neither was he running a commercial undertaking at the time of the accident to enable us assess his present loss, as well as his future loss of earning. We also note that the evidence does not show that he engaged in some sport or activity of a social nature that he has to forego as a result of the injury. Besides there was no evidence to suggest that he has stopped performing his duties as a married man as a result of the accident.” It was pointed out that the permanent disability suffered by the Respondent as a result of the accident was to her knee which was fused and does not move freely and also a shortened leg as observed by the Deputy Registrar. That it can be seen from her (68) J10 evidence that the Respondent came to Court geared to exaggerate her testimony and to literally mislead the Court. As an example, certain portions of the Respondent’s evidence in the Court below were cited. This is as follows:- “I cannot even go into the tab, unless there’s somebody to help me. I cannot walk without using the walking frame. My injured leg has scars. Now am unable to do anything, I cannot cook, I cannot have sexual intercourse with my husband, I cannot stand for more than five minutes, I cannot move my leg.” However, that the medical report at page 95 of the Record of Appeal states that: - “She has since slowly recovered from the surgery and the fracture has healed. I have reviewed her and found her mobile without support. Her knee is fused and she is unable to flex that knee. She is grossly overweight (117.9 kg) and this puts her at risk of further injury ….. I would attach a 30% disability to the injury.” It was argued that the medical report at page 149 of the Record of Appeal, was merely solicited by the Respondent as it does not state that the Doctor who signed the report examined her. That it is therefore, clear from the above that the Respondent had embarked on a mission of fabricating evidence. J11 Further, that the learned Deputy Registrar also observed and stated that: - (69) “Indeed I find it true that some receipts are false, i.e., they tell lies. Possibly the Plaintiff and the purported driver or drivers of the taxi connived and dishonestly authored some receipts. In fact, during cross examination the Plaintiff failed to explain or justify the anomalies……” It was argued that in view of the above, the Deputy Registrar ought to have been more cautious in awarding damages for permanent disability. On the award of K1,500,000.00 (K1,500) as transport expenses incurred, it was contended that there was no justification in awarding a nominal amount for the reason that the receipts were falsified. Therefore, that this award should be quashed as there is no basis for awarding that sum and that it be replaced with an award of K830,000.00 (K830), the sum proved by the receipts on record which were relied upon. On the global sum of K55,000,000.00 (K55,000) awarded for permanent disability, it was submitted that no reasons were given for such an award. Further, that no justification whatsoever was given for departure by the Deputy Registrar J12 from the decisions in Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms Limited1 and Bank of Zambia vs Caroline Anderson and Another3 in which case where pain and suffering and permanent disability were in fact awarded as one component. That in Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms Limited1, this Court stated that: - (70) “When assessing damages for personal injuries the proper approach is to categorize the heads of the awards. By so doing it enables the Court to justify an award by assigning reasons including authorities in support of such an award.” It was further contended that 30 per cent disability due to a fixed knee did not justify an award of K55,000,000.00 (K55,000). Hence, this sum should be quashed and a liberal figure of K10,000,000.00 (K10,000) for permanent disability should be awarded. We were also referred to the Appellant’s submissions in the Court below which we have also read and will consider in this Judgment. In summing up the arguments in Grounds 1 and 2, we were urged to quash the total sum of K62,503,000.00 (K62,503.00) awarded as that sum should come to us with a serious sense of shock. Further, that the awards that we may J13 substitute should be less what the Appellant has so far spent on the Respondent, namely, the sum of K2,685,000 (K2,685). In support of Ground 3, it was contended that although it is appreciated that Courts generally have discretion in awarding (71) interest to successful parties, it was also important that such awards should be within the confines of legal precedents and the Judgments Act. It was submitted that the Court can either follow the Judgments Act or the established legal precedents such as the principle in Smart Banda vs Wales Siame6 in which this Court stated as follows:- “This appeal is allowed and the award of K8,000.00 damages to the Respondent is set aside. In its place we substitute an award in the sum of K4,000 with interest thereon at the rate of 10.5% from the date of the accident until the date of this Judgment. Costs follow the event and will be awarded to the Appellant.” We were, accordingly, urged to apply the Judgments Act and the above cited case and order that interest should run from the date of Writ and not from the date of the accident up to the date of Judgment. In opposing this Appeal, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Simwanza, also relied on the arguments in the J14 Respondent’s Heads of Argument as Grounds 1 and 2 were also argued together. In response to the two Grounds of Appeal, it was submitted that the Deputy Registrar was on firm ground when he awarded the sums in question as he followed the (72) guidelines established by this Court in the case of Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Limited1. Further, that the law provides principles for calculating such awards as was guided by this Court in Duncan Sichula and Another vs Catherine Chewe7 in which this Court stated that:- “We affirm that previous decisions of the Court in the various cases often offer useful guidelines, though ultimately the facts and circumstances of each case have to determine in which broad category of similar cases the case under review should be placed. Recourse to previous decisions makes for consistence and helps parties who wish to settle cases amicably or out of Court to do so …… the task of the Court assessing the damage is far from being an exact art or an easy question of simply repeating awards or scaling them up or down.” It was submitted that the learned Deputy Registrar therefore, properly directed himself on the facts and established the injuries and the physical, mental, social and J15 economic effect on the Respondent. Further, that the Deputy Registrar made no extraneous conclusions but relied on the oral and pictorial evidence adduced. It was further contended that by considering pain and suffering, the learned Deputy Registrar was on firm ground when he noted that the pain and suffering was from the time of the accident, during the period of hospitalization, during the long (73) process of healing and during the time of further treatment. And that this period was from 4th November, 2006 to June, 2007 and from the 7th May, 2008 to 22nd May, 2008. Therefore, that the approach taken by the learned Deputy Registrar in making his findings of fact was in line with the guidance of this Court in Bank of Zambia vs Caroline Anderson and Another3. Hence, he properly heard evidence and found as a fact that the Respondent sustained serious injuries whose severity cannot be doubted. And that his findings of fact were not controverted nor were the awards outrageously high or unsupported by evidence. Citing the decision in Nkhata and 4 Others vs the Attorney General8, J16 it was argued that the findings of fact upon which the learned Deputy Registrar anchored the award of damages assessed were not misapprehended to warrant reversal. It was contended that the learned Deputy Registrar, in applying the principles of assessment, drew comparison from experience and from awards in comparable cases and books of authority. In support of this contention, the case of Ruston vs National Coal Board9 was cited in which Singleton L. J., stated (74) that: - “I still think that it is most useful thing to look at comparable cases to see what other minds have done and so to gather opinion as to the amount which a man in a certain state of society ought to be awarded.” It was contended that what is fair and reasonable compensation is that compensation should be assessed in the light of previous awards in respect of comparable damage. That the learned Deputy Registrar cannot therefore, be faltered for taking into consideration the devaluation of the Kwacha as directed by this Court in Smart Banda vs Wales Siame6, in which Gardner JS, held that: - J17 “Awards for damage must take into account the devaluation of the Kwacha. It is not a matter of multiplying previous awards by the amount to which the Kwacha has been devalued. Courts must take into account the general costs of living and the real value that will be received.” Thus, the learned Deputy Registrar, having considered the racing inflation, was on firm ground in awarding herein the damages as he did. And that the amounts assessed are reasonable as they are indicative of the injury suffered by the Respondent as properly supported by the medical evidence. The case of Continental Restaurant and Casino Limited vs Arida Mercy Chulu10 was cited in which we held that: - (75) “The basis of awarding damages is to vindicate the injury suffered by the Plaintiff and no damage will be awarded if no proper evidence of Medical nature is adduced.” It was contended that the award should therefore, not be interfered with as it is not wrong in any way and neither is it too high nor a wrong estimate of the damages to which the Respondent was entitled. It was argued that the award was also not out of proportion under the circumstances of the case for this Court to exclaim as did Birkett, L. J., in Rose vs Willey11 that: “Good gracious me - as high as that.” J18 The Respondent did not respond to Ground 3 of this Appeal. We have seriously considered this Appeal together with the arguments advanced in the respective Heads of Argument and the authorities cited therein. We have also considered the Ruling by the Deputy Registrar. This Appeal raises the question whether or not the learned Deputy Registrar was on firm ground in awarding the sum of K62,503,000.00 (K62,503) to the Respondent as damages for personal injuries and as special damages following the road traffic accident in which the (76) Respondent was severely injured. The major contention under Grounds 1 and 2 is that the Deputy Registrar did not apply the established legal principles and the guidance of this Court of categorizing and analyzing each category in assessing the amount to be awarded for personal injuries and that the sum of K1,500,000 (K1,500) awarded as transport costs was not supported by the receipts as some of the receipts filed were false. The question therefore, is whether the learned Deputy Registrar was on firm ground when he awarded the sums of K55,000,000 (K55,000); K3,000,000 (K3,000) and K2,500,000 J19 (K2,500) as damages for permanent disability, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, and the sum of K1,500,000 (K1,500) as refund of transport expenses, respectively. The thrust of the Appellant’s argument is that the learned Deputy Registrar should not have overlooked the established legal principles of categorizing damages under personal injuries and that he was also obliged to follow this Court’s guidance in Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Limited 1 . In that case, we categorized damages under personal injuries as: “damages for pain and suffering; loss of amenities; permanent disabilities and loss of future prospective earnings”. It was argued that the learned Deputy Registrar should also have analyzed each category and give reason(s) for awarding the sums (77) awarded. On the sum of K3,000,000.00 (K3,000) awarded for pain and suffering, it was argued that this should be quashed as the same was not pleaded and that instead, a sum of K1,400,000.00 (K1,400) should be awarded or nothing at all. On the sum of K55,000,000.00 (K55,000) awarded for permanent disability, it was contended that this should be set J20 aside as the Deputy Registrar did not give any reasons for awarding this sum. Further, that the case of Smart Banda vs Wales Siame6 relied upon by the learned Deputy Registrar did not address the issue of permanent disability as that case only dealt with pain and suffering. On special damages awarded, it was contended that the sum of K1,500,000 (K1,500) awarded as transport expenses incurred, should be set aside and replaced with the sum of K830,000.00 (K830.00) supported by the receipts produced by the Respondent. Further, that the awards should be less what the Appellant had spent on the Respondent, namely, the sum of (78) K2,685,000 (K2,685). On the other hand, the thrust of the Respondent’s argument in response to Grounds 1 and 2 of this Appeal is that the learned Deputy Registrar was on firm ground when he made the awards in question as he did not consider any extraneous matters, nor were the awards outrageous as the Respondent suffered serious injuries. Further, that both Grounds attack findings of fact made by the learned Deputy Registrar. In support of the argument that the two Grounds of J21 Appeal attack findings of fact, the case of Nkhata and 4 Others vs The Attorney General8 was cited. In that case, we held that an appellate Court will only reverse the findings of fact made by the trial Court if the trial Court misdirected itself; failed to direct itself or wrongly evaluated the evidence. We have considered the above arguments. It is our considered view that there is no merit in Grounds 1 and 2 of this Appeal as the learned Deputy Registrar properly directed himself on the facts which clearly established that as a result of the road traffic accident, the Respondent was severely injured not only (79) physically but also socially and economically. This evidence shows clearly that as a result of the accident, the Respondent has suffered 30 per cent permanent disability which has and will continue to have an effect on her physical, mental, social and economic well-being. We, also agree that during the period of hospitalization and further treatment, the Respondent suffered pain starting from the time of the accident up to May, 2008. We, do not also accept the argument by the Appellant that the learned Deputy Registrar did not categorize the damages J22 before making the awards complained of as the record shows that the learned Deputy Registrar in his Ruling did in fact, categorize these damages. He categorized these as follows: - “Personal Injuries 1. Permanent disability - K55,000,000.00 2. Pain and suffering 3. Loss of Amenities - - K3,000,000.00 K2,500,000.00 Special damages 4. Medical Expenses 5. Transport Expenses- 6. Damages of dress TOTAL - - - - K353,000.00 K1,500,000.00 K150,000.00 K62,503,000.00.” (80) Although it has been argued that the Respondent did not specifically plead for damages for pain and suffering, thus, the award of K3,000,000 (K3,000) should be quashed, the learned Deputy Registrar in his Ruling at page 20 of the Record of Appeal stated that:- “As regard the present case I notice the Plaintiff generally pleaded for permanent injuries and consequential loss, there is no special claim for pain and suffering and loss of amenity. However, that as it may be, the claim or assessment herein, as it were, include damages for pain and suffering, and loss of amenities. The evidence adduced plainly shows that not only did the Plaintiff suffer agonizing pain during the time she was admitted to Ndola Central J23 Hospital, the Plaintiff continued to suffer pain even after her discharge. Even at the time she was attended to at the Zambian-Italian Orthopedic Hospital for surgical operation, the Plaintiff continued to endure pain and suffering.” It is our firm view that the learned Deputy Registrar properly directed himself as pain and suffering was covered under consequential loss in the pleadings. Hence, the argument that the award for pain and suffering should be quashed as it was not pleaded lacks merit. Therefore, as much as we agree with the principle in Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Limited1 that for pain and suffering, a weekly rate should be applied, we do not find the award of the sum of K3,000,000 (K3,000) under this head to be extraneous as the amount cannot be said to be outrageously high (81) so as to justify our intervention. Further, we note that the Reuben Nkomanga vs Dar Farms International Limited1 case was decided in 2006 while the assessment in the current case took place in 2011. Hence, it is not a misdirection for the court to take into account the depreciation of the Kwacha. With regard to the award of a global sum of K55,000,000 (K55,000) by the Deputy Registrar for permanent disability, we J24 take cognizance that permanent disability is a non-pecuniary damage which cannot exactly be quantified by arithmetical means. Courts have to rely only on estimates based on judicial precedents. Hence, we adopt with emphasis the words of Halsbury, L. C., in The Mediana12 in which he stated that:- “How is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact sum of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. But nevertheless, the law recognizes that as a topic upon which damages may be given.” In the current case, we have noted that the learned Deputy Registrar in discussing permanent injuries stated that:- “At the time of the accident the Plaintiff was aged forty one years, enjoying the full pleasures of life, needless to say including her marriage and the inherent gift of marriage. I note with diffidence, the Plaintiff said sexual relationship with her husband was affected. Indeed given the pain and suffering, and the permanent injuries the Plaintiff has suffered, it is not remote to (82) assert that this has affected her marriage. The joy of life is impaired further in the sense that to a measurable extent she has to depend on the care of other people, this was even witnessed in court during proceedings, when it came to taking a seat she had to be assisted, including when standing up.” Therefore, the question to be answered when considering damages for permanent disability is, was the award extraneous J25 and/or inordinately too high so as to induce a sense of shock in us? Birkett, L. J., in Rose vs Willey11 had this to say:- “The question for this Court is whether this figure was too wrong in the colloquial phrase, so hopelessly wrong that it was the duty of the Court to interfere with it.” In Smart Banda vs Wales Siame6, we held that the award by the High Court of K8,000-00 as damages to the respondent for pain and suffering was inordinately high. We substituted it for an award of K4,000-00. There was no permanent disability proved in that case. In Duncan Sichula and Another vs Catherine Chewe7 in which the Respondent suffered severe paraplegic injuries as a result of a road traffic accident, we stated that:- “An appellate court should not interfere with an award unless it was clearly wrong in some way, such as because a wrong principle has been used or the facts were misapprehended or because it is so inordinately high or so low that it is plainly a wrong estimate of the damages to which a claimant was entitled.” (83) Applying the principles of law outlined above and in the circumstances of this case, we do not regard the award of K55,000,000 (K55,000) inordinately high or so hopelessly wrong as the Respondent suffered severe injuries resulting into 30 per J26 cent permanent disability which has and will continue to have an effect on her physical, mental, social and economic well- being for the rest of her life. We also note that at the time of the accident, the Respondent was only 41 years old enjoying full pleasures of life some of which she cannot now enjoy. For the reasons given above, we are not persuaded to interfere with the award of K55,000,000 (K55,000) by the learned Deputy Registrar as the award was/is consonant with the severity of the injuries suffered and the resultant permanent disability. With respect to the sum of K1,500,000 (K1,500) awarded as transport expenses, we agree that since this was a special damage, it had to be specifically proved. The record shows that the Respondent produced various receipts in support of this claim. The Deputy Registrar however, found some of the receipts produced not to have been genuine. He disallowed those receipts. Therefore, the Deputy Registrar cannot be faulted for awarding the sum of K1,500,000 (K1,500) as he properly directed himself when he stated that the Respondent had doubtlessly expended money on transport and that the sum (84) J27 awarded was nominal. Consequently, the proposed sum of K830,000 (K830) has no basis. Although it has also been spiritedly argued that the sum of K2,670,000 (K2,670) that the Appellant said he incurred on the Respondent should be deducted from the amount(s) due to the Respondent, the Deputy Registrar in his Ruling at page 23 of the Record of Appeal, stated that he had deducted the amount the Appellant had expended towards medical expenses by deducting the sum of K2,670,000 (K2,670) from the net damages. We therefore, find no merit in the above contention. With respect to Ground 3 of this appeal which attacks the award of interest, the thrust of the Appellant’s argument is that interest so awarded should not have been effective from the date of the accident but from date of Writ and that the same was contrary to the Judgments Act and various legal precedents. We have considered the above arguments. It is our considered view that there is merit in Ground 3 of this Appeal in that the interest rate of 12 per cent per annum awarded should have been effective from date of Writ up to Judgment date and thereafter, (85) J28 at Bank of Zambia recommended lending rate to date of full and final payment. Therefore, Ground 3 partially succeeds only to the extent reflected above. Ground 3 only having partially succeeded and only to the extent specified above on interest, we award the costs of this Appeal to the Respondent to be taxed in default of agreement. ……………………………… F. N. M. Mumba ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE ………………………………. H. Chibomba SUPREME COURT JUDGE …………………………………… M. E. Wanki SUPREME COURT JUDGE